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This dissertation is a history of medicine in development planning and popular politics in Malawi between
the First World War and 1980. Using archival sources and oral histories, this dissertation seeks to explain
when and why access to biomedical care became a central political concern and budgetary priority.
During both the colonial and early post-colonial eras, Malawi's governments increased spending on
biomedical care to demonstrate beneficence, particularly when they faced popular reactions to widely
hated policies. Government officials and international advisers persistently attributed Malawi's
inadequate medical provision to the nation's poverty, but changes in health spending
have�not�automatically followed shifts in GDP or government revenues. Instead, the construction of
new hospitals and dispensaries, the purchase of new supplies and medicines, and the addition of medical
staff have almost always come in the wake of social unrest (in particular, following world wars and
internal protests). Only at these moments was the government compelled to devote more resources to
health. Yet unrest did not automatically lead to increases in Medical Department spending. Increases in
health expenditure often came only after influential officials argued that there was a link between medical
spending and regime stability. The first attempts to bring “Western” medicine to Nyasaland’s African
population came after the great disruptions caused by the First World War. The most rapid increase in
public sector health spending came during the Federation era, when popular protests threatened the
government. This rise in spending occurred even though influential modernization theorists counseled
governments like Nyasaland’s to avoid spending on health care. In the months after independence in
1964, President HK Banda abandoned health fees during a moment of political crisis. In the years that
followed, he turned his attention away from medicine as his hold on power solidified. Each of these
episodes demonstrates that official claims that there was simply not enough money to improve health
services have almost always been abandoned during periods of political crisis. Still, these moments have
been infrequent; placidity, and not just poverty, helps account for Malawi's dismal medical infrastructure.
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DIVIDENDS OF DISQUIET: POPULAR POLITICS AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN
THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT MEDICAL SERVICES IN
NYASALAND/MALAWI, 1914-1983
Luke Messac
Robert Aronowitz
This dissertation is a history of medicine in development planning and popular politics in
Malawi between the First World War and 1980. Using archival sources and oral histories,
this dissertation seeks to explain when and why access to biomedical care became a
central political concern and budgetary priority. During both the colonial and early postcolonial eras, Malawi's governments increased spending on biomedical care to
demonstrate beneficence, particularly when they faced popular reactions to widely hated
policies. Government officials and international advisers persistently attributed Malawi's
inadequate medical provision to the nation's poverty, but changes in health spending
have not automatically followed shifts in GDP or government revenues. Instead, the
construction of new hospitals and dispensaries, the purchase of new supplies and
medicines, and the addition of medical staff have almost always come in the wake of
social unrest (in particular, following world wars and internal protests). Only at these
moments was the government compelled to devote more resources to health. Yet unrest
did not automatically lead to increases in Medical Department spending. Increases in
health expenditure often came only after influential officials argued that there was a link
between medical spending and regime stability. The first attempts to bring “Western”
medicine to Nyasaland’s African population came after the great disruptions caused by
the First World War. The most rapid increase in public sector health spending came
during the Federation era, when popular protests threatened the government. This rise in
spending occurred even though influential modernization theorists counseled
governments like Nyasaland’s to avoid spending on health care. In the months after
independence in 1964, President HK Banda abandoned health fees during a moment of
political crisis. In the years that followed, he turned his attention away from medicine as
his hold on power solidified. Each of these episodes demonstrates that official claims that
there was simply not enough money to improve health services have almost always been
abandoned during periods of political crisis. Still, these moments have been infrequent;
placidity, and not just poverty, helps account for Malawi's dismal medical infrastructure.
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Introduction
I. The thrall of scarcity and the narrowing of the historical imagination
This dissertation interrogates a notion with an air of common sense. It is an idea that
seems, to many scholars, so patently obvious as to merit only a fleeting mention. It is an
old idea, and it has had many critics, but it remains a common justification for
maintaining the status quo in global health. Here it is: public sector health care for poor
people in poor countries is fated to be poor in quality and quantity. Inadequate funding,
poorly trained medical staff, outdated drugs and equipment, and inefficient management
are, in this formulation, a necessary consequence of a low GDP. In his A History of
Global Health, Randall Packard captures the essence of this idea (which he emphatically
does not endorse) in the following question: “It’s Africa and India, what did you
expect?”1 A corollary is the contention that increased funding for health and other forms
of social protection must await a rise in national income. This idea has had remarkable
staying power, and has long foreclosed more careful inquiry into the actual forces that
have influenced levels of government health spending in colonial and postcolonial
settings.

The idea that economically impoverished regions must have poorly funded health
services has been repeated by politicians, and accepted by scholars, for decades. In her
1944 report titled Welfare in the British Colonies the social anthropologist Lucy Mair
(who had worked extensively in Nyasaland) claimed that government efforts to stem the

Randall Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions into the Lives of Other
Peoples (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).
1
1

spread of transmissible diseases had “been hampered by the lack of funds and personnel
sufficient to carry it out.”2 She did not interrogate any further the reasons for the “lack of
funds” for this work. A decade later, in her report on a year of travels through many of
Britain’s African colonies, Labour Party activist Joan Wicken noted that each colony had
a per-capita income much lower than the United Kingdom’s. “Given these figures,” she
concluded, “it is hardly surprising that Government officials constantly commented that
certain things were desirable but not possible.”3 In her analysis, Africa’s “basic poverty”
was sufficient explanation for governments’ “difficulty in providing the most elementary
public services.”4

More recent historical scholarship has, at times, continued to accept at face value colonial
officials’ claims that resources were too scarce for robust social services, including health
care. In a 1985 paper, the historian John Iliffe recounted the response by the Chief
Secretary of Nyasaland to a report submitted by the Colonial Secretary’s Advisor on
Social Welfare in 1950: “The conclusions were to spend more money,” reported the
Chief Secretary, “and we have no more to spend.”5 The reader assumes that Iliffe is
demonstrating colonial stinginess here, but in another section of the paper, Iliffe himself
seems to lend credence to official pleas of poverty. He recounts the Nyasaland Financial
Secretary’s denial of a native council’s 1949 proposal to set aside a portion of each
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African’s hut tax to assist orphans and disabled adults; this refusal, Iliffe asserts, was a
product of “governmental poverty joined with official ideology.” Thus Iliffe himself
gives at least some credence to the government’s claim that low revenues are sufficient to
explain the paltriness of public services and social protection programs.6

The examples of this equation between poverty and poor social services are legion. In his
history of Malawi’s medical services, John Lwanda contends that Malawi’s early
postcolonial government “did not have enough resources to run universal medical
services.”7 In an otherwise careful study of taxation in British colonial Africa, Leigh
Gardner does not elaborate on her claim that postwar plans for improved social services
in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya were stymied by “resource constraints.” She does not
say whether these resource constraints stemmed from the stinginess of officials or the
absolute poverty of colonial treasuries.8

Yet some of these same scholars admit, at other points in their writings, that such claims
of scarcity are too facile. “It is true that social services can only be secured by an
adequate economic base,” said Wicken. But, she continued, the people of Britain
“indirectly benefit” from the poverty of their colonial territories.9 Wicken did not explain
in this passage precisely how citizens in Britain benefited from African poverty, but the
6
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rest of her report pointed to the use of low-wage labor on plantations and in mines by
British capitalists. She suggested that since such a large share of the wealth drawn from
African labor had filled British bank accounts, the UK Treasury’s long-standing
insistence that colonies had to fund their social services with local revenue was
inequitable. The people of Britain, Wicken declared, were obliged to use “some of our
economic resources to break the vicious circles which bind the peoples of Africa in the
chains of poverty.”10

In her study of colonial taxation, Gardner also complicated her acceptance of official
claims of “resource constraints” when she detailed increases in spending on health and
education just before independence in both Kenya and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia, after
independence). The extension of the franchise to more Africans gave them “greater
bargaining power…and allowed them to lobby for fiscal transfers, thus fundamentally
altering the politics of taxation and government expenditure.”11 Thus, the most important
change allowing for increased social services spending was neither an increase in gross
domestic product nor the growth of public revenues, but a shifting balance of political
power between European settlers and African colonial subjects. These effects of new
political pressures during decolonization belied to the oft-repeated claims that there was
just not enough money to increase spending on health and education.

It is certainly true that colonial officials administered vast populations with finances that
were—to most contemporary British observers—absurdly paltry. Yet this “governmental
10
11
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poverty” must be put into context. First, little of the revenue that administrators collected
(or, often, forcibly extracted) in the form of hut taxes, poll taxes, income taxes, sales
taxes, and customs duties was spent on health, education and social welfare. Officials
hoping to spend more on social services in Nyasaland were continually frustrated by the
burden of the colony’s massive debts, accrued in loans of dubious merit through a
process described in Chapter 3. In 1937, 44 percent of Nyasaland’s public expenditure
went toward servicing the colony’s debts. An additional six percent of Nyasaland’s
public expenditure in that year was devoted to pension allowances for British colonial
officials. By comparison, eight percent of government spending went toward health
care.12

Second, there were obvious sources of additional revenue that could have funded social
services that colonial administrators in British Africa did not tap. One such source was
extractive industry. Northern Rhodesia’s copper industry provides a particularly stark
example of the extent of foregone revenues. In her 1941 Plan for Africa, Rita Hinden—
who will be a significant figure in Chapter 5—explained:
These few facts illumine the extraordinary distribution of the produce of the
Northern Rhodesian copper industry. Three private companies, registered in Great
Britain, own the richest copper-fields in the world. The value of their exports
reaches £10 million a year. Half of this sum is taken directly out of the country
and handed over to shareholders, directors, and others. About half a million is
paid to a chartered company which apparently does nothing at all to further the
production of copper; another half-million is paid over in taxes to the British
Treasury. About one million pounds is paid to a few thousand European
employees of the company in Northern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian government is
itself given half a million in taxes, and the native workers in the mines, ten times
12
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as numerous as the Europeans, receive about one-quarter of a million pounds a
year—less than the royalties of the Chartered Company!13
With so much of the territory’s mineral wealth destined for capitalists in Britain or
European laborers on the mines, there was little left for the Northern Rhodesian
administration to devote to social services for the general population. In fiscal year 19371938, the Northern Rhodesian administration collected £1 million in revenue, and
government expenditure on the medical department was approximately £70,000.14 Thus,
expatriated profits of the territory’s three major copper companies amounted to more than
70 times the Northern Rhodesian government health budget.15

Even while shareholders in London prospered, the UK Treasury maintained a nearly
impregnable stance against using its own funds for colonial projects. Even after the
passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act, the Treasury maintained its policy that
grants for capital expenditures (on new hospitals, for example) would not oblige the UK
Treasury to cover recurrent expenditures (such as the staffing and equipping of those
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hospitals).16 This policy would only begin to change at the end of the Second World War,
following developments that will be explained in Chapter 6.

So those officials and observers who argued that there was simply not enough money to
pay for social services for Africans had to: first, ignore the relatively low portions of
colonial budgets spent on such services; second, obfuscate about flows of wealth from the
colonies to the metropole, and; third, maintain a hard line against releasing funds from
the imperial treasury for colonial social services.17 The claims of scarcity were a
simulacrum, a distorted vision of reality carefully maintained to deflect criticism and
defend against any welfarist claims on public and private finances.

One more piece of evidence that this claim of scarcity was a convenient construction was
evident in patterns of public sector spending. In metropolitan Britain, the share of total
government spending devoted to health care and sanitation rose steadily throughout the
twentieth century (with the exception of 1914-1933 and 1939-1949, when vast increases
in expenditures on armaments depressed the share going toward health). Figure 0.1
demonstrates this relationship. This secular increase in the share of government spending
on health (both medical care and public health) supports the oft-repeated claims by
colonial officials and mid-century modernization theorists that health spending claims
16
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Figure 0.1: Health spending as a share of total (central and local) government spending
in the United Kingdom, 1900-2013. Source:
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/government_expenditure.html
larger shares of public budgets as nations grow richer. But the same graph looks quite
different when we use Malawi’s data. As shown in Figure 0.2, recurrent health spending
(again, including both medical care and public health) as a share of total expenditure on
the Malawi revenue account shows nothing resembling Britain’s steady increase. The
share fell during the Second World War, but it was already on the decline during the
1930s. It rose during the 1950s, and fell again during the 1960s. I will argue that changes
in public expenditure on health services in Nyasaland were driven as much by political
events and official perceptions of regime legitimacy as they were by aggregate
production or public revenues.
II. Medicine’s presence and absence in African history

8

This dissertation chronicles government medical care in Nyasaland and Malawi between
the First World War and the dawn of the AIDS epidemic. This is not a history of health
outcomes and mortality rates. Malawi has never had compulsory universal vital
registration, so it is extremely difficult to discern how patterns of healthcare and political
economy have affected morbidity and mortality rates. Some studies have attempted to
determine the impact of health care on health outcomes in Africa using survey data.
Because the most extensive survey data is quite recent, these studies tend not to have
great historical depth.18 The most careful historical investigation of health care on health
outcomes may be Shane Doyle’s painstaking study of three districts in Tanzania and
Uganda; among other sources, he mined decades of parish records of births and deaths.19
But in this dissertation, the focus is on government health spending and health care
provision.

Nor is this the history of one disease or individual. Instead it is a political and social
history of a government medical system. The main actors are officials (in
Nyasaland/Malawi, the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere in Africa),
healthcare providers (both African and European), and patients (mostly African, though
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European settlers and officials sometimes enter the narrative).20 While historians of
medicine in Africa have chronicled disease-specific campaigns,21 or mission hospitals,22
detailed histories of government medical administration and practice are still few.23

20

Though this dissertation explores the influence of a number of events happening outside
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Figure 0.2. Recurrent government health spending as share of total government
recurrent expenditure, Nyasaland/Malawi, 1920-1980. Sources: Annual Medical
Department Reports (1920-1952), Hazelwood & Henderson (1960) and DT Jack (1959)
(1953-63), and Reports of 1974, 1979 and 1983 World Bank Missions to Malawi (19641982).
Those that do exist tend to focus on government development plans—while tending to
downplay the fact that few were ever brought to fruition24—or to take a teleological
perspective in which progress toward a robust system of lifesaving care was stepwise and
steady.25 Even those histories that highlight the use of biomedical rationales for
segregationist and economically exploitative policies do not generally highlight the extent
to which medical care was or was not a part of the daily life of the average African
subject.26
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The result is a historiography that either tends to emphasize the presence of biomedicine
over its absence (for the more celebratory narratives), or biopower and mass
experimentation over neglect (in critical histories).27 In both sets of histories, the writings
and exploits of a small number of white men (e.g. Albert Cook, David Livingstone)
occupy much more of the narrative than African auxiliaries and lay caregivers.28 As
Steven Feierman has argued, for the vast majority of people in southern, central and
eastern Africa care in times of illness is given not by medical doctors nor by registered
nurses, but by kin and neighbors.29 This was even more the case during the first half of
the twentieth century, when Nyasaland’s health facilities—both mission and
government—were always sparse and poorly-funded, even by the contemporary
standards of British Africa.

This dissertation is a biography of government provision of “Western” medicine and
public health in Malawi. Though I recognize that this was but one part of a plural medical
Labor on the South African Gold Mines, 1903–36,” The Journal of African History 34, no. 02
(1993): 271–92.
27
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system in Malawi, and remains so today, I will focus on this one element throughout. Of
course other elements (including missionary medicine, millenarian Christianity and
popular healers) will enter the narrative, as they had significant effects on the history of
government medical care. But by recounting the history of government medical care over
the course of the twentieth century, it will become apparent that something is missing
from many micro studies and grand narratives of colonial and postcolonial medicine. The
missing element is the key role of social unrest in determining the level of official
attention paid to public sector health care. Malawi’s government health facilities often
grew during periods of colonial labor agitation and after major global wars, while they
languished in during periods of perceived quietus. The disquiet that impelled greater
spending on health did not necessarily have to occur within Malawi—particularly during
the interwar period, Nyasaland was the beneficiary of funding spurred by striking
workers in the United Kingdom, the West Indies and other British African colonies.
Colonial officials with a particular interest in social services in Nyasaland made creative
use of crises elsewhere to direct resources to the impoverished backwater of the British
Empire. The greatest increase (in terms of the share of government spending going
toward health) occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s, when Nyasaland’s Africans proved
unwilling participants in an incipient Federation system of government with Northern and
Southern Rhodesia. During these turbulent years, health spending was a response to the
unrest within Nyasaland. And shortly after Malawi secured independence in July 1964, a
brief and abortive experiment with outpatient user fees in Malawi proved to be a cause of
social unrest.

13

Arguing that unrest has positive social dividends may seem dangerously naïve,
particularly in a region long plagued by terrific violence and bloody racial strife.
Compared to other countries in southern, central and eastern Africa, Malawi’s relatively
placid history seems an obvious benefit. Though I will argue in the following chapters
that Malawi’s political history is often written in sepia tones that obscure bloody events,
it is true that Malawians were, for the most part, spared the great brutalities visited upon
other peoples in the region. Malawians were not pillaged to the same extent as the
Congolese under both Belgium’s King Leopold or Mobutu. Malawians were not herded
into concentration camps, as the Namibians were under German rule before the First
World War, or as Kenyans were by the British during the Mau Mau revolt. They did not
experience civil wars like those in Mozambique and Angola. They did not suffer the
same degree of systematic and brutal racial segregation as blacks in Southern Rhodesia
and South Africa.

By comparison, Malawi’s political history seems calm, almost serene. Long described as
simple peasants in a remote outpost of the British Empire, Africans in Nyasaland rarely
made the front pages of newspapers in Europe or the United States. The famed Scottish
missionary physician David Livingstone had railed against slave traders around Lake
Malawi in the 1860s—when the territory was a source for thousands of slaves in the
Indian Ocean slave trade—but by the twentieth century Nyasaland was, in British eyes, a
paragon of primitive placidity.30 And so it would remain, save for an abortive revolt by a
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fiery African minister in 1915 (Chapter 1) and a brief period in the years leading up to
independence when a vibrant movement against the Federation government took hold
(Chapter 8). Nyasaland rarely roused great concern in the Colonial Office, or in any other
centers of imperial or commercial power. After independence in 1964 outside
indifference continued, as Prime Minister Hastings Kamuzu Banda swiftly became Life
President Banda and remained firmly in control of the nation’s politics and economy until
the early 1990s (Chapters 9 and 10). The population and the economy grew, but in terms
of per-capita GDP Malawi remained one of the poorest countries on the planet. Bereft of
mineral resources and spared headline-grabbing violence, Malawi became the province of
aid workers and missionaries, not international journalists or high-level diplomats.

But even though Malawi has lacked easily recognizable drama or destruction in its
colonial and postcolonial political history, there was throughout a silent violence being
done to its poorest people. In her memoirs, English-born Margaret Fuller compared the
experience of her early childhood years in Southern Rhodesia during the civil war in the
1970s with her teenage years in a comparatively peaceful Malawi in the early 1980s:
We feel more dangerously, teeteringly close to disease and death…than we did
during the war in Rhodesia…In Malawi we frequently see children bent
backward, as easily and rigidly as twisted paper clips, with cerebral malaria, from
which, if they emerge alive, they will rarely recover completely.31
Malawi’s governments—colonial and postcolonial—consistently denied the vast majority
of its population access to healthcare services that were the standard of care in much of
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the rest of the world. Without enough adequately trained medical providers, women
perished from treatable complications of labor and delivery. Stringent rationing and
frequent stock-outs of antibiotics left thousands to die of treatable infections (see
Chapters 4 and 8). The absence of accessible health facilities doomed many to needless
suffering and premature death in their homes. And for those patients who did manage to
make it to hospitals and health centers, broken X-ray machines and laboratory equipment
left medical providers unable to render accurate diagnoses (see Chapters 8, 9 and 10).
While Malawians paid taxes and submitted to forced labor under both colonial and
postcolonial governments, little of the wealth extracted from their toil came back to them.
These, too, were acts of violence. The dearth of funds budgeted to the “staff, stuff, space
and systems” necessary to deliver preventive and curative healthcare was, for many, as
fatal as a shot from a gun or the slice of a machete.32

But political inattention to health care was not total. The pervasive neglect was
interrupted, at brief and irregular intervals, by additional funding. One question this
dissertation seeks to answer is: why did those interruptions occur? The answer, most
often, was unrest. Unrest came in many different forms, including non-violent
demonstrations and global wars, general strikes and subversive rumors. Colonial
subjugation and post-colonial dictatorship proved to be political arrangements most
responsive to these kinds of threats to legitimacy. Government spending on medical care
was a favored palliative during times of unrest. In contrast to “native” education, which
officials feared would stoke rebellion (particularly after the 1915 Chilembwe Rising),
32
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health spending (and, in particular, curative health spending) was seen as a way to quiet
restive publics.33 This contrast in the perceived political consequences of health and
education spending helps explain why networks of government-run district hospitals and
clinics were constructed throughout Nyasaland during the 1920s and 1930s, while the
colony’s first government-run secondary school for Africans did not open until after the
Second World War.

Unrest did not have to happen within Nyasaland’s borders to impact its health budgets.
Savvy officials in the UK and Nyasaland with an interest in this oft-forgotten land’s
health sector drew persuasive—if roundabout—connections between the need to quell
unrest elsewhere and the imperative to spend more on health care in Malawi. Such
connections by well-placed moral entrepreneurs were key to securing drugs and doctors
for a colony (and later, a country) that so woefully lacked them. Popular social unrest,
including a number of episodes linked to Malawi only by the most tenuous of
connections, was a precursor to every significant increase in public sector health
spending. Given the crucial importance of the monopoly on violence to any regime’s
legitimacy, it is understandable that Malawi’s colonial and postcolonial governments
would seek to keep potentially violent forms of political agitation from seeping into the
33
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thinly governed land.34 Yet the fact that official attempts to palliate the populace could so
often involve health spending is barely recognized by political scientists, sociologists or
historians.35

Perhaps part of the reason why this pattern has gone relatively unnoticed is the fact that
not all wars and strikes proved boons to health spending. The relationship between unrest
and outlays for health was not an automatic cause-and-effect of the kind readily
discernable in regression analyses. Labor unrest and unemployment in the 1920s in
Britain set in motion events that would lead to the construction of district hospitals across
Nyasaland during the early 1930s (Chapter 3). Yet within Nyasaland the share of
government expenditure going toward health care declined markedly during the mid1930s, a slide that continued after a massive anti-witchcraft movement known as mchape
swept across the countryside. It persisted even after the return of the infamously
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disruptive millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from his forced exile in 1937 (Chapter
4). The connection between unrest and health spending had to be forged deliberately,
often using finely tuned arguments delivered by officials with influence in the budgetmaking process.

Of course, the unrest-driven increases in public spending on health were not sufficient to
spare Malawi its dismal health indices, currently some of the world’s worst. But that fact
does not refute, but rather strengthens, my thesis. Interruptions to the prevailing neglect
of the health of Malawi’s people were too seldom and brief precisely because of its
people’s reputation for placidity.

III. The role of economic thought: the eternal health-is-wealth debate
Before a crowded Harvard lecture hall one brisk November afternoon in 2014, Paul
Farmer chuckled. He had paused in the midst of discussing an article by the Nobel Prizewinning economist Amartya Sen, with whom he was teaching a graduate seminar. He
laughed because he thought Sen had penned a hilariously tongue-in-cheek passage. In the
1998 article, Sen offered a number of reasons economists should concern themselves
with indicators of mortality (and not only with measures of income). To Farmer, a
number of the arguments were so blatantly obvious as to go without saying. Why, Farmer
wondered, would Sen need to remind anyone of “the intrinsic importance we attach—and
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have reason to attach—to living,” or—in an even more amusing turn of phrase—of “the
fact that many other capabilities that we value are contingent on our being alive”?36

Yet for Sen, who had long encouraged development economists to broaden their scope of
inquiry beyond per-capita GDP statistics, these remained necessary arguments. The
relevance of human health and even human survival to economics remains a subject of
debate in the field’s top-tier peer-reviewed journals. In 2005, the Quarterly Journal of
Economics published “The gift of the dying,” in which Alwyn Young argued: “The AIDS
epidemic enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities of the South African
economy, in effect endowing it with additional resources.”37 Resting this argument
largely on the (disputed) assumption that high rates of AIDS mortality would lead to
decreased fertility rates (thereby leaving more resources for those who survived), Young
chided advocates who called AIDS an economic problem. “One cannot endlessly lament
the scourge of high population growth in the developing world and then conclude that a
reversal of such processes is an equal economic disaster. The AIDS epidemic is a
humanitarian disaster of millennial proportions, one that cries for assistance. It is not,
however, an economic disaster.”38 Given the prominent place given to such arguments in
a major economic journal, Sen did have ample reason to worry about the consequences of
understanding poverty only through “the cold and often inarticulate statistics of low
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incomes,” rather than “the directly relevant and immediately gripping facts of diminished
lives, agonized existence, and untimely deaths.”39

These articles added to a storied, and complex, literature in economics. Sen’s arguments
about the intrinsic value of “being alive” might seem bemusing and obvious at first
glance, but they are a deliberate corrective to a long-standing discourse about the
instrumental uses of health for economic ends. For over a century, a number of
economists and policymakers arguing for increased public expenditure on medicine and
public health have often framed health as in instrument for aggregate economic growth.
Their tracts did not dwell, as Sen’s often do, on the value of health as an end in itself or
as a precondition for a meaningful life. Seeking to appeal to the cold calculus of
treasuries and taxpayers, advocates for increased health spending have often framed
health as a useful “investment” in the pursuit of economic growth. One prominent and
fairly recent example is the World Health Organization’s Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, chaired by economist Jeffrey Sachs, which published a
report in 2001 claiming that “good population health is a critical input to poverty
reduction, economic growth, and long-term economic development at the scale of whole
societies.”40
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Yet such arguments have often proven ineffective in convincing skeptics. In this
dissertation I will demonstrate that presenting human health as an instrument for
growth—rather than an end in itself—has sometimes helped to pry open government
purses. But I will also argue that the argument has often fallen on deaf ears, or even
invited contrary claims, along the line of Alwyn Young’s, that saving the lives of the
poor through health spending might decrease per-capita incomes.41 This pattern is clear
in the response to a 2001 article co-authored by John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs.
Using data from 1965 to 1990 and controlling for a number of variables, the authors
concluded from a cross-country regression that a 10 percent reduction in their “index of
malaria” was associated with an annual boost of 0.3 percent to per-capita GDP.42 Five
years later, economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson countered this finding in
their own regression analysis. Using a range of data sources on life expectancy starting in
1940, the authors concluded: “There is no evidence that the large exogenous increase in
life expectancy [effected, in their account, by chemotherapeutic agents] led to a
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significant increase in per-capital economic growth.”43 Advocates of the claim that health
spending increases economic growth can point to empirical evidence to support their
claims, but so can the argument’s detractors. As I will demonstrate, the claim has a less
illustrious record in actually increasing public sector health budgets than its advocates
might assume.44 Multiple chapters (2, 7, 8 and 10) examine the influence—or, more
often, the lack thereof—of arguments claiming that public sector health spending is an
effective instrument for increasing economic growth (an argument that I will refer to as
the “health is wealth” argument) in colonial Nyasaland and post-colonial Malawi.

The inability of changing fashions in development economics to explain actual outlays on
health is evident from Malawi’s twentieth-century government budgets. Figure 0.2
(shown above) tracked the share of Malawi’s recurrent expenditure devoted to the
Medical Department (or, after independence in 1964, the Ministry of Health) between
1920 and 1980. The graph revealed that health accounted for more than 8 percent of
recurrent government expenditure in only two periods: first, in the years between 1920
43
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and 1930, and; second, between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. The first such period
(the 1920s) will be discussed in Chapter 1. This decade is less pertinent to this argument,
as public sector health spending in Nyasaland during this period was still largely focused
on the care of European officials. However, in comparing the rest of the graph with the
history of thought in development economics, a counterintuitive becomes apparent.
Health secured its highest shares of government spending precisely when the “health is
wealth” argument was given the least credence by leading development economists.

In later chapters I will describe in detail the dominant trends in development economics
during three major eras. Here, though, I will provide only the most cursory of summaries.
In the first era, lasting from the 1930s to the early 1950s, the “health is wealth” argument
was an important facet of British thought about how to develop colonial holdings.
Spurred by research nutrition, entomology, and tropical medicine, officials in both the
UK Colonial Office and in the colonies spoke ever more forcefully about the futility of
efforts to increase output from the colonies without concomitant efforts to improve
nutrition and eliminate widespread parasitic infections. Still, the UK Treasury remained
doubtful of the impact of health spending on revenues throughout this era, and the need
for “economies” in social services such as health limited the reach of health campaigns.
With the arrival of the Second World War, even frugal plans for health were shelved in
Nyasaland and elsewhere in British Africa.

Though health was mentioned in early postwar economic planning, by the late 1950s the
focus had shifted. In this era, university economists from the US and the UK argued for
24

modernization, a strategy for rapid industrialization that called for focusing public
expenditure on the building blocks of capital-intensive industrial production rather than
the health of the broader populace. Yet despite the fact that colonial economists and even
African nationalists in Nyasaland corresponded with leading theorists of modernization,
it was during the 1950s and 1960s that Nyasaland (known after its independence in 1964
as Malawi) experienced its most rapid rise in government health spending. This spending
was, in large part, a response to a crisis of political legitmacy that led political authorities
to discard some prescriptions of modernization in favor of overt and widely-publicized
demonstations of beneficence made possible by health spending.

Finally, in the 1970s (the third era in economic thought covered in this dissertation)
international development discourse rediscovered nutrition and health. A burgeoning
literature on “human capital” and a focus within the World Bank on Basic Needs
prompted increased attention to and financing for health projects. For the first time since
independence, Malawi could obtain more substantial assistance from bilateral and
multilateral donors for health projects. But once again, there was discordance during this
era between health spending and trends in economic thought. Health spending remained
limited, as Britain no longer felt it necessary to spend its resources on an independent
Malawi and President Banda no longer perceived internal threats to his own political
legitimacy.

Again, aside from the 1920s, the share of public sector recurrent expenditure devoted to
health was greatest during the 1950s to the early 1960s. The coincidence of increased
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health spending (in both absolute and relative terms) with the era in which modernization
theorists dismissed the “health is wealth” argument motivates this historical analysis of
the relationship between economic theory and economic policy. Academic economists
have long repeated John Maynard Keynes’ observation that “practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist.”45 The argument that economic ideas hold great sway over
health budgets is prevalent in accounts of international health since the dawn of the
neoliberal era in the 1980s; in these histories of the recent past, International Monetary
Fund and World Bank officials compelled the governments of poor nations to enter into
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that gutted health sector budgets in the name of
debt repayment.46 The policy prescriptions of World Bank and IMF officials were, as
these histories demonstrate, inspired by the ideas of “neoliberal” economists such as
Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek.47

These histories reveal deep and disquieting truths about the relationship between
armchair elite theorizing and the “immiseration” of health care systems for poor people in
poor countries.48 But in this dissertation I am concerned with an earlier era, before the
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much-discussed age of structural adjustment.49 By chronicling the history of a public
sector health system prior to the neoliberal age, I intend to demonstrate the profound
influence not of elite theory, but of popular politics. Mine is not a history in which
regnant economic theory is the most important determinant of health policy. Instead, the
story follows closer to the lament of Peter Ruderman, an economist who had worked in
development policy. “Decisions as to public spending on health,” Ruderman explained,
“are often taken in response to…political pressures.”50 I ultimately conclude that
economic thought can provide a hospitable (or inhospitable) international milieu for the
officials and politicians holding the purse strings of government spending. Yet the
credence (or lack thereof) given to the “health is wealth” argument does not explain the
major changes in health spending in Malawi during the colonial and early post-colonial
eras. Intellectual histories of Western economic thought are unable to explain patterns of
health spending. Claims about the economic value of health spending have a long and
contentious history, yet shifts in economic thought have not been the primary influence
on levels of government spending on medicine and public health.

For the key influences, the historian must look to popular politics and the ideological
commitments of key political officials. Ferguson was correct in noting that the poorer
nations of southern Africa were under the thrall of an “anti-politics machine” by the
49
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1980s, but it was not always thus.51 Patterns of growth and retrenchment of the Malawian
health sector can only be explained with reference to broader African, European and
American political histories. Health spending was long seen as a political weapon, an
instrument intended to quell restive publics. It was popular politics, and not the writings
of the elite academics, that determined whether or not the rulers of one of the world’s
poorest peoples cared about matters of health and sickness, life and death.
IV. Outline: political crises and health spending in Malawian history
The chapters ahead chronicle the role of medicine in development planning and popular
politics in Malawi between 1914 and 1983. This time span is bookended by two
calamities that fundamentally changed the nature of health care in Malawi. The period
begins with the First World War, a war in which hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland’s
Africans encountered both European forced labor and European medical provision for the
first time. Before the First World War, government health programs for Africans were so
sparse that, aside from mass campaigns to vaccinate against smallpox and monitor for
sleeping sickness, they rarely touched the lives of most Africans in Nyasaland (Chapter
1). This dissertation ends (save for a conclusion and ethnographic interludes) with the
start of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. This was a massive conflagration that would, by
2004, grow to claim the lives of 80,000 Malawians every year (out of a population of
12.5 million) before mortality began to fall with the free provision of antiretroviral
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therapy.52 This epidemic was so traumatic that it profoundly colored, and even erased,
earlier memories of government health provision (see conclusion). The AIDS crisis also
helped usher in a new era of health financing in Malawi (as elsewhere in southern
Africa), an era in which significant external resources would change the relationship
between crisis politics and health spending.53

In the seventy years between these two disasters, I ask, when and why did access to
biomedical care become a central political concern and budgetary priority? During both
the colonial and early post-colonial eras, Malawi's governments increased spending on
biomedical care to demonstrate beneficence, particularly when they faced threats to
legitimacy. These threats could come from within Malawi, but they could also arise from
seemingly unrelated and far-flung events. Officials and international advisers persistently
attributed Malawi's inadequate medical provision to the nation's poverty, but changes in
health spending have not automatically followed shifts in GDP or government revenues.
Instead, the construction of new hospitals and dispensaries, the purchase of new supplies
and medicines, and the addition of medical staff have almost always come in the wake of
social unrest, such as world wars, international waves of labor action, and domestic
protests. Only at these moments were the government and its international partners
compelled to devote more resources to health. Oft-repeated official claims that there was
simply not enough money available to improve government health services have almost
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always been abandoned during periods of political crisis. Yet these periods have been
infrequent; placidity, and not just poverty, may account for Malawi's dismal medical
infrastructure.

Health services in Malawi have been a product of strife, not quietus. War and unrest,
often in far-flung locales, brought spending on healthcare provision, while periods of
perceived calm have spurred retrenchment. Because the idea that government spending
on health has been as much a function of international political instability as national
prosperity is so counterintuitive, it will be proven not with one example, but with many,
spanning seventy years and involving actors and events many countries. The history is
drawn from numerous archives in Malawi, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Botswana. Written sources include official reports, memoirs and correspondence of civil
servants in both the colonial and postcolonial administrations. Oral sources include
interviews conducted with dozens of Malawians and expatriates between 2011 and 2015.
Fieldwork in two Malawian villages (one in Neno District, and another in Mangochi
District) provides additional data.

The chapters ahead are organized in roughly chronological fashion, but each relates a
different episode to compare the influence of social unrest and economic thought on the
attention given to health care in public sector budgets in colonial Nyasaland and postcolonial Malawi. Each chapter is preceded by a “prelude.” Most of these preludes are
vignettes from my fieldwork in Mangochi and Neno Districts. The questions and issues
raised in each prelude are similar, though not identical, to those explored in the
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corresponding (historical) chapters. The preludes, then, are intended to show resonances
and dissonances, to trace the lineaments of history in an emergent present. I have changed
the names of people (except for public figures) and village names (but not district or
hospital names) in the preludes (except for 2, 4, 8 and 9), in order to protect the identities
of my interlocutors.

The first five chapters focus on the period spanning the two world wars (1914-1945).
Chapter 1 draws a link between the conscription of hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland
Africans into the Allied carrier service during the First World War and the first deliberate
efforts to provide some measure of health care to rural subjects in Nyasaland during the
1920s. Many conscripted carriers and soldiers had their first contact with hospitals during
the Great War, though these facilities were far more impressive in official records than in
reality. During the early 1920s—not a particularly hospitable time for health spending in
the British Empire—persistent advocacy by the Director of Medical Services and chief’s
demands to resuscitate health facilities shut down after the war helped prompt the
administration to fund the construction of more than sixty rural dispensaries around the
colony.

Chapter 2 turns to the interwar era of investigations into the health of Africans in the
British Empire. These investigations were conducted by experts in diverse array of
scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture and anthropology. During
the interwar era, these fields were high on the British imperial research agenda.
Physicians and administrators echoed the academic findings that hardy, productive bodies
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could only be sustained with diets containing enough vitamins, minerals and calories and
living environments sufficiently free of parasites. Multi-disciplinary investigations, such
as the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey (1938-1940) buttressed officials’ claims that increased
production from colonial subjects depended on increased investment in the health of
colonized Africans. Commonly proposed investments included agricultural extension
services and vector control campaigns, but also improved health care facilities.

But, as chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate, these visions for colonial social medicine were not
the principal determinants of spending on health during the interwar years. Chapter 3
recounts the passage of the UK Colonial Development Act of 1929, and the effect of this
law on Nyasaland’s health sector. Odd as it may seem, health spending in Nyasaland in
the early 1930s was a piece of the government’s response to the 1926 General Strike in
the United Kingdom. In the years following this strike, British officials with experience
in both domestic labor relations and colonial administration argued that colonial
development spending could both alleviate a worsening unemployment crisis and calm
labor militancy within the UK. Other officials in the Colonial Office in London and the
Colonial Medical Service then drew special attention to Nyasaland, a poor colony which
held little promise as a market for British goods but which—according to these
advocates—languished in such a state of neglect as to threaten to bring “grave public
discredit” upon the Crown. As a result of this lobbying, Nyasaland’s health sector
became a major beneficiary of 1929 Colonial Development Act. Many of the colony’s
district hospitals were built with funds made available by this legislation. Thus, moral
entrepreneurs in the British administration were able to subvert the law’s original intent
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(to increase employment in the UK through the purchases of manufactured goods for the
colonies) in order to improve a health system in Nyasaland they had long lamented.

Chapter 4 demonstrates the other side of the link between unrest and health spending.
Once the well-connected moral entrepreneurs with a concern for Nyasaland departed
from their posts, the colony’s health sector languished. The late 1930s and early 1940s
were a period of profound disquiet in the British Empire; waves of riots and strikes roiled
the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern Rhodesia’s
Copperbelt, and cocoa farms in West Africa. Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm
MacDonald used these crises of colonial legitimacy to usher the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act of 1940 to passage. But most of the initial funding made possible by this
law went to the perceived centers of unrest, such as the West Indies, and not to a
seemingly docile Nyasaland. Medical administrators in Nyasaland complained bitterly to
their superiors, but to no avail; even as the metropolitan government touted the new
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, proposals to improve nutrition and medical
training in Nyasaland were shelved.

Yet developments in Britain during and immediately after the Second World War
changed political discourse about social services in British Africa. Chapter 5 focuses on
changing metropolitan thought about colonial development during and immediately after
the Second World War. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, powerful voices in
Britain’s Labour Party challenged the persistent claim that there just was not any money
available to improve health services for Africans in Britain’s colonies. At the same time,
33

a new consensus emerged in British society about the government’s responsibility to
ensure the health of the British people. This consensus was in evidence both in the
popular reception to the 1942 Beveridge Report, and in the 1946 enactment of the UK
National Health Service. For many, including William Beveridge and prominent
members of Britain’s Labour Party, the social and economic rights embodied in the
Beveridge report seemed applicable not only to Britain, but also to its colonies. In the
years following the publication of the report, officials throughout the British Empire and
Commonwealth contemplated their own plans for social protection.

But once again, Nyasaland’s reputation as a land of quietus helped officials in Whitehall
exclude the colony from discussions about more robust social services in Africa. The
causes and consequences of this relative neglect in the immediate postwar period are the
focus of Chapter 6. Instead of enacting the old-age and disability pensions and healthcare provisions that were the backbone of the consolidated British welfare state, officials
in London and Zomba argued that rural Africans in Nyasaland were already protected
against ruin by traditional village mechanisms of social security. The idealized image of
egalitarian social solidarity among rural Africans amounted to a historically dubious and
politically interested argument for inaction. So when a postwar wave of labor unrest
spread across much of British Africa, Nyasaland was dismissed as a haven of political
quietus, and its health sector saw relatively little of the newly available development
financing.
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Despite the dearth of official attention given to Nyasaland’s dismal health centers and
hospitals, African subjects in the colony showed increasing interests in health facilities in
the decades following the Second World War. In Chapter 7, I chart the rapid rise in
attendance at government health facilities in the postwar decades, and argue that the
(slow and halting) arrival of new drugs and equipment during the postwar years were key
to attracting patients to government facilities. The increased popularity of government
health care among the general population had profound effects on the politics of medicine
in the postwar era. Health care itself became an even more important response to social
unrest, and health care became a major subject of late-colonial and post-colonial political
demands.

Even as more patients began to present for care, prominent development economists in
the United States and the UK argued ever more forcefully that government spending on
healthcare was “consumption” rather than investment, and that such spending was an
imprudent use of public resources in poor countries. Yet in Chapter 8, I explain how it
was that precisely during the period when modernization theorists seemed most
influential in economics, recurrent government health spending in Nyasaland rose
dramatically, from £273,000 pounds in 1953 to £1.48 million pounds in 1969. The
prevailing development discourse of the moment cannot explain this pattern of spending.
Instead, we must look again to political crises. Officials in the government of the
controversial and short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963)
publicized financial commitments to health in an attempt to quiet growing protests within
Nyasaland and critics in the UK. Government health care even became a focal point of
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political contests, as pro-Federation commentators accused anti-Federation nationalists
had sabotaged a smallpox vaccination campaign, while anti-Federation voices countered
that the Federation government had neglected health care for Africans.

Shortly after Malawi gained independence in 1964, another political crisis prompted
Malawi’s new government to turn its attention to health care. Chapter 9 chronicles a
short-lived rebellion by Malawi’s cabinet ministers, which prompted the embattled Prime
Minister Hastings Kamuzu Banda to abandon the outpatient user fees he had enacted only
a few months earlier. His attempts to establish legitimacy in the eyes of Malawi’s
citizenry included well-publicized visits to government hospitals. Yet throughout the
1960s he could find scarce support for health care from other governments and
international agencies. This was the heyday of population control in international health,
so aid for health was focused almost entirely on contraception. Yet Banda refused to
contradict his regime’s own carefully constructed ideology of abundance by promoting
contraception at government health facilities.

Chapter 10 documents Banda’s turn away from healthcare as a major priority during the
1970s. Not coincidentally, this shift in focus coincided with greater regime stability.
Without any mortal threats to his rule, Banda could turn his attention to estate agriculture
and a new capital city, even as the rise of human capital arguments in development
discourse led to increased interest in health among bilateral and multilateral aid donors.
Banda came to rely on external donors, particularly governments that were facing
international crises of legitimacy, for health financing, rather than drawing upon
36

Malawi’s own domestic revenues. As in prior decades, Malawi’s public sector health
expenditures and policies were the opposite of what the cosmopolitan advisors and august
professors advised. Here, once more, the shifting tides of economic theory are unable to
explain patterns of outlays for health.

In the conclusion, I consider how this pattern of crisis-driven health spending has
changed during Malawi’s crisis-riddled recent past. In the three decades since the mid1980s, a period marked by AIDS, famine and periodic suspensions of donor aid,
Malawi’s governments have come to hold little legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.
Still, public officials continue to try to regain the public’s trust through displays of
solicitude. But political leaders have devoted relatively little in the way of domestic
revenues to health, instead seeking to claim personal credit for international aid coming
into Malawi.

Over the last few years I have been asked a question. It recurs in libraries and archives
and district hospitals and government offices and cafes, in the United States and Europe
and Africa. The question is innocent enough: “What are you researching?” Among the
many expatriate aid workers and volunteers that I meet, the most frequent response to my
explanation (“I’m studying the history of the government health service in Malawi”) is
something akin to “Oh, I can’t imagine there is much to study there.” They are correct
that there is not much in the way of government medical care in Malawi, nor has there
ever been. But just as action has a history, so, too, does inaction. Just as acts of care and
attention can be chronicled and explained, so can records of neglect. The dreadful
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disrepair of Malawi’s public hospitals and the empty shelves in public dispensaries are
just as much a product of history as Britain’s well-equipped clinics and socialized health
insurance. In fact, they are a part of the same history. Who has the government cared for?
Who has been left to die? And why? These questions can only be answered with a global,
contingent, and often ironic history of crisis politics. It is a history in which perceptions
of peace can bring untimely death. It is also a history in which, as the next chapter will
show, brutal and deadly war brings expectations of health.
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Chapter 1
Drugs for the tengatenga: the beginnings of government medicine in Nyasaland in
an era of war, 1914-1929
Abstract
As unpaid forced labor on settler farms, as carriers supplying the British in the East
African theatre during the First World War, and as transporters of European officials,
Africans were made to carry loads throughout the colonial era. Less remembered by
historians of Malawi (and, as it was known under British rule, Nyasaland), though, is that
the colonial administration’s reliance on African subjects as beasts of burden impelled its
initial expenditures on medical care. Whereas before the First World War the only source
of biomedical care in Nyasaland were the scattered mission hospitals, the intense
demands for African labor during the war spurred the construction of government-run
hospitals and dispensaries. These ill-equipped facilities were tasked with the care of the
hundreds of thousands of “carriers” forced to carry munitions, rations and other supplies
to troops fighting near the border of Nyasaland and German Tanganyika.
In the aftermath of war, experience with biomedicine at these hospitals led native
authorities and colonial medical officers to call for the construction of additional health
facilities. By 1923, Nyasaland had a system of 70 rural dispensaries. These facilities were
staffed by poorly trained African auxiliaries and operated under extreme economies, and
according to colonial officials they had not secured the confidence of most Africans. But
the hospitals and dispensaries owed their very existence to the even more threadbare
carrier hospitals that inaugurated the era of biomedical care for Africans in Nyasaland.
Using archival records and oral histories from Malawi and the United Kingdom, this
chapter seeks to explain the beginnings of government medicine for Africans in colonial
Nyasaland. The need of massive human labor supplies during the Great War, and the
perceived need to demonstrate imperial concern for sick subjects in the years that
followed impelled a pennywise Treasury to begin spending on health services.
Prelude: Memories of carrying
“They were always carrying the colonists,” remembered “Francis,” a 48-year-old farmer
in Nyanza, a lakeshore village near the town of Monkey Bay in southern Malawi. Taking
a brief respite from his daily labors to drink tea in the living room of his home one hot
morning in March 2015, Francis recounted stories of the colonial era told by his parents
and grandparents. He had heard from them that whenever a district commissioner would
travel through the village on ulendo (tour) to meet with local leaders or collect taxes,
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villagers would have to carry his machila (hammock-stretcher) on their shoulders. “The
people complained about it, a lot, (anadandaula kwambiri)” he said.

Memories of carrying have even been etched into the names Malawians have given to the
landscape. In the southwestern province of Neno, the poorest district in the world’s
poorest country, a schoolteacher explained the meaning of the name of a hill called
Caliwoni near his home. It was not, he said, a Chichewa word. Rather, Caliwoni
harkened back to a command uttered often in that place by a British official whenever he
visited on tour. Villagers carrying the machila on which he rode would inevitably slow
when they reached the long, steep hill. “Carry on! Carry on!” the official would
command. The villagers so associated that hill with this command that they Chewa-ized
the command and named the hill Caliwoni.1

All kinds of forced labor remain vivid in Malawian memories of colonization. Still
sipping his tea, Francis reminisced about the demands of thangata labor. Thangata was a
system by which, in return for the privilege of living as squatters on the massive estates
granted to European settlers by the colonial government, Africans were made to perform
at least one month of unpaid labor for the settlers each year as “rent.”2 In colonial days
(ku nthawi atsamunda), Francis remembered, people were beaten for refusing to perform

1
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2
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History of Malawi : 1859-1966. (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2012). Page 80.
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thangata labor. They were sometimes beaten just because a settler found their work too
slow for his liking.3

As bearers of European officials’ machilas, as thangata laborers on European estates,
and—as this chapter will detail—as carriers supplying troops in the East African theater
during the First World War, African men and women were put to work against their will
throughout the colonial era. The personal memoirs of former British officials and
commentators tend to portray all this labor as ennobling, even enjoyable. The Cambridge
Professor of Geography Frank Debenham claimed the first Nyasaland administrators had
devised the hut tax for the purposes “of paying for benefits conferred and of keeping the
men occupied.”4 WTC Berry, a medical officer in Nyasaland between 1936 and 1943,
described the invariably jovial disposition of the men who were his means of transport:
In the remoter parts of the Protectorate the Boma [government] also kept a team
of four ‘machila men’ for the doctor’s use if he had to visit a village some miles
away, off the beaten track where a car could not go. A machila was a wheeled
chair with shafts at each end. One man pulled between the shafts in front, another
pushed at the back and the other two ran alongside to take over at intervals. Even
in the fiercest heat they would not slack off their running and sang, whooped, and
turned somersaults as they went…They showed extraordinary powers of
endurance and arrived at their destination up to eight or ten miles away quite fit
and well able to quip along the way with any villagers they might encounter.5
These men may or may not have been paid, and the labor may or may not have been
forced; Berry did not say. The point here is merely the merry, unburdened attitudes that
he attributed to them. Yet for Nyasaland’s Africans, laboring for Europeans—particularly
forced labor—was the stuff of bitter memories. Lewis Bandawe, a Lomwe immigrant
3

Personal interview with Francis in Nyanza Village, Mangochi District, Malawi, March 20, 2015.
Debenham, Nyasaland. Page 165.
5
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17.
4
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from Portuguese Mozambique who would go on to serve as head clerk and interpreter in
Nyasaland’s High Court from 1934 from 1960, wrote in his memoirs that the British
colonial government “was a terror to all people.” To Bandawe, the iron collars used on
prisoners (most often guilty of nothing more than defaulting on hut taxes) looked just like
the ones he had seen on slaves in neighboring Mozambique.6 Bandawe claimed (with,
perhaps, some exaggeration) that “every European, with the exception of the
missionaries, had a chikoti—a whip made of hippo’s hide—which he used on his
domestic servants and labourers.”7 Ending such practices was an animating force of
anticolonial politics. For Francis, the most inspiring promise in the early speeches of
Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Malawi’s nationalist leader and first president) was his promise
to end thangata.8
Today’s rural Malawians relish the absence of such overt systems of forced labor. But
even without demands for unfree labor there remains, of course, plenty of work to do.
The annual hungry season (December-March), when food from the previous harvest runs
short but the work of tending to the next is hardest, is the busiest time. I lived with
Francis and his family during this period, and noted the daily routine. Five people (not
including me) slept in Francis’s home on most nights. Francis and his wife, Edith, slept in
one room on a mat of woven banana leaves. Lucia, the couple’s eight-year-old daughter,
and Monica, their three-year-old niece, slept in another room. Samuel, the 17-year-old
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son of Francis’s late sister, sleeps in the hut adjacent to the house that doubles as Edith’s
kitchen.

Every morning before daybreak, Francis’s wife Edith swept the house and the back yard
with a broom made of twigs. She then walked 100 meters to the nearest borehole, where
she filled a 50-liter basin. With apparently little difficulty, the slight yet strong Edith
lifted the basin and placed it on her head for the walk home. Walking into the dimly lit
kitchen, a hut with no ventilation that will soon be filled with smoke, she packed twigs
and branches into an earthen cook-stove and started a fire to heat the water. Some of the
water would be used to cook nsima, the maize porridge that is the staple of the Malawian
diet. Much of the rest of the water will be used for bathing. She helped Lucia prepare for
school, then tied Monica to her back with a chitenje cloth and departed to collect more
firewood or to help Francis’s disabled parents, who lived next door, with their chores. On
many other days helped Francis and Samuel in the fields. Every evening she spent two
hours preparing dinner.

Francis also rose before dawn, and during most days in the hungry season he walked two
kilometers to the two-hectare field where he grew maize and groundnuts. There he
carefully tended to what would be the major source of his family’s sustenance for the
coming year. Francis was often joined in the field by his late sister’s son, Samuel, a 17year-old who was orphaned three years prior and who slept in the hut that doubled as
Edith’s kitchen. My rent helped Francis purchase a 50-kilogram bag of fertilizer; this cost
16,500 kwacha (about US$40) at the nearest agricultural marketing board depot. Though
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fertilizer can increase yields by as much as three-fold it also added to Francis’s workload.
In addition to planting the crops and weeding the fields, he now had to apply fertilizer in
a painstaking process two times during the growing season. To me, Francis and Edith’s
exertions appeared unbelievable, especially because they lived on such a meager diet.
Their daily nsima satiated hunger, but furnished few calories.

For Francis and Edith, work abounds. The harvest rarely provides much more than
subsistence. Still Francis says he enjoys farming. He is one of the few men in the village
who does not spend every night in a canoe on the lake, fishing for kampango (catfish) or
usipa (sardine-like fish) by lanterns and moonlight. The family has proved successful
enough at farming to live a more comfortable life than others in their village. Their house
is made not of wattle and daub (as are many others in the village), but of cement. Their
floor is also cement, as opposed to the packed dirt many others have. The roof of their
three-roomed domicile is made of corrugated iron, not straw. Francis’s family has even
amassed wealth, in the form of 10 chickens, four goats and one pig.

If the annual rains do not fall at the right time and in the right amount all their exertions
can come to naught. Their home, like the rest in their village, has neither electricity nor
running water. Francis once had a working cell phone, but it has been broken for months.
The couple derives great satisfaction from the fact that they labor on their own terms.
Unlike their grandparents and great-grandparents, they are not colonial subjects. They are
no one’s beasts of burden.
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I. Introduction
Malawian government health care was born of a war in which Africans died in droves.
The colonial administration’s reliance on African subjects as beasts of burden impelled
its initial expenditures on medical care. In the aftermath of war, medical officers began to
focus not only on the health of Europeans and research, but also on the wellbeing of
Africans. Whereas before the First World War the only sources of biomedical care for
Africans in Nyasaland were the few scattered mission hospitals, the intense labor
demands during the war spurred the construction of government-run hospitals. In the
aftermath of the war, experience with biomedicine led native authorities, and the medical
officers who interacted with them, to call for the construction of dispensaries around the
country.

The 1920s were the start of a period—which in many ways, never ended—when Medical
Department officials and native authorities consistently demanded additional funds from
the territorial and imperial Treasuries for medical care for Nyasaland’s Africans. As the
colonial employees with the most frequent contact with rural African smallholders,
doctors saw each day how the UK’s claims that it brought bring health, peace and
prosperity to the colonial populace were belied by quotidian realities. Africans, they
argued, must be able to expect something in exchange for onerous taxation, forced labor
and alien rule. Colonized Africans in Nyasaland received very little government medical
care until the era of the Central African Federation (1953-1963, see Chapter 8), but public
sector health care was born earlier, after a Great War that took the lives of thousands of
the colony’s inhabitants.
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II. The mirage of hospitals during the Great War
a) Reviewing missionary and government services in Nyasaland before the Great
War
Before the Great War, medical care for Africans in Nyasaland was sparse and almost
wholly provided by missions. Mission hospitals had been established at Cape Maclear in
1875, Bandawe in 1881, Livingstonia in 1894, and Zomba in 1896. They were important
not only for the care they provided, but also because they trained African medical
auxiliaries for both mission and government facilities.9

Before the First World War, the government medical service was devoted almost entirely
to the care of European officials (and, to a lesser extent, non-officials) and scientific
research.10 Nyasaland, like many other colonial regimes in Southern and Central Africa
(e.g. Northern and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Congo), was
originally a for-profit private enterprise. Established in 1891, the British Central African
Protectorate was originally a public-private venture funded by Cecil Rhodes’ British
South Africa Company (BSAC). Rhodes did not think the territory very profitable, and
paid His Majesty’s Government to administer it on a shoestring budget of £10,000 per
year. He agreed to fund the establishment of the “Protectorate” in part to advance his
dream of British rule “from the Cape to Cairo,” and in part because the British
government had agreed that in return for its funding the BSAC would secure the sole
9
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rights to the gold fields in Mashonaland (in present-day Zimbabwe).11 The interest from
the start in Nyasaland (so renamed in 1907) was to spend as little as possible, while
maintaining a modicum of order and aiding European planters to profitably run estates.
The spirit of extreme economy continued even all of the Nyasaland administration’s
political ties to the BSAC were severed in 1911.12

In this era British medical officers came to Africa to build reputations as researchers, to
discover new pathogens and disease mechanisms and enter the bacteriological pantheon
of Koch and Pasteur, rather than to provide medical care. Michael Worboys and Megan
Vaughan have argued that late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century practitioners of
tropical medicine were more interested in biological investigation than public health or
clinical medicine.13 Such was the case for Dr. Hugh Stannus, stationed at Fort Johnston
as a medical officer to the King’s African Rifles [Nyasaland’s military force] from 1905
to 1910. Stannus built a pathology laboratory, started a medical library, and authored
scientific publications on sleeping sickness (in humans and animals) yaws, black-water
fever, albinism, and ethnological works on African peoples.14

11
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From the perspective of the metropolitan government, the role of medical officers in
Nyasaland before the First World War was to protect the few Africans, Indians, and
Europeans involved in the threadbare administration of the new territory. The contract of
the Indian surgeon Dr. Sorabji Boyce, the colony’s first medical officer (who
accompanied Sir Harry Johnston to the new British holding in 1891 and died only six
months later), explained his primary duty was to care for government officials.15 Almost
a quarter-century later, in 1913, Nyasaland’s Medical Department had twelve medical
officers and five nurses.16 In 1914, there were only a few small government hospitals
providing care for Africans at Port Herald (4 beds), Zomba (46 beds), Fort Johnston (5
beds), and Karonga (2 beds).17

Public health ordinances passed during the early years of the twentieth century were
martial in nature and ill-suited to securing the trust of peoples so recently conquered,
often by force of arms. A July 1903 ordinance aimed at limiting sleeping sickness
(human trypanosomiasis) required all Africans seeking to cross the border of a district to
enter only at specified government stations, where they would be made to submit to a
medical examination. These exams focused on palpation of the cervical glands (in the
neck). If the glands were not enlarged, the traveler would be issued a pass. If the
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travelers’ glands were enlarged, the traveler could be quarantined in a “segregation
settlement.”18 Suspected sleeping sickness cases sometimes had their cervical glands
punctured for diagnosis, though widespread opposition to this procedure limited its use.19

If, in the course of sleeping sickness investigations in villages, officials suspected
infection or if the residences were believed to lie within the range of the tsetse fly (the
carrier of trypanosomiasis), District Residents could evict Africans from their huts or
even order the abandonment of entire villages.20 The consequences of disobedience were
harsh: “In case of disobedience to such an order the District Resident may, after due
warning, destroy such hut, settlement or village and remove the inhabitants thereof in
custody.”21

Smallpox vaccination campaigns involved similarly harsh measures. In 1896, Dr. Neil
Macvicar of the Church of Scotland Blantyre Mission had begun training African medical
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assistants to vaccinate against smallpox using scalpels and lymph.22 These assistants
entered the field in time to respond to a fairly short-lived epidemic in 1899-1900—the
brevity of this outbreak seemed to confirm to the administration the utility of native
vaccinators.23 The colonial administration began to pay the wages of the native
vaccinators and to purchase the supplies of calf lymph.24 As Agnes Rennick argued in her
dissertation on missionary medicine in Malawi, both the missionaries and the
administration sought to draw additional settlers from Britain by demonstrating that both
European planters and African laborers could live healthy lives in the Protectorate.25

Nearly a decade without a serious smallpox epidemic in Nyasaland bred confidence
among both missionary doctors and colony’s chief medical administrator that their
vaccination program was effective. In 1907, Principal Medical Officer Henry Hearsey
confidently declared that “epidemics of smallpox, such as were common in the
protectorate some years ago, do not now occur.”26 But when large outbreaks struck
Nyasaland the very next year, the colonial administration issued the Vaccine Ordinance
22
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of 1908, which made vaccination compulsory. By 1913, the Government reported that the
African assistants had administered 143,502 vaccinations in that year alone.27

Yet Rennick provides ample evidence that these vaccination campaigns may have been
less effective than advertised. Even Hearsey doubted the accuracy of the vaccinators’
returns. The few medical officers in the employ of the government did little to verify
them. Doctors also recognized that their lymph was often stored so long that it lost its
capacity to stimulate immunity. At times some of the vaccinators’ efforts seemed worse
than useless. In 1909, a District Resident reported that the high frequency of severe
ulcers on the arms of the recently vaccinated might have something to do with a local
vaccinator’s wont to use a blood-soaked, dirt-stained scalpel to carve gaping wounds into
patients’ arms.28

On the other hand, these campaigns were definitely effective at demonstrating to African
subjects the similarities between public health and the recent wars of colonial conquest.
The Central African Times reported in 1899 on the government’s response to a smallpox
outbreak in the Ntcheu District village of Ntonda: “Every house in which a case was
found was burned and the natives compensated. A cordon of askari [African soldiers in
the employ of the colonial administration] is on duty day and night.” Even missionaries
joined in the arson. Dr. Walter Elmslie of Universities’ Mission for Central Africa
Livingstonia Mission reported that after unsuccessfully “hunting for a case of small pox

27
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which is being hid away by the people,” he “burnt down several houses where we knew
he had been, so the stupid people may begin to see their own interests and help us.”29

Such tactics would do little to secure the trust of Africans that vaccination campaigns
were, in fact, helping them. As early as the 1908 epidemic, a movement emerged that
appeared dangerously subversive to colonial officials. The moment seemed to augur
upheaval. In addition to smallpox, the years 1907-1908 brought other unusual occurrence.
Nyasaland’s: minor earthquakes shook the earth, a comet appeared in the sky, and cattle
were felled in large numbers by an epidemic.

Into this tumult stepped Elliot Kamwana, a mission-educated 26-year-old from Nkata
Bay. In 1908 Kamwana returned home from his studies to baptize his neighbors into the
Watch Tower Church. His sermons proclaimed, “Kwacha, Africa yuka” (“It is dawn,
Africa rise.”). Kamwana spoke of a future where “all Kings, Kingdoms and Governments
would cease.” Within six months of beginning his ministry, he had already baptized over
9,000 people. Seeing in his message a political challenge “under the cloak of religion,”
Nyasaland’s authorities arrested Kamwana. In 1909 he was deported to the Seychelles.30

Decades later, colonial measures against smallpox would continue to engender
opposition. The frequent recurrence of smallpox in the coming decades, and the often-
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unexplained brutality of the measures taken in the name of disease control, would spur a
backlash against vaccination campaigns. Vaccinators lamented villagers’ refusal to
cooperate during a 1936 outbreak.31 Resistance would take on special importance in the
late 1950s, when the Federation Government claimed that the leadership of the Malawi
Congress Party had frightened the people into rejecting vaccinations (Chapter 8).

Coercive public health measures, and not curative medicine, were the only introduction
most Africans received to government medicine before the Great War. Removals from
villages by armed police in the name of sleeping sickness prevention resembled nothing
so much as the battles only recently fought by some of Nyasaland’s peoples against
British and BSAC troops during the 1890s before they submitted to “protection.”32 The
most profound impact of Europeans in most African lives was in the hut taxes they were
made to pay each year, which compelled thousands of men to leave their villages to in
search of waged labor on plantations and in mines. Curative health care was not a
meaningful part of this experience of being governed. Unless they lived near a religious
mission, most Africans never saw a doctor or nurse.

b) “Invited to die for a cause which is not theirs”: Nyasaland Africans in the Great
War
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It was not until the Great War reached Nyasaland that many Africans had contact with
government-employed British or Indian medical providers or African auxiliaries. For the
Africans patients, this introduction to European medicine came during a period of
profound upheaval. The nkhani chiwaya (war of the big gun) has long been remembered
as a time of excruciating forced labor and mass death. WTC Berry, a medical officer in
Nyasaland during the 1930s, recalled an aphorism coined by “an observant Bantu chief,”
summing up the chronicity of European presence in Africa: “First the missionary, then
the trader, then the gunboat.”33 Indeed, it was a gunboat that heralded the start of
hostilities between the UK and Germany in East Africa. On August 8, 1914—four days
after Germany invaded neutral Belgium prompting the British to declare war on
Germany—British warships fired on a wireless installation and railway station at the
German East Africa capital, Dar es Salaam. On August 13, the war reached Nyasaland;
sitting in dry dock in the German port of Sphinx Hafen on the northeastern shores of
Lake Nyasa, the German ship Hermann von Wissmann was demobilized by a shot from
the British gunboat Guendolen. This was no great battle, as the German captain had not
even been alerted to the outbreak of war.34 From then on, a long war would be fought in
each of Nyasaland’s neighbors: German East Africa (today’s Tanzania), Portuguese East
Africa (today’s Mozambique), and Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia).35
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Africans in Nyasaland did not immediately feel the most terrible exactions of war, but in
time they would toil, and die, in droves. Opposition to the war surfaced early. In an
unpublished letter he sent to the Nyasaland Times shortly before he led an armed uprising
in January 15, the preacher John Chilembwe decried the lot of Africans in “this present
world.” They were, he declared, “invited to die for a cause which is not theirs.”36 This
was, of course, a dramatic understatement, for Africans were not so much invited as
forced to join the war. But after leading a short-lived rebellion, Chilembwe would be shot
dead by a police patrol in February 1915, so he would not live to see the worst of the
wartime conscription.

In the aftermath of Chilembwe’s bloody but abortive uprising, British officials were
reticent to arm the newly restive African population. This would change later in the war,
when the demand for reinforcements led to the conscription of many African soldiers
(askari)). But in early 1916, British commanders were far more desperate for human
carriers than armed troops. In February 1916 Brigadier-General Edward Northey arrived
as commander of the Nyasaland-Rhodesian forces to find his troops desperately short of
food. Askari and carriers were receiving “starvation rations” of 1.25 pounds of maize
each day, as supplies ran short near the front lines.37 Food, munitions, medicines, mail
and even whiskey were supplied via a route that demanded vast quantities of human
labour.38 Ocean, river and rail transport from South Africa only reached as far as
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Blantyre (along the main supply line) and Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia (on a
subsidiary route). Pack animals could not survive in the tsetse-infested regions, as they
were quickly killed off by trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).39 So all along the 120
miles from Blantyre to Fort Johnston, and along a 700-mile route from Livingstone to
Fife in Northern Rhodesia, and up mountains and through the dense brush of German
East Africa, African carriers were the British army’s beasts of burden. Among Africans
the carrier service was known as tengatenga; kutenga means “to take” in Chichewa;
tengatenga translates, roughly “to take very far.”
Northey made constant demands for additional carriers from Nyasaland Governor George
Smith. Smith set quotas for each of the chiefs; some who failed to supply the allotted
numbers of carriers were put to the lash.40 Police who failed to conscript sufficient
carriers would have their pay withheld. The pay for carrier service was not sufficient to
draw Africans into the service; carriers were paid six shillings per month, the same
amount white settler volunteers earned in a single day. Turning to coercion, the
administration first went after Africans who had defaulted on the hut tax (then six
shillings per year per hut) were the first to be forced into service.41 When defaulters went
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into hiding, police kidnapped their wives until they surrendered. But these conscripts
were not sufficient to supply the war effort. Facing demands for additional carriers,
police conducted night raids in villages to kidnap any able-bodied men they could find.42
Estimates of the number of Nyasaland Africans in the carrier service during the war vary
widely; the historian Melvin Page’s figure of 200,000 is neither the lowest nor the
highest. Population figures for this period were based not on careful census data but
rather on administrative conjecture. Nevertheless, using the official estimate of
Nyasaland’s African population in 1918 (1.218 million), we can estimate that 16 percent
of Nyasaland’s African population worked in the carrier service during the war.43 But
even this figure does not adequately convey the scale of disruption that the carrier service
brought to some parts of the colony, particularly those along the major transport routes.
An administrative census of military labor in 1918 found that the number of people
engaged in military labor in South Nyasa district (18,615) was equal to 54.7 percent of
the adult male population of the district.44 This district, on the southern shore of Lake
Malawi, includes the village where Francis lived in 2015—small wonder, then, that a
century after the Great War, collective memories of carrying remained pervasive.
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Tengatenga brought extreme privations. Even the pro-British Nyasaland Times reported
that maize was “ground up, husks and all, and then issued as rations.”45 Men (and
sometimes women and children) were made to carry loads through swamps and up 9,000foot peaks. Conductors, including missionary priests, beat carriers with whips, and often
left them to die of exposure and exhaustion along these seemingly interminable supply
routes.46 Dysentery and pneumonia were rampant, and there were documented outbreaks
of smallpox and plague.47 Many of the sick and exhausted were abandoned along the
road to die.48 FC Baily, a convoy officer in German East Africa during the war,
remembered carriers thus:
A carrier is one of the lowest forms of life (except a machine gun carrier, who is a
picked man) and he is always more or less in a state of misery, as well he may be,
for his job is to carry forty pounds’ weight on his head, and as he takes no interest
whatever in the war, he does not find this very amusing. The mortality among
carriers was extremely high, because, contrary to the popular idea, the native is no
more immune to local diseases than anybody else, and goes down with malaria,
dysentery and diarrhea very much the same as a white man.49
Even Governor Smith, who had orchestrated the brutal recruitment campaign of carrier
labor, estimated a mortality rate for carriers of 4-5 percent during 1917-1918, when
conditions were worst.50
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In a final stroke of suffering, survivors of carrier service returned home to two more
scourges: epidemic and famine. Thousands who had survived carrier service died on the
walk home at the end of the war in the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic.51 Then, by April
1919, villages across the Protectorate found themselves without food. According to
Nyasaland Governor Hector Duff, the famine was due in part to the failure of the early
grain harvest, but he admitted the cause was “chiefly the fact that immense quantities of
stored native grain had been requisitioned for the use of the troops and that scores of
thousands of able bodied natives had been withdrawn from their homes to serve as
military porters…leaving few but old men, women and children to attend to the
cultivation of the land.” Thus, the effects of the war on health rippled far beyond even the
hundreds of thousands compelled into years of forced labor.52
c) Carrier hospitals in the East African theater
In an attempt to maintain supply lines, the British military set up “carrier hospitals” near
the front lines in German East Africa. In some accounts these medical facilities appear
quite impressive. The official history of the First World War, commissioned by the UK
Government, claims “the supply of medical stores and drugs, ordnance stores and
comforts was…sufficient for the needs of the force.” According to this chronicle, medical
care for carriers was provided at “twenty-eight mixed rest stations, five casualty clearing
hospitals, and seven carrier hospitals.”53 In August 1917 these facilities were staffed by
“80 medical officers, 3 sub-assistant surgeons, 14 Roman Catholic priests, 23 nursing
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sisters, 24 dispensers, and 123 British other ranks.”54 The history notes the “excessive
death-rate” of the carriers, but attributes this primarily to “the poor physique of the
African native.”55

But recent historians do not paint the same portrait of a robust carrier medical service. In
his Chiwaya War, Melvin Page explains, “Government authorities published impressive
lists of hospitals, personnel ‘available,’ and lists of medical supplies. Most of these were
only last minute and meager efforts and even then did not often operate as the
organizational plans projected.” A missionary without any medical training who treated
many of the carriers on the routes in southwest Tanganyika, remembered most of his
medicines came from “a fine assortment” looted from a German mission, “but nearly all
with German titles” he did not understand. He mostly gave sick patients “salts,
Livingstone’s rouser pills [an antimalarial pill containing quinine and a mixture of
purgatives, marketed by Burroughs Wellcome], quinine, boric powder and dressings and
bandages.” Even hospitals with trained nurses were overwhelmed by sick carriers. “Our
hospital is so crammed that patients sleep on top of one another,” remembered a Catholic
nun posted at one of the carrier hospitals. At another hospital in Mwenzo the facilities
were so small, and the sick so numerous, that many cases were turned away.56

Within Nyasaland the war left medical services even more depleted than before. Seven of
the twelve doctors employed by the government were called up to serve on the front in
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German East Africa.57 “Owing to the extreme shortage of staff it was not possible to keep
open more than three civil stations, namely, Port Herald, Blantyre and Zomba.”58
Another hospital remained in operation at Fort Johnston, but was under military control.
Even obtaining medical staff for Nyasaland’s troops proved extremely difficult. On
January 4, 1917, Governor Smith sent a telegram to the UK’s Secretary of State for the
Colonies requesting five Indian sub-assistant surgeons immediately.59 Robert Hollowell
Headley, an official in the Military Department of the India Office in London, explained,
“In view of the shortage of this class of medical personnel in India it is very doubtful
whether the men can be supplied.”60 Two months later a British General in Dar-esSalaam cabled the Secretary of State for the Colonies, lamenting the sub-assistant
surgeons were an “urgent need” yet were still “not received.”61 The records do not
indicate whether the sub-Assistant surgeons ever arrived.

Yet despite the shortcomings of medical care for carriers and askari, more of Nyasaland’s
Africans came into contact with government-run British medical facilities during the war
than at any time previously. “For the first time,” claims the historian Colin Baker,
“hundreds of thousands of Nyasaland Africans had access to Government medical
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services.”62 This might be an overstatement, depending on one’s definition of “access”
and “medical services.” But Baker is correct when he argues “this was bound to lead to
pressure—whether voiced or not—to extend medical facilities after the war.” Though
Baker does not explain how this “pressure” manifested, the next section of this chapter
will do so. The popular memory of carrier hospitals and clinics, and officers’ desire to
maintain some semblance of attention to Africans, impelled the construction of dozens of
dispensaries throughout Nyasaland in the early 1920s.

III. Bringing medicine back from the war: government dispensaries and auxiliary
training in the 1920s
a) Rural government dispensaries: a postwar demand of Nyasaland chiefs
In 1921, three years after the war’s end, Nyasaland’s Principal Medical Officer, Dr.
Henry Hearsey, drafted a Circular and sent it to the Chief Secretary in Zomba for
comment. Hearsey, who had occupied his position as Principal Medical Officer since
1902, wrote: “A not unimportant part of the scheme for providing medical aid to the
native population is the provision of Rural Dispensaries in areas distant from stations
where Medical Officers and Sub-Assistant Surgeons are posted.” Such provision of
medical care in rural areas had not previously been a part of government medical
policy—certainly not an important one—so Hearsey explained his inspiration. “That
there is an urgent need for such Dispensaries was forced on my mind when I closed down
those which had been erected on Lines of Communication during the late War. Various
Headmen and others enquired of me what they were now to do with their sick who
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needed treatment.” Even though the health facilities for African carriers maintained
during the war were sparse, poorly equipped and staffed with minimally trained
personnel, Africans remembered them as one of the few parts of the war effort worth
keeping. In response to the enquiries of native authorities, Hearsey announced his plans:
It is my intention to indent this coming year for a quantity of concentrated stock
mixtures for easy dispensing, which together with simple dressings, etc., would be
supplied to these dispensaries. They would be placed in charge of intelligent
native Hospital and Dispensary Attendants who had received some training and
experience in our native hospitals.63
Hearsey’s circular asked each of Nyasaland’s “Residents” (British officials in charge of
administering each district) to send him a number of locations that would be appropriate
for these new dispensaries. The criteria for selection of sites should, he explained, be the
density of the population in that area, and the distance from a Mission health facility for
natives. Hearsey sought, then, not to situate the rural dispensaries only in areas of
commercial activity or military importance, but rather to reach the largest native
population possible.

Two weeks later, when the Chief Secretary sent a copy of the circular to district officials,
he changed both its content and tone. No longer did the circular open with a declaration
of the importance of medical care for Africans. The Chief Secretary’s language was less
enthusiastic, lacking any indication he thought Hearsey’s plan important: “I am directed
to inform you that a proposal has been put forward by the Principal Medical Officer for
the establishment of dispensaries in rural areas.” The Chief Secretary’s revised circular
also added a criterion for the site of rural dispensaries, namely that “accessibility to the
63
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medical headquarters of the District should also be taken into consideration.” Ready
access to administrative centers, then, compromised the ideal of serving the most people
in areas remote from extant health services. The Chief Secretary also added “not more
than four sites in your district should be reported upon.”64

Similar stipulations would become a recurring theme in Nyasaland’s medical service—
central administrators constantly stressed cost containment. When the Principal Medical
Officer stressed the need for greater provision of medical services to Africans, the Chief
Secretary revised his circular to ensure limits on transport costs and in the number of sites
chosen. When the District Residents responded with their potential sites some, including
the Resident of South Nyasa (later known as Fort Johnston District) proposed only three
dispensary sites rather than the Chief Secretary’s limit of four. Seeking to maximize the
number of dispensaries overall, Hearsey and the Medical Officer at Fort Johnston argued
for the addition of a fourth site.65 As will be evident in the coming chapters, directors of
medical services and medical officers, were almost always encouraging more health
facilities, more rapid expansion, more spending, while administrators holding the purse
strings in Zomba and London tried to quell these demands.

When Hearsey sent his proposal to the Chief Secretary in 1921, there were already plans
afoot, and funds indented in the budget, to build seven health facilities for Africans to be
staffed with sub-assistant surgeons. Recognizing the extreme economies under which the
64
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colonial budget operated at the time, Hearsey admitted that his plan might have to wait.
Still, he believed that with the information provided by the districts, he would be able to
gradually expand the dispensary system “as opportunities occur,” eventually building 64
new dispensaries (four in each of Nyasaland’s sixteen districts).66

Initially, prospects for Hearsey’s proposal did not appear to be very good. The Treasury
Department in London demanded that Nyasaland cut its proposed 1922-23 budget in
order to attain an operating surplus of £80,000. This surplus would permit Nyasaland’s
government to cover expected losses on the privately owned Trans-Zambesi Railway,
whose profits Nyasaland had been compelled by officials in Whitehall to guarantee in
1919 (see Chapter 3). In order to meet these demands for austerity, Acting Governor
Richard Rankine cut £39,000 from his 1922-23 budget, including £500 he had originally
allocated for construction of the new dispensaries.67 Upset at being forced to make these
revisions, Rankine lodged a protest with Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the
Colonies. He explained that although “it has not been possible in the past to provide to
any extent for medical attendance of natives,” there remained “a great need for this,”
particularly “if we are to prevent the large waste of human life and energy which goes
unchecked at present among the natives.”68
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In February 1922, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Gilbert Grindle passed this
plea to the true arbiter of budgetary matters, Chancellor of the Exchequer Robert Home.
Grindle added that “information obtained in connection with the recent census and the
latest annual medical report of Nyasaland emphasize the urgent need for increased
medical attention to the native population.”69 Eventually the Treasury relented, if only
slightly, in its demand for economies. Their justification here seems to have been a
forecast by a Treasury official, who predicted that Nyasaland’s tariff and income tax
revenues in 1922/23 would be higher than originally estimated, thereby reducing the
scale of budget cuts needed.70 In March, Controller of Supply Services George Barstow
informed Grindle that the Treasury was prepared to allow the reinsertion of £12,500 of
Rankine’s proposed cuts.71 Ultimately, Nyasaland’s 1922-23 budget did include £768 for
dispensary attendants’ salaries, £580 for supplies for both hospitals and dispensaries, and
£500 for dispensary construction.72 An enthused Hearsey requested the expeditious
construction of the new dispensaries, and reported he had already begun recruiting
attendants.73

The significance of these new dispensaries, for the health of the populace or for the
colonial coffers, should not be overstated. The first year’s indent for the new attendants’
salaries (£768) represented less than one percent of the £100,000 collected from the
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annual hut tax.74 Even in the Principal Medical Officer’s initial plans, the dispensaries
were to be austere and inexpensive. Each facility, he explained, would consist of two huts
of wattle and daub, one for the dispensary and another for the living quarters of the
dispensary attendant. The inside walls of the dispensary hut would be equipped with
shelving made of reeds or split bamboo.75 Together, he estimated the two huts could be
built for £10. The only other cost would be the wages of the dispensary attendant; he
thought these should begin at £20 per month, rising each year by £2 and 6 shillings to
reach a maximum of £30 per month.76

Beyond the lingering memory of carrier hospitals, there were other forces impelling the
British administration to pay greater attention to the health of natives. Historians Richard
Rotberg and Colin Baker both note that British missionaries complained often to
government officials about the inadequacies of medical care for Africans, while European
landowners began to see the potential for greater output from healthier laborers.77 There
was also a newfound focus on social service provision in the major treatises and
justificatory doctrines of the British Empire. Former Governor-General of Nigeria Lord
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Frederick Lugard, architect of the principle of indirect rule that became official policy
throughout British Africa, published The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa in
1922. Lugard explained, “The white man was at first engaged in consolidating his own
position, and making the tropics healthier for Europeans engaged in their own
development. He has now accepted the principle that they must be made more healthy for
the native population.”78 As evidence, Lugard cited the testimony of then-Undersecretary
of State for the Colonies L.S. Amery from a debate in the House of Commons on the
Colonial Office Vote in August 1919. Because his was one of the earliest official
articulations of imperial responsibility for native health, Amery’s words are worth
quoting at some length:
The whole problem of the development of the tropics is in fact largely a problem
of coping with disease. Remember that the deadliness of the tropics is not merely
the deadliness to the white man. If he suffers it is entirely, or almost entirely,
because he catches diseases with which the native community around him is
already infected, and which lowers his vitality. Our problem is not merely to
make East Africa and West Africa healthy to the white man, but to make them
healthy to the whole population, to undertake out there, as here at home, a
campaign for dealing with the diseases of those countries in a much more
comprehensive and bolder spirit than we have ever undertaken before.79
Amery’s speech drew upon the concerns with contagion that had spurred segregationist
city planning in the name of sanitation.80 But in his case, the possibility that African
sickness could lead to European illness was a reason to improve native health, not
separate their dwellings.
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b) The realities of government medicine for Africans, 1921-1930
Unsurprisingly, the visions of healthy, well-served native populations evoked by this
rhetoric remained far from the daily experience of colonial medicine. At the few native
hospitals in Nyasaland during the early 1920s, medical officers wrote scathingly about
the conditions in which they were made to practice. A 1921 annual report authored by Dr.
Raymond Busy, the Senior Medical Officer in Blantyre, explained:
The present position of the Native Hospital is unsatisfactory from all points of
view. It is situated right on the road side…There is only one ward, which has to
be used for all classes of cases…Government should build a proper new Native
Hospital…with separate wards for medical, surgical and female patients and with
good rooms for outpatients and for operations…Failing this it would be better to
give a large government grant to the large, well-established and well-staffed
hospital at the Church of Scotland Mission for the treatment of Natives and send
all cases to that institution.81
Busy’s proposal was not approved. Three years later, in his new post as Nyasaland’s
Principal Medical Officer, Busy forwarded the Chief Secretary another complaint about
Blantyre’s native hospital, this one written by A.G. Eldred, his successor as Blantyre’s
Senior Medical Officer. Eldred’s report was even more vivid, describing the hospital’s
“one large ward, in which all patients, prisoners, and the general native public have to be
herded.” Lacking even a room to treat outpatients, “the dressing of wounds and ulcers is
at present performed practically in the main road.” 82 In his own minute, the Director of
Public Works added his opinion that the present Native Hospital was “in a very
unsanitary condition…and, if retained, would involve such expenditure on improvement
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as, in my opinion, is unjustifiable.”83 In 1925, citing the hospital’s “disrepair,” FE
Whitehead, Nyasaland’s new Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, simply shuttered
the building and paid the Blantyre Mission Hospital to treat African inpatients referred
from government dispensaries.84

Nyasaland was not the only colony in British Africa where the medical administration
sought increased facilities for natives in the years after the First World War. In 1922, Dr.
John Gilks, Kenya’s Principal Medical Officer, wrote of his Department that it was “no
longer considered merely as an organization maintained by Government to facilitate
administration by maintaining the personnel of the executive in health, but as a
Department of Government responsible for the carrying out of the most important
function for which Government itself is established, namely the maintenance in health of
the general population of the country and the improvement of the conditions under which
that population lives.”85 In Tanganyika (most of what was formerly German East Africa),
the British administration began rural dispensary construction in 1926 in response to what
historian Ann Beck described only as “popular demand and political pressure.”86

In Nyasaland, Government dispensers were recruited from the small cadre of young
African males who had received some education at mission schools; these recruits were
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trained at native hospital in Zomba, where they apprenticed for a few months under
African dressers and dispensers before being sent out. Though a few African auxiliaries
in the government service had received months or even years of medical training at
mission hospitals, there was no formal didactic instruction for the new dispensers training
in Zomba in the 1920s87. When they reached their rural outposts, the new dispensers did
not draw in droves of sick patients. Attendance figures belied the Medical Department’s
claim that dispensers were “giving the natives confidence in European medicine.”88 In
1927, the average number of new cases presenting daily at each of the 78 rural
dispensaries was only 3 to 4.89

Though dispensaries and African hospitals made some bare minimum of care available to
the general African population in Nyasaland, members of the colonial administration did
not take great pride in them. In 1925 the government claimed to provide 14 “hospitals”
for natives, though it counted the Blantyre Mission as one such hospital, and only seven
of the 14 had a medical officer. The other seven each had a sub-assistant surgeon, though
at two of these the sub-assistant surgeon was present only two or three months each
year.90 As Nyasaland Governor Shenton Thomas lamented in a dispatch to the Colonial
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Office in 1930, native hospitals were so poorly maintained that “Africans of the better
type flatly refused to enter.”91

There were few diseases for which European medicine was thought, among the general
African population, to be effective. During the early 1920s, the new native dispensaries
joined mission hospitals in attempting to cure yaws, a treponemal infection closely
related to syphilis, though spread via non-sexual contact.92 Yaws was not a fatal
infection, but it caused disfiguring and often debilitating ulcers that could erode skin,
tissue and even bone. The dispensaries and hospitals initially used “Castellani’s mixture,”
a combination of tartar emetic, sodium salicylate, and potassium iodide that had been
used by David Livingstone in the 1860s. But the treatment was “disappointing,” as
relapses were common and advanced cases were rarely cured.93

In 1925, medical officers in the districts of Karonga and Dedza introduced an
intramuscular injection of sodium bismuth tartrate that seemed, at least initially, more
effective. “The natives, once they realized the value of the new treatment, flocked to the
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dispensaries,” wrote medical officer HB Follit.94 Various preparations of bismuth had
been used to treat syphilis and yaws in other British colonies since 1922. It eventually
appeared to demonstrate some efficacy as a treatment for yaws; six injections over three
weeks suppressed the disfiguring and painful ulcers (though, unbeknownst to the
investigators of the 1920s, this suppression would usually not be permanent).95 The
injections were intramuscular (not intravenous, as were other treatments such as
salvarsan), so some of the dressers staffing native dispensaries were permitted to
administer them by themselves.96 But the injections were not without side effects. The
most common was stomatitis, a painful an inflammation of tissue in the mouth. This side
effect was more commonly seen with the higher doses administered to patients with
syphilis. For yaws patients, for whom side effects were less frequent, the injections
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proved quite popular. Outpatient attendances for yaws climbed from 479 in 1925 to 2227
in 1928.97

Few Nyasaland Africans had access to what was generally believed to be the safest, most
effective yaws treatment available. Yaws symptoms could be even more quickly
suppressed by injections of neosalvarsan. Discovered in the laboratory of German
physician Paul Ehrlich in 1912 (and an improvement on salvarsan, which his laboratory
had discovered in 1909), neosalvarsan was first used in Europe as a treatment for
venereal syphilis.98 A few missions and native hospitals in Nyasaland began using this
injection in 1920s for both syphilis and yaws. The drug proved fairly painless, and within
weeks after completing the course of two injections, administered one a week apart, most
patients’ outward manifestations of yaws had disappeared. But the Medical Department
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deemed neosalvarsan too expensive for “general use.”99 In 1921, a missionary in
Tanganyika reported that neosalvarsan cost him 10 shillings per dose.100 Five years later,
writing in the pages of the Lancet, John Owen Shircore (then Tanganyika’s Director of
Medical Services), reported that for 10 shillings he could prepare over 300 doses of his
favored bismuth injection.101 In addition, because neosalvarsan had to be administered
intravenously, it was used only at stations staffed by medical officers.102

Despite the popularity of yaws treatment, most Africans did not begin to seek care at
government or mission facilities for every kind of serious illness. As Terence Ranger
explained, “there was remarkably little of the predicted carry-over effect. Readiness to
come for yaws treatment did not break down a more general ‘mistrust of European
methods.’”103 I will argue in Chapter 7 that Nyasaland Africans were skeptical
empiricists in their therapy-seeking behavior. This is anything but a novel argument—
though, as I will argue, its veracity and import have not yet been fully appreciated. Dr. JB
Christopherson, a missionary physician working in Tanzania, made the same case in the
UMCA’s journal in 1921 when he declared: “the native only judges by results.”104 In the
late 1920s European medicine seemed effective at treating yaws, though the popularity of
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these injections would abate as the disfiguring lesions reappeared in previously treated
patients. This was due to at least three factors: the inefficacy of the treatments themselves
(truly effective therapy would come only with the arrival of penicillin); the difficulty in
completing full treatment courses, which required multiple visits by patients in whom
lesions had already begun to resolve; and the lack of a focus on treating latent cases, in
addition to patients with clinically manifest disease.105

Beyond the deficiencies in yaws campaigns, an even more important reason for the dearth
of African attendance at medical facilities was that European medicine had not yet
demonstrated any efficacy at treating many other common illnesses, from tropical ulcer
to tuberculosis. The total number of African and Asian outpatient attendances did rise
during the 1920s, markedly after the construction of dispensaries, from 19,089 in 1921 to
96,088 in 1923, then more slowly, to 168,181 in 1928. By 1928, there was still barely one
outpatient admission per year for every ten Africans in Nyasaland.106 Christopherson
may have been right when he claimed that “every case cured is placed in the native mind
to the credit of the government”—as we will see in later chapters, this was the
assumption underlying investments in health care throughout the British Empire during
periods of tumult—but in the 1920s such cases remained relatively few and far
between.107
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In any case, government medicine was not the most pervasive fact of colonial rule for
African subjects in Nyasaland during the first interwar decade. During the early 1920s, a
flat hut tax of 6 shillings was due from inhabitants of each hut every October 1. Default
on this tax carried penalties including a prison term of six months, the demolition of
one’s hut, and even the seizing of the defaulter’s wife as a hostage until payment (a tactic
born in the impressment of carrier labor during the Great War).108 As late as the mid1930s, tax-defaulters held as prisoners in Mlanje were even made to perform the daily
task of removing buckets of feces and urine from the latrines in the homes of
Europeans.109

Beyond the conscription of wartime carriers and punishments for tax defaulters, the
government was known among Africans for its neglect during times of want. During a
terrible famine in 1922-1923, British administrators set the price of imported maize at
more than two times the rate the government had ever paid to peasant producers, and
refused to release stored maize from granaries.110
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The Nyasaland government was also known for its seemingly endless preferences for
European settlers. In 1928, when a 20-year old European man named D’Arcy shot and
killed an African boy, D’Arcy claimed he had merely intended to show off the gun but it
had accidentally gone off. Nyasaland’s High Court ruled that this act was “that of a youth
who considers it grand and manly to be seen carrying a firearm” and, though finding the
defendant guilty of manslaughter, Judge Haythorne Reed felt he could “pass on…only a
sentence of a fine” of forty pounds. “I hope,” the judge advised D’Arcy, “you will shew
that this is justified by becoming a useful member of society, and by living up to the
highest ideals of our race.”111 Contrast this to the sentence imposed upon an native cook,
who was convicted of disobedience to his master’s orders when, instead of drowning
“two sick puppies” as ordered, he gave them away as a present. A lower court sentenced
the cook to three months imprisonment with hard labor; on appeal, the High Court
showed the extent of his forbearance for natives by lowering the cook’s sentence to 2 ½
months.112 So while the Principal Medical Officer succeeded in garnering some funds to
make government medicine for Africans more widely available, this was a small and, in
many ways, anomalous departure from colonial policy of the era.
IV.

Conclusion

Whereas before the First World War the only source of biomedical care in Nyasaland
were the scattered mission hospitals, the intense demands for African labor during the
war spurred the construction of government-run hospitals and dispensaries. These ill111
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equipped facilities were tasked with the care of the hundreds of thousands of “carriers”
forced to carry munitions, rations and other supplies to troops fighting near the border of
Nyasaland and German East Africa. Many conscripted carriers and soldiers had their first
contact with hospitals during the Great War, though these facilities were far more
impressive in official records than in reality.

In the aftermath of war, experience with biomedicine at these hospitals led native
authorities and colonial medical officers to call for the construction of additional health
facilities. These facilities were staffed by poorly trained African auxiliaries and operated
under extreme economies. According to colonial officials of the 1920s, these healthcare
facilities had not secured the confidence of most Africans. But the hospitals and
dispensaries owed their very existence to the even more threadbare carrier hospitals that
inaugurated the era of biomedical care for Africans in Nyasaland. During the early 1920s,
persistent advocacy by the Director of Medical Services, who invoked the recent war,
helped prompt the construction of rural dispensaries around the colony.

The next chapter will show that in the decades that followed the Great War, healthcare
for Africans would continue to be dictated by colonists’ labor demands, in particular the
need for healthy laborers on European-owned agricultural estates. For most other
Africans in Nyasaland, health remained a small part of the experience of being colonized.
Still, the feverish demand for labor during the Great War, the colonial government’s first
great crisis, had helped spur medical provision that reached Africans even in some rural
areas.
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Chapter 2
Legacies of interwar nutrition research: from veterinary medicine to economic
growth in Nyasaland, 1920-1953
Abstract
This chapter chronicles the efflorescence, decline and enduring effects of interwar-era
nutrition research in British colonial Africa. During the interwar era, experts in a diverse
array of scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture, and anthropology
investigated the health of Africans in British holdings in eastern and southern Africa.
These studies were inspired by—and in some cases led by—veterinarians who had
previously conducted animal studies in Africa. In both the veterinary and human studies,
investigators were interested in growing and maintaining productive bodies. Such bodies,
they found, could only be forged with diets consisting of sufficient quantities of vitamins,
minerals and calories. The researchers were also concerned about parasites’ ability to sap
productivity. One of the most ambitious such investigations was the Nyasaland Nutrition
Survey (1938-1940), which buttressed officials’ claims that improving productivity
among colonized subjects demanded increased spending on health services and
agricultural extension. During the interwar years this research showed little immediate
impact on colonial expenditures for either health or agriculture. But later, in the postwar
dawn, economic researchers would use the Nyasaland Survey data to calculate colonial
national incomes. After the Second World War, the Survey’s agriculturalist advocated
radical changes to agricultural policy. Ultimately, a research agenda originally aiming to
help transform Africans into more effective laborers was repurposed to try to make them
into more ambitious capitalists.
Prelude: Flood, drought, and living in uncertainty
“If you could leave this place, you would,” explained an elderly man waiting in line to
see a nurse operating a mobile clinic out of the back of a Toyota Landcruiser. The man
(who declined to give his name because he had just cobbled together a shoddy grass hut
outside the camp and did not want to be disqualified from relief offered in the camp) was
one of thousands in the area who had lost homes and livelihoods in recent floods. But for
the many who continued to sleep in Red Cross tents or church pews or hastily converted
schoolrooms, the danger that roused the greatest fear was not continued homelessness,
but famine.

80

In early January 2015 large swaths of the southern African nations of Malawi and
Mozambique suffered the region’s worst flood in at least a half-century. The United
Nations estimated 170,00 people were displaced, while at least 150 people died. Budding
crops on an estimated 89,000 hectares of cultivated fields were washed away, while
195,000 livestock were drowned. One week after the rains ended, some areas were still
only accessible by helicopter. Thousands sought shelter from the waters in hastily
constructed camps. Camp residents complained they had little food, and nurses operating
out of Red Cross ambulances reported seeing cases of scabies, diarrhea, malaria, and
scores of women complaining of non-specific and diffuse body pain.

The annual rains are usually a welcome sight and, initially, their arrival was a relief. After
applying fertilizer and planting crops in November 2014 farmers waited anxiously for the
rains, which usually start by mid-November but only started this year in mid-December.
But over the holidays the rains did not relent. By the second week of January, the Shire
River had flooded its banks and began to fill the surrounding valley. Refugees in Nchalo,
a town in Malawi’s southern district of Chikwawa, recounted waters that rose to the
necks of full-grown men. Clothing, pots, and livestock were washed away. Malawians
described the scene with a refrain repeated so often that one wondered if everyone had
read Coleridge: “Water, water everywhere.”

By February 2015 in Nchalo a shifting cast of NGOs provided ad hoc relief to the
thousands housed in two contiguous camps with a combined 3,000 people. The tents had
been cobbled together from UNICEF, the Red Cross and the Malawi Army, but many
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leaked in the heavy rains. The World Food Programme and World Vision distributed soy,
beans and cooking oil. Médecins Sans Frontières built latrines and began offering a daily
mobile clinic. Illovo, a sugar company with a plantation nearby, parked a tank of potable
water at the side of the road and offered to treat more medical cases referred to the
company clinic free of charge. One afternoon, without any notice, shopkeepers in a local
Muslim charitable society unloaded a truck full of groceries right in front of the camp.
Realizing immediately that this donation was unlikely to be repeated, hungry men and
women jostled for the sudden windfall. Government officials conducted head counts of
camp residents. Sundry NGO administrators visited every day to assess the situation and
deliver sundry supplies. But aside from the higher-level meetings in the country’s capital,
there seemed to be little coordination; NGO employees interviewed in the camps had not
met with other groups working there.

A week after the waters began to subside, more and more refugees tried to return to their
homes. The tents in the camps were too crowded with unwashed, unfed bodies, and the
site itself was miserable. Located in the middle of barren soccer field without trees for
shade, the tents became ovens in the hot midday sun.

Neatly clad in a brown dress, a young girl in a camp alongside thousands displaced by
recent floods repeated a daily chore seen often in nearby villages. Bent at the hip, her
body folded in two, she used a small broom of bundled twigs to sweep away the dirt
outside her tent. But this was a Sisyphean task. The tent was surrounded only by a barren
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expanse of dust. It seemed a quiet attempt to recover some sense of normalcy in the midst
of an unfolding disaster.

There was relative comfort nearby. Across the tarmac road from the camp was an outdoor
market where brightly colored clothing was sold. A half-mile away, a quaint lodge
offered ample shade and breakfast to NGO administrators with per diems and SUVs. The
camp residents lived in a squalor surrounded by normalcy.

Outside the official disaster area, further north along the Shire River in the village of
Matope, the flood inflicted similar damage. Matope means “mud” in Chichewa, a nod to
its low-lying locale. A smallholder farmer named John Lucia returned to his brick house
after the water receded to find a wall collapsed. After his neighbor found his home
destroyed as well, both of their families (comprising 11 people) moved into a single
wattle-and-daub hut nearby. They were the lucky ones; families without recourse to spare
huts slept on church pews and on schoolroom floors.

While the destruction of housing was a disaster, the most fearful sight came when the
waters subsided and people surveyed their fields. The entire valley was usually lush with
maize, cotton and rice by late January. But they saw only a thick layer of silt and sand
that promised to suffocate their crops. Though the region’s semi-subsistence farmers
were accustomed a precarious existence and seasonal hunger, this was an unbearable
shock. Most families had already run out of food stored up from the May 2014 harvest.
The months from January through April are commonly known in Malawi as nyengo njala
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(the hungry season). Dedicated malnutrition wards in district hospitals fill with infants on
the verge of death, children with crispy orange hair, distended bellies, edematous feet and
twig-like arms. So concentrated is the suffering here that the hungry season draws an
annual pilgrimage of medical researchers, studying either the effect of acute-on-chronic
malnutrition, or devising biomedical interventions to address it.1

During these months, people toil on empty stomachs to produce the next harvest. “We are
poor people,” explained Ruthina Medisani, an elderly woman in Matope whose home had
been felled and fields laid waste by the flood. “We must rely only on what we can grow.”

Those able-bodied poor who cannot grow enough for themselves must begin the sojourn
for ganyu (piecework labor) in the fields of wealthier farmers. But in the floods of early
2015, even this work had disappeared. Crops had been destroyed across the valley. The
quest for meager pay now forced many to make the long walk into the highlands where
some farms have been spared. A well-built young man named Denies Bonongwe, who
had lost his house and was living with friends, says these sojourns for ganyu earned him
no more than 200 kwacha (US$0.43) per day.

Although no Malawians I interviewed could remember floods of this magnitude, they did
point to recent history for predictions of what could come next. In 2002 the country had
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endured a deadly famine after a poor harvest (spurred, in part, by cuts to a government
program that provided free agricultural inputs). The famine was worsened by the bungled
response. The recently privatized agricultural marketing board (ADMARC) had sold off
the government’s reserves of grain, the president was late to declare a state of emergency,
and disaster relief from outside the country was late and insufficient. Many baby boys
born during this period were given the name Mavuto (translated literally, “misfortune”).
Patrick Mwale, an elected ward councilor representing the area around Matope,
remembers 2002 as the year “nobody came to help.” He hoped that his year his
constituents’ cries were heard, both by the Malawi government and by outside donors.

For their part, Malawians affected by the floods were quick to list exactly what they
needed. Mwale reported that his constituents’ demands were varied, but amounted to a
comprehensive program of relief and rehabilitation. In the immediate term, they called
for emergency food relief and expanded public works programs to keep families fed.
They also demanded a rapid distribution of seed and fertilizer to allow them to make one
last-ditch attempt to replant their crops before the rains stopped for the year. They called
for tarpaulins to cover their collapsed roofs, and assistance rebuilding their homes. Most
of the displaced dreaded the prospect of sitting idle in sweltering camps or church floors,
subject to the whims of whatever NGO decided to visit. But most of this relief did not
come. As the window for replanting crops closed rapidly, many Malawians had nothing
left to their names but ruined fields and collapsed homes.
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Two months later the scale of devastation looked worse than ever. Parts of the country
spared the torrential rains were struck by drought. Francis’s village was one such place.
On the morning of February 21, Francis looked relieved by rains overnight. His smiled
more than he had during the past three weeks. His nascent maize crop was about to enter
a crucial phase. Without sufficient moisture in the soil over the coming weeks, the silken
tassels that signaled a healthy crop would not emerge on time. “I was worried,” Francis
admitted. He hoped the rains would continue.

But his hopes would soon be dashed. Over the coming weeks, unrelenting sunshine
parched the soil and scorched the stalks. Tassels, those hoped-for harbingers of full
stomachs, sprouted late or not at all. By mid-March Francis was worried once more that
even if rain fell again, the year’s harvest would still be paltry.

Sure enough, the joyful spirits that accompany a strong harvest season came to few
Malawians in 2015. Smaller crops of pumpkins proved hardy in the face of continued
drought, but Malawians’ reliance on high-risk, high-reward maize—a crop that can yield
bounteous harvests but is dangerously susceptible to drought—did not pay off that year.
After a record 2014 harvest of 3.93 million tons, the floods and droughts during the 2015
growing season depressed the annual harvest to only 2.88 million tons. The market price
of maize barely dipped after the harvest; by December 2015 short supplies and a
depreciating currency had pushed the maize prices to record levels.2 Even fishermen
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shared in the misery, as unusually strong winds on the lake kept fish outside the reach of
their nets.

These disasters revealed the nature of wealth in rural Malawi. Malawians determined
their neighbor’s wealth not by their conspicuous consumption of superfluous luxuries
(few had any), but rather the number of misfortunes (sickness, flood, drought, changes in
government programs) they could withstand before tumbling into utter penury. When, for
instance, Francis’s neighbor Bamusa developed cataracts so advanced he could scarcely
see, he was able to afford surgery at Zomba’s Central Hospital. Both the surgery and food
for inpatients were free (as are almost all services at government hospitals). Bamusa also
had livestock he could sell to pay for transport and other ancillary expenses. When
Francis’s nephew William could no longer afford school fees following the death of both
his parents, he could turn to Francis to pay them. Wealth, in this village, entailed
networks of support that allowed individuals to deal with tragedy and disaster. Francis
and his family had the means to shield themselves against the coming onslaught of
hunger, but without public action to ensure access to food, many Malawians did not.
I. Health as wealth from the 1920s to the 1940s: entomology, nutrition, and labor
productivity
The first iteration of academic concern for the health of the general population of African
subjects in the British Empire was driven by a diverse array of scientific fields, including
nutrition, entomology, agriculture and anthropology. Improvements in health were
understood to stem from a diet containing enough vitamins, minerals and calories and a
living environment sufficiently free of parasites to build and maintain hardy, productive
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bodies. Together these investigations buttressed the claim that increased production from
colonial subjects—a boon for colonial exports of primary materials and purchases of
industrial products from the metropole—depended on increased investment in the health
of colonized Africans. These proposed investments included agricultural extension
services and vector control campaigns, but also improved health care facilities.

One of the most significant scientific investigations of the connection between health and
productivity was the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey, begun in 1938. For a brief moment,
Nyasaland was the center of imperial expectations for cutting-edge research and novel
interventions in the effort to make colonized labor healthier and, consequently, more
productive. Proposals for dramatic expansions in colonial interventions in the health of
natives arose from this survey, interventions which at full scale would have impelled
significant increases in health and agriculture department budgets and a wholesale
imperial commitment the “health is wealth” argument. But this moment faded quickly;
the exigencies of wartime—including the secondment of doctors and agricultural experts
from Nyasaland and other African colonies to military service elsewhere—halted efforts
in Nyasaland and elsewhere. When imperial concern for colonial development reemerged
in the postwar era, it had far more resources but a waning belief in the connection
between health and economic growth.

This chapter draws upon archival research in Malawi and the United Kingdom to
demonstrate both the efflorescence—and enduring effects—of interwar-era nutrition
research in British colonial Africa. During the interwar era, experts in a diverse array of
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scientific fields, including nutrition, entomology, agriculture, and anthropology
investigated the health of Africans in British holdings in eastern and southern Africa.
These studies were inspired by—and in some cases led by—veterinarians who had
previously conducted research in Africa. In both the veterinary and human studies,
investigators were interested in growing and maintaining productive bodies. Such bodies,
they found, could only be forged with diets consisting of sufficient quantities of vitamins,
minerals and calories. The researchers were also concerned with the role of parasites in
sapping productivity. One of the most ambitious such investigations was the Nyasaland
Nutrition Survey (1938-1940), which buttressed officials’ claims that improving
productivity among colonized subjects demanded increased spending on health services
and agricultural extension. During the interwar years this research showed immediate
impact on colonial expenditures on either health or agriculture. But later, in the postwar
dawn, economic researchers would recycle this research in calculating colonial national
incomes. Agricultural experts, for their part, revived the research to advocate for radical
changes in colonial land tenure and agricultural policy. Ultimately, a research agenda
originally aiming to help transform Africans into more effective laborers was repurposed
to try to make them into more ambitious capitalists.

a) From livestock to natives: nutrition science in British Africa, 1925-1928
Much of the knowledge of how to produce a more productive African laborer drew from
the veterinary sciences. One of the first to propose that disease could result from
deficiencies in micronutrient deficiencies (or, to use the early-twentieth-century category,
“accessory factors”) was the University of Cambridge biochemist Frederick Gowland
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Hopkins, who in a 1912 paper demonstrated that young rats fed diets lacking specific
vitamins grew only slowly, while others fed diets lacking the amino acids tryptophan died
within 14 days.3 In 1919, Hopkins chaired a Committee on Accessory Food Factors,
which produced a report for the UK Medical Research Committee (itself chaired by
Member of Parliament and dairy farmer Waldorf Astor). The report claimed that
deficiencies of accessory factors produced similar manifestations in humans and animals.
Among other examples, the report pointed to the visual impairments caused by the lack
of Vitamin A in both animals and humans.4

When, in time, British nutrition researchers sought to study human diseases more
directly, colonized subjects seemed ready human subjects. The transition from animals to
Africans was apt, given the uses to which Africans had been put in the recent war. During
the First World War, hundreds of thousands were forced to work as “beasts of burden” in
the East African theater (see Chapter 1).5 Many veterinary researchers quickly
transitioned to African subjects in nutritional studies. One such researcher was John Boyd
Orr, the head of a veterinary research institute in Aberdeen, Scotland. In 1925 while on
assignment for the Colonial Office in Kenya, he worked with John Gilks, the director of
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the Medical Department, on a survey of the diet and health of the Maasai and the Kikuyu.
Their findings, published in the Lancet in 1927, stressed the poor nutritional status of
both groups (though the meat-consuming Maasai were thought to have better nutrition)
and the investigators’ confidence that greater efforts to improve African diets would
improve the value of “the native as an economic factor.” 6

In Nyasaland, medical officers echoed this concern with diet, while pointing as well to
parasitic infections as another major cause of native “indolence.” In the 1925 Medical
Department Annual Report, medical officer W. Milne-Tough contended poor diet was
partly responsible for Africans’ deficient labor on European-owned agricultural estates,
but he also blamed the high prevalence of ankylostomiasis [hookworm].7 Among the
appendices included in Milne-Tough’s report was a study from Mlanje—a southern
district filled with European-owned tea estates—in which medical officer HG Wiltshire
found that even among (presumably better-fed) Africans employed as police and hospital
attendants the prevalence of Ankylostoma duodenale in feces was 23.3 percent, while the
prevalence of the ova of Ascaris lumbricoides was 43.3 percent.8 Milne-Tough allowed
that some part of the problems with African labor productivity could be attributed to the
“natural indolence” of natives (they were, he said, “content with a hand-to-mouth
existence”), parasitic infections and diet were major contributors. “The first step towards
6
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an improvement in the existing state of affairs,” he insisted, “must be taken by the
employers of labour.”9

Three years later, in his 1928 annual report, Director of Medical and Sanitary Services FE
Whitehead made these same links between labor productivity, diet, and hookworm
infection. He remarked that native labourers were given “physiologically insufficient,
monotonous, and ill-balanced” rations of maize, beans and salt. The main element
missing from this diet, Whitehead believed, was meat. Boyd Orr and Gilks had made the
same claim with regard to the agricultural Kikuyu people while contrasting them with the
pastoralist Maasai. But in his report, Whitehead admitted that “the Government rightly
hesitates to enforce an adequate scale of diet,” as employers might not be able to afford to
provide a regular ration of meat to African laborers.10

In addition to such rationalizations, this medical discourse also served to de-politicize (at
least in official discourse) the problem of labor productivity, and to ignore the possibility
that African laborers might be working slowly in part because they resented the
conditions under which they toiled. William Cecil Botttomley, a clerk in the Colonial
Office, wrote in 1912 that the prevailing wage rate for African laborers on Nyasaland
estates (four to five shillings per month, without food) was “a record for any settled part
of Africa.” Hungry for labor to work their fields, many planters turned to the thangata
system devised by Nyasaland Governor Alfred Sharpe in 1902.11 Under this system
9
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African “tenants” on land alienated to Europeans were required to work for at least one
month on Europeans’ crops in lieu of rent, and another month in order to meet hut tax
obligations. The historian John McCracken has argued that African tenants often had to
spend even longer on landlords’ fields, as landlords were wont to abrogate verbal
agreements “by the simple expedient of refusing to provide workers with the vouchers
required to demonstrate to the government that they had met their obligations.”12 While
parasites and diet were much-studied causes of low productivity of African labor on
European-owned estates, the problem could also have been a result of foot-dragging. In
the absence of any real incentives to work harder, these African laborers (like many
subject peoples) might have seen little reason to strain every fiber.13 But the colonial
medical officials did not raise this possibility, perhaps because acknowledging it might
detract from their ongoing efforts to prove to potential European settlers that they could
turn an easy profit using low-paid or unpaid African labor.

b) Anti-hookworm campaigns: medical popularity and danger, 1928-1931
While solutions to problems with the native laborer’s diet appeared expensive, the
Nyasaland government helped planters attempt a more frugal biomedical remedy for
parasitic infections. Whitehead observed in 1928 that hookworm did “not appear to cause
severe symptoms, and beyond a feeling of lassitude and discomfort suggestive of
dyspepsia there is little to make the patient suspect his trouble. These slight symptoms are
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sufficient, however, to interfere with his output of work.”14 The Nyasaland Medical
Department responded to this problem by providing carbon tetrachloride free of charge to
European employers of native labor. The use of this drug marked another repurposing of
veterinary medicine. Just as veterinary researchers like Boyd Orr had helped spark
concern with African diets, they had also helped devise a cure for native lassitude caused
by parasites. Carbon tetrachloride had first been tested for use as an antihelminthic on
dogs by American pharmacologist Maurice Hall in 1921.15

Such government aid for estates marked one of the Nyasaland government’s first
interventions into the health of natives. Outside the sparsely placed mission hospitals,
which tended to charge fees for care, Africans in the protectorate had few options for
government healthcare, other than the few poorly equipped native hospitals in major
towns and the recently established rural dispensaries constructed from wattle-and-daub
and staffed by attendants with very limited diagnostic skills (see Chapter 1). Though
Whitehead claimed in 1928 that hookworm was “nearly universal amongst the natives of
the country,” he confessed he had not yet begun mass campaign against it ”owing to a
lack of staff.”16 The government did undertake such a campaign following an increase in
imperial grants for native health the early 1930s (Chapter 3), but in the 1920s the
14
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government focused its limited medical budget on improving the health of laborers on
Native estates.
c) Pharmacies versus estates: elite battles over labor productivity and profits, 19281932
Early in the colonial era, concern for maintaining productive labor led some European
planters to pay for health services for their African laborers. In 1901, the Church of
Scotland mission hospital in Blantyre began to supply health services to employers of
African labor—including planters, traders, and transport agents—in the Shire Highlands.
African hospital assistants examined sick patients on an outpatient basis, and referred
serious cases to the mission’s hospital.17

By the 1920s, the government Medical Department had supplanted missionaries as the
major supplier of medicines to European employers. In addition to supplying carbon
tetrachloride to estates free of charge, the Nyasaland Government sold estates other
medicines at their “landed cost” (at the cost of importing drugs); these prices were far
below those prevailing at privately owned pharmacies in the territory. In a February 1928
letter to the Chief Secretary in Zomba, Percy Skerett of the Nyasaland Merchants’
Association objected to this policy. He noted that the Government enjoyed much lower
transport costs than private importers; government paid railway transport rates one-third
lower than the private sector, and did not pay any wharfage fees at ports. “The Trader is
therefore handicapped,” Skerett argued, “at once by the difference between the
Government and his landed costs to the extent that he cannot compete at a price to get his
17
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actual outlay back.”18 Three months later, the Nyasaland Planters’ Association responded
with its own letter, in which it contended “the scheme…is working well—to the benefit
of the native who gets the proper medicine when he is sick and to the benefit of the
Planter who thus manages to keep his workers in better health.”19

The Government sided with the planters, and continued the policy—over the
pharmacists’ objections—for years. Skerrett persisted in protesting the government’s sale
of drugs to estates. He even penned a June 1932 letter to the editor of East Africa, a
newspaper published in Kenya, decrying the policy as “most unfair competition” and a
burden on the taxpayer. Repeal would, he said, “relieve the Government from their
present invidious position, whereby they charge a license to those who deal in drugs and
medicines and then, by supplying those stores themselves, deprive them of such business
as would accrue.”20 But the government had already reaffirmed its position; in an April
1932 memo to the Chief Secretary, Whitehead wearily explained that “this matter has
been fully dealt with in previous minutes…I know that there is a very strong desire
amongst planters to continue this arrangement.” The political power of estates—the main
source of export revenue for Nyasaland—gave the cash-strapped government an interest
in their prosperity—and support for medical provision on the estates was thought to be a
cost-efficient way to improve their output.
18
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d) Building “human material”: nutrition in British development thought, 1932-1938
By the mid-1930s, though, both the myopic focus on chemotherapeutics for estate labor
seemed, to a number of colonial researchers and officials, inadequate. In 1932, the British
social anthropologist Audrey Richards’ published a revised version of her PhD a study of
food and nutrition titled Hunger and work in a savage tribe: a functional study of
nutrition among the southern Bantu. In the book, drawn from material presented in other
ethnographic studies as well as her own fieldwork, she argued that malnutrition in British
Africa was not solely a biochemical deficiency remediable with supplements, but the
result of social processes legible only upon deeper examination of kinship groups and
clans.21 But Richards was not averse to biochemical studies of nutrition; in her work
among the Bemba in Northern Rhodesia during the mid-1930s she collaborated with Dr.
Elsie Widdowson, a biochemist at Kings’ College Hospital in London.22 Richards and
Widdowson published their findings in Africa, the journal of the London-based
International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (IIALC). This institute had, in
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1934, established a diet committee, which sought to support investigations of nutrition in
British Africa by combining the insights of social anthropology and biochemistry.23

But the increased interest in the economic underpinnings, and economic consequences, of
nutrition during the 1930s was not unique to Britain’s holdings in colonial Africa. Studies
published in the League of Nations Health Organization’s Bulletin in 1935 contended that
poor nutrition was a truly global problem. Even in wealthy nations, such as the United
Kingdom and the United States, the relatively poor continued to go hungry.24 In poor
nations and dependencies, the report contended, the problem was an absolute shortage of
food. Remedies, the report concluded, demanded the collaborative efforts of experts in
health and agriculture.25

The Colonial Office took up this call for combining experts in health and agriculture as
part of an overall vision of colonial development. After a 1937 visit to East Africa,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Herbrand Sackville, the Earl de
la Warr, declared that “the real ‘development’ needed in Africa is not in the investment of
large sums of capital, but the improvement of the human material. The limiting factor is
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the low standard of health and intelligence of the average native.”26 To build Africa’s
“human material,” improvements in agriculture, health and education would have to be
pursued in tandem. Malnutrition—a product, according to a 1939 Colonial Office report,
of poverty and ignorance, and a cause of disease and lassitude—was a problem that dealt
with all three facets of this notion of development.27
II.
The rise and fall of nutrition research in Nyasaland: the Nyasaland Nutrition
Survey
a) Conducting the survey, 1938-1940
In the year before the Second World War, Nyasaland was the site of an ambitious study
meant to inform future interventions. Leading officials in Nyasaland at the time were
eager to obtain additional funding for the medical department emphasizing the link
between health and productivity. A March 1936 memorandum penned by ADJB
Williams, Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services and forwarded by Governor
Kittermaster to the Colonial Office, stated that “the efficiency and therefore the material
prosperity of a people depends to a very large extent on the healthiness of the people.”28
Their timing was auspicious. In 1937, the UK Economic Advisory Council established a
Committee on Nutrition to review responses from a questionnaire on nutrition that had
been sent to every British dependency by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1936.
Drawing upon funding from the IIALC, the Colonial Development Fund, the British
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Medical Research Council, and the Colonial Office, the Committee on Nutrition planned
to support a series of multi-disciplinary nutritional surveys in colonial holdings
throughout the empire.29 Kittermaster made it known that he was eager to have a study
conducted among his subjects, and in March 1937 the governors of the East African
territories—who had been tasked with selecting the site for the first study—granted his
wish.30

The Nyasaland Nutritional Survey began in three villages in Nkhotakota District in
September 1938, under the leadership of Benjamin Stanley Platt. Though only in his midthirties, Platt was already physician and biochemist of considerable repute. He had spent
the previous six years in Shanghai, where he had conducted controlled trials and
published findings the links between thiamine (Vitamin B1) deficiency, rice preparation,
and the symptoms of beriberi.31 The survey team included another doctor, HG
Fitzmaurice, who had been the medical officer stationed in Nkhotakota for two years the
survey began. He was tasked with continuing his regular clinical work throughout the
district while in the three survey villages he was to examine all the adults (using Platt’s
own 10-page-long form for each exam) and to weigh the infants and young children.32
For the team’s nutritionist, Platt chose Jessie Barker, another young researcher who had
worked as a recorder on John Boyd Orr’s urban surveys in the UK. In Nyasaland
Barker’s job was to record the weight of all food before cooking and as consumed, and to
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pack samples to be sent to Boyd Orr’s laboratory in Aberdeen for biochemical analysis.
Her nickname in the villages became Mwadya chiyani (Chichewa for “what have you
eaten”) due to the frequency with which she asked the question.33 Governor Kittermaster
had chosen the anthropologist, Margaret Read, who had been conducting fieldwork in
central and northern Nyasaland among the Ngoni people as a research fellow of the
IIALC.34 Richard Kettlewell, an official in Nyasaland’s Department of Agriculture—and
a man with a dismal view of extant African agricultural practices—was the team’s
agriculturalist. The final expert on the survey team was the botanist, a role filled during
most of the study by Dr. Geoffrey Herklots, an economic biologist whom Platt had met at
the University of Hong Kong.35 The other actors in this drama—the Africans in the three
villages that were to be the focus of the study—had been promised exemption from the
hut tax for the duration of the study.36

Early survey results soon revealed the complexity of nutritional problems in Nyasaland.
In Shanghai, Platt’s studies of beriberi had shown that simple nutritional supplements, or
slight alterations in the preparation of rice, could ameliorate biochemical deficiencies.
But to Platt’s surprise, medical examinations of in the three villages revealed not a single
clear case of any deficiency disease—no beriberi, no scurvy, no pellagra—known to be
amenable to cure with a specific vitamin or mineral.37 Platt’s dreams of another a silver-
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bullet nutritional cure—along the lines of the thiamine supplementation for beriberi he
helped develop in Shanghai—would go unrealized.

But Platt still believed the subjects in the surveyed villages were anything but hardy.
Though they did not exhibit florid deficiencies of any particular micronutrient, many
suffered from what William Thomas Charles (WTC) Berry—a medical officer who
succeeded Fitzmaurice as the physician on the team—called “seasonal semi-starvation.”
Using data from studies of Europeans, Platt assumed a basal metabolic rate (the rate of
calorie usage during sleeping), as well as metabolic rates associated with a number of
activities (harvesting maize, weeding, etc.) for both men and women.38 Drawing upon the
team’s fieldwork studies of time devoted by their subjects to specific types of labor, Platt
was able to estimate a number of calories required to meet energetic needs. To calculate
the number of calories consumed, the report took Barker’s records of the amounts and
kinds of food eaten in a number of the survey households as representative samples, and
multiplied these tallies by the per-unit calorie figures for each kind of food that she had
sent for biochemical analysis in Scotland. Though the original data collection was
disaggregated by age, sex and other categories, in this table Platt used weighted averages
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to offer a single figure comparing calorie requirements to calorie consumption for each
village in each month between December 1938 and September 1939 (Figure 2.1).39

In her book on the history of British colonial nutrition research, Cynthia Brantley focuses
on the reductionism that went into crafting this table, noting that it does not disaggregate
on the basis of age or sex. But Platt’s survey does often disaggregate on the basis of age,
sex, and types of labor in many other tables. This is evident in a graph charting the
average numbers of hours that men and women devoted to work throughout the survey in
each village (see Figure 2.2). This graph focused on agricultural labor, and did not count
many kinds of “women’s work,” such as cooking, grinding corn and sweeping the home.
It also gave a somewhat unrepresentative picture of the male contribution to the family
farm, as the exemption from the hut tax for the study villages meant that fewer men left
the village in search of waged labor to pay the tax. Despite these shortcomings, Platt and
his team used far less aggregation, than GDP per capita, an estimate of welfare that
became globally popular in the decades following his survey (see Chapter 7).

The survey data revealed that in each village there were months in which consumption
did not meet requirements; in one village this happened in two months, in another it
happened in seven months, and in a third it happened in nine of the months. The “energy
deficit” could be astounding; in the maize-growing village of Jere in January 1939, a
period during the growing season that demanded long days pulling weeds even as
granaries containing the 1938 harvest began to run short, calorie intake was 28.5% below
39
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AVERAGE CALORIE INTAKE PER DAY PER INDIVIDUAL FOR
DIFFERENT MONTHS
HILL VILLAGE
Month
Calorie Requirements
Calorie Intake Percent Surplus
December
2245
2130
-5.1
January
2208
1580
-28.5
February
2022
2006
-0.8
March
2115
1721
-18.6
April
1967
1722
-12.4
May
1573
1401
-11
June
1895
1786
-5.8
July
1966
2304
+17.2
August
1620
1617
-0.2
September
1843
1691
-8.2
Average
1942
1784
-8.2
FOOTHILL VILLAGE
December
1899
1537
-19.0
January
2051
2108
+2.8
February
1823
2354
+29.2
March
1980
2229
+12.6
April
1760
2004
+13.9
May
1733
1485
-14.3
June
1610
1947
+21.0
July
1771
2958
+67.0
August
1646
2308
+40.0
September
1726
2033
17.8
Average
1784
2050
+14.8
LAKE SHORE VILLAGE
December
1773
1907
+7.5
January
2001
1895
-5.3
February
1862
1567
-15.9
March
1940
2099
+8.2
April
1812
2154
+18.9
May
1753
1429
-18.5
June
1824
1234
-32.3
July
1729
1460
-15.5
August
1787
1393
-22.1
September
2053
1803
-12.2
Average
1852
1733
-6.4
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Figure 2.1: Average calorie intake per day per individual for different months of the year
by village. Source: The Nyasaland Survey Papers, 1938-1943: agriculture, food and
health. Eds. Veronica Berry and Celia Petty. London: Academy Press, 1992. Page 138.
calorie requirements. This table demonstrated both a chronic absolute deficiency and
acute seasonal shortages in the number of calories available to villagers. The main
problem, then, was that Africans simply did not grow enough food.40
b) Nutrition Development Units, 1940-1943
Platt used early results of this caloric budgeting to support his proposed solution, laid out
in an April 1939 memo. There he called for the establishment of a pilot “Nutrition
Development Unit” (NDU), a multi-disciplinary center that would seek to abolish the
energy deficit throughout Nkotakota District by pursuing continued research and
interventions in agricultural diversification, fishery, forestry, animal husbandry,
healthcare (especially maternity and child welfare centers), sanitation, and handicrafts.41
Platt believed that the NDU would be a model for the colony and even the rest of British
Africa. In fact, there was great enthusiasm about the survey among many administrative
and technical officers in Nyasaland. In his autobiography, WTC Berry remembered that
upon his appointment to Nkotakota in January 1940, he was grateful to be “presented
with a great opportunity.”42
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Figure 2.2: Average number of hours of work per individual per working day. Source:
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Archives, GB 0809--Nut 02/04/11.
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Yet soon, Berry would come to see his time in Nkotakota as an ignis fatuus—that is, a
‘will o’ the wisp,’ a deceptive vision pursued in vain.43 The problem, as ever, was
funding, though by 1940 the UK Treasury had a new reason to hoard its money. Berry
knew of the September 1939 declaration of war against Germany when he began his
tenure in Nkotakota, but he still believed then that the war would amount to no more than
“an affair of leaflet raids over Germany.”44 When the Provincial Commissioner of
Nyasaland’s Northern Province submitted his initial proposal for the NDU to the Colonial
Office and Medical Research Council in 1939, he had requested £10,000 per year for
three years.45 But after the British rout at Dunkirk and the fall of France to the Nazis,
officials in London drastically curtailed the budget, to £1,025 per year for three years.46
Kettlewell and a new agricultural officer named Dawkins were both seconded abroad for
military service, as was the Assistant District Officer, Rangeley—who was supposed to
run the NDU. Barker’s role became unclear, as she was supposed to teach women how to
cook new crops that the agricultural officer taught men to plant, and to teach crafts such
as spinning, weaving, knitting and pottery to women referred by the assistant district
officer. Instead, she ended up pursuing research on the pediatric growth and development
(continuing the dataset begun by Fitzmaurice) and completed a list of native plants and
cooking methods. For his part Berry—disappointed both by the obsolescence of the
development unit and his own distance from patriotic battle, tested a number of
nutritional remedies for two common medical problems: sores on the lower leg known as
“tropical ulcer,” and a painful bleeding of the gums in children known to Africans as
43
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chiseye and to the British medical officers as Vincent’s angina. To his chagrin, neither
proved susceptible to Vitamin C or the addition of hippopotamus meat to the diet.47

As the war continued, and resources grew scarcer, officials in the Colonial Office and
new leadership in Nyasaland made clear that there was no more room for heady ideas to
improve productivity through nutritional improvements. Nyasaland’s Director of Medical
Services at the war’s outset, H.S. de Boer, had been a fervent supporter of the survey, and
had asked Barker to help recommend changes to African diets in government hospitals
and prisons and on private tea estates. But by June 1942 the prime advocates of
nutritional work in Nyasaland, de Boer and Kittermaster, had left Nyasaland, and
Barker’s funding was not renewed.48 Berry continued his work, though he grew
frustrated both by frequent drug shortages (which he attributed to the sinking of ships by
German submarines) and by what he perceived as the obstinacy of the villagers to the
unit’s schemes. The latter he blamed on the inherent limits to social engineering imposed
by the system of indirect rule, where African chiefs retained significant authority over
land issues. When the NDU’s three-year budget ran out in 1943 it, too, was terminated,
its staff scattered to other duties.49

The war also led Platt to delay, and ultimately abandon, his plans to produce a final report
on the Nyasaland Survey. Upon his return to England in late 1939 to aid in plans to
ensure troops had adequate nutrition, Platt had compiled the survey’s raw data but had
47
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yet to write a conclusion or even to analyze the final results. He deposited the papers in
the archives of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s (LSHTM’s)
Department of Human Nutrition. These survey papers were not published in any form for
a half-century, until Veronica Berry (widow of the late WTC Berry, who had died in
1983) and a recent graduate of the Department of Human Nutrition named Celia Petty
edited them into a book in 1992.50
c) Government healthcare becomes a “lavish” expense
This whimper of a denouement to the nutrition survey was, in part, a product a slow
waning of interest among London-based officials in funding efforts to remedy parasitic
infections and nutritional deficiencies in Nyasaland. As early as 1936, Thomas Stanton,
Chief Medical Adviser to the Colonial Office opined that after Nyasaland’s medical
entomologist, Dr. William Lamborn, retired, the post should be abolished in order to save
money.51 Lamborn had authored of dozens of studies of insect- and rodent-borne diseases
(including sleeping sickness, plague, and leprosy) in Nyasaland. But the scientific merits
of the position were not enough to save it; after Lamborn’s retirement in 1941,
Nyasaland’s Medical Department abolished the position.52
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More evidence that London remained chary of increasing healthcare spending came
while Platt’s team was in the midst of its survey. In June 1939 de Boer sent a report to the
Colonial Office detailing deficiencies in the Protectorate’s hospitals and dispensaries, and
calling for greater investment in health services. Nyasaland Governor Donald MackenzieKennedy, Kittermaster’s successor, added a supportive letter in which he contended
“health and allied services, directed to the development of a physically fit population,
should be extended slightly in advance of schemes for the promotion of education and
economic prosperity.”53 But officials in the Colonial Office and Treasury responded with
skepticism, calling his proposals “prohibitively expensive.” One Colonial Office official
even derided the free provision of food to hospitalized Africans as an unduly “lavish”
expense (see Chapter 4).54

When development grants restarted after the Second World War, the rhetoric supported
the “health is wealth” argument, but linking healthcare to agricultural policy no longer
seemed as potent in mobilizing financial resources for the government medical services.
A 1944 report produced by Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee argued that
production would not rise so long as “a large proportion of the Native population suffers
from the debilitating effects of malaria, hookworm, bilharzia and other parasites” and
while “malnutrition exists to a certain degree.” The authors declared: “We do not
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consider that medical problems are separate and distinct in a tropical country from other
social problems.”55 Yet the only immediate postwar development grants for health
proposed by the committee—and eventually funded by the UK Colonial Development
and Welfare Act—was a chemotherapeutic intervention to treat demobilized soldiers and
other Nyasaland Africans for venereal disease. The Medical Department’s share of total
government recurrent expenditure declined from 9.0 percent in 1935 to 4.3 percent in
1946. Expert investigations into health and agriculture would continue with the “second
colonial occupation,” but these did not lead to the prioritization of either sanitation or
curative medicine in Nyasaland (Chapter 5).

III.

The legacies of an aborted report: Afterlives of the nutritional link between

health and wealth
a)

Kettlewell’s sequel: malimidwe, coercion and the nationalist battle

But the Survey, and the interwar focus on nutrition throughout the Empire, was never
solely focused on public health and curative medicine. Given Platt’s finding of “seasonal
semi-starvation,” one would expect that the Survey might spur greater spending on
agricultural interventions. Indeed, despite the fact that the Nyasaland Survey Papers sat
unpublished in a London archive, and even though the Development Units were never
fully realized, both the study data and the researchers who helped to collect it greatly
influenced Nyasaland’s future agricultural policies. During the survey Richard
Kettlewell, the Survey team’s agriculturalist, came to favor major changes in extant
55
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African agricultural techniques. Less than a decade after his work on the survey,
Kettlewell became director of Nyasaland’s Agriculture Department. From this post he
sought to put into practice his plans for improved smallholder agriculture. Yet by the
1950s the intrusive regulations that he implemented would prove so unpopular that
politicians would use them to drum up opposition to the colonial government (see
Chapter 8).

Kettlewell’s involvement in the Nyasaland Survey made him a vocal proponent of soil
conservation measures. He said his experience led him to the recognize that insufficient
food production and resulting malnutrition would be an “inescapable consequences of
increasing soil erosion.” The dangers of erosion were, to him, great enough to justify “the
compulsory introduction of basic conservation practices.”56 Kettlewell was particularly
interested in mandating the construction of “contour planting ridges.” This would entail a
rule that all maize was to be planted atop 2-foot-high ridges of soil; African smallholders
were to build these ridges using hoes. In his portion of the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey
report, Kettlewell had lamented agricultural agents’ inability to convince smallholder
farmers to take up ridging:
The advantages of contour planting ridges have been appreciated for some time,
and considerable propaganda has been devoted to their introduction; but where
maize and other food crops are concerned, the native exhibits a rigid, and not
unnatural conservatism against which relatively little progress has been made so
far. It is frequently agreed that the change in method involves a great increase in
the amount of work, but although this is scarcely true yet laziness, indifference
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and not knowing how else to set about it are probably the chief reasons for lack of
response.57
Kettlewell was firmly convinced not only that ridging would prevent erosion, but also
that the perils of erosion merited coercive policies. Later in life, Kettlewell said he found
a good part of his zeal after reading The Rape of the Earth: a World Survey of Soil
Erosion, a 1939 book written by the British soil scientists GV Jacks and RO White.58
During the Second World War Kettlewell could not secure the funds, the staff, or the
support of his superiors to enforce a compulsory ridging campaign. But he found a
kindred spirit in 1947, when Geoffrey Colby became Governor of Nyasaland. Colby
transferred Director of Agriculture PB Garnett to the Gambia and, appointed Kettlewell
to lead the department. Beginning in 1948, thousands of cultivators were arrested and
tried in native courts for failing to construct ridges in their fields; those found guilty
received punishments that varied from a 5-shilling fine to 6 months in jail.59
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Kettlewell thought Africans opposed ridging because it entailed “extra hard work,” but
the historian Elias Mandala (who himself grew up in a rural Malawian village) has argued
that there was an agriculturally sound reason behind smallholder resistance to ridging.60
Aside from the immense work required to construct the ridges, many farmers believed
ridging actually hastened soil erosion. Particularly on the flat, low-lying areas near Lake
Malawi and in the Lower Shire Valley, farmers contended that wind would denude the
sandy soil from high ridges.61 In a 2013 interview, a smallholder farmer from the rural
Neno district remembered the anger this caused: “Any garden without contour bunds and
ridges, people were punished, and even taken to the prison…that’s why people were not
happy to go along with white people, we rebelled against their ruling…An African was
under pressure with the Europeans ruling…why should they dominate? We wanted
freedom, so we fought for it, even died for it.”62

Indeed, in the coming years, opposition to Kettlewell’s campaign (popularly known as
malimidwe, the Chichewa word for conservation) became a potent plank of African
nationalist propaganda. In 1953 over a thousand people attacked the courthouse of Chief
Mlolo, who had supported the regulations. That same year, the Nyasaland African
Congress linked opposition to ridging to the campaign to stop the upcoming formation of
a federation government that would place Nyasaland’s Africans under the control of
white settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia (see Chapter 8). In the Lower Shire
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Valley, women could be heard singing a song promising “death” to the “Federation
capitaos” and to the “contour ridging capitaos.”63 Facing unrelenting opposition and
without the support of Governor Colby, who departed Nyasaland in 1956, Kettlewell’s
Agricultural Department relented; between 1957 and 1960, the number of court cases
relating to ridging declined, even as many farmers refused to obey the regulations.64 In
the years following Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s return to Nyasaland in 1958, his speeches
before audiences of rural Africans consistently linked his opposition to the “stupid
Federation” to the unpopular malimidwe regulations.65

Thus did an idea (compulsory ridging) born partly of the Nutrition Survey help spur anticolonial protests two decades later. And these protests, in turn, led Federation officials in
Salisbury to devote far greater sums (both in absolute terms and relative to overall
government expenditure) to Nyasaland’s health sector than the colony had ever before
seen (see Chapter 8). So, in the most roundabout of ways, one legacy of the Nutrition
Survey was increased spending on government health services, but this only arrived
decades later.
b)

Colonial income accounting and the fetishization of GDP

The Nyasaland Nutrition Survey had another surprising legacy. The survey data formed
the basis of the earliest “colonial national income” estimate not only in Nyasaland, but in
all of colonial Africa. Though the survey was not intended for use in what we now call
63

Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Page 217.
64
Kettlewell, “Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 1945-1960.”
65
Lawrence AB Malekano, “Peasants, Politics and Survival in Colonial Malawi” (PhD
Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1999). Page 142. Also see Philip Short, Banda (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). Page 92.

115

Gross Domestic Product, an economic researcher named Phyllis Deane would use it for
this purpose. In later years the GDP would come to be heralded, by both Malawi’s
government statisticians and by cosmopolitan economic experts, as the chief barometer of
human welfare. This epistemology, which erased important distinctions through
aggregation, stood in stark contrast to the epistemology of the Nutrition Survey. Platt’s
survey methodology demonstrated, in numerous tables, differences in food consumption
by age and sex within each village. Other tables (such as Figure 2.1) demonstrated stark
inter-temporal differences in food consumption, thereby drawing attention to what Berry
called “seasonal semi-starvation”—and what Malawians still call “hungry season”
(nyengo njala). GDP, on the other hand, is a technology of aggregation. By summing
production into a single annual index, it obscures both unequal inter-personal and
seasonal distributions of production and consumption. Malawi’s GDP statistics did not,
for instance, reveal the depths of despair faced by many of the most destitute during the
worst of the 2015 and 2016 hungry seasons, after floods washed away crops and drought
scorched the rest. The use of Nutrition Survey data for Africa’s earliest national income
calculation is, then, another example of the malleable, even ironic uses to which the
survey was put.

Deane’s task, upon being hired by the UK National Institute for Economic and Social
Research in 1943, was to experiment with a method of triple-entry national income
accounting devised by Cambridge economists James Meade and Richard Stone. 66 Meade
and Stone believed their system was a tool not only for economic planning in a single
66
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country, but also as a universal method capable of comparing nations and imperial
holdings around the globe.67 For Deane the task was to attempt to measure ‘certain
colonial incomes,’ first using sources available in London and, later, by conducting
fieldwork. Initially, Deane and her advisors chose Northern Rhodesia (today, Zambia)
and Nyasaland (today, Malawi) for her study (Jamaica was added later). Robinson wrote
that the team chose Northern Rhodesia in part because he had worked on studies in the
territory and knew of some sources of statistical material. He explained that Nyasaland,
an adjacent colony, was chosen because Platt’s Nutrition Survey data could be used to
estimate subsistence agricultural production as well as native incomes and
consumption.68

Working from London, Deane estimated the “national” income of these territories. The
earliest date for which she had any sort of reliable data in Nyasaland was 1938. For this
year, her estimate relied heavily on extrapolations from the Nyasaland Nutrition
Survey.69 Deane hoped that her estimates would be used to guide economic policies, with
two ends in mind. “We start,” Deane explained, “from the assumption that for all
communities an increase in the volume of economic goods and services produced, and an
improvement in its distribution over time and among persons and groups, are important
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ends of economic policy.”70 Hers was not a minority position among economists; as early
as 1934, Simon Kuznets and John Blair claimed, “Economic welfare cannot be
adequately measured unless the personal distribution of income is known.”71

But by the 1960s, in economic policy discourse in Malawi and elsewhere, the goal of
increasing aggregate production was paramount. “The simplest indicator of economic
progress of a community,’ explained a 1968 report produced by Derek Blades, a recent
Oxford graduate then serving as Malawi’s Director of Census and Statistics, “is the
movement of real income per head of the population. This is not an unqualified measure
of improvements in the standard of living for the average inhabitant of a country but has
been found a useful guide.”72 In Malawi, where wealth had long been concentrated
among the owners of large agricultural estates, Blades’ assertion had great political
import. Once the distribution of wealth was rendered invisible by the myopic focus on
aggregate production, planners could easily justify extracting resources from smallholder
farmers to finance export-oriented, large-scale, elite-owned agricultural estates. Indeed,
Anne Conroy and colleagues have illustrated the ways in which Malawian policies have
favored the estates in the decade following independence:

70

Phyllis Deane, Colonial social accounting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p
120.
71
Simon Kuznets and John Blair, National income, 1929-1932: Letter from the Acting Secretary
of Commerce transmitting in response to Senate resolution (US Government Printing Office,
1934), p. 7.
72
Malawi National Accounts Report, 1964-1967 (Government of Malawi, Zomba, 1968), p. 7. It
should be noted that Blades’ choice to use Billington’s method for imputing prices runs counter
to this narrative of modernization theory’s erasure of peasant production. But, as will be made
clear in the next section, Blades possessed a greater curiosity about the economic contribution of
non-monetary production and methods of measurement than most statisticians.

118

Customary land was annexed from the smallholder subsector; smallholders were
legally prevented from growing important high-value crops (burley tobacco, tea
and sugar were reserved for the estate subsector); smallholder producers of export
crops were paid less than the export parity price by the state marketing
board…with most of the resulting profits channeled into the development of the
estate subsector.73
During the post-independence decades such policies impoverished large portions of the
population even as GDP growth figures remained strong (see Chapter 10). Once again,
then, the Nyasaland Survey data came to be used to advance political goals never
foreseen by Platt.
c) WTC Berry and the Population Bomb
A third surprising sequel to the Nutrition Survey was the change in thinking of WTC
Berry. Berry had been a leading administrator and a vocal proponent of the Nutritional
Development Units, and was dismayed and frustrated when their funding was not
renewed in 1943. But in his memoirs, published posthumously in 1984, Berry wondered
whether his efforts to save the lives of the sick and hungry in Nyasaland had only sped
the descent into a Malthusian trap. After recounting a campaign to stem an outbreak of
cerebro-spinal meningitis (CSM) in southern Nyasaland in 1937, Berry added the
following note:
The containment of the CSM outbreak changed nothing much and even less was
changed for the better. Population pressure was all the greater for the survival of
five hundred or so Africans who might otherwise have died. Because of this
pressure forest land around the foot of Chiradzulu mountain had to be yielded for
Agriculture with all that entailed, but that was another story, as Kipling might
have said.74
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No such fatalism appears in the Nyasaland Nutrition Survey. In his agricultural studies,
Kettlewell documented the relatively low ratio of arable land to land currently under
cultivation near one of the survey villages.75 The medical reports—authored by
Fitzmaurice and Berry—mention population only briefly. There the authors note that
while “reference has been made to the fact that by comparison with Africa as a whole,
Nyasaland is a relatively densely populated country…By European standards…
Nyasaland is only sparsely populated.”76 During their brief tenure (1940-43),
Nyasaland’s Nutrition Development Units were far more concerned with increasing child
and maternal survival than with lowering birth rates.77 In short, population pressure was
not a major concern in interwar Nyasaland.

The idea that the country was locked in a Malthusian trap gained credence among
Nyasaland officials during a 1948-1949 famine.78 Population control was a major focus
of international development discourse in the 1960s and 1970s (see Chapter 9). By the
end of his life, it seems, Berry had become convinced of the danger of the “population
bomb.” His work early in life was dedicated to improving survival among rural Africans,
but eventually he came to doubt that this would effect change “for the better.”
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By the time Berry made his late-life reflections of his medical work in Nyasaland, the
nutrition paradigm had come full circle. The measures advocated in the 1960s and 1970s
in the name of population control, including forcible mass sterilization and even inaction
in the face of mass die-off (see Chapter 9), seemed to harken back to the days when
nutrition was primarily a veterinary concern. Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans
were, in this iteration of nutrition discourse, a herd grown too large. Whereas in 1920s
and 1930s nutrition science had seemed to unite medical and agricultural specialists, later
in the twentieth century concerns about the “population bomb” and “demographic
entrapment” insinuated that doctor’s tools had outrun the agriculturalists, and were
making their work harder. Medicine was saving people who could not be fed. Health
services and population health were, in this logic pitted against one another. In their
survey reports, neither Platt nor any of the other researchers even entertained such
ideas.79
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has charted the rise and fall of a certain iteration of the “health is wealth”
argument. In this paradigm, an interdisciplinary group of experts became increasingly
concerned with labor productivity among African wage earners and farmers. Africans’
reputed lassitude, they believed, could be attributed to toll exacted by parasites and
inadequate diets. Researchers proposed programs to remedy these problems. Their
prescriptions were focused largely on improving agricultural production and increasing
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access to health services. Given this focus, and given Nyasaland’s centrality to nutrition
research, one would think that during this period Nyasaland’s Medical Department would
have received a growing—or at least a steady—share of government spending.

But when it came to dollars and cents, the interwar period of interest in nutrition as a
determinant of productivity, and the oft-repeated claims that health spending was a down
payment on development, did not materially affect government outlays for the Nyasaland
Medical Department. Despite the enthusiasm expressed by WTC Berry and other
researchers, their science did not increase recurrent spending on either medicine or public
health. Between 1924 and 1939, the Medical Department’s share of total recurrent
spending fell, inexorably, from 10.1 percent to 6.5 percent. The slide continued during
the Second World War, as the Medical Department’s share fell further to 4.1 percent by
1945. The percentage then rose briefly in the immediate postwar dawn, to 7.5 percent in
1946, before falling to a new low of 4.2 percent in 1951 (see Figure 0.2).80 The absolute
figures of current pounds sterling spent on health generally rose every year during this
period, but they increased more slowly than general domestic revenues (derived in large
part from ever more enthusiastic campaigns to collect hut taxes from subject African
populations) and expenditures. Health spending may have been relatively more important
part of colonial budgets during the early twentieth century, when the Colonial Office
employed physicians to try to protect the health of the few officials making up the “thin
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white line” of the colonial administration.81 But once the worst of European mortality in
the tropics had passed, the argument that “health-is-wealth” was not enough to save the
Medical Department from becoming a shrinking priority in colonial budgets.

Of course, the interwar focus on labor productivity did not lead experts to call only for
greater spending on medicine. As this chapter has demonstrated, some colonial
physicians and planters were enthusiastic about treatments for hookworm and other
intestinal parasites. But few thought that African laborers would become more productive
by pills and injections alone. The Nyasaland Nutrition Survey was not solely, or even
primarily, focused on health care provision. Though Platt initially hoped for a magicbullet solution to malnutrition (along the lines of his discoveries about beriberi in China),
ultimately he and his team focused on “seasonal semi-starvation.” This problem would
not be solved by pills or injections, but by increased agricultural production. Yet the
survey’s favored strategy to improve both health and agricultural production—the
Nutrition Development Units—did not survive wartime austerity. After the Second
World War agricultural production became a major focus of the Nyasaland Government
(Chapter 6), but public health and medicine would not become a major priority of the
colonial government until the anti-Federation movement of the 1950s. Popular politics,
and not economic logic, would be the force that drove up government spending for
medical care.
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But even during the interwar era, there were political forces that helped increase medical
spending in Nyasaland. The next two chapters will demonstrate that officials deciding the
health budgets of interwar Nyasaland were more responsive to labor militancy in the UK
and the Empire than to scientific treatises on the relationship between health and
economic growth. Investments in health resulted from perceived threats to legitimacy,
especially labor strikes in Britain and in her Colonial Empire. Budget cuts, on the other
hand, often coincided with periods when officials with control over budgets (namely,
officials in the UK Treasury) perceived no such threats. Health spending was, almost
invariably, a function of unrest.
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Chapter 3
“Territories of vast potentiality”: British unemployment, colonial debts, and the
subversion of intent to expand Nyasaland’s medical services, 1919-1936
Abstract
Using archival sources from both the United Kingdom and Malawi, this chapter argues
that unemployment within the UK was, indirectly, a major impetus for increased
spending on health in colonial Nyasaland during the interwar years. Nyasaland’s public
finances had been mired in debt since 1919, when a railroad financier convinced the UK
government to force Nyasaland’s government to guarantee an onerous loan for a doomed
railway line. This debt kept the UK Treasury from approving any sizable increases in
expenditure on health care in Nyasaland throughout the 1920s. This only began to change
with the 1929 Colonial Development Act. Before the 1929 UK General Election, both
Conservative and Labour politicians argued that government spending on roads and
railways in the colonies could increase employment in the UK, both by spurring orders
from British factories and by opening new markets. During the debate over the 1929
Colonial Development Act, a few backbench MPs worked to ensure that the new funding
could be used to build hospitals and clinics in the colonies. At the same time, officials in
the Colonial Office in London convinced the Treasury to lessen the spending controls it
had placed on Nyasaland as a result of the railway debt. As a result of these two lobbying
efforts (and following a 1930 report on Nyasaland’s health sector by Dr. John Owen
Shircore), the colony’s Medical Department was able to increase both its recurrent and
development expenditure. Many of the district hospitals in Malawi today were built with
funds made available by the 1929 Colonial Development Act. Thus did a handful of
moral entrepreneurs in the British administration subvert a law’s original intent (to
increase employment in the UK through the purchase of British manufactures) in order to
ameliorate dismal colonial medical provision. This episode is another demonstration that
the history of government health care in Malawi can only be told through a global,
contingent and even ironic history of crisis politics.
Prelude: Missing surgeons and a rotting leg
It was not a clean space. Cockroaches scuttled about the floor and on bedframes in the
men’s ward of the Mangochi District Hospital. Minutes after the floors were washed each
morning, the roaches were back. The nightstands next the beds were cluttered with halfempty bottles of the orange soda hawked by vendors outside the hospital gates.
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Nor was the ward a space where anyone could seek privacy. In the large, open greenwalled room almost everyone’s words were audible, and actions visible. That morning in
early February 2015, patients occupied all 36 beds—that is, until an attendant and a nurse
wheeled away the covered body of a just-deceased patient. A dozen family and friends
followed the stretcher to the morgue. An elderly man with a distended abdomen sat
upright, talking to a family member who had just fetched his hospital-provided lunch of
nsima (maize porridge) and beans. On a nearby bed, a cachectic man with glassy eyes
stared blankly at the roof.

But neither the cockroaches nor the other people were of much concern to a 15-year-old
boy named Innocent in the ward that morning. Innocent had a far more serious problem:
his right leg was rotting. He had been shot a week earlier when, while walking his sister
home from school, he happened upon a protest in Monkey Bay and was hit by a stray
bullet fired by the local police (for more on the protest, see the prelude to Chapter 4). The
bullet had torn straight through his knee, injuring the popliteal artery, which carries much
of the blood supply to the lower leg and foot. Friends had taken Innocent to Monkey
Bay’s government hospital, where he was transferred by ambulance to the larger district
hospital an hour drive away at Mangochi. Upon arrival he had undergone emergent
surgery to ligate (tie off) the popliteal artery. The site of the injury had been wrapped in
gauze. Then he was put into a bed to recover.

This surgery helped prevent him from bleeding to death. But what Innocent really needed
in those crucial hours was a vascular surgeon. Though hemorrhaging blood from the torn
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artery could have become the life-threatening without ligation, Innocent was almost
certainly doomed to lose his leg if blood flow to the lower leg was not restored. Popliteal
artery trauma is “the most limb-threatening of peripheral vascular injuries,” but in the
United States gunshot victims with this injury can have their limbs salvaged—and blood
flow restored—with prompt surgical repair involving a vein graft. Outcomes are
particularly good if surgery is performed within seven hours of injury.1 Vein graft has
been the standard of care for American soldiers with popliteal artery injuries since the
Korean War in the early 1950s. A 2002 review of 24 published series of 678 penetrating
popliteal artery injuries found a mean amputation rate of 11 percent, with lower rates in
the more recent series.2 Yet this review drew from patients treated mostly in the United
States and Europe. On the day Innocent was shot, there were no vascular surgeons in the
whole of Malawi, a country of 15 million people.3 There were able vascular surgeons in
South Africa, but emergent air evacuations were reserved for expatriate aid workers and
government officials, not the children of subsistence farmers. Instead of receiving a
procedure that could save his leg, Innocent was literally left in a bed to rot.

Innocent’ right leg steadily deteriorated. First he lost feeling below the knee. Then the
skin began to blacken. The toes shriveled and the toenails turned a ghostly silver hue (see
Figure 3.1). Ten days after he had been shot, Innocent’s attending physician (who made
rounds three times per week) warned him he would likely have to have the leg amputated
1
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Figure 3.1: Innocent’s leg two days before amputation, two weeks after shooting.
soon, to prevent gangrene from ascending from the necrotic tissue to the rest of his body.
Two weeks after the shooting doctors wheeled Innocent into the surgical suite and
amputated his right leg just above the knee.

After the amputation Innocent was calm, but quiet. He deferred to his ever-present
mother when I posed questions. When I asked if he planned to get a prosthetic leg,
Innocent looked forlorn. “We would like one,” his mother explained, “but it is too much
money.” A wheelchair would be of little use on the uneven and sandy trails near his
home. The doctors in Mangochi had advised Innocent that he would have to let his stump
heal for a few months, then he could travel to Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in
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Blantyre to be fit for a new prosthesis. He would have to pay for the prosthesis himself.
The cheapest leg available would cost $250. To Innocent’ mother, who farmed a small
plot of land just outside Monkey Bay, the idea that she could ever find so much money
was absurd. Innocent faced the prospect of a bleak future with no mobility, and—as a
consequence—no more school and no more work.

For much of his admission, Innocent lay beside two fellow victims of the Monkey Bay
shootings. Felix, 25 years old, had been shot through his right shin, fracturing the tibia in
multiple places. The leg had been placed in a cast. Over the coming weeks his condition
improved steadily, eventually regaining the use of the toes in his right foot. His biggest
complaint was that the medicine he had been given for pain relief lacked mphamvu
(power). The nurse on duty explained that he was being given pethidine, a powerful
synthetic opiate commonly used in Africa even decades after concerns about toxicity and
drug interactions have limited its use in the United States. Though this drug should have
been strong enough to hold Felix’s pain at bay, the nurse administered it at irregular
intervals, whenever she got around to seeing him in the course of tending to a ward full of
seriously ill patients on her own. But even with this poorly managed pain, Felix seemed
on course to make a complete recovery.

The same could not be said for David, a 23-year-old recent graduate of a teachers’
training college in Lilongwe. On the day of the shooting, David was back home in
Monkey Bay, living with his wife and newborn son and looking for work as a teacher.
From his hospital bed he claimed he had not intended to become involved in the protests,
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but was caught unaware when the crowd came by. When the police opened fire, a bullet
struck David’s right leg behind the ankle, rupturing his Achilles tendon. At first glance
David’s injury did not appear very grave. He had ruptured no major arteries, and had
broken no bones. But without a functioning Achilles his leg would be severely weakened
for the rest of his life. An avid football (soccer) player, David feared he might never run
again. And he would be far less useful in farm labor without two strong legs.

Seeking a remedy, David asked a clinical officer visiting from Queen Elizabeth Hospital
if he had any ideas. The clinical officer (a medical provider with more training than a
nurse, but less than a doctor) was in a training program for plastic surgery, and claimed
some experience in relevant procedures. He said he could try to re-attach the two torn
ends of David’s tendon (a procedure known as reanastomosis). But, the clinical officer
continued, he would only do so “in private”—that is, in exchange for an under-the-table
payment. David hurriedly cobbled together 8000 kwacha (about US$30). He obtained
most of it from his malume, his mother’s brother, a relation who held great responsibility
among the matrilineal, matrilocal peoples of southern Malawi.

But the operation had failed. The surgeon explained later that the gap between the two
pieces of tendon was too long to allow for reanastomosis. In such cases, surgeons in the
United States and Europe often use tendons harvested from elsewhere in the body (such
as the bottom of the foot) to reanastomose ruptured Achilles’ tendons, but the clinical
officer admitted he was unfamiliar with these procedures. In the coming months David
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would continue to seek a surgical remedy. The visiting clinical officer offered to try
again, “in private.”

The absence of surgeons trained in orthopedics and vascular procedures worsened the
outcomes for David and Innocent, respectively. If they had lived near such specialists,
both might have left the hospital with full use of both legs. As it turned out, neither
would. David departed for home with a much-weakened right leg, and Innocent was
discharged with a stump. Innocent said he hoped for a prosthetic leg, but he was not at all
certain he would ever have one. For his part, David sounded surprisingly world-weary for
a man so young. I asked whether he would seek a tendon transfer. “We will see,” he
shrugged.

I.

Introduction: subversion of intent in metropolitan politics

While the previous two chapters kept focused largely on events within Nyasaland, in the
next four chapters the lens will turn increasingly to metropolitan Britain and other parts
of the Empire. These chapters will re-examine an older historiography (written mostly in
the 1970s and 1980s) on the politics of interwar and immediate postwar British colonial
development spending. I will argue that, in both eras, the main enemies of colonial
physicians and African medical assistants were not microbes of the gut and blood, but the
longstanding parsimony of the UK Treasury. Officials seeking the funding increases they
needed to purchase chemotherapeutic agents, diagnostic equipment, and even food and
bed sheets could do so only through the deft manipulation of political crises elsewhere.

131

The first such manipulation occurred during and after the passage of the 1929 Colonial
Development Act (CDA), discussed in this chapter. The Act was the culmination of a
long-standing project of Conservative Colonial Secretaries Alfred Milner and Leo
Amery. Their intent was to free up funds from a famously obstinate Treasury to build
railways, roads and bridges in Britain’s Colonies, thereby increasing trade and
employment both in Britain and her dependencies. Much of the historiography on the
CDA has evaluated to what extent the act fulfilled this original aim. But what much of
this work overlooks is the subversion of the law’s original intent by moral entrepreneurs,
including British politicians and colonial administrators with an interest in improving
colonial health services. A few little-known Members of Parliament amended the CDA to
allow the Fund to be used to improve and expand health services. Once the bill was
passed, the Colonial Office sought to use the new funding to build more hospitals and
health centers, particularly in Nyasaland. A colonial physician and administrator named
John Owen Shircore wrote both a critique of the low quality and poor reach of Nyasaland
extant health services, and a plan to improve them. This report helped garner funding
sufficient to fund the construction of 12 new district hospitals and 36 additional
dispensaries. Even today, most of Malawi’s major hospitals can trace their construction to
this tranche of funding. This chapter recounts a history of constructed scarcity,
punctuated by a brief moment of increased infrastructure spending.

II.

The yoke of an odious debt

a) Larcenous development: the Trans-Zambesi Railway loan guarantee, 1919-1922
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The paucity of government medical provision in Nyasaland only began to change in the
early 1930s, after the colony became a major beneficiary of the 1929 UK Colonial
Development Act. Most histories of colonial development in Africa tend to downplay the
significance of the 1929 Act; its passage did not mark a newfound willingness by the UK
Treasury to spend much greater sums on African colonies, especially after the Great
Depression led to further budget controls. 4 But for Nyasaland’s Medical Department,
funding from the Colonial Development Act was a major windfall. Many of Malawi’s
current district hospitals were first constructed with funds from this Act. The government
health sector in Nyasaland saw such a disproportionate share of the Act’s funding
because of persistent advocacy from medical officials in Nyasaland.

In order to understand the profound departure that the Colonial Development Act funding
represented for Nyasaland, it is necessary to review the fiscal administration of the
Protectorate by the British during the interwar years. Just after the First World War, UK
Colonial Secretary Lord Milner and Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain
agreed to guarantee debt taken on by Mozambique Company (a private corporation
funded by British investors) for the construction of a railway line (known as the TransZambesi Railway, or TZR) to run entirely outside Nyasaland, from the port of Beira to
the southern bank of the Zambesi River in Portuguese East Africa.5 The railway line was
an impractical one, creating a route too long to transport goods for a reasonable price
4
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between Nyasaland and the Indian Ocean. It was a route much longer and costlier than
another possible route terminating further north, at Quelimane. The uneconomical nature
of the line is evidenced by the company’s failure to raise private capital sufficient to
finance its construction.6 But Libert Oury, the Mozambique Company chairman and
financier who deliberately kept a low profile, lobbied hard for British government
financing; a line commencing at Beira would increase the profitability of his company,
which had a number of financial interests in Beira. Oury appealed to Colonial Secretary
Alfred Milner, arguing that the line would run entirely through British-held territory.7
Milner was also concerned about rumors of American financiers planning to build a
different railway in the region held by the Mozambique Company, and sought to preempt
them with a British railway in order to cement British dominance in the region.8

Not for nothing was Oury known as “the other Rhodes.” The British Consul in
Mozambique called him “a financial spider sitting in the midst of his web in London.”9 In
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the course of his campaign Oury plied a former Nyasaland governor, Sir Alfred Sharpe,
with partnerships in a few of his many firms, including the Mozambique Company.10
Sharpe had many friends in the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and was a member of the
St. Stephen’s Club, a famous Westminster watering hole for Conservative Party
politicians. Oury also organized regal dinners in Zomba to curry favor with officials. Yet
he could not secure the support of Governor George Smith, nor could he win over most
of the white settlers in Nyasaland. The latter feared (correctly, as it turned out) that they
would ultimately bear a much of the cost of such an unprofitable venture. Oury did not
despair, though, for he knew that the decision would ultimately be made in London
(Figure 3.2).

Indeed, by 1919 Oury had convinced Milner to support his plan. In decision pivotal to
Nyasaland’s future finances, Milner decided—without consulting the Nyasaland
administration—to guarantee the railway financiers an annual rate of return of at least 6
percent for 25 years. Milner claimed, initially, that the UK Treasury would underwrite the
guarantee. But the Treasury decreed that Nyasaland would guarantee the debt itself. If
Nyasaland’s government should be unable to cover the losses from current revenues (80
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Figure 3.2: Trans-Zambesi Railway poster, 1925. Source: Exclusive News Agency,
London. The caption reads: “Not only has this railway inaugurated a new epoch of
economic prosperity for Nyasaland by providing it with direct access to an ocean port,
but it has also opened up a region of great forests, a sportsman’s paradise wherein the
elephant, the lion, the rhino and the antelope have roamed since the beginning of time.”
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percent of which were derived from the African hut tax in 1917), the Protectorate would
be forced to take out loans at 7 percent interest.11
c) Treasury control and starving social services
Sure enough, the railroad quickly racked up operating losses.12 As early as 1921, a junior
Treasury official gave a pessimistic appraisal of the line’s financial prospects, and
blamed the Colonial Office for misunderstanding—and even misrepresenting—the
project. “When the question of the guarantee was under consideration [the] Colonial
Office expressed the opinion that the guarantee would cease to be operative after the line
had been working a year or two. I understand however it is now expected that the
guarantee will be operative for many years.” After insinuating that Lord Milner had
deceived the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the line’s future profitability, the
Treasury dismissed the Colonial Office’s plea that the Imperial Exchequer indirectly
assume responsibility for payments that would otherwise be a tremendous burden on
Nyasaland’s budget for the foreseeable future.13
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Nyasaland’s government suddenly faced a future of inordinate payments for a loan
guarantee that they had had no hand in crafting, and that would scarcely benefit either its
African or European population. Following a 1921 agreement between the UK Colonial
Office and Treasury, Nyasaland was forced to devote one-half of annual revenues over a
protected “standard revenue” of £275,000 toward the loan guarantee. Whenever
Nyasaland’s Governors wrote to complain about the burdens of this arrangement, and the
impediments it placed on sorely needed increases in expenditures (including spending on
the medical department), Treasury officials repeated their calls for further tax increases
and spending cuts.14 By 1928, the protected ‘standard revenue’ that Nyasaland could
devote toward its own expenditures before spending half of additional revenues on the
paying off the TZR loan had only been raised slightly, to £300,000.15 As Harold Philips,
who had worked as both assistant district commissioner and Financial Secretary in
Nyasaland, remembered, “Treasury control [was] a horrible thing…they couldn’t spend a
penny unless it had first been approved by some backroom boy in London [who] didn’t
know a thing about it.”16

In July of 1928, Colonial Secretary Leo Amery complained to Chancellor of the
Exchequer Winston Churchill that Nyasaland’s “social services are at a scandalously low
ebb” and the “death rate is disgraceful.” Reporting the results of a meeting between his
subordinates and lower-level Treasury officials, he recounted, “We asked for some little
mitigation. But we were turned down by the Treasury pretty stiffly.” Churchill’s Treasury
14
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offered a slight increase in the protected revenue to £325,000, but demanded in return
increases in customs duties on “native” goods such as matches, salt, and beads as well as
an increase in the hut tax. John B Sidebotham, a budget official in the Colonial Office,
said this would place an overly burdensome tax on the people, particularly considering
“about 20 percent leave the Protectorate to earn it and the rest suffer from debility.” No
agreement was reached. Nyasaland’s Africans seemed doomed to remain impoverished,
indebted, and without any robust social services.17 Such was the assessment of
Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ormsby-Gore, who lamented, “The Treasury have for
years resisted…any attempts to get Nyasaland out of the slough of despond.” Referring to
the desperate need for “wise expenditure on public health, scientific agriculture,” and
“education,” Orsmby-Gore declared, “The history of all grant-aided, i.e. Treasurycontrolled, dependencies in the last thirty years has always shown the starvation of these
life-giving services.”18

III.

The 1929 Colonial Development Act

a) Colonial Development as a remedy for metropolitan unemployment
Nyasaland’s budget and health sector only began to be cleared from the “slough of
despond” in 1930 thanks, strangely enough, to rising unemployment in Britain. The
succeeding chapters will show how much Nyasaland relied not so much as ideas as on
crises (both nearby and far-flung) for boosts in health spending. Such was the case here,
where, as the historian Rudolf von Albertini notes, “It was the advent of the economic
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crisis that brought these proposals into public discussion.”19 In the months prior to the
1929 UK General Elections, leading members of the governing Conservative Party cast
about for ideas to include in their election platform. The election was to be fought largely
on the issue of unemployment; widely publicized statistics published by the Board of
Trade every month showed the number of Britons registering for unemployment
insurance rising in late 1928 (from 1.37 million in August to 1.57 million in
December).20 Particularly in northern industrial constituencies, Conservative Members of
Parliament (and the Unionist Party MPs in their governing coalition) worried about losing
their seats to voter frustration over rising unemployment.21 Only two years earlier, in
1926, the entire nation had ground to a halt for eight days during a General Strike in
which millions of workers took to the picket lines.22 Although labor unrest had quieted
significantly since 1926, and even though unemployment was not nearly as grave as it
would become in the early 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression, the rising
unemployment figures in late 1928 and early 1929 seemed to bolster the electoral
prospects of the opposition Labour Party.

In discussions of unemployment measures that the Conservatives might propose,
Colonial Secretary Leo Amery repeated an idea that he and his mentor and predecessor,
Lord Milner, had been advocating since 1922: to spend Treasury funds to build up
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transportation networks in colonial holdings. Such a “colonial development fund” would
combat domestic unemployment in two ways: first, road and railway construction paid
for by the fund would spur orders for factories in Britain, and; second, the new
infrastructure would open up new markets for British producers and consumers.23 A
memorandum circulating in Whitehall in October 1928 promised that orders of millions
of pounds of railway materials from the UK would reduce “industrial irritation” that
could otherwise affect “the Ballot Box to the detriment of the government in power.”24

But Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin was initially non-committal, and Chancellor of the
Exchequer Winston Churchill adamantly opposed the departure such a fund would entail
from the longstanding policy restricting colonies from accessing UK Treasury funds.25
Churchill proved so obstinate that Amery asked Baldwin to remove Churchill from the
Treasury (and to name as his replacement either Neville Chamberlain or Amery himself).
Amery did not conceal his derision for what he saw as Churchill’s myopically martial
understanding of the Empire: “If Winston could only be induced to go away and wage
war somewhere something might perhaps be done.”26
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Eventually, Amery secured the support of other Cabinet members and Party leaders for
the colonial development fund. In February 1929 JCC Davidson, Chairman of the
Conservative Party and a close confidant of Baldwin’s, wrote to the Prime Minister that a
large-scale policy of colonial development would not only address domestic
unemployment, but also demonstrate that their party was “still full of energy” and “fire
the imagination of the country.” Amery and Davidson eventually won over their
colleagues. In early April, Churchill reluctantly conceded.27

On April 18, Baldwin opened the general election campaign with an address before an
audience of 2000 Conservative and Unionist Party loyalists in the Theatre Royal in
London’s West End. He proposed a Colonial Development Fund as a major part of his
party’s plan to fight domestic unemployment:
If you sum up what our ideal is—to find permanent employment—you may sum
it up in this way, I think: that it is the modernization of industry at home and the
multiplication of markets overseas. And that has caused us to look once more at
the development of our own Colonies…Overseas, and particularly in Africa, we
have territories of vast potentiality, and we want them to develop…and so we
shall provide out of our imperial funds such sums as are required—within a
maximum, to be attuned by our needs…to pay the interest in the initial years of
unfruitful schemes which otherwise must be postponed.28
The Conservatives trumpeted the idea for a Colonial Development Fund in their General
Election Manifesto. During Question Hour in the House of Commons in late April,

27

Williamson, “‘Safety First’: Baldwin, the Conservative Party, and the 1929 General Election.”
Also see Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). Page 37.
28
“Stanley Baldwin Speech to Open Conservative General Election Campaign,” The Times (of
London), April 19, 1929, The Times Digital Archive.

142

Amery predicted that the fund would be used to build sorely needed roads and railways in
British Africa.29

While the Labour Party did not include a Colonial Development Fund in its own election
platform, the Fund would come into existence under a new Labour Government. The
Conservative Party met defeat in the May 30 General Election, losing 152 of its 412
seats. The Labour Party won 151 new seats to climb to a plurality (though not a majority)
of 287. Yet within weeks, the Labour Government took up the Conservative idea of a
Colonial Development Fund as an immediate response to unemployment. This was
largely the work of “Jimmy” Thomas, a former railway labor organizer and a Colonial
Secretary in the first Labour Government (January-November 1924) who had been tasked
by the new Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, with coordinating the new
government’s response to unemployment. In the first post-election meeting of a
committee to address unemployment, Thomas declared his intention to link new
development spending in the colonies to job creation at home.30 Thomas did just this in a
speech to the House of Commons on July 4, when he previewed an upcoming bill to
authorize up to £1 million in annual spending for Colonial development.31 By July 11 the
Treasury had issued a White Paper explaining the proposal, and on July 12 Thomas
moved a resolution to establish both a Colonial Development fund and a Colonial
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Development Advisory Committee to assist the Treasury in judging the merits of
applications submitted by colonial governments.32
b) The fascist vs. the pedant: the debate over including health in the Colonial
Development Bill
In their addresses, Thomas as well as Amery and Baldwin had always asserted that
physical capital projects—and in particular, roads and railways—were to be the main
beneficiaries of this new colonial development funding. Such projects, they promised,
would entail large orders of manufactured goods (e.g. steel) for domestic factories, and
would decrease shipping costs for primary products (such as cotton) shipped from the
colonies to British manufacturers. 33 Health was not in a central feature of either the
Conservative or Labour Party leadership’s original vision for the Colonial Development
Act.34 Yet historians have noted the curious fact that a surprisingly large portion of the
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funding made available by the 1929 Colonial Development Act (16 percent between 1929
and 1940) went to health projects.

Rarely explored in this historiography, however, is exactly why such a sizable share of
funding originally promoted as a boon for transportation and communication networks
was ultimately used to construct hospitals and clinics. To some chroniclers, the use of the
Colonial Development Fund for health is evidence of a certain sort of failure. In his fivevolume Official History of Colonial Development, DJ Morgan writes of the period after
the passage of the 1929 Act that “the subsequent move away from emphasis on economic
toward concern with social projects serves to confirm the fact that viable economic
openings were just not abundantly available in the Colonial Empire as a whole.”35 Yet
this characterization overlooks the fact that during the 1929 debates over the Colonial
Development Act, a few vocal backbench MPs worked to ensure that the “promotion of
public health” was an explicitly authorized purpose of this new funding. The inclusion of
health as a major aim of the Colonial Development Fund (CDF) was less a “failure” than
a skillful subversion of Amery and Thomas’ original intent to decrease unemployment in
the UK. Because CDF health funding would soon prove so important for Nyasaland’s
Medical Department, the political maneuvers that effected this subversion of intent will
be related here.

insofar as it allowed roads, bridges, and electrical plants to be constructed more expeditiously.
One such instance in which health work had proven important took place, Amery recounted, in
“the creation of a large hydroelectric power scheme in Perak [in Malaysia],” which was “carried
out in a malarial jungle without involving any appreciable sickness among a body of 4,000
workers, a condition which would have been incredible a few years ago.” Ibid.
35
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When the Colonial Development Bill of 1929 was first discussed on July 12, a number of
MPs urged that “medical services” should be included in bill’s list of “means” by which
the fund could be used to further colonial development. Five days later, when the bill was
discussed again, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies William Lunn addressed these
MPs, assuring them that the health services would be provided to laborers on
infrastructure projects funded by the Colonial Development Act. Past experience, Lunn
claimed, had shown “the wisdom of giving attention to the health conditions of those who
labour in these great enterprises, and I think I ought to say that is equally important that
health conditions should be considered either in smaller enterprises.”36 He then sought to
move swiftly on to other matters.

But one MP was wholly unsatisfied with this clarification. Lord Eustace Percy had served
as a Conservative MP from Hastings since 1921. His policy interests lay primarily in
health and education, as evidenced by his previous posts as Parliamentary Secretary to
the Ministry of Health (1923) and President of the Board of Education (1924-1929).37
Percy argued that the bill, as written, seemed to indicate to future officials (and he might
have had niggardly treasury officials in mind) that health projects were not a legitimate
use of the bill. If, he explained, grants for development of the health services “are to be
permissible under the Bill, [they] will be admissible under Section I (I, 1)—‘any other
means.’” But, he continued, “If you mention ‘any other means’ and specify one of those
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other means, as is done in the paragraph in the words ‘including surveys,’ we run very
great risks of finding that health will be excluded.”

Sir Oswald Mosley, a Labour MP who helped coordinate the new government’s
employment policies alongside Jimmy Thomas, answered Lord Percy. “I hope,” he said,
“I can give some more encouragement than he found in the bill, because the governing
words are—aiding and developing agriculture and industry…It should be clear that,
where you are dealing with the promotion of industry, the health of those engaged in
industry is of primary concern.”

Yet Percy (who, according to a biographer, had a reputation for being “pedantic” and
“always ready to magnify small differences”)38 persisted: “I am afraid that,
grammatically, I do not find comfort in those words.”

Mosley tried to quell Percy’s concerns with an example. “It is possible to introduce
diseases which affect those engaged in industry, and consequently impair those who are
thus engaged. Certainly, such diseases as hookworm, which notably impair the efficiency
of those engaged in industry, can be dealt with under this bill…It would be a very narrow
and very mistaken reading of the purposes of this Bill if the great human element, upon
which, after all, all industrial efficiency rests in the first degree, was excluded from its
purview.”

38
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At this moment, the physician and Unionist MP Vernon Davies entered the fray.39 “Why
not include it specifically?” he asked Mosley.

Mosley was not known for his tolerance of criticism. Within three years, he would leave
the Labour Party to found the British Union of Fascists. By the late 1930s, he was best
known as Adolf Hitler’s chief British apologist.40 On this day, Davies’ challenge brought
Mosley to exasperation: “I have been trying for some five minutes to explain that it was
included. Perhaps I went into such detail in trying to make that explanation that I
mystified the honorable member.”

Dr. Davies, though, remained as unconvinced as Lord Percy: “With great respect to the
honorable Baronet [Mosley], I do not agree with him.”

Aided by Davies, Lord Percy pressed ahead with his endeavor to include an ironclad
provision to ensure health and education were not excluded from the CDF. He sought not
only to further the health of European-employed laborers (as Mosley had assumed), but
also the health of general “native” populations. Percy called for Mosley to insert two
amendments to the Bill that would add the promotion of both education and health of the
“native community” to the explicitly listed purposes of the fund.
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When debate recommenced on the bill the next day (July 18), Mosley addressed Percy’s
request. First, he moved to insert “the promotion of public health” as a purpose of the
Fund. Second, he contended that the phrase “native community” was not appropriate
because it might exclude “white settlers,” “Indian settlers” and “Arabs.” Finally, Mosley
argued that education “does not really fall within the scope of this bill.” Education was,
he explained, “a most important matter, but it falls under the ordinary colonial
administration.” Mosley’s amendment passed without further discussion. The entire bill
was approved by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, and received the
Royal Assent on July 26.

The Commons debate was recounted at such length here because health funding under
the Colonial Development Act became such an important part of the subsequent
development of Nyasaland’s government health sector. In contrast to the previous three
decades of colonial rule, the number of government health facilities for Nyasaland’s
Africans expanded rapidly after the passage of the 1929 act (see below). That the health
funding in the act was made possible only by the persistent objections of a “pedant” and a
little-known physician in the House of Commons has not yet been fully appreciated in the
historiography of the Colonial Development Act. George Abbott critiques the differential
treatment of education and public health in the act as one of the “rather glaring
inconsistencies” of the Act. This is certainly true; as the next chapter will demonstrate,
the absence of funding for education contributed to Nyasaland’s shortage of medical
providers, even as CDF monies were used to build new hospitals and dispensaries. But
Abbott suggests that this exclusion of education was the work of the Colonial
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Development Advisory Committee.41 It was not. The text of the House of Commons
debates reveal that the inclusion of health was the work of Lord Percy and Dr. Davies,
and the exclusion of education the product of the efforts of Sir Mosley.

The debate also reveals how a few persistent politicians partially transformed a measure
sold by Conservative and Labour leaders as an answer to a domestic concern
(unemployment) into a fund for the construction of hospitals in the colonies. In 1929
British unemployment was a crisis capable of overcoming the resistance to spending of
the UK Treasury (just as colonial labor unrest would prove capable of quelling Treasury
objections a decade later, see Chapter 5), but with this “emergency measure” virtually
assured of passage Percy and Davies felt no obligation to ensure that the law hewed too
closely to this politically potent justification.

IV.

The Colonial Development Act in Nyasaland

a) Easing the terms of debt repayment and increased recurrent expenditure
Officials in Nyasaland jumped at an opportunity to secure additional funds. In the autumn
of 1929, Nyasaland’s Acting Governor, Wilfred Bennett Davidson-Houston, wrote Lord
Passfield, the Labour Government’s Secretary of State for the Colonies (and, prior to his
1929 peerage, a prominent socialist reformer known as Sidney Webb). The Governor
informed Passfield that he hoped to submit proposals for funding to the newly established
Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), a group of private eminences and
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public officials in London tasked with deciding on the merit of submissions to the CDF.42
At first prospects did not look good; the CDAC was already considering funding for a
massive rail bridge over the Zambesi River, thereby connecting the port of Beira to
Nyasaland by a continuous railway line.43 But Nyasaland’s new Governor, Shenton
Thomas (a former prep school teacher less than three months into his first Colonial
Service assignment) insisted that a bridge was not enough. Thomas wrote to the Colonial
Office on January 30, 1930, explaining why Nyasaland remained so poor, and what it
would take to increase production:
Money is necessary for development and the money has not been forthcoming.
And, until the money is forthcoming, the country will not develop, whether the
Zambesi Bridge is built or not…Roads in themselves will not produce crops;
crops cannot be grown without skilled and systematic agricultural supervision;
and that supervision will only be partially effective unless it is exercised over a
healthy population.44
Governor Thomas’ main request (upon which he felt the other schemes for assistance
were entirely dependent) was to use the Colonial Development Fund to allow for an
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increase in Nyasaland Government’s ‘standard revenue’ from £300,000 to £450,000 for
ten years (1930-1939).45 The ability to devote domestic revenues to domestic
expenditures would, Thomas explained, allow him to increase recurrent expenditure on
priority areas such as health. In a February 24 debate in the House of Commons, Leo
Amery (by this point an opposition MP) spoke approvingly of Thomas’ proposal:
Nyasaland has been a Treasury controlled territory, conducted, as such territories
are apt to be, on the absolute minimum of expenditure…If we are to open up
Nyasaland and its resources by this new connection with the sea [the Zambesi
Bridge], it would be well worth while at the same time relaxing a little that
extreme rigour which limits its medical services, its sanitary services, and its
general administrative services.46
The CDAC approved of Thomas’ proposal at their meeting in March and urged expedited
negotiations with the UK Treasury, who still held sole power over Nyasaland’s standard
revenue arrangement. Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Samuel Wilson
lobbied Treasury Secretary Philip Snowden in a letter dated April 11. Wilson argued for a
clean break with the parsimonious approach of the past decade:
It is recognized that any Power with takes the responsibility of governing
uncivilized races should, in the words of the League of Nations, ‘apply the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust
of civilization.’ In this duty British control has failed. The natives are underfed
and under paid…such important social services as medical and sanitary
work…have been so restricted as to fall far below the standard normally attained
by backward British Dependencies….The Protectorate should at least be
maintained in a condition to avoid the grave public discredit which would attach
to Her Majesty’s Government, both in this country and abroad, should the present
scandalous state of Nyasaland attract attention.47
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This time, the Treasury agreed. Nyasaland’s standard revenue rose to £450,000, freeing it
to spend more of the customs duties and hut taxes raised within the Protectorate on
domestic services rather than on the TZR loan guarantee. Nyasaland’s recurrent
expenditure on health rose immediately. After barely budging during the 1920s—rising
only from £29,804 in 1924 to £33,191 in 1928—it increased to £42,496 in 1930, then to
£49,138 in 1934. But the health sector did not receive an outsized portion of the increased
domestic spending. Though absolute spending rose, the share of recurrent government
expenditure devoted to health fell slightly, 10.1 percent in 1930 to 9.0 percent in 1934.48

b) For once, London demands more spending on health
Even more important for Nyasaland’s health sector was the development expenditure
(spending on new buildings and equipment) made possible by the Colonial Development
Fund. During the campaign to raise Nyasaland’s standard revenue, Governor Thomas
also prepared a set of specific developmental schemes for CDAC consideration. In late
1929, he sent a circular to each of his departments—including the Medical Department—
asking for proposals for development schemes consistent with the aims of the Colonial
Development Act.49 Director of Medical Services FE Whitehead’s proposal was included
in the Governor’s January 30, 1930 despatch to the CDAC, and were considered at a
meeting on May 7. Thomas had included proposals for an agricultural laboratory,
veterinary extension services, and telegraph and telephone improvements.50 Whitehead’s
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proposal requested a total £80,596 for the Medical Department, with this funding to be
split roughly equally between renovation of existing hospitals and dispensaries and
construction of new facilities.51

Not everyone in Whitehall was enthusiastic about the scale of this proposal. Sir John
Campbell, financial advisor to Lord Passfield, objected to Governor Thomas’ suggestion,
included in his letter to the CDAC, that in promoting the cause of European medicine in
Africa “we should aim at nothing but the best.” Campbell’s penned a rejoinder:
“Financial considerations cannot be disregarded; they are, in fact, all-important. One
must cut one’s coat according to one’s cloth…If Nyasaland attempts to develop on what
one may call ‘European’ lines, the attempt will fail, for the finances of the country will
not stand it.”52

But Blackett’s CDAC had the opposite reaction; they thought Whitehead’s proposal
lacked sufficient ambition. While they approved many of Nyasaland’s other proposals,
the CDACs sent the Colonial Office a request for a more comprehensive four-year
program of medical and sanitary improvement in Nyasaland. They hoped for a new plan,
more ambitious than Dr. Whitehead’s, that would reflect the new reality of increased
standard revenue and, as a result, the capacity for higher recurrent expenditure. The
CDAC letter indicated that the new plan should expand the government’s work in public
health and sanitation (though not at the expense of previously proposed expenditures on
51
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curative medicine).53 This encouragement to request more funding for health was
unprecedented in Nyasaland’s relationship with Whitehall, and would scarcely be
repeated again.

The CDAC’s appetite for health spending (and, in particular, for public health and
sanitation) was, in large part, a result of its members’ personal interests. This was
particularly true of the CDAC’s Chairman, Sir Basil Blackett, the Calcutta-born son of
missionaries who had worked for decades as a finance expert in the British civil service.
Blackett’s interest in health was evidenced by his service as President of the British
Social Hygiene Council, a government-funded body known before 1925 as the National
Council for Combating Venereal Diseases.54 In 1932, Blackett published “A Layman’s
Plea for a Positive Health Policy,” a pamphlet in which he argued for far greater
emphasis on health education and preventive measures in the United Kingdom.55 During
Blackett’s years at the helm of the CDAC, proposals for projects to improve curative
medicine and public health projects in the colonies were both warmly reviewed and
frequently approved. For instance, during fiscal 1930-31, health accounted for 18 percent
of grants approved by the CDAC. In 1931-32 this figure rose to 44 percent.56
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The CDAC’s request that Nyasaland in particular needed to spend more on health was
supported by prominent figures in the Labour Government. Under-Secretary of State for
the Colonies Thomas Drummond Shiels, a Scottish physician known for his sympathy for
black African nationalists politicians and trade unionists,57 chaired a sub-committee of
the CDAC devoted specifically to advancing “the use of a portion of the Colonial
Development Fund for the promotion of public health in the Colonial Empire.”58 On June
26, 1930, Shiels spoke in the House of Commons of the need for CDF support for health
services in Nyasaland:
The terms of reference of the Fund were broadly drawn, and it has been found
possible to include in the schemes towards which assistance can be given schemes
to develop and assist the public health service…There is no doubt that we have
been hampered, especially in certain Colonies, such as Nyasaland, because of the
former parsimoniousness of the Treasury, but we are now hopeful that in
Nyasaland and other parts we may be able, with the help of the Colonial
Development Fund, not only to assist in public health but also in the training of
subordinate medical personnel and of midwives and in other ways to meet the
very real need to which honorable Members have called attention.59
Even Snowden’s Treasury echoed this encouragement, suggesting that Lord Passfield
request from Governor Thomas “a complete scheme of development within the additional
funds that will be available.” Among the priorities set out by the Treasury for the
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development scheme were “measures to improve the physical condition of the natives” so
as to facilitate increased production.60

By this point, neither Shiels, nor Blackett, nor even the Treasury felt compelled to
demonstrate any proof that colonial health schemes would aid employment in Britain.
With the bill passed, and the funds authorized, the Colonial Office finally felt freed to
pursue development as it saw fit. This was a short-lived feeling, as we shall see—by
1931, the deepening of the Great Depression would severely restrict their imaginations.
But for the moment, the prevailing sentiment in Whitehall was—for once—to think big.
Lord Passfield’s message to all Colonial and Mandated Territories of August 10, 1929
had informed them that schemes need not promise immediate economic returns, but they
should be submitted as quickly as possible.61 In 1930, the CDAC complained, in its first
interim report, that the schemes being submitted were both too few and too unambitious.
The Colonial Office responded by setting up a special committee to deploy public health
specialists to the colonies to devise larger plans for submission to the CDAC.62

V.

The Shircore Report of 1930

a) John Owen Shircore
Seeking an ambitious scheme for Nyasaland in short order, the Colonial Office
committee requested the assistance of Dr. John Owen Shircore, the Director of Medical
Services in Tanganyika. Shircore was, by 1930, an experienced hand. The son of a
60
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Captain in the Indian Medical Service, he had studied in Edinburgh, London and
Cambridge before joining the Colonial Service in 1908. Shircore had worked in the
northern Nyasaland town of Karonga as a medical officer, then in the East African
Medical Service during the First World War. After the war Shircore oversaw the
establishment of a new Medical Department in the former German territory of
Tanganyika, first as Deputy Principal Medical Officer then, beginning in 1924, as
Principal Medical Officer.63 There he launched massively popular voluntary
chemotherapeutic campaigns, treating more than 374,584 cases of yaws and 72,377 cases
of syphilis with a preparation of bismuth sodium tartrate and soamin (an arsenical) that he
had devised himself.64 Shircore’s work in Tanganyika demonstrated that he was by no
means blind to persistent Treasury concerns over cost containment; one of the major
advantages he saw in his own injection for yaws and syphilis was that its cost was far
lower than salvarsan, while being just as effective. 65 But he was also aware that both
cost-cutting measures and ill-conceived mass interventions could do more harm than
good. In dealing with sleeping sickness Shircore argued against tryparsamide
monotherapy, since in high doses the drug often caused atrophy of the optic nerve (and
consequent vision loss) or even death. Instead, he advocated dual therapy with lower
doses of tryparasamide alongside suramin, a drug with less frequent, though still serious,
side effects. Shircore also advocated individual examination of the sick over “wholesale
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blood examination of village populations,” which “tends to destroy the confidence of the
people…which results in obstruction and the concealment of cases.”66

b) A scathing critique and a plan for expansion
Shircore arrived in Zomba on August 9, 1930. Setting immediately to work, he covered
more 1000 miles by motorcar in 40 days, visiting native hospitals, European hospitals,
and dispensaries across the colony. Decades later, an obituary for Shircore would note
that some colleagues had found his demeanor “detached.” But in his report on Nyasaland,
submitted on September 20, Shircore’s tone was clear in its appraisal and passionate in its
call for far greater funds. “It may be stated,” he stated in his introduction, “that, with the
exception of an almost negligible addition of staff and a few beds to some of the
hospitals, little progress had been made until the year 1929…The department is merely in
embryo.”67 He recommended a significant increase in development expenditure, totaling
£110,325 over the coming four years.68

Shircore explained his recommendations by prefacing them with rather bleak assessments
of Nyasaland’s medical personnel and facilities for Africans. Shircore considered
European hospitals “adequate for their purpose.” But such was not the case for African
hospitals. Taken together, these hospitals contained only 170 beds for an estimated
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African population of 1.4 million in 1930.69 Patients were housed in a wattle and daub
hut in Chikwawa and in “dilapidated” buildings in Fort Manning and Kota-Kota. The
health facilities were too poorly funded, Shircore believed, to gain the confidence of the
native people:
The accommodation at the African hospitals is entirely disproportionate to
demand…Drugs are adequate, but medical and domestic equipment, such as beds,
blankets, sheets and pillows, require thorough overhauling. Similar remarks apply
to the allocation of funds for the upkeep of patients. Africans, unless dangerously
ill or destitute, will not apply for the treatment as in-patients or stay in hospital
unless reasonably well provided with food and comfort. Additional wards at the
established centres, likewise new hospitals, are urgently required.70
Shircore proposed substantial increases in facilities, staff, equipment and training over
the four-year period covered by the report. The largest line item, new facility
construction, included the construction of seventeen new African hospitals: 12 would
have 30 beds each and cost £2,050; four would have 50 beds each and cost £2,800; and
one (in Zomba) would have 100 beds and cost £7,194. He also proposed a new European
Hospital in Lilongwe, with 6 beds and a cost of £1,085. He recommended adding 36 new
dispensaries—costing £300 each—to the existing stock of 83. In addition, Shircore
recommended five new maternity and child welfare clinics, each with 12 beds, an
operation room, a dispensary and an outpatient room, to be staffed by a European Health
Visitor and four female African Maternity Assistants (£700 each).71 Medical and surgical
supplies and equipment, including X-ray machines, were to be purchased for the major
hospitals.
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Shircore also recommended more than doubling recurrent expenditure on personnel. This
would allow for an increase in the number of medical officers from 11 to 18. Such an
increase would, Shircore argued, greatly increase productivity, as it would reduce the
share of time medical officers spent traveling long distances (often up to 150 miles) to
see a single European patient. The number of sub-assistant surgeons was to be increased
from 8 to 20 using recruits from Bombay. This class of providers completed the same
curriculum as medical graduates in Great Britain, but they could be employed at far lower
cost.72 A Bacteriologist was to be hired, and a properly equipped laboratory constructed.
The Sanitation Branch was to be expanded to two European health officers and 80
African sanitary inspectors.

Shircore’s most expansive increase in staff would come in the cadre of African Hospital
Assistants. In the short term, he recommended an immediate increase in the number of
African Hospital Assistants from eight to 18. Then, over the following ten years, he
planned to have Hospital Assistants replace the existing dispensers. “The majority of the
dispensers,” he claimed, “possess no knowledge of drugs and merely dole out stock
mixtures.”73 Instead of barely trained dispensers he sought a hospital assistant at every
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health facility in the country, and at least one health facility for every 20,000 people.
Even assuming zero growth in Malawi’s population, this ratio required the cadre of
African Hospital Assistants to grow from eight to 70. To reach this figure, Shircore
sought to emulate his work in Tanganyika by establishing a Medical Training School at
Zomba. This school would replace an arrangement that the government maintained with
the University’s Mission for Central Africa (UMCA) hospital in Blantyre, where African
Hospital Assistants were trained in a four-year curriculum before being placed in the
government’s employ. Shircore thought a government training school preferable to the
subvention of a mission school, where the “atmosphere” and “methods” might differ
from the government service and the ability to study at a large central hospital was not
available to trainees.
c) Aftermath of the report: plans, realized and unrealized
Shircore’s report was not a radical document. His total request for development
expenditure was slightly more than £110,000, only exceeding Whitehead’s original
request to the CDAC by £30,000.74 And though Shircore called for improved facilities
and staffing at African hospitals, he recommended nothing approaching equality in
medical provision for Europeans and Africans in Nyasaland. For instance, the new sixbed European hospital in Lilongwe would cost £1,085—more than half the cost of a 30bed African hospital—and was to be staffed by a Medical Officer, Nursing Sister,
Sanitary Superintendent and Sub-Assistant Surgeon. Indeed as a 1931 Medical
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Department report would find, the cost per patient per day was more than two times
higher in European Hospitals than in Native Hospitals.75

Blackett’s CDAC was enthusiastic about Shircore’s proposal, and did not accept the
notion that there Nyasaland should finance the development of its medical services. The
CDAC approved most of the funds requested, allotting a total of £101,410 to Nyasaland’s
Medical Department.76 But the relative optimism did not last for long. During the depths
of the Great Depression, the UK scaled back outlays from the CDF.77 As the Depression
dried up government coffers throughout the empire, calls for ambitious schemes had
turned to calls for economies. The Imperial Treasury eventually approved expenditures of
only £78,284 for Nyasaland’s Medical Department. This amount was less than Nyasaland
than Shircore had proposed, and even less than Whitehead requested of the CDAC in
January 1930.

Total disbursements from the Colonial Development Fund between its inception in 1929
and October 1940 (when it was supplanted by the Colonial Development and Welfare
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Fund) were £6,523,193.78 Nyasaland, a colony with three percent of the population of the
British Empire in 1930, received 11.1 percent of total funding.79 Between 1930 and 1938,
Nyasaland received £726,534 in grants from the CDF. The majority of these funds,
£500,000, went towards the TZR loan guarantee (to allow for an increase in the standard
revenue). Funding for the medical department represented less than 10 percent of
Nyasaland’s total CDF funding.80 Still, the CDF assistance was more infrastructure
funding than Nyasaland’s medical department had ever received before. Nyasaland was,
then, a disproportionate beneficiary of the CDF, which in other colonies was far less
significant contributor to public coffers.

By 1938, 12 new hospitals (with a total of 510 beds), 36 rural dispensaries, and 3
maternity and child welfare clinics had been constructed in Nyasaland with CDF
monies.81 A newly constructed Zomba African Hospital was staffed by two medical
officers, two nursing sisters, and a pathologist, and equipped with a new laboratory and
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X-ray machine.82 But while Shircore had called in 1930 for X-ray machines in African
hospitals throughout the country, as late as 1945 Zomba remained the only African
hospital equipped with one.83

Staffing remained the largest problem in the years following the Shircore report. The
number of medical officers rose from 11 in 1930 to 14 in 1933, but it would not exceed
15 until after World War II. Sub-assistant surgeons on government payroll rose from 8 in
1930 to 10 in 1933, but rose no further during the decade. Nyasaland would never rely to
the same extent upon sub-assistant surgeons as Tanganyika.

The new development funding and increased recurrent spending, both made possible by
the CDF, changed the quantity and quality of medical care at government hospitals in
Nyasaland.84 In the early 1930s, medical officer Walter Gopsill was deployed to Cholo,
an area in the south known for its tea estates. Heretofore the station had only a small
outpatient dispensary for a district of 53,000 people. Shircore had called for the
construction of a 50-bed hospital, as well as the appointment of a Medical Officer and

82

Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 87. Also see ADJB Williams, “Annual Medical &
Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December, 1934” (Zomba, Nyasaland: Government
Printer, April 25, 1935), Box 15, No 20, SoMA.
83
ADJ Bedward Williams, “Post-War Development of Medical Services,” 1944.
84
Medical officers were still overwhelmed by the scale of the work with which they had been
tasked. Speaking of his responsibilities as the sole medical officer in Mlanje in 1941, Gopsill
explained: “As well as being in charge of a Hospital containing one hundred beds one was
responsible for the control of Epidemic diseases in the area, the medical care of the European
population, eight District dispensaries dotted about the district, inspections and care of factory
staffs and the general public health of the district, also the inspection of the numerous Indian
Stores and of course the Market. In addition one was called out to treat European planters and
their families. The African population was well over 100,000.” Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My
Life in Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Page 34.

165

African Hospital Assistant.85 The funding was ultimately used to erect a 100-bed
hospital. Gopsill was also heartened that “the native staff at the hospital had considerably
increased and improved.” He worked alongside “well trained dressers, and dispensers,
nurses,” and “one boy who showed promise I taught to do blood films and all microscope
work, which was of tremendous assistance to me.”86 But some aspects of care remained
poor. Funding to feed hospital patients was so paltry that Gopsill required inpatients with
venereal diseases to supply their own “bags of mealie meal.”87 The only time the Medical
Stores supplied his hospitals with sufficient bed sheets was just before an official visit by
Nyasaland’s Governor.88

VI. Conclusion: medicine as byproduct of colonial and postcolonial politics
If Innocent had lived near a vascular surgeon, he might have left the hospital with both
legs. The process of training, employing and equipping surgeons is no mystery. But it
takes money, and money—as this chapter has shown—is something Malawi’s health
sector has long been denied. Innocent’s avoidable amputation was the product of a
thousand decisions and omissions that left Malawi without the equipped and trained
medical practitioners needed to salvage his leg. Many these causes (such as the exclusion
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of education from the 1929 CDA) are quite distal, and only come to light with an analysis
that is both geographically broad and historically deep.

The focus on health budgets, political economy, and the moral commitments or greed of
individual actors might seem a tad retrograde. Since the postmodern turn, Africanists
have written about scarcity in medicine, but they have been especially curious about the
innovations, improvisations, appropriations, and hybridizations wrought by health
providers and patients. This vein of inquiry has inspired rich literatures in both the history
of medicine and medical anthropology.89

Yet there are pitfalls to this focus, especially when it moves into the realms of policy and
practice. Of late, the notions of “reverse and “frugal” innovation (terms imported from
business management) have become infatuations in global public health.90 The term
“reverse innovation” assumes that the flow of innovation has historically flowed from
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“West” to “non-West.” This is, of course, obscurantist, continuing a long-standing and
widespread ignorance about the history of innovations stemming from the “non-West.”91
In this way, the politics of reverse innovation” are entirely inapposite to postmodern
Africanist literatures, even if both share a concern with “innovation.” The politics of the
term “frugal innovation” are subtler, but can have insidious side-effects. Extolling
“necessity as the mother of invention” runs the risk of downplaying the fact that, now as
in the past, the absence of strong health systems leads most often to suffering and death,
not the spark of creativity.

Reexamining the history of health spending—or lack thereof—in British colonial Africa
does not necessarily require rehashing the same questions. At stake in much of the earlier
literature on this subject was the nature of an imagined unitary soul of colonialism: was it
benevolent or malevolent? The battle lines were clear; on one side stood the
hagiographers, and on the other the radical critics.92 Here, though, I treat the British
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colonial enterprise as simultaneously exploitative, unfree and invested with moral fervor
and even heroic works. I turn, instead, to more practical, even prosaic questions: when
and why did colonial medicine actually reach African subjects? In what form? And with
what consequences? The new resources for health discussed in these chapters were, in the
scheme of things, paltry. But, as later chapters will demonstrate, the medical facilities
constructed in Nyasaland in the early 1930s would in time become important—and
highly valued—to millions of people.

occupation…The colonizer perverts his meaning and translate, ‘Don’t leave, for what would we
do without you?’” Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (New York: Grove Press, 1965).Page 122.
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Chapter 4
“We have to wait for riots and disturbances”: Budget cuts in a uniquely quiet
Nyasaland, 1935-1945
Abstract
This chapter explores the role of political unrest in colonial medical spending. During the
mid- and late-1930s, Nyasaland’s Medical Department annual expenditures barely
budged, even as revenues continued to rise. This was a product, in part, of the perception
in Whitehall that Nyasaland was a placid backwater, and therefore did not need the
political palliative of health spending. This perception, and the resulting retrenchment in
health spending, continued after the mchape anti-witchcraft movement swept across the
countryside, and even after the return of the millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from
forced exile in 1937. Looking elsewhere in the British Empire, though, officials saw far
graver threats to economic and political stability. Between 1935 and 1940, waves of riots
and strikes roiled the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern
Rhodesia’s Copperbelt, and the cocoa farms of West Africa. This unrest proved capable
of stirring the Colonial Office and even the UK Treasury to call for greater health
spending as a demonstration of beneficence. The Colonial Office’s connection between
unrest and social services spending was forged deliberately. Malcolm MacDonald, the
son of the first Labour Prime Minister, became Colonial Secretary in 1938. He played on
British anxieties about the future of the Empire to drum up support for the 1940 Colonial
Development and Welfare Act. Most of the Act’s initial funding went to perceived
centers of unrest, especially the West Indies. Medical administrators in Nyasaland
complained bitterly to their superiors, but to no avail; few development funds went to
colonies that did not provoke metropolitan anxieties.
Prelude: When the ‘warm heart of Africa’ turns hot: protests against land
alienation in a zone of media indifference
Nicotine was dead. The news spread quickly among the crowd gathered on the dirt road
outside the Monkey Bay District Hospital. The normally bustling shop stalls hawking
sodas and mandazis (fried dough) had been shuttered. Policemen and soldiers stood guard
inside the hospital gate. Huddled together in small groups, the adults spoke in hushed
tones, their eyes downcast. No one wailed with grief, not yet. Those loud lamentations
would come a few days later, at Nicotine’s funeral. Incongruously, a girl skipped around
blithely in front of the hospital, her face alight with an unknowing smile. A young man
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chided her. “Simuli ndi chisoni?” (“Have you no sympathy?”). The girl stopped, looked
about, and quickly adopted the somber expression shared by all the other faces.

Nicotine was a nickname, given to the good-natured youth in his early 20s because he
always seemed to have a cigarette in his hand. This is unusual in Malawi where, although
tobacco is the country’s leading export, few can afford a cigarette habit. Nicotine lived
with his grandmother, and had recently received a good score on his terminal secondary
school exams. One person in the crowd reported having seen Nicotine being beaten by a
policeman, while another said he saw blood coming out of his nose.

Earlier that day, people from the fishing village of Masasa had gathered outside a local
government building where they had heard that their local hereditary chiefs and elected
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Malawian soldiers in combat gear inside Monkey Bay District Hospital after protests.
February 3, 2015.
officials were holding a secret meeting with a representative from Mota Engil, a
Portuguese multinational construction corporation. The Malawi Government and Mota
Engil, a publicly traded company with over $2 billion in revenue in 2014, had been in
talks for months about plans to build a 5-star resort hotel.1 It was to be, in the words of
one Mota Engil promotional article, a “ranch-style resort, with a beautiful pool, a golf
course and an inlet connecting the pool to the lake,” to be operated by “a world-famous
brand name hotelier.”2 To the surprise of government officials, Masasa residents had
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obtained a copy of closely-held plans showing the resort would displace their entire
lakeshore village.

After months with barely any official response to their vocal complaints and wellreasoned petitions, Masasa residents were angry. Most of them had already been
displaced seven years earlier from a verdant plot blessed with fertile farmland in order to
make room for company housing. Now, they had built modest thatch-roofed huts on the
beach, where most eked out a living as fishermen. They knew from experience not to
believe those politicians who painted visions of El Dorado, in which the resort would
bring jobs for the many. A $400-per-night lodge, offering snorkeling and water sports,
had for years operated near their village. But this reclusive retreat warned residents not to
approach if they did not want to risk being shot, and employed only a handful of locals.

The soon-to-be-displaced had been promised monetary compensation, but the plot where
they suspected they would be moved was suitable for neither fishing nor farming. And
Mota-Engil already had a reputation among rural Malawians for being untrustworthy. In
the months leading up to the Masasa protest, another Mota Engil project had run into
similar opposition in the nation’s southwest, in Neno District. After the Brazilian mining
giant Vale subcontracted to Mota Engil to build a railroad from the Moatize coal mine in
Mozambique to the coast, Neno residents accused both companies of reneging on pledges
to compensate the displaced with money, schools and health facilities. Hundreds of
protestors in Neno had even gone so far as to block the main road leading to the railway
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line.3 Masasa residents protesting Mota Engil’s machinations with local officials would
soon prove just as determined.

When officials left their meeting with a Mota Engil representative on the afternoon of
February 3, they were met by an angry crowd. The assembly had been stoked to a furor
by a rumor that their own officials had just signed away their land. What happened next
was the subject of much debate among local Malawians and cursory press reports (none
of which were written on the basis of first-hand knowledge or detailed research). The
account that follows is the consensus view of most of the dozen people I interviewed in
Monkey Bay. The Masasa protesters destroyed the car of Traditional Authority
Nankumba, a car they had heard had been paid for by Mota Engil. Both Nankumba and
the Mota Engil representative were bloodied, but not gravely injured, by protestors. The
Monkey Bay police deployed quickly from a nearby station, and after being pelted by
rocks opened fire on the crowd using live rounds.

The bullets struck eight people. Two would succumb to their bullet wounds, and an
additional six would survive after being treated in nearby hospitals. Some of the victims
were not even involved in the protest. Just as the officials emerged from their meeting, a
nearby secondary school let out. Among those shot (but not killed) were a 14-year-old
male student and a 22-year-old man accompanying his sister on her walk home. The two
men killed by the police were not even from Masasa. Nicotine lived in another village in
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Monkey Bay. The other victim, who died shortly after being transferred to Mangochi
District Hospital, was a fisherman from Cape Maclear.

After the shooting the crowd ran, but they were far from finished expressing their
displeasure. A few men ran into town and ransacked a local bar owned by Ward
Councillor Bulireni. Bulireni had been a local favorite, having run for office
unsuccessfully a few times before winning the people over with displays of generosity
such as letting people use his truck to drive to funerals. But he was rumored to have
signed away the Masasa residents’ land to Mota Engil.

Others ran to the home of Chief Njogo, also rumored to have agreed to the land
alienation. While Njogo’s wife hid in a neighbor’s hut, enraged Masasa residents set fire
to his kitchen and his outhouse, ripped the doors off their hinges, tore the screens off of
the windows, and smashed his dishes. One man outside the hospital said he heard Masasa
residents say they would rather die than move.

Such violence was highly unusual for this sleepy town. Most residents could recall
hearing gunshots in town only once before, in 1993. That event had occurred after
President Bakili Muluzi had ordered the Malawi Young Pioneers, a paramilitary
organization maintained by his predecessor, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, to disband. In
response some Young Pioneers had driven through town on pickup trucks, shooting off
guns and looking menacing, but people didn’t remember anyone being hurt.
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This episode included all the outrages and David-and-Goliath drama one would expect to
find in a muckraking magazine article. But even in the Malawian press the coverage was
sparse and one-sided. A Chichewa-language broadcast on the independent radio station
Zodiak FM that evening featured an interview with Mangochi’s Police Inspector. None of
the protestors were interviewed, nor were other witnesses. Local newspapers quoted
statements from local politicians following the “fracas,” but no reporters interviewed the
villagers threatened with displacement or even the victims of the police shootings. For its
part, the foreign press did not cover the event.

Not that it would have been easy for reporters to discern what had happened even if they
had shown up. There was an imperative to obfuscate on all sides. No one I talked to
around Monkey Bay admitted involvement in the protests. And why would they? It
would profit them nothing, and risked punishment. Fearing there would be police
reprisals during the night after the protests, the men of Masasa found shelter outside their
village. Mota Engil disclaimed any interest in building the lakeside resort, explaining to
the press that it was more of a favor to the government. They denied that they had even
sent a representative to the meeting on the day of the protest. For its part, the Malawi
government claimed that a much-criticized letter agreeing to the alienation of the Masasa
villagers’ land was a forgery created by an opposition politician attempting to smear the
ruling party. It seemed as though a great conflagration had erupted, and then disappeared
from view. The episode barely registered in the media; as in the 1930s (see Chapter 4),
Malawians could be seen by outsiders as an entirely placid people.
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Still, the protests had lasting effects. Two months later, The Nation, a leading daily,
published an op-ed decrying the protestors for throwing up “disincentives to investment”
and denying themselves the opportunity for “thousands of jobs.”4 There would be no
compensation, neither from Mota Engil nor the government, for the families of the two
boys who had died, or the six who had been injured. Yet despite the paltry and biased
media coverage, and the absence of any official remuneration for the injured, Mota Engil
cancelled its planned $50 million project. Malawian President Peter Mutharika continued
to plead with the company to reconsider.5 The protestors had proved surprisingly
powerful, despite their near-invisibility in the local and international media.
I. Introduction
During the mid- and late-1930s, Nyasaland’s Medical Department budget barely budged,
even as revenues continued to rise. This was a product, in part, of the perception in
Whitehall that Nyasaland was a placid backwater, and therefore did not need the political
palliative of health spending. This perception, and the resulting retrenchment in health
spending, continued after the mchape anti-witchcraft movement swept across the
countryside, and even after the return of the millenarian preacher Elliot Kamwana from
forced exile in 1937. Looking elsewhere in the British Empire, though, officials saw far
graver threats to economic and political stability. Between 1935 and 1940, waves of riots
and strikes roiled the oil fields and ports of the British West Indies, the mines of Northern
Rhodesia’s Copperbelt, and cocoa farms in West Africa. This unrest proved capable of
4
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stirring the Colonial Office and even the UK Treasury to favor greater health spending as
a demonstration of beneficence. This connection between unrest and social services
spending had to be forged deliberately. Malcolm MacDonald, a son of Ramsay
MacDonald, the Prime Minister during the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development
Act, became Colonial Secretary in 1938. He quickly played on British anxieties about the
future of the Empire to drum up support for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare
Act. Most of the Act’s initial funding went to the perceived centers of unrest, especially
the West Indies. Medical administrators in Nyasaland complained bitterly to their
superiors, but to no avail; few development funds went to colonies that did not provoke
metropolitan anxieties.

The political scientist James Scott has argued that “most of the great political reforms of
the nineteenth and twentieth century have been accompanied by massive episodes of civil
disobedience, riot, law-breaking, the disruption of public order, and, at the limit, civil
war. Such tumult not only accompanied dramatic political changes but was often
absolutely instrumental in bringing them about.”6 This chapter will demonstrate both the
veracity of this link between unrest and political change, as well as its logical obverse.
That is, in the absence of perceived unrest, elites feel little urgency to change methods of
governance or levels of social provision.

It might be worthwhile to add a methodological note here. In a 1955 speech, the colonialaffairs expert Lord Malcolm Hailey opened a speech with the following observation:
6
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“Everyone must agree that as a source of study, history has one great defect; it is very
untidy.”7 Indeed, the following three chapters might seem, to some historians devoted to
geographic specialization, untidy. But this is, I hope, no defect. These chapters do not
focus entirely on Nyasaland, nor on medicine. Instead, they recount labor strikes and
riots, intellectual movements, and social and economic policy debates throughout
southern Africa, the West Indies, Britain and the United States. These events affected, in
indirect but clearly discernible ways, colonial policies and everyday practices in
Nyasaland’s dispensaries and hospitals. But Nyasaland was not some passive receptacle
of actions taken elsewhere. In later chapters (particularly 8 through 10), events in colonial
Nyasaland and postcolonial Malawi will prove to have a profound impact on policies and
practices throughout the southern African region and around the globe (see, for instance,
the dissolution of Federation in Chapter 8, or the creative use of international crises by
Kamuzu Banda in Chapter 10). A robust history of medicine in Nyasaland demands this
transgression of political borders and disciplinary bounds.
II.

The metropole strikes back: London demands an end to “lavish” care

a) Too much, too fast: Whitehall questions the growth of Nyasaland’s Medical
Department, 1935-38
Officials in Nyasaland had yet to spend their last CDF dollars before they began to face a
backlash from London. The perception in the Colonial Office and the Treasury was that
the medical department had grown dramatically, perhaps even too dramatically. This
perception became more prominent in the years after Basil Blackett, the chairman of the
CDAC and advocate for new hospitals and health centers throughout the colonies, died in
7
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a car crash in August 1935.8 Rumblings of cutbacks had begun even earlier. In May 1935
the Colonial Office sent a letter to the Treasury, suggesting Nyasaland’s number of
medical officers per unit of land area or per capita compared favorably with other
neighboring colonies, and therefore the increases in recurrent expenditure it had
experienced in recent years might be stopped.9 In a dissent dispatched from Zomba,
Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services reminded the Colonial Office that Nyasaland
remained an impoverished colony with much lower per-capita recurrent health
expenditure than other British colonies in southern and eastern Africa.10 Nyasaland
Governor Harold Kittermaster echoed the Director of Medical Services’ argument,
stating that on a per capita basis Nyasaland’s government spent less on health (7.4 pence
per capita) than any other dependency in East Africa. Kittermaster also highlighted a
different measure of staffing than the Colonial Office had, demonstrating that Nyasaland
had fewer “qualified medical staff” [medical officer plus sub-assistant surgeons] than any
other dependency in East Africa.11 Statistics could be used to serve different ends;
Kittermaster recognized—as had Shircore—that Nyasaland had far fewer sub-assistant
surgeons than Tanganyika and other British colonies in East Africa, and he used this fact
to demonstrate the paucity of medical staff in his colony. “It would show poor
8
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appreciation of the generosity with which the Protectorate was treated by the Colonial
Development Fund now to close down or curtail the activities in the hospitals.”12

Yet Colonial Office officials persisted in portraying Nyasaland as a colony amply served
with medical staff. To do this, they used their own favored statistical ratios. Marcus
Greenhill, an 36-year-old official who had worked in the Colonial Office in London since
the age of 20, argued that “the medical staff of the Protectorate was large in relation to
the size of the country…in the southern Province where the population is largely
concentrated it seems possible that fewer officers should be able to provide an efficient
service with a corresponding reduction in expenditure.”13 This was a decided change in
Colonial Office policy compared to just five years earlier, when Lord Passfield was
Secretary of State for the Colonies under a Labour Government. By late 1935, the UK
Government was a coalition of Labour, Conservatives, and Liberals, and this regime
proved decidedly less friendly to health spending in Nyasaland. In addition, two
downturns in global demand (one in 1929-1933 and another in 1937-38) led to
plummeting prices for the mineral and agricultural commodities extracted from southern
and eastern Africa. This, in turn, left colonial treasuries even more penurious than usual.

12
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Nyasaland’s African population found less of the waged work that helped them to pay hut
taxes, while customs duties decreased.14

These political and economic shifts drastically changed the appetite for development
funding in London. The Colonial Office demanded spending cutbacks, and viewed the
elimination of medical staff as the quickest route to such economies. Greenhill
complained that government medical provision had expanded far too quickly, to a level
beyond Nyasaland’s capacity to pay for it. “Nyasaland was provided with the necessary
funds by the CDF for the provision of hospitals, clinics and staff quarters, but that seems
no reason why all the money should have been spent at once. The result is that Nyasaland
has a service far in advance of its present stage of development including a large number
of hospitals and clinics, etc. which it cannot use to the fullest extent.”15

b) Another doctor calls for more: the de Boer Report, 1938
Not everyone agreed with this call for spending cuts; once again, the rebuke would come
from a veteran member of the colonial medical services. In 1938, Henry Speldewinde de
Boer began his tenure as Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services. Born in Ceylon, de
Boer had studied medicine at the London Hospital. After serving in the Royal Army
Medical Corps during the First World War, he took postgraduate degrees at both
14
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Cambridge and the London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. Beginning in
1926, he spent five years as medical officer in Kenya, two as Deputy Director of Sanitary
Services in Northern Rhodesia, and another five as Deputy Director of Medical Services
in Uganda.16 In these colonies he was known for his interest in malariology and maternal
and child welfare.

Immediately upon his arrival de Boer toured the country and submitted a set of proposals
on the Medical Department to the Colonial Office. He opened his report with language
even more blunt than Shircore’s: “The present services are completely inadequate to
touch even the fringe of our medical problem. They have not made true contact with the
population as a whole, nor can they claim to have gained the confidence of any but a
small section of the people. With our existing hospitals and dispensaries, it is doubtful
whether [we] have made any serious reduction in the sickness and mortality rates...”17 De
Boer criticized the paltry number of medical officers, who were “tied largely to the needs
of the European population.” Sub-assistant surgeons were being asked to function as
administrators, and even hospital assistants were being put in charge of entire district
hospitals.

De Boer recognized that Africans lacked trust in the efficacy of treatments, particularly
those available at rural dispensaries. There were 90 dispensaries throughout the country,
but de Boer argued the dispensers were held in so little regard by Africans that “the
16
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average number of patients seen at most of our dispensaries does not exceed 15 a day,”
and the majority of those patients presented only with minor complaints.18 Can this be
taken as an indication that there are no genuinely sick persons in our African villages?
What little we do know goes to prove the contrary!” When Africans did bring gravely ill
patients to dispensaries, they had to be transferred to district hospitals by stretcher. Such
trips often took more than a day and were sometimes impossible when poor roads were
washed out during the rainy season.

The answer to the lack of adequately trained medical providers was not, De Boer argued,
to halt the construction of new facilities. Instead he called for a rapid increase in the
number of hospitals beds for Africans, from approximately 700 to 1080. He also called
for an increase in dispensary construction and an improvement in the training of the
auxiliaries who staffed them.19 De Boer noted that even after the new Zomba African
Hospital was built the only training facility for hospital assistants remained the UMCA
mission in Blantyre. A training effort on the scale envisioned by Shircore had never been
undertaken. De Boer called for a massive recruiting and training effort, with free tuition,
18
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room and board at both the mission training school and at a government school. Between
1940 and 1947, De Boer requested increases in medical personnel including medical
officers (from 14 to 20), European nursing sisters (from 12 to 30) and, most notably, in
hospital assistants (from 15 to 116). In total, his proposal called for additional capital
expenditure of £122,766 (over eight years) and a considerable increase in recurrent
expenditure, more than doubling from its 1938 level of £52,839 to more than £110,000
by 1947.

Realizing that questions about funding such a proposal would follow his report, De Boer
proposed fiscal policies with which to fund his program. These proposals reflected De
Boer’s understanding of Nyasaland’s role as a labor reserve for southern Africa, and
demanded that industries benefiting from this migration take on additional
responsibilities for the health of Africans remaining in or returning to Nyasaland. “It is
believed that every batch of returning natives includes one or more individuals bringing
back, if not new diseases, fresh strains of old diseases that may flare up and affect
adversely the balance of nature that has existed. Our Africans are generally admitted to
be our country’s only important asset. Can we say that it is not a wasting asset?”20 At the
time, Southern Rhodesia remitted 6 of the 20 shillings it collected in taxes from
Nyasaland’s migrants to the Nyasaland government; de Boer suggested that the entire
amount (20 shillings) be sent back to Nyasaland. He also proposed that the Union of
South Africa should levy a tax on Nyasaland natives living within its borders, to be
remitted to Nyasaland. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA), a
20
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recruiting organization that drew recruits from Nyasaland for South Africa’s mines,
would be “asked to contribute £2 per head of labour recruited in Nyasaland.”

De Boer knew that most past proposals had not amounted to much. “The files of my
department make for very sad reading,” he lamented. Past Directors of Medical Services
had “little time to think on big lines,” and when they did “recommendations and demands
have either been neglected completely or in approval so pared down and attenuated, that
little progress eventuated.”21 Indeed, after an initial increase in recurrent expenditure on
health in Nyasaland during the early 1930s (rising from £33,191 in 1928 to £49,138 in
1934), the budget for health barely had budged for the rest of the decade (increasing only
to £52,343 in 1939). Public sector health spending also came to occupy a smaller portion
of overall public expenditures in Nyasaland. The medical department claimed more than
10.1 percent of the Protectorate’s total recurrent budget in 1930, but this had dropped to
6.5 percent by 1939.22 De Boer took over Nyasaland’s Medical Department at a moment
far less ripe with promise and support from London than when Shircore had written his
report in 1930.
c) An “excessive” service: reception of the de Boer report in London
The response to De Boer’s report clearly demonstrated the conflict between Zomba and
London over the quality of medical services due Nyasaland’s African population. In a
note accompanying De Boer’s report in May 1939, Nyasaland Governor Donald
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Mackenzie-Kennedy—having arrived only two months prior from Northern Rhodesia—
expressed his support for the plan, saying its enactment would “avoid a continuance of
what can only be described as a sham and a pretense—hospitals and dispensaries,
inadequately staffed and insufficiently supervised.”23 Officials at the Colonial Office did
not agree. Edmund Boyd, the Principal Private Secretary to the Colonial Secretary,
praised de Boer’s “superabundant energy and enthusiasm,” but dismissed his proposals as
the unreasonable wishes of an administrator “coming fresh from Uganda, where medical
and public health standards have reached a pretty high standard.”24 Dr. Arthur O’Brien, a
member of the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee who had joined de Boer for part of
his inaugural tour of Nyasaland, opined that de Boer’s proposals for funding recurrent
costs through charges on the governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were
not “practical.” The only proposal in the report for which O’Brien’s offered wholehearted support was the call for improving housing and hospital accommodation for
white settlers. The existing “European hospitals” were, O’Brien noted, “disgraceful” and
had to be improved immediately; the expansion of African medical services could be
“more gradual and spread over a longer period.”25
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Gerard Clauson, a Sanskrit philologist and a rising star at the Colonial Office then
serving as head of the recently established Social Services Department, was more blunt.26
He dismissed de Boer’s proposals as “prohibitively expensive” before expanding on his
view that Nyasaland’s medical services for Africans were actually too lavish:
I admit that 1080 beds for 1,620,000 inhabitants, i.e. 1 per 1500, is not excessive,
but the quality of the service is. It seems to me fantastic to take a native who all
his life has probably never slept anywhere except on the ground or a few boards
and, if he stayed sick at home, would continue to live in that way, and directly he
gets into the hospital to put him into a bed with blankets, sheets and other
appurtenances and wait on him hand and foot. The solution seems to be to imitate
the French who provide much humbler accommodation at their hospitals,
comparable to the proposed patients’ huts at the Dispensaries, into which the
patient can be moved with his family and be nursed principally by them, the
Government providing treatment but not attendance and food.27
So while Nyasaland’s Director of Medical Services saw medical provision as
“completely inadequate, and the Governor thought it a “sham,” Clauson argued African
patients were being pampered. Bedding and food and professional attendance were, to his
mind, much more than any African patient in Nyasaland might expect from a government
medical facility. The answer was not more spending and more care for the sick, but rather
less of both. De Boer thought African hospitals had empty beds because accommodation
and equipment remained dreadful; Clauson said that it was evidence only that a large
increase in the number of facilities was unnecessary.

Particularly on the arguments regarding hospital feeding, doctors working in Nyasaland
did not share Clauson’s opinion. Reporting on medical services in 1939, when the
26
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recurrent health budget decreased from his first year, de Boer complained it was
“becoming more difficult to provide patients admitted with a satisfactory diet. In a
country where the average inhabitant suffers from defective nutrition, good feeding is an
important part of curative medicine.”28 Medical officers saw patients’ kin nursing and
feeding the sick in their hospitals each day. Though grateful for such care-giving, the
medical officers considered this a complement, rather than a substitute, for trained
nursing and hospital feeding. In his memoirs WTC Berry, who worked in Nyasaland
from 1936 to 1943, recalled the deficiencies in accommodation at rural district hospitals
(“outstations”) and the reliance of harried staff on family caregivers:
[The hospitals] were single-story buildings, built of brick with corrugated Iron
roofs and cement floors, laid out round a quadrangle of grass or hard-packed
earth. The space beneath the roofs was often, especially in out-stations, occupied
by bats and sometimes by fierce, wild bees…On out-stations the crowd was more
countrified and included more women, children, and babies…A problem in every
hospital before the days of DDT, which only arrived in Nyasaland during the last
years of the war and was, even then, in very short supply, were the bedbugs. They
infested the clothing and bedclothes of the patients and lived in the cracks of the
hospital walls…The patients’ relations came into the hospital too, sleeping in their
own blankets between the beds and on the verandah. They brought their own food
in with them (and, sometimes, their bedbugs) and their food helped to vary the
patients’ diet; to that extent, and for some of the nursing, we depended on them.
The patients’ diet consisted of maize meal, beans and, where available, fish. Leaf
vegetables were cooked as side dishes…The hospital would have been a worse
place without the relations and less used as a result.29
Clauson penned his critical response to the De Boer report on August 8, 1939. Less than a
month later, on September 1, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. In response, the UK and
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France declared war on Germany. It had been difficult to secure finances for expanding
medical services just before the war began; it was impossible during the war. As one
official remembered, the war brought with it a new “disease” called “Algef—Apres la
guerre est fini (‘After the war is over’)—a refrain which become the “customary
direction on nearly all new proposals.”30 Not until after the war would Nyasaland’s
health services become an imperial priority once more.
d) The wages of quietus: cutbacks as a consequence of placidity
To what can we attribute Whitehall’s distaste for health spending in Nyasaland during the
mid- to late-1930s? Surely the Great Depression and the advent of the Second World War
were significant factors, but as we will see in the next section, health services in other
colonies garnered far more attention during this period. Economic and military
imperatives were not the sole cause of the UK Government’s turn away from
Nyasaland’s Medical Department over the course of the 1930s. Clauson and others
rebutted De Boer’s report so readily in part because Nyasaland was seen as politically
placid during the 1930s. While (as the next section will show) Northern Rhodesia and
British West Africa and the West Indies erupted in labor unrest, Nyasaland’s officials
reported no episodes of great concern. In an era when health was used as a political
palliative, Nyasaland’s Africans seemed to issue no cry worthy of response.
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This is not to suggest that Nyasaland’s Africans were, in fact, quiet. There was plenty of
discontent and political activity during this decade. In 1932, an anti-witchcraft movement
spread rapidly across the Protectorate. Young men organized sessions in which people
were made to drink a concoction known as mchape (a derivation of the word kuchapa,
which means “to wash”), which they said would harm only practitioners of sorcery. The
movement spread like wildfire, in part because it helped young men counter the authority
of their elders.31 But while officials noted the movement in their reports, they were not
overly concerned about it. Though witchcraft was technically illegal, authorities did not
bother to imprison many involved in the movement.32 The system of indirect rule
continued working decently well, and production on European estates was not much
affected. This was not the kind of unrest that would spur increased health spending from
colonial officials.

Even in the face of politically subversive rhetoric, colonial officials remained nonplussed.
In 1932, George Simeon Mwase sent officials in Zomba a typescript entitled “A Dialogue
of Nyasaland Record of Past Events, Environments & the Present Outlook within the
Protectorate.” The bland, nondescript title belied fiery contents, which included a
provocative and heroic biography of the revolutionary preacher John Chilembwe as well
as Mwase’s own criticism of contemporary race relations and living conditions in
Nyasaland. Mwase, who had worked as a government clerk and storekeeper, was already
well known to officials for his missives on the depredations of the colonial police and
31
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other matters, which he had written on behalf of the Central Province Universal Native
Association since the late 1920s.33 But, as historian Richard Rotberg has noted, Mwase
“had long been regarded by many white administrators as an excessively opinionated,
‘harmless,’ compulsive writer of memoranda and tracts…the Government of Nyasaland
had always replied to his missives in the noncommittal, routine manner it reserved for
cranks and other meddlesome Africans.”34 Officials in Zomba filed away Mwase’s work
in the archives, where it remained until Rotberg and his wife rediscovered and published
it in 1967.

Nyasaland officials were so unconcerned with unrest during the 1930s that they
repatriated Elliot Kamwana, a millenarian preacher exiled on pain of death decades
earlier for the anticolonial overtones of his ministry (see Chapter 1). Though the
Nyasaland authorities of the era before the First World War had treated Kamwana as a
dangerous revolutionary, the authorities of 1937 considered him harmless.35 When he
returned from the Seychelles to his home village, Kamwana was even allowed to set up
an independent church. The church rejected European medicine—perhaps, historian
33
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Henry Donati suggests, because a European doctor had once failed to heal Kamwana’s
dying wife, or because of bad experiences as a hospital assistant in South Africa early in
life. But officials showed little concern for his preaching, and allowed him to work
undisturbed until his death in 1956.36

For their part, officials in Zomba were so confident about political security that they used
medical technologies not to quell discontent, but to enforce hated taxation policies. In
1939 the Commissioner of Police reported that the most frequent assignment his men
performed was collection of the hut tax.37 The courts, too, spent much of their time on
taxation cases; of the 5517 cases tried in subordinate courts in 1936, 1812 were for
“breaches of hut tax laws.”38

The major concern of Nyasaland officials during mid- to late-1930s was collecting tax
revenues. They saw little need to placate the masses of African subjects. During these
years, political dissenters, millenarian preachers and anti-witchcraft movements did not
much concern them. European estate owners, the major economic interests in the
Protectorate, were able to pursue profits unimpeded by unrest. Political legitimacy in
Nyasaland appeared secure—or, more precisely, secure enough to them to move ahead
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with the overriding imperatives of revenue collection and budgetary retrenchment. For its
part the Colonial Office called for economy, not new spending.

III.

Imperial disquiet as impetus for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare

Act, 1935-1940
a)

Copperbelt strikes in Northern Rhodesia and health as a political palliative,

1935-1938
Officials elsewhere in the British Empire did not feel this same sense of security. On the
morning of May 29, 1935, the Commissioner of Northern Rhodesia’s Central Province
called the colony’s Acting Chief Secretary to report a crisis. A thousand Bemba natives
living in a town compound adjacent to the Roan Antelope copper mine in Luanshya
District had marched to the compound offices. Troops from the Northern Rhodesia
Regiment had already been flown to other mines from the colonial capital in Lusaka by
the Royal Air Force two days prior, in response to other strikes. The Provincial
Commissioner begged the Chief Secretary to expedite the transport of troops to
Luanshya, but by the time they arrived blood had already spilled. The police—Africans
led by white officers—were either taking refuge in the compound offices or trying to
disperse the gathering by charging at the crowd outside. Some in the crowd hurled stones.
The investigators heard conflicting reports of how the firing started, but they believed
that the Police Superintendent’s attempt to frighten the crowd by firing shots into the air
had spurred other police to open fire. They shot randomly into the assemblage of miners,
domestic servants, and neighbors who had shown up in support of the strikers. Fold and
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other European officials said they tried to stop the firing as soon as they heard it, but by
the time the guns fell silent they had killed six people, and wounded 22 others.39

Within days, the mineworkers were back to work across the Copperbelt, including
Luanshya, but the brief wave of strikes—where there were not yet even any labor
unions—shook the Colonial Office in London. Northern Rhodesia Governor Hubert
Young commissioned a report on the “disturbances” led by Sir William Alison Russell,
the former Chief Justice of Tanganyika. The investigators concluded that a major
proximate cause of the strikes was the news of a tax increase in the mining areas.40
Though Russell’s Commission found fault less with the tax increase itself than with the
abrupt way in which the policy was announced to the workers, the incident stirred
reformers to question what Africans in Northern Rhodesia saw in return for their tax
payments.

Colonial Office adviser Sir Alan Pim made Northern Rhodesia the focus of the last in a
series of reports on financial administration in British Africa. The Colonial Office had
tasked Pim with finding ways to reduce public expenditure and increase revenue in
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Northern Rhodesia.41 But his report, published in 1938, criticized the extraction of
Northern Rhodesia’s resource revenues to public and private coffers in Britain, and called
for additional expenditures on health, education, and infrastructure in Northern
Rhodesia.42 On the state of the medical services, he wrote, “There are large
concentrations of natives outside the reach of any doctor…Of the 12 Government
hospitals for Natives. Only two…are good.” The report lamented that a comprehensive
development scheme for improvement of medical and public health services, submitted to
the CDAC (where Pim was a member) in 1936, had been awarded only £20,000.43
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Recurrent expenditure on health had risen in absolute terms in the years since the
protests, but only enough to keep pace with the rise in total recurrent expenditure.44
Health was not yet a significant part of the response to burgeoning colonial unrest.

b) Labor strikes in the British West Indies and health as a political rallying cry,
1937-1939
The role of health in colonial politics would soon change. As Pim and others pondered
the factors leading to riots in Northern Rhodesia, labor unrest in British holdings in the
Caribbean stoked even more concern about the direction of imperial policy. In June 1937,
workers in the oil fields of Trinidad began a sit-down strike, demanding an end to racial
discrimination in the workplace, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation,
trade union recognition, and an end to an employment passbook system used to depress
wages. Strikes proliferated throughout the island, growing to include dockworkers,
laborers on sugar, cocoa and coconut plantations, domestic servants, and some
government employees.45 In July, inspired in part by a labor organizer named Clement
Payne who had arrived earlier that year from Trinidad, workers in Barbados rioted in
Bridgetown and burned sugarcane fields in the countryside.46 Fourteen people were shot
dead by police. In October, thousands of cocoa growers in the Gold Coast announced a
one-half of the £40,000 requested. See 94th meeting of CDAC, 27 January 1937, CO 970/2,
UKNA.
44
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boycott of “non-essential” European goods and a hold-up of sales to buyers (including
the British-based confectionary Cadbury) who had colluded to lower producer prices.47
By the close of April 1938 the disquiet reached Jamaica. Sugarcane workers on an estate
of the West Indian Sugar Company went on strike during the harvest, protesting low and
irregular pay and dismal lodging. Within two days four protesters were dead and another
13 were injured. In the next few weeks, dockworkers and the unemployed in Kingston set
fire to buildings, while firefighters threatened to strike unless their wages were
increased.48 The Peoples’ National Party, established by Jamaican attorney and protest
leader Norman Manley in September 1938, promised free secondary education and
healthcare for all Jamaicans.49
c) Colonial labor unrest as a justification for colonial development, 1938-1940
Manley was not the only person in a position of influence who thought that health and
education might be of interest to newly restive colonial publics. Social services were
foremost in the mind of Malcolm MacDonald, a 36-year-old M.P. appointed to serve as
Secretary of the State for the Colonies in Neville Chamberlain’s Conservative
government while Jamaica erupted in May 1938. MacDonald, son of the recently
deceased former Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, had been a Labour Party member
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until both he and his father were evicted from the party when the latter formed a
“National” Government with Conservative Ministers. But the younger MacDonald
retained his longstanding interest in colonial development policy, and agreed with the
Labour MPs who were calling for a Royal Commission to investigate the “disturbances”
in the West Indies. In a memo calling for the appointment of a Royal Commission,
MacDonald argued one necessary response to the unrest was an improvement in social
services supported by an expanded system of imperial grants.50 Labour MP Arthur
Creech Jones also made this link explicit in a speech before the House of Commons:
The truth is that until riots and disturbances occurred and we had unrest beginning
to sweep from one end of our Colonial Empire to the other, very little was really
being done [in social services]. This burst of activity is largely due to the fact that
at last the workers are demanding that something should be done. It is a sad
commentary on our method of government when we have to wait for riots and
disturbances to force us to do what is…right.51
Such rhetoric had already proved successful. By the time Creech Jones made this speech,
MacDonald had only just announced that both the Prime Minister and the Treasury had
acceded to his call for the appointment of a Royal Commission.52 The Commission’s
Terms of Reference—“to investigate the social and economic conditions [in the British
West Indies], and matters connected therewith, and to make recommendations”—was
rather broad and vague, but the members knew that they had been tasked with finding an
antidote to the unrest.53
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Over the next eighteen months, as the Commission did its work, MacDonald prepared to
use its findings to announce a fundamental overhaul of the Colonial Development Act.
He and others in the Colonial Office believed that imperial grants should be vastly
increased, from the existing £1 million per year to £10 million per year. Significantly, in
contrast to the grants given under the existing Colonial Development Act, such funding
should be allowed to cover recurrent expenses for health and education.54

By 1939, as the specter of war loomed ever larger in government plans, MacDonald
stressed the impact that such financial support could have on Britain’s standing in the
world and, more practically, its defense. MacDonald had been a labor organizer, and
knew how to foster a sense of crisis. He used these skills within the Cabinet to argue for
colonial development. As MacDonald added in a minute to a Colonial Office meeting
from 9 December 1938, “It was an essential part of [Britain’s] defense policy that her
reputation as a Colonial power should be unassailable.” 55 His efforts to drum up concern
about colonial stability were aided by recent events. Over the summer, dockworkers had
halted trade with strikes in the significant African port cities of Port Sudan (April-May
1939), Dar es Salaam (July 1939) and Mombasa (July-August 1939).56 Few of the
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striking workers and rioting subjects throughout the Empire had uttered slogans calling
for health and education, but MacDonald and others portrayed social services as an
effective and economical palliative for political unrest.

Within two weeks after Britain declared war in September 1939, a Treasury official
chastised the CDAC for planning to continue to meet to consider colonial development
proposals: “We are not unmindful of the importance which your Secretary of State
attaches to social services and economic development in the Colonies…but first things
must come first…Here, as in other services at home, we shall have to resign ourselves to
stand still now.”57 MacDonald, for his part, argued a reformed approach to colonial
development would avert costly unrest during the war. Even more importantly, it would
improve British standing abroad, particularly in the United States, thereby helping to
ensure the UK to retained its empire in a postwar settlement.58

Treasury officials continued to object to the use of imperial funds for recurrent social
service expenditures, which they believed would put “the Colonies on the dole from
henceforth and forever.” But MacDonald would not give in, replying that it was
“essential to get away from the old principle that Colonies can only have what they
themselves can pay for: they must have what a first-class Colonial power may reasonably
be expected to provide.” Pressing upon political arguments about Britain’s reputation in
wartime, MacDonald eventually succeeded. Treasury yielded, agreeing in principle to the
funding of both capital and recurrent expenditures so long as funding for both came from
57
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a single source.59 The Colonial Office agreed that this single source of funding, voted
annually by Parliament, should be capped at £5 million, rather than their original
proposal of £10 million. Treasury, for its part, had agreed to forgive £11 million of the
£15 million in debt owed by the colonies to the Imperial Exchequer.60 In a 1939 review
Treasury officials had already deemed the hope of repayment of much of this debt “an
obvious unreality,” and lauding increased aid to impoverished colonies while continuing
to insist upon such debt payments seemed, even to them, “not reasonable.”61

MacDonald had secured the necessary concessions from the usually-parsimonious
Treasury, but his plans to publicly release his proposals alongside the Royal
Commission’s report were not to be realized. In a decision that would anger Labour MPs
including Clement Attlee and Arthur Creech-Jones, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet had
decided that the document was so critical of British policy as to provide fodder for Axis
propaganda.62

The Report itself was no radical document. It attributed some of the problems in the West
Indies to the “moral standard” of the “negro population.” But the authors did highlight
59
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the many grievances presented by members of the “negro” and “coloured” populations,
including the problems of “colour discrimination,” the lack of support for peasant
agriculture, and restrictions on strike actions. The Commission even declared “a “right to
strike,” and considered “any restriction of this liberty of action…tantamount to industrial
servitude.” In line with MacDonald’s campaign for social service provision, the report
devoted many pages to the woefully inadequate provision of health and education. The
report’s authors noted that spending on health (as a percentage of overall government
expenditure) and government medical officers (relative to population) were both higher
in most West Indies colonies than in any British African holding. But still, the report
called for expanded medical auxiliary training, more rural clinics and hospitals, and far
greater spending on preventive medicine throughout the West Indies. Increased spending
on health services was, according to the report’s authors, an integral part of the imperial
response to recent unrest on the islands.63

Though Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s cabinet refused to publish the report, they
did permit MacDonald to publish the Royal Commission’s summary recommendations
alongside the Government’s new Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and
Welfare. Both were released on February 20, 1940. That day, a publicity campaign
coordinated by Colonial Office staff included a speech by MacDonald to the House of
Commons and an address by Lord Moyne, Chairman of the Royal Commission; the latter
was broadcast on radio in Jamaica.64 The Statement of Policy touted by MacDonald was
63
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only six pages of text, but its drafting had occupied the Colonial Office and Treasury in
heated debate for months. The final text highlighted His Majesty’s Government’s
agreement with the Royal Commission’s recommendation that £1 million per year should
be spent on education, health services, housing, slum clearance, and land settlement in
the British West Indies. The statement continued to explain that while the Commission
conducted its investigation, the UK Government had “been examining the position in the
Colonial Empire generally.”65 It announced a new colonial development policy, in which
“assistance will be available not only for schemes involving capital expenditure
necessary for Colonial development in the widest sense but also for helping to meet
recurrent expenditure in the Colonies on certain services such as agriculture, education,
health and housing.”66

The simultaneous release of the Statement of Policy and the Royal Commission
recommendations had the political effects that MacDonald had desired. The Colonial
Development and Welfare bill moved, uneventfully, to passage. Though MacDonald was
transferred to a new position as Minister of Health after Churchill replaced Chamberlain
as Prime Minister in May, the bill’s progress through the legislative process continued,
and the act received the Royal Assent on July 17, 1940.67
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The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was, then, a dividend of disquiet.
Both the labor unrest of the mid- and late-1930s and the outbreak of war furnished
MacDonald with powerful political arguments capable of overcoming the longstanding
objections of the Treasury.68 Colonial Office reports and speeches by Labour MPs had
stressed the need for a focus on social welfare in the colonies even before the
“disturbances” in the West Indies, but the threat to imperial legitimacy helped soften the
objections of Treasury officials and other skeptics. The 1940 Act was, according to
historian Stephen Constantine, “devised as a method of removing legitimate grievances in
the colonies, stabilizing the empire and defusing criticism of British colonial rule. The
emphasis on colonial development and welfare was, then, essentially a defensive
operation, to provide a new justification which would legitimize the perpetuation of
colonial rule.”

d) Explaining the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act: imperial
legitimation or altruism?
But one question remains unanswered in MacDonald’s arguments for—and Constantine’s
analysis of—the Colonial Development and Welfare Act: why did health and education
spending seem a logical response to labor unrest? After all, investigations of the protests
in Northern Rhodesia, Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica pointed to taxes, low pay and
poor working conditions as the causes of unrest, not the level of social service
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provision.69 Constantine seems to indicate that the answer lies in a spirit of imperial
altruism (he closes his analysis with quotes from other historians lionizing the generosity
of Empire), but there was a much more self-interested reason for the focus on public
sector social services at the start of the Second World War. For officials in the Colonial
Office, it was much more politically palatable to propose increased health and education
spending than to contemplate more fundamental changes to the extractive economic
systems. The sites of protest, such as the Luanshya mine and the West Indies Sugar
Company plantation, were owned by companies registered in Britain that reaped
tremendous profits from the mineral wealth and cheap labor made available in the
colonies. Investors in such companies were—for the most part—British voters, and
among the most invested were a wealthy British MPs and Lords. It was more palatable to
such investors to use tax dollars on more nurses and teachers than to lessen their own
company profits in order to increase wages.70 Such investors were also a target of
MacDonald’s arguments about the reputation of Empire, for alongside the danger that
Britain might lose her territorial possessions came the risk of investment losses through
nationalization or expropriation by some other colonial power. Spending on social
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services, then, was an attempt to “palliate” colonized publics and international criticism
without more fundamental changes to the imperial economic system.71

The fate of Nyasaland provides further support for this argument. Far less significant in
economic terms, and seen to be relatively unaffected by labor unrest, Nyasaland garnered
a fairly small share of the debt relief and new funding made available by the passage of
the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare (CDW) Act. The Act decreased
Nyasaland’s outstanding debt for the Trans-Zambesi Railroad loan guarantee from
£550,000 to £300,000. Nyasaland’s share of debt relief (less than half) was far less than
the overall share of colonial debt forgiven by the Imperial Exchequer (more than twothirds).72 The squeaky wheels, it seemed, got the grease.

IV.

Nyasaland, the still-quiet backwater: wartime neglect and the postwar dawn

a) A medical service gutted by war, 1939-1942
At the start of a new global war in 1939, Nyasaland’s public sector medical services
became even more threadbare. Unlike the First World War, Nyasaland would not forcibly
recruit hundreds of thousands of Africans for carrier duty, but its already paltry medical
services would be drained once more. Three African medical officers were seconded for
71
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military service abroad in 1939, along with two African hospital assistants, 16 dressers,
20 stretcher-bearers, and seven wagon orderlies.73 The Medical Department was
prohibited from spending the resulting savings. Some of Nyasaland’s medical stores were
also shipped away to aid the war effort.

Initially De Boer reported that despite the staff withdrawals, only three dispensaries had
closed.74 But in 1940, when Italy joined the Axis powers, another five government
medical officers and one of the missionary doctors at the Church of Scotland Mission
were released for military service in North Africa. Within two years, the number of
medical officers had fallen from 18 to 10.75 The remaining doctors took on even more
responsibilities than usual. Between 1940 and 1943, in addition to managing pilot
Nutrition Units (see Chapter 1), Berry was the only government doctor in Kota Kota and
Dowa districts; the two hospitals serving these districts were 90 miles apart.76 Medical
officers were still overwhelmed by the scale of the work with which they had been
tasked. Speaking of his responsibilities as the sole medical officer in Mlanje in
1941,Walter Gopsill explained: “As well as being in charge of a Hospital containing one
73
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hundred beds one was responsible for the control of Epidemic diseases in the area, the
medical care of the European population, eight District dispensaries dotted about the
district, inspections and care of factory staffs and the general public health of the district,
also the inspection of the numerous Indian Stores and of course the Market. In addition,
one was called out to treat European planters and their families. The African population
was well over 100,000.”77 Obviously, very little of this work was done extensively. Many
districts had no medical officer at all during the war. African hospital assistants were put
in charge of daily operations at district hospitals in Chiradzulu, Chikwawa, Upper Shire,
Ntcheu, Dedza, Dowa, Kasungu and Nkhata Bay.78 When the council of chiefs in
Lilongwe District requested additional rural dispensaries in 1942, Governor ECS
Richards informed them many of the freshly trained African auxiliaries were unavailable
to staff new dispensaries because they had been recruited to the military.79

b) The politics of scarcity: maintaining a placid populace
De Boer may have been concerned about these conditions, but neither he nor other
officials in Nyasaland wanted to see political protests erupt over the sorry state of social
services. After years of riots in the West Indies and Africa, officials were alive once more
to the dangers of disquiet. By the early 1940s, with all resources directed at the war
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effort, they sought to mitigate the dangers in Nyasaland not through health spending, but
by preventing African medical workers from organizing. After all, African medical
workers were among the most educated colonial subjects in a time when education was
considered as a risk factor for disquiet. In June 1941, Henry J. Banda and PJ Godfrey
Mhango, two African medical assistants at the Zomba African Hospital, wrote de Boer to
ask for his comments on their proposed constitution for a “Nyasaland African Medical
Association.”80 De Boer and the Chief Secretary agreed to recognize the organization,
but advised Mhango and Banda to “concentrate on the educational side.”81 The
implication was that they should steer clear of other, more overtly political purposes.
Their proposed constitution had suggested that the group would work to “attempt to
overcome the difficulties and to examine the complaints of members of the
Association.”82 For colonial officials, such hints at labor organizing were not welcome.

The colonial administrators were successful at maintaining political calm in Nyasaland
during the war. At the same time medical services did not fare well. During the Second
World War, with both mission and government personnel depleted and growing patient
censuses, the administration attempted to coordinate government and mission
healthcare.83 In some cases the absence of adequate medical provision spurred such
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frustration that remaining medical officers resorted to uncommon measures. In 1942
John Owen Shircore returned to Nyasaland, where he had begun his career in the colonial
service over thirty years earlier. As a veteran medical officer on the cusp of retirement,
Shircore wrote to the Director of Medical Services to explain there was a “considerable
population” in his district (Karonga) “for whom there are no immediate medical
facilities.” Sick Africans in an area called Mlale faced an “arduous journey” to reach his
hospital in Karonga. Patients who were carried all the way to the hospital were often so
ill they died en route or shortly after arrival. Shircore suggested renovating a building in
Mlale owned by the estate of a European farmer; the building could, he explained, be
used as a government dispensary.84 The prevailing government policy at the time was to
deny requests for new dispensaries unless construction was financed out of the budgets of
Native Authorities (who kept a small share of hut tax revenues). In this case, Mlale’s
Native Authority, Chief Kyungu, wanted to see the new dispensary built but said he
lacked the funds to pay for it. Shircore offered Chief Kyungu £100 out of his own savings
to pay for the building.85 He did not wish to be repaid. Both Kyungu and the Governor
gratefully accepted this offer. The next chapter will further explore the unwillingness of
other.” In January 1942 Bishop of the UMCA Mission and Dr. Wigan agreed to the
“amalgamation” of medical work in Kota Kota, whereby in return for a £100 “donation” from
government to the mission, a mission nurse would work at the Government hospital most
mornings, while spending afternoons at the Maternity Centre at her Mission. But the arrangement
did not last. By October 1943, the nurse complained her maternity responsibilities at the mission
were far too demanding for her to work in both facilities; she explained that laboring women had
awoken her for “twelve nights in succession.” The UMCA terminated the arrangement with the
government and the staff continued their work separately. See TA Austin, “Letter to Chief
Secretary, Zomba, Re: Mission Cooperation at Kota Kota Hosptial,” October 14, 1943, S40/1/5/4,
MNA.
84
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medical officers to accept what they considered to be unprofessionally low standards of
medical provision. It will show that neither Shircore’s frustration nor his determination
were unique, but might be understood as manifestations of a professional imperative in an
environment of heavy morbidity and forced scarcity.

c) Miracle drugs in small quantities: Nyasaland’s first antibiotics
Even as staff left for military service and the recurrent budget flat-lined, admissions at
government hospitals climbed rapidly during the early 1940s. After an increase (from
3,958 in 1930 to 10,052 in 1935) that coincided with the construction of new hospitals
with CDF funding, inpatient admissions remained fairly steady through the start of the
war, rising only to 11,102 in 1939. But then patients came quickly; inpatient admissions
rose to 20,008 in 1941, then to 23,369 by 1945. For the first time since the construction
of a dozen district hospitals in the early 1930s, many government facilities were
overcrowded. In August 1941, DMS de Boer noted that during a recent visit to Kota Kota
he found 114 patients in a hospital with only 70 beds. “There were patients lying on the
ground between beds and in the passage-way down the middle of the wards.”86

Some of this increase can be attributed to the entry of sulphonamide antibiotics, which
brought even dramatic changes to patient care even as its use was strictly controlled. The
first sulphonamide, Prontosil, was marketed in the United States and Europe beginning in
1935, and won acclaim after it was used to cure U.S. President Franklin Delano
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Roosevelt’s son of a septic strep throat infection in 1936.87 WTC Berry used
sulfanilamide (known by its trade name, “M&B 693”), another sulfa drug, in either 1937
or 1938 (he does not specify the exact date) at Mlanje District Hospital for the treatment
of gonorrhea. At Berry’s hospital this drug was so limited that he prescribed it only to
inpatients. Berry also made sure to witness each administration of the medicine with his
own eyes. “The dressers could not be trusted not to change the amount of the prescribed
dose, or to substitute some similar but less potent tablet, retaining the surplus M&B for
‘private practice,’ or for their sale on the black market.”88

Doctors were excited by the arrival of the new sulfa drugs. Gopsill recalled how before
the first sulfa drugs reached Nyasaland a fellow medical officer had died of septicaemia
after a postmortem exam. Gopsill also remembered an epidemic of cerebrospinal
meningitis in Mlanje that killed “thousands.” Once the new drugs arrived such outbreaks
became less common and less devastating, as “one was able to protect contacts and
carriers were in large degree eradicated.”89 In 1941, the DMS included in his report his
hope that “the more regular use of M&B 693 in the treatment of [gonorrhea] at
87
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government hospitals may in time bring infected persons in bigger numbers to those
institutions.”90

Chapter 7 will discuss the impact of antibiotics on popularizing government medicine in
Nyasaland. For now, suffice it to note that the number of patients presenting for
gonorrhea treatment in government hospitals and clinics did indeed increase following
the introduction of sulfa drugs, rising from 1061 in 1935, to 2089 in 1945, to 3715 in
1951. Patients seemed to have growing confidence that treatment for this condition was
effective; in 1944 medical officers reported to the DMS that patients were becoming less
apt to abscond from the hospital before the end of a treatment course.91

Still, during the Second World War medical officers lamented that many sick patients
still did not present to government facilities, or that when they did they often sought
inappropriate treatments. Berry complained that for every ailment, from serious illnesses
to mild aches, patients demanded injections. He ascribed this to the memories of yaws
injections, which brought dramatic cures.92 Not all injections were equally popular.
Medical officers lamented that they could convince few patients to submit to antimony
tartrate injections for schistosomiasis. This was a fairly indolent infection; it could result
in blood in the urine or, eventually, bladder cancer, but was not as disfiguring as yaws,
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and the injection itself could precipitate serious malaria infections or abscesses.93 Megan
Vaughan has described how African patients in Nyasaland knew the difference between
the more expensive arsenical drugs (intravenous injections available at some hospitals)
and cheaper mercurial compounds (intramuscular injections available at rural
dispensaries). Seeking the former, they favored hospitals over rural dispensaries for
syphilis treatment. African patients were, in Vaughan’s words, “discriminating” in their
approach to drug therapy, and medical officers knew it.94

While by the late 1940s government health facilities were becoming steadily more
popular and more amply funded, hospitals and dispensaries were still not a meaningful
part of experience of being governed for most Africans in Nyasaland. Outpatient
attendance at government facilities rose steadily, though never dramatically, beginning
with the construction of the first dispensaries in the early 1920 to the beginning of
Federation in the mid-1950s (see Figure 4.1). Inpatient admissions rose steadily after the
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Figure 4.1: African and Asian outpatient attendances at Nyasaland government facilities,
1914-1953. Source: Nyasaland annual Medical Department reports, 1914-1953.
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Figure 4.2: African and Asian inpatient admissions at Nyasaland government facilities,
1914-1953. Source: Nyasaland annual Medical Department reports, 1914-1953.
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CDF-funded construction of hospitals in the early 1930s, then more dramatically in the
early 1940s following the introduction of sulphonamide antibiotics (see Figure 4.2). But
as late as 1946, the Director of Medical Services worried that “no more than a beginning
has been made in inducing the African population to take advantage of the medical
facilities provided.”95

V.

Conclusion

As Chapter 3 demonstrated, the Colonial Office used unemployment in the UK to garner
funds for colonial development in the late 1920s. In the late 1930s, the Colonial Office
secured additional funds through the deft use of metropolitan fears about colonial labor
unrest. Yet while Nyasaland’s Medical Department benefited from the 1929 Colonial
Development Act almost immediately, colonial medicine was far from a priority a decade
later.
In both periods, leading colonial medical officers authored reports on the sorry state of
Nyasaland’s medical services. But they were received quite differently. Whereas Shircore
had been invited to write such a report in 1930, and submitted his work to the
sympathetic Basil Blackett at the CDAC, de Boer had no such license. Officials in
Whitehall were unmoved by his (apparently unsolicited) report. Whereas the promised
materiel orders from the construction of the Zambesi Bridge and the especial attention of
a few key MPs rendered Nyasaland a place of imperial concern in 1929, a decade later
the Protectorate was known only for its relative political quietus and economic
95
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insignificance. While other parts of the empire erupted in deadly riots and costly strikes,
Nyasaland seemed to offer little evidence of unrest. Nyasaland was not entirely quiet, but
the anti-witchcraft and millenarian movements of the 1930s did not arouse much official
concern. Ironically enough, health services would suffer for this seeming placidity.

This chapter, and the last, also demonstrates something else. The scathing tone of both
the Shircore and de Boer reports provides further evidence of an emerging
historiographical understanding of the differences between colonial doctors and other
colonial administrators. Members of the UK Colonial Service have long been stereotyped
as Oxbridge-educated white males born into at least some wealth, endowed with a
penchant for sports, practical minds and adventurous spirits. In general, historians
believed them to have shared a “world-view that was politically conservative, any more
radical elements within it being silenced for the sake of preserving the status quo.”96

Yet Anna Crozier has demonstrated (through prosopographical analysis of members of
the Colonial Medical Service in Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya) that medical officers
hailed from a “more diverse social group” and trained at more varied institutions.97 These
differences in biography between doctors and other colonial officers could help explain
why Shircore, de Boer, and a number of medical officers in Nyasaland during the
Federation years (Chapter 8) were so critical of the quality of medical services available
to Africans. Both had trained at leading medical schools in the UK (de Boer in London,
96
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and Shircore in Edinburgh). Both had connections to South Asia; de Boer was born into a
burgher family in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Shircore’s father was in the Indian Medical
Service.98 The Indian Medical Service included famous researchers and enjoyed greater
resources, and held much greater prestige than the East African Medical Service.99 And
both de Boer and Shircore had practiced in other East African colonies, all of which spent
more per capita on health for Africans than Nyasaland. Neither man was by any means a
radical, but their backgrounds left them dissatisfied with the state in which they found
Nyasaland’s medical services. Each wrote scathing reports that called for far greater
spending on health.

These reports were a necessary, though (as this chapter has shown) not sufficient element
in expanding Nyasaland’s health services. They reveal contests over budgets and
resources between colonial medical officers and the Colonial Office. These debates rarely
appear on the physicians’ memoirs, which as Crozier notes, tended to “sensationalize
Africa” while avoiding quotidian bureaucratic realities.100 Yet, as the next chapter will
demonstrate, sometimes the most bureaucratic prose that creates the greatest sensations.
In the midst of the Second World War, an Indian-born British economist named William
Beveridge would author his own report, one that would radically shift discourse on
medical policy throughout Britain and her Empire.
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Chapter 5
Beveridge beyond the British Isles: health in wartime development and postwar
visions of social protection, 1939-1945
Abstract
This chapter examines wartime and early postwar debates over social and economic
rights in Britain’s colonies in southern Africa. During the Second World War Churchill’s
Coalition Government sought to defend the British Empire not only against Axis troops,
but also against critics in the United States. For its part, the Labour Party sought to define
its colonial policy. Within the party, the members of the Fabian Colonial Society
discussed the relationship between their political commitments to democratic socialism
and the practice of colonial rule.
The UK Government responded to its critics by touting spending on colonial
development in the midst of war, while the Labour Party called for additional spending
on colonial social welfare. At the same time, social policy became a focal point of
Britain’s domestic politics. William Beveridge’s wildly popular Report on Social
Insurance and Allied Services, published in November 1942, called for rationalizing and
expanding programs of social protection including unemployment insurance, health care,
and subsistence payments for the elderly and infirm.
For some commentators, including Beveridge and prominent members of the Labour
Party, the social and economic rights embodied in the report seemed applicable not only
to Britain, but also to its colonies. Immediately after the war Beveridge planned a trip to
India, where he hoped to write a report on social protection that included programs for
subsistence farmers as well as industrial laborers. Though they had their own pre-existing
politics of social protection and social medicine, the Beveridge Report also provided an
additional political weapon to advocates in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This
chapter provides an account of a contingent moment, when various sorts of social welfare
were debated in southern Africa.
Prelude: “I have taken them into my hands”: kinship and state social protection in
2015
Walking down the main dirt road of the Neno boma (district capital) one morning in midJanuary of 2015, I saw a stream of men and women using bicycles or wheelbarrows to
carry large bags. On closer inspection, I discovered the bags were filled with 50
kilograms each of urea fertilizer. I asked a young man where he had obtained his bag. He
pointed to a primary school about 100 meters up the road. I asked him if he had
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purchased the fertilizer: “Munagula feteleyza?” He answered no, he had received it: “Ayi,
ndinalandira feteleyza.” The distinction was an important one, as the price of imported
fertilizer had skyrocketed with the devaluation of the kwacha against the US dollar and
the euro.

I walked to the primary school, past young men (and even women) straining to carry the
bags on their backs. Parked in front of the school was a large blue lorry with an empty
bed, with a few stragglers standing by their bags. The driver of the lorry explained that
he had driven from Blantyre that morning with 270 bags of fertilizer, which had been
distributed that morning. This distribution, he explained, was not a part of the main
government-sponsored fertilizer subvention program (popularly known as the “coupon”);
that fertilizer had been sold a month ago. This was a public works program, wherein
heads of those households identified as vulnerable by village headmen were employed in
fixing roads. In return for their labor, each household received a 50-kilogram bag of
fertilizer and 10 pounds of maize seed.

Safety-net programs such as this work-for-farm-input program are, in the words of one
World Bank assessment, “core instruments for reducing poverty and managing risk.”1 In
2015 Malawian social policy included such anti-poverty interventions as targeted cash
transfers, cash-for-work programs, subvention of farm inputs and free healthcare and
primary education. Each of these programs has come under criticism, from within and
1
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from outside Malawi. For instance, the World Bank has long contended that chiefs and
politicians distribute fertilizer coupons not to Malawi’s poorest people, but to friends and
________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5.1: Private and public forms of social support in Malawi
Forms of kinship/village social support
Child fosterage (permanent or temporary)
Caring for the sick, accompaniment to hospitals (woyanganira wodwala)
Sharing food
Working fields of the sick
Paying school fees of family members
Piecework labor (ganyu) in fields of wealthier relatives and neighbors
Community donations for marriages, funerals and health care costs
Forms of Government social protection
Free public sector health care
Free primary education
Public works programs during hungry season
Targeted fertilizer subsidies
Targeted cash transfer programs
________________________________________________________________________
influential supporters.2 Newspapers in Malawi often run editorials decrying the cost of
providing healthcare and primary education without fees. And the targeted cash transfers
remain little more than pilots, and have not reached many of the most destitute in
Malawi.

For most Malawians social support is crucial for survival, yet relatively little of it comes
in the form of government programs (see Figure 5.1). One particularly common form of
kinship-based social support is child fosterage, wherein young children live for in the
homes of relatives other than their birthparents. This is especially important for families
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with many young children; for parents in this particularly stressful time of the life-cycle
of a family, there were many mouths to feed and few hands to help in the field and
around the home.3 A year ago, Francis sent his daughter Lucia to visit (kucheza) her
maternal grandmother in Lilongwe for three months. For weeks while living with Francis
I thought Monica was also his daughter; they would call her “my child” (mwana wanga).
But, while inquiring about his extended family, I finally discovered that Monica was, in
fact, the daughter of Edith’s brother, David. Edith and Francis were helping to care for
Monica for a time, while David and his wife—who had less material wealth than Francis
and Edith—cared for their newborn baby.

In other households in Mbeya village, grandparents cared for grandchildren. In some
cases, the parents had died early, while in others they were away working in Lilongwe or
South Africa. In a number of these households the grandparents were barely able to
provide for the children. An old woman with a marked limp said she had given birth to
seven children, but only two survived. Two of her late daughters had each given birth to
five children. Seven of those children now lived with her. The grandmother said she
received some support from her other three grandchildren, who were older. One worked
at the Pumulani Lodge nearby, another worked in in Blantyre, and the third lived in a
nearby village. But she placed the most hope in one of her grandsons, currently in his
penultimate year of secondary school. She showed me his report card, which listed him as
third in his class. His teacher complimented his “seriousness.” Beaming with pride, the
3
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grandmother described her great expectations for the boy: “He will take care of me”
(adzasamalira ine). The care could not come a moment too soon. Only a few days ago,
while trying to transport a bag of fertilizer to her field, the grandmother had slipped and
dropped the heavy bag on her own foot. It was quite swollen, but she did not think she
had broken any bones. She did not think it would do any good to go to the clinic.

Many adults in Mbeya had to provide not only for young children, but also for their
elderly parents. For the last two years, Francis’s mother, Anna, has found it difficult to
complete her daily chores. She suffers from osteoarthritis that so advanced that she can
walk only slowly, and with a grimace on her face. Her husband, Chisomo, Francis’s
stepfather (Francis’s father died twenty-five years ago) is even more disabled. Though
the medical assistants who see him in rushed visits at the nearby Monkey Bay hospital
have diagnosed him with nothing more than benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), a
common condition among older men the world over, he lives in such chronic pain that he
rarely ever rises from his banana-leaf mat (For more on Chisomo’s medical history, see
the prelude to Chapter 7). The couple could do little to support themselves. Neither Anna
nor Chisomo could complete the walk to the maize fields to help with planting or
weeding, though they maintain a tiny garden behind their home. Once every morning
Anna hobbled down to the shore of the lake with a pail to gather water to wash her
dishes. One morning, I even saw her chopping at a felled tree with a heavy axe in an
attempt to gather firewood.
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It has fallen to Francis to do much of the work in caring for his ailing mother and
stepfather. He gives them a portion of each year’s harvest. Edith often cooks extra food to
bring to them; often Anna joins them in their home dinner (while Chisomo finds the short
walk too painful on most days). “I have taken them into my hands,” Francis explains, “so
now it is as if I have two houses.”

Even within his immediate family Francis must cope with expensive social needs. For
the past two years Lucia has complained of intermittent dull pain in her chest and in the
left lower quadrant of her abdomen. This often keeps her home from school, and her
teachers have complained that she lags in some subjects. When Lucia first complained of
this pain Francis had taken her to the private clinic twelve kilometers away in Cape
Maclear—a fee-charging clinic but one that is widely thought to give more thorough
exams than the public hospital in Monkey Bay. The doctor there could find nothing to
explain the symptoms, and transferred her to Mangochi District Hospital, where she
remained as an inpatient for two weeks. After those physicians failed to explain her
condition, Lucia and Francis went to Zomba Central Hospital. She received an X-ray
there, but no diagnosis. Her sojourn continued to Kamuzu Central Hospital in Lilongwe,
where she stayed for four days but without any answers or relief. Today she still
complains about this pain, which reduces her to tears for hours at a time. Whenever
Lucia’s pain is mentioned, the expressions on her parents’ normally cheery faces quickly
change to chagrin.
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Francis does not complain much about these familial responsibilities. But he does say that
they have prevented him from building up much in the way of savings. Even though most
of Lucia’s care was at public clinics, weeks of food and long trips to hospitals proved
expensive. In addition to providing food for his parents and a home for Monica and
Samuel, he also spent four years paying secondary school fees for his late sister’s son,
William. The problem with meeting these obligations—beyond the pain and suffering
that has engendered them—is that it has wiped out his “capital” (here Francis uses the
English word). Francis and Edith rarely produce a harvest greater than their household’s
own consumption in the coming year, so they make very little money from crop sales.

To make cash, Francis prefers to buy usipa in bulk from fishermen in his village, then
travel on the back of a lorry to larger towns away from the lake (such as Limbe or Dedza
or Lilongwe) where he can sell them the fish by the pail at a decent markup in outdoor
markets. But in order to make the initial bulk purchase he needs to amass cash. With all
of the obligations to pay school fees and find transport to hospitals and provide food for
kin he rarely has this cash for long. He feels like he rarely has any savings to guard
against a bad harvest or another family emergency, let alone save for a business
investment.4 With his limited collateral he is unlikely to qualify for a small business loan

4
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from the bank in Monkey Bay. Even if he did, the annual interest rate charged for such a
loan is nearly 30 percent.

So systems of social support exist, even if imperfectly and at great personal cost. While
newspaper columnists constantly denounce the “culture of dependency,” rural Malawians
often say it is the government that is overly demanding.5 As Francis explained in a
discussion of taxation, “The government finds ways to get money from the poor.” In the
colonial era this took the form of the annual hut tax; the consequences of non-payment
were described in Chapter 1. Under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who ruled from 1964 to
1993, every man, woman and child had to buy a Malawi Congress Party card every year;
the consequences of non-payment will be described in Chapter 9. In the “multi-party”
era, since 1993, consumption taxes increase the prices of basic goods. People expect
benefits from their government because they have been made to pay for them.6
I.

Introduction

In contrast to the 1930s—when plans authored by Shircore and De Boer were frustrated
by complacency in London about the legitimacy and staying power of British Empire—
by the mid-1940s colonial labor unrest and global conflagration engendered sufficient
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concern to spur increased funding for health programs. The wartime craze over William
Beveridge’s plans for social security reforms—including a National Health Service—also
increased attention to health policy in Britain’s colonies. Some of this attention and
funding reached Nyasaland, where government health services grew in both resources
and popularity in first postwar decade.

In the prelude to this chapter, I began to explore present-day understandings of
obligations that Malawians articulate, obligations between family members and between
state and citizen. In this chapter, and the next, I will explore the history of contesting
notions of obligation in late colonial British Nyasaland. One set of obligations formed the
moral basis for the postwar British welfare state. These ideas circulated widely in the
British Empire, forcing the Colonial Office to lay out just how much of the welfare state
could and should be enacted outside the British Isles. Another set of obligations
circulating during this period concerned social protection in the African village.
Discussed by anthropologists, these notions of “traditional” safety nets were repeated
often by colonial officials seeking to justify the absence of robust welfare provision in the
colonial state. These two sets of assumptions about the relationship between the state and
the people would inform a debate, in Nyasaland and elsewhere, about the responsibilities
of colonial British administrations to subject African peoples.

Nyasaland’s first rural dispensaries grew from the ashes of the First World War (Chapter
1), and the first district hospitals were built after a brief efflorescence of enthusiasm for
development spending in 1929 (Chapter 3). This chapter focuses on the years
228

surrounding the calamitous Second World War, when uncertainty about the future of its
imperial possessions once again overcame the consistent chorus of claims about scarce
resources long used to protect the UK Treasury from demands for spending on health in
the colonies.
II.

British colonial development discourse during the Second World War

a)

“The Bantu are willing to give everything for victory”: extraction in British

Africa during the Second World War, 1939-1942
The historian Stephen Constantine ends his history of the politics of British colonial
development in 1940, but debates over aid to the colonies for health and other social
services did not abate with the outbreak of war. To be sure, the escalating war effort did
dampen imperial expenditures on social services and other development projects in the
colonies. In February of 1940 the Statement of Policy had acknowledged that spending on
the Colonial Development and Welfare fund was not likely to reach the legislated
maximum of £5 million per year “at any time during the war.”7 MacDonald’s successor
as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd, added his own note of pessimism after
the law’s enactment: “Much that we had hoped to do under this Bill when it became law
must wait for happier times.”8 Though the law allowed for £5 million in annual spending,
in the first year (1940-41) the UK government spent only £177,802 on Colonial
Development and Welfare fund schemes.9
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Meanwhile, colonial treasuries were impelled to ship away both men and treasure to aid
in the war effort. The transfer of financial resources could be substantial. Between 1939
and 1945, the Imperial Exchequer received monetary “gifts” made by colonial
governments, native rulers, and private groups and individuals in the colonies. Such gifts
emanating from public and private sources in Nyasaland during the war years totaled
£164,214.10 This amount represented nearly three times Nyasaland’s recurrent budget for
health in 1939. In 1940 alone the South African protectorate of Basutoland so tightened
its belt that revenues exceeded expenditures by £100,000; the entire surplus was
transferred to the Imperial Exchequer for the purchase of Spitfire fighter aircraft. “The
Bantu,” declared the London-based Royal African Society in 1941, “are willing to give
everything for victory.”11

And give they did. The supply of men drawn from the colonies was even more
impressive. By the end of the war, 473,000 soldiers in Britain’s army hailed from the
Colonies. These soldiers made up a particularly large share of troops in battles against the
Italians in East Africa and, later, against the Japanese in Burma. An estimated 7,000 died
in combat, and an additional 7,000 were wounded. A government report after the war
claimed that the “majority” of the troops from the colonies had volunteered, though some
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had been conscripted.12 Labor had also been conscripted in some colonies (including
Nigeria, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Northern Rhodesia) during the war to increase
production of agricultural and industrial products for the war effort.13

b) Wartime development spending as a response to fear of losing the empire, 19421945
While the colonies gave blood and treasure from the outbreak of war, they only began to
receive substantial quantities of Colonial Development and Welfare funding after the war
cabinet grew concerned about critics within Britain and in the United States. In 1942,
Labour MPs in Parliament and some quarters of the press pointed to the discrepancy
between CDW spending to date and the originally publicized figure of £5 million per
annum.14 In April of that same year, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US
President Franklin Roosevelt had “their first serious political argument” over the future of
the British Empire, particularly India. Indian nationalists had threatened to withhold
support for the Allied war effort, so Roosevelt asked Churchill to make a firm
commitment to grant Indians greater self-government. Churchill rebuffed his request,
then and repeatedly during the war.15
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Anti-imperial sentiment in the United States, a concern of the Colonial Office in the
1930s, was proving an even greater danger to Britain as it became clear that the United
States would have the preeminent role in the postwar world. In May 1942, US UnderSecretary of State Sumner Welles announced that an Allied victory “must bring in its
train the liberation of all people.”16 United States Vice President Henry Wallace urged
the Roosevelt Administration to advocate for immediate independence for colonized
peoples.17 In a May 1942 speech, Wallace predicted a “Century of the Common Man”
that would commence after the war. The advent of this Century would bring a rapid end
to European empires:
No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations
will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to
industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism.
The methods of the nineteenth century will not work in the people’s century,
which is now about to begin. 18
Colonial development spending was, to apologists of British imperialism, a
demonstration of beneficence directed not only at colonized subjects, but also at
Roosevelt and other American architects of the coming postwar world. Colonial
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development was a version of Wallace’s vision of a global New Deal, but without his call
for an immediate end to colonial rule.

Amidst these pressures, the UK Government accelerated its approval of new Colonial
Development and Welfare Fund schemes. Up until October 31, 1942, after two years in
operation, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had approved only 167 schemes
involving a total financial liability of just over £2 million. Most of these plans were for
possessions in the Caribbean, where memories of unrest were freshest and American
attention greatest. But the next two and one-half years (November 1, 1942 to March 31,
1945), the Secretary of State approved an additional 381 schemes involving liability of
almost £14 million.19 CDW schemes classified under the heading “medical, public health
and sanitation” also increased after 1942. During the first two years 35 such schemes
with an aggregate cost of £330,000 were approved. During the next two and a half-years
65 such schemes were approved, involving costs of more than £2.6 million.20

c) Seeking a colonial policy for the Left: the Labour Party before the Second World
War, 1900-1939
International pressures were not the only influence on UK policy on colonial
development. During the War, the most prominent site in Britain for discussion and
debate over how the government should improve living standards for the colonized was
the Fabian Society. Given the Society’s history, this was an unlikely forum for such
19
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discourse. The Fabian Society had been established in 1884 to engage, according to the
historian Mark Minion, in “a long and gradualist fight against the evils of late-nineteenthcentury capitalism.” The Fabian Society was also established in opposition to those
Marxists and trade unionists who called for social transformation by way of revolution.
Instead, the Fabians sought to achieve socialism in Britain through peaceful politics—
their members founded the Labour Party—as well as dissemination of information and
democratic discourse.21 Toward that end, the Fabians published essays, books, and
pamphlets, primarily on domestic economic issues.

Disagreements within the Society had caused its membership to steer clear of discussions
of imperial policy, particularly after 1900. During that year, in the midst of the Boer War,
the Society published an essay by Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw entitled
“Fabianism and Empire: a Manifesto.” Shaw argued that since imperialism was a fait
accompli, the Fabians should support the British Government and help develop the
empire into a “great socialist Commonwealth.” But a large portion of the Society
sympathized with the Boers against what they saw as British imperial aggression.
Thirteen members, including future Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, resigned in
protest. Thereafter, until the end of the Great War, the Society published few tracts on
international affairs.22
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Fabians became more vocal on colonial policy when Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), a
leading Fabian, became Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1929, but the Society’s
reticence on imperial issues finally ended in 1940, when Rita Hinden, a 31-year-old
economist raised in South Africa and Palestine, suggested the establishment of a Fabian
Colonial Bureau, a new section of the Society devoted to the problems of the Empire.23
Her own doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics had focused on
Palestine as a case study in colonial economic development.24 At the first meeting of the
bureau, on October 26, Hinden was elected secretary.

To chair the bureau, the founding members chose Arthur Creech Jones, a Labour MP
who had served over two years in prison as a conscientious objector during the First
World War. Creech Jones had been interested in colonial issues since 1926 when, as a
leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union, he had provided advice to Clements
Kadalie, the Nyasaland-born General Secretary of the South African Industrial and
Commercial Workers’ Union. During the interwar years, Creech Jones served on the
Labour Party’s Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions and helped found the Trade
Union Congress’ colonial affairs committee.25 By the outbreak of the Second World War,
he had become the de facto spokesman for the Labour Party (and Britain’s political left
more broadly) on colonial issues. To Creech Jones, the mission of the Bureau was to
serve as “a clearing-house of information on current colonial problems, and for the
23
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formation of a group of liberally-minded persons, expert in colonial matters, who would
sponsor research an inquiry into subjects concerned with the welfare and development of
the colonial peoples.”26

The bureau was not a band of anti-colonial activists. This was evident from the
(uncritical) title of the group’s bi-monthly journal, Empire, begun in May 1941. In
general, the sympathies of the group members led them to call for increased spending on
social services and welfare programs, policies of racial non-discrimination, and increased
participation of colonized peoples in political administration. Yet from the outset, many
leading policymakers and public voices on colonial affairs viewed the Bureau with
skepticism. The Colonial Office subscribed to Empire, and copies were circulated
throughout the office. But in July 1941 Colonial Office assistant under-secretary JA
Calder penned a minute expressing his desire to establish “some guidance as to the
propriety of members of this office supporting this Bureau by subscriptions or
donations.”27 CJ Jeffries, another assistant under-secretary, opined, “There is no absolute
reason why members of the office should not, in their private capacities, support this
Bureau with subscriptions and donations. But I think it is better that they should not do
so.”28 Jeffries did not offer any reasons for this counsel, but he might have shared the
concerns articulated by the editors of the Journal of the Royal African Society when they
“welcomed” the formation of the Fabian Colonial Bureau in October 1941. “The
26
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usefulness of this new movement,” the editors warned, “will depend upon the degree of
accuracy, and of the absence of prejudice due to preformed opinion, to which its work
attains. No doubt its workers will be alive to the pitfalls for research inherent in starting
from a political background.”29

But even if some in the Colonial Office and intelligentsia were put off by Fabian
socialism’s foray into imperial affairs, the members of the Colonial Bureau were an
august group. Besides Hinden and Creech Jones, the other founding members were:
evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley; Labour MP John Parker; former Labour MP James
Francis Horrabin; socialist writer Margaret Cole; development economist W. Arthur
Lewis; physician and former Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Thomas
Drummond Shiels; author and long-time secretary for the Labour Party’s Advisory
Committee on Imperial Questions Leonard Woolf (better known, in many circles, as the
husband of the writer Virginia Woolf); imperial historian Margery Perham; and historian
of race relations William M Macmillan. Their contacts with leading publications were so
strong that within six months of the Bureau’s first meeting they had published articles in
The Economist, The Manchester Guardian, the New Statesman, Time and Tide, Reynolds
News, the Evening Standard, and the Daily Herald. They had also recruited over a dozen
MPs who agreed to pose questions on the Bureau’s behalf in Parliament or directly to the
Colonial Office. They had also found volunteers to maintain a press-cutting service that
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drew from colonial journals available in London.30 This was no fringe group, but rather a
well-resourced operation endowed with immense stores of social capital.

c) A Colonial Charter: social services as the socialist’s justification for Empire
Members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) produced most of the literature that
defined the Labour Party’s stance on colonial issues. Early in the war, FCB members
tried to ensure that increased spending on colonial development and welfare was a major
focus of Labour’s rhetoric. In April 1940, the Advisory Committee on Imperial
Questions, long led by Leonard Woolf, had issued the Labour Party’s Declaration of
Policy for Colonial Peoples. This document argued that improving health was a major
part of Britain’s justification for continued colonial rule. Though the document did not
say so explicitly, this promise to improve health seemed to provide a justification
sufficient to reconcile (for most Fabians) the contradictions inherent in socialist advocacy
for the persistence of imperialism.31 In seeking to bring Britain’s possessions to eventual
independence, improving health was a necessary and urgent step:
Political self-government is not enough. It must be accompanied by economic
independence and economic self-government. By economic independence we
mean a new orientation of motive in colonial policy, putting first the satisfaction
of urgent colonial needs (for instance nutrition and the conquest of the disease)
and treating external trade as a secondary and auxiliary object.32
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In September of 1941 Leonard Woolf sought to lay out, in greater detail, how this
commitment to “the satisfaction of urgent colonial needs” would manifest in Labour
Party policy should it be handed the reins of Government. In a draft “Memorandum
formulating a colonial policy for the Labour Party after the war,” Woolf argued, “Much
larger sums will have to be found” for economic development, education, and health
“than is now usual in colonial budgets.” But, he continued, the lack of education and the
low standard of health amongst the colonized caused the poverty that so limited colonial
revenues usually required to fund public services. This “vicious circle” could be broken
only with capital from Europe or the United States. Because resulting growth would
necessarily be slow, this capital had to be provided on terms more generous than marketrate loans.33

Woolf’s focus on social services spending found critics on both the left and right even
within the Labour Party. On the left, long-time colonial commentator Norman Leys urged
deletion of the section of the memorandum calling for “costly education and health
services.” He argued that land alienation, direct taxation of the poorest, and legal
restrictions on free movement and political organizations were the fundamental causes of
colonial poverty. His focus deemphasized the contribution of health and education to
endemic diseases, which “can be uprooted only as and when a general advance is made,
that need not be slow but must be liberative.” 34 To Leys, Labour’s focus should remain
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on these causes, rather than on the social services that had so recently been the stated
focus of Colonial Office policy under the Conservative PM Neville Chamberlain.35

Farther to the right, Thomas Reid (who would become a Labour MP in 1945) contended
it was political suicide to advocate colonial social service spending outlays to a “groaning
British taxpayer” besieged by war and want. Colonies had low “taxable capacity,” so
such “obviously desirable boons cannot be provided, unless we, or other altruists, finance
the needs of about 500 million poverty-stricken people in the midst of our own
bankruptcy.” Woolf’s proposed platform, Reid said, was not only “generally
impracticable” and “unjust to our own people,” but “electorally disastrous to Labour, and
therefore to the public and the world for whom a Labour Government in Britain after the
war is a sine qua non of success for all.” In any case, since “tropical people do not
exercise birth control and breed up to the bare subsistence or below it as a rule,” health
and education spending would result in an increase in population rather than an increase
in per-capita wealth.36 Labour, then, was not at all united in their visions for colonial
development. Fierce critics of extractive economic policies (e.g. Leys) mingled with neoMalthusian colonial apologists (e.g. Reid), while still others (e.g. Woolf) tried to steer a
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middle course similar to the prewar policies pursued by the Colonial Office under
Malcolm MacDonald.

Even with this dissension within the Labour Party, members of the Fabian Colonial
Bureau soon reiterated calls for social services following supportive words from British
officialdom’s favored colonial expert, Lord Hailey. Hailey, a retired member of the
Indian civil service, had become the preeminent public intellectual on colonial issues
since the publication of An African Survey, a massive interdisciplinary study under his
direction, in 1938.37 In a keynote address to the annual meeting of the Anti-Slavery and
Aborigines Protection Society on May 28, 1942, Hailey suggested that the increasing
expectations of state social protection within Britain should also extend to the colonies.
These expectations entailed a “conception of the State not merely as an agency for
maintaining justice and equal rights, or for preventing abuse…but as the most active
agency for promoting social welfare and improving the general standard of living.”
Judging the legitimacy of colonial government with the same criteria as domestic
governance would “serve to justify our position as a colonial power to the outside world,
and to mitigate some of the suspicion which now attaches to it.” He called for a statement
outlining “our obligations to the colonial peoples…not as those of trustees, but as those
incumbent on the modern state in regard to the improvement of the social services and
the standards of living in its own domestic backward areas.”38
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Hailey said this statement should come in the form of a “Colonial Charter.” The Colonial
Charter, he explained, would be a supplement to the Atlantic Charter, a document signed
by Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 to express shared aims in fighting the war.
That document had included a “wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored
to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” Before the House of Commons on
September 9, Churchill said he felt compelled to clarify that the Atlantic Charter applied
only to “the states and nations now under Nazi yoke,” and did not address the “separate
problem progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples
which owe allegiance to the British Crown.”39

Hinden, who noted the “disappointment” of peoples “in the colonies” to Churchill’s
unwillingness to include them in the promises of the Atlantic Charter, quickly took up
Hailey’s call for a Colonial Charter.40 Within a week of Hailey’s address, she had drafted
a memo to members of the Bureau to explain her thoughts on the politics and content of
such a charter. In a political stroke reminiscent of MacDonald’s arguments to the
Treasury a few years prior, Hinden pointed to a colonial crisis to call for increased social
spending. In Hinden’s case, the crisis was the fall of British Malaya to the Japanese in
January of 1942. This defeat of British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces “seemed
to indicate an apathy on the part of the colonial peoples to a British victory.” This crisis
39
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of legitimacy should be addressed with “specific pledges and guarantees as to the future
of the Colonial people on the successful outcome of the war.” Hinden argued that one
guarantee capable of increasing martial zeal in the colonies was a promise to improve
social services.41

The Bureau had already called for a “charter of colonial social welfare” in a pamphlet
published earlier that year.42 In his May 28 address, Lord Hailey said that the Charter
should promise “the extension to the colonies of the obligations accepted by the modern
state to provide a minimum of social services for all its citizens.”43 Hinden went even
further, suggesting that a Colonial Charter prepared by the Bureau should include an
imperial “responsibility” to “secure a uniform standard of social services.”44 Her
language showed a stronger commitment to egalitarianism than that produced by the
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, which in its own proposed International
Colonial Convention, declared, “Measures for improving health and preventing and
curing disease shall be expanded.”45 There was clearly a movement afoot, at the highest
levels of left-leaning intelligentsia on imperial policy, to spur greater spending. As the
last section demonstrated, approval of colonial development and welfare schemes
(including medical projects) did accelerate by the end of 1942. Much of this discourse did
focus on the need to quell imperial unrest and gain support for the war effort in the
41
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colonies. But beginning in late 1942 there would arise another impetus—from within
Britain itself—for colonial experts and colonized peoples to advocate for greater state
provision of social protection.

III.

Beveridge at home, Beveridge abroad: social protection and health in the

Empire and Commonwealth, 1942-45
a) Domestic labor unrest in the political response to the Beveridge Report, 1942
Sir William Beveridge made for an unlikely international celebrity. Detractors derided
him as a mechanistic bureaucrat. Indeed, the bureaucracy was in his blood; he had been
born in Bengal, the son a judge in the Indian civil service. He had spent his entire career
either in the civil service (the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Munitions, and the
Ministry of Food) or in academia (the London School of Economics and, later, Oxford).
Though a recognized expert on social insurance, he had only authored a single book
(Unemployment: a problem of industry, in 1909) before the Second World War. In
appearance he presented a slender frame, a heavy brow and a shock of straight white hair
combed over a bald scalp.

He was hardly a firebrand. He favored the Liberal Party—the party of John Maynard
Keynes, Lloyd George, and John Stuart Mill—over democratic socialist Labour, but until
he himself ran for Parliament in 1945 Beveridge had always maintained that academics
should refrain from overt commitments to political parties.46 As Director of the London
School of Economics—a school founded by the Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb—
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Beveridge recruited faculty of every persuasion, including the Austrian economist and
hero of libertarians Friedrich von Hayek. He made for an unlikely father of the “welfare
state,” a phrase he detested. He lauded individual initiative, decried sloth, and
championed private efforts at charity and social uplift.47

But ever since his youthful days working at Toynbee Hall in Britain’s East End,
Beveridge had been firmly committed to a “national minimum,” in which “no one is to
fall below a certain standard.”48 In 1942, Beveridge’s proposals to render this
commitment a reality made his a household name in Britain and in many parts of the
English-speaking world.

The fame began with the publication of the Report on Social Insurance and Allied
Services in November 1942. The report was the product of an interdepartmental
commission tasked with providing recommendations on means to improve the
coordination of social insurance programs. Beveridge noted that Churchill’s Government
had created the commission in June 1941 in response to a demand by the Trades Union
Congress.49 But according to the historian Daniel Rodgers, this was not supposed to be
an influential commission, and Beveridge himself did not really want to lead it.
Beveridge saw himself as an expert on efficient use of manpower. He had declined offers
to sit on official committees investigating old-age and health insurance, claiming they
were not within his field of expertise. The assignment Beveridge most wanted was to
47
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direct the allocation of wartime labor, but he lacked the connections within the Ministry
of Labour necessary to secure the post.50 Recognizing that his “welcome had run out” in
the main war coordination effort and consigned to a task deliberately designed to be
obscure and out of the way, Beveridge set to work on the social insurance report.51
Though many other prominent officials had been named to the commission, Churchill’s
government would not endorse the document, so Beveridge called the rest of these
members “advisers” and made himself the report’s sole signatory.

In 299 pages of text and tables, Beveridge’s report painstakingly detailed a plan to
expand and rationalize Britain’s programs of social protection, including unemployment
insurance, subsistence payments for the elderly and infirm, children’s allowances. He
also proposed a government-run health care system to be financed entirely by general
taxation and provided free at the point of care.52 Despite the report’s dry prose and
seemingly interminable tables, it was a sensation. Within two weeks of its release, nine in
ten Britons were telling pollsters they approved of it. Within a year, 600,000 copies of the
report had been sold. 53 In 1945 the London correspondent of the New York Herald
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Tribune reported, “Beveridge has become almost a common noun in the English
language. It stands for hope.”54

Churchill had worked with Beveridge decades earlier on the National Insurance Act of
1911, but was initially skeptical of the proposals. The Prime Minister told his War
Cabinet that he did not wish to encourage “false hopes and airy visions of Utopia and El
Dorado.” Harold Nicolson, Churchill’s Minister of Information, opined in his diary that
Beveridge was a “vain man,” and predicted Conservatives would “welcome the Report in
principle, and then whittle it away with criticism.”55

But to many Britons, the Beveridge Plan was neither a dry technical exercise nor a
utopian dream. It was, to them, a practical promise for a better society after the guns fell
silent. A number of historians and sociologists of wartime and postwar Britain have
written of a popular consensus on the need for “fairness,” a product of both generalized
Depression-era want and shared wartime sacrifice. In this milieu, political opposition to
welfare spending and social protection programs was, for a time, muted.56 The Labour
Party, led by Clement Attlee, quickly lent its support for the Beveridge Plan as a key part
of its postwar domestic platform.57 Throughout 1943 Beveridge addressed large crowds
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across the country to drum up support for his proposals. He even starred in a newsreel
that summarized his proposals to cinemagoers across the nation.58

As in the 1920s and 1930s (see chapters 3 and 4), labor unrest proved a crucial impetus
for a change in government policy. Some British workers in key industries were clearly
growing tired of forbearance on questions of material security. Following years of
relative quietus in the late 1920s and 1930s, labor stoppages became more common
during the war. In the midst of a legal ban on strikes and lockouts, labor stoppages
increased in the UK. Nationwide, strikes escalated from 922 in 1940 to a new record peak
of 2194 in 1944.59 Neither mass arrests by government nor calls for patience from union
leaders proved effective deterrents to workers striking for higher wages and other
protections, particularly in the economically crucial coalfields.60 In the face of rising
unrest, Churchill finally decided to issue some promises on postwar social protection. On
the evening of March 20, 1943, in a radio broadcast carried nationwide, Churchill called
himself a “strong partisan of national compulsory insurance, for all classes, for all
purposes, from cradle to grave.” He added: “We must establish on broad and solid
foundations a national health service.”61 Most of Beveridge’s proposals would be
implemented after the war, under Attlee’s Labour Government. The health care proposal,
a key pillar of the Beveridge Report, was made manifest in the 1948 inauguration of the
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National Health Service, a single-payer health care system provided free at the point of
care to all British citizens.62

b) Social protection in South Africa: African pensions but not health care, 19421943
For many, Beveridge’s aims of “freedom from want” and universal healthcare seemed
possible and urgent not only in Britain, but also in the Colonies and Commonwealth. As
his Report became a bestseller in Britain, visions of social protection abounded around
the globe. These visions were not always welcome. As one official in the UK actuary
office lamented in a November 1943 letter, “It is unfortunate that the ideas in the
Beveridge Report have stimulated a vague but strong desire for ‘social security’ in so
many parts of the world where they are manifestly inappropriate without severe
limitation.”63 Yet political officials could not afford to entirely ignore calls for social
security. In the British Empire and Commonwealth, reports on social security
commissioned by political leaders invariably included mentions of health, and often were
followed by fuller investigations of national health services.

In early 1943, as MPs in the Union of South Africa’s Parliament called for
comprehensive welfare schemes, Prime Minister Jan Christiaan Smuts made the worried
observation in a letter to a friend in London that “it is here very much as with you, where
people talk Beveridge instead of war and Hitler.” Though Smuts privately lamented the
“preoccupation with the postwar paradise on earth,” he would lead his United Party to
62
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victory in June 1943 by coopting the Labour Party’s rhetoric. Smuts persistently
promised a society in which “there will be no forgotten men.”64 African political leaders
in South Africa also made use of this Beveridge moment to advance their claims. In
December 1943 the African National Congress unanimously adopted a report written by
Dr. Alfred Xuma, the Congress’ President-General. The document has been called “The
Atlantic Charter from the Africans Point of View,” or the “Bill of Rights,” or “Africans’
claims in South Africa.” Dr. Xuma combined Beveridge’s proposals with the rights
articulated by Atlantic Charter, and insisted that both should be applied to Africans.
Though Xuma’s document was focused foremost on rights of political representation and
an end to economic exploitation, it also demanded “equality of treatment…in the State
social services, and inclusion on an equal basis with Europeans in any scheme of Social
Security.” In a section devoted to health services, Xuma, a medical doctor educated at
Northwestern University in Chicago, urged “the establishment of free medical and health
services for all sections of the population.”65

Responding to demands to follow in Beveridge’s footsteps from many sections of South
Africa’s population, Parliament appointed a Committee on Social Security and a National
Health Services Commission (NHSC) to investigate and issue proposals in their
respective remits. In 1944, following a report from the Committee on Social Security,
Parliament passed the Pension Laws Amendment Act, establishing war pensions and
64
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extending non-contributory old-age pensions and disability grants to African men and
women. The maximum benefit payable to Africans was less than one-third the maximum
for white pensioners, but the inclusion of Africans in this massive new social security
program was a significant departure from earlier policies.66

The NHSC also reported its findings in 1944. Drawing upon the community-based health
centers of Sidney and Emily Kark in Natal, the report recommended a network of 400
such centers, which were to be accessible to all races, free at the point of care and funded
by a common “health tax.” Though inspired in part by Beveridge, the report’s
recommendations were far from a facsimile of his report. As historian Shula Marks has
observed, “The break with the hospital system, the centrality of the health centers, and
the focus on health education all put the commission’s report ahead of the contemporary
Beveridge Report.”67 Enthusiasm for Beveridge might have helped spur Smuts to promise
schemes for social protection, but South Africa had its own extant politics of social
medicine that shaped the reports commissioned by his government.

Yet the NHSC’s plan would not come to fruition. Smuts, who had opposed efforts to
strengthen public sector health care for decades, dismissed the report as “utopian” and,
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save for a few clinics, the commission’s vision was never realized.68 Perhaps the most
influential result of this work was that it caught the attention of the physician John Grant,
a consultant for the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division, who in 1947
drew upon the report of the NHSC to call upon every nation in the world to enact family
allowances, maternity benefits, home help, housing and food assistance, and universal
access to medical care.69 In addition, the wartime South African politics of social
medicine also made its way to the World Health Organization, where Sidney Kark,
deputy chief health officer Harry Gear, and George Gale all later worked.70

c) Social protection in Southern Rhodesia: African health care but not pensions,
1943-1945
Southern Rhodesian officials were similarly compelled by the Beveridge Report to
investigate reforms to systems of social protection, though their conclusions differed
from those in South Africa. In a radio broadcast on March 6, 1943, Prime Minister
Godfrey Huggins (a physician who had once practiced in London) announced that the
government social security officer, Frank Thomas Russell (a former schoolmaster), had
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been tasked with an investigation of possible reforms of existing social security
programs.

In the first part of his report, issued in 1945, Russell focused on public pensions. Here he
recommended expanded protections for European settlers, but he explicitly excluded
Africans. Russell argued that even though Africans had been included in South Africa’s
unemployment and disability insurance and old-age pensions, in Southern Rhodesia
Africans should continue to be excluded because “the Natives [in Southern Rhodesia] are
less urbanized, less dependent on wages and to a large extent self-supporting in less
crowded and better reserves.” The most appropriate tools for improving African welfare,
Russell argued, were not “civilized” social security protections but national economic
policies that increased aggregate production.71

In the second part of the report, however, Russell turned his focus to social services, and
in particular to health services. Though animated mostly by the quest to find an
arrangement by which poor whites could have some private practitioners’ fees covered by
general tax revenues, Russell also investigated the medical care for Africans. He called
for greater spending for preventive and curative health services, especially for “natives.”
Russell believed that for both natives and non-natives, the government should undertake
nationwide surveys of nutrition and urban housing, and the compilation of vital statistics.
He called for free school meals and milk for schoolchildren (immediately for non-natives
71
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and “as soon as possible” for native school children) and food subsidies for natives in
reserves.72 He called for increased personnel and spending on preventive activities
including sanitation, health propaganda, and TB sanatoria. For curative services, he
contended that while the segregated facilities and personnel devoted to the care of the
European community were, on the whole, sufficient, those devoted to the care of natives
were woefully inadequate. Russell estimated that his proposals required an increase in the
share of government expenditure devoted to health (defined in the broad sense
encompassed by his proposals) from its 1942 level of 8 percent to 10 percent.73 In
monetary terms, this represented an increase in spending from general revenue of
£100,000 on preventive services (for natives and non-natives) and of £150,000 on
curative services for natives. Russell believed that Africans should continue to receive
medical attention free at the point of care in government facilities, and proposed various
schemes to lessen the financial burden on Europeans, who at that time usually paid
private practitioners for outpatient services while paying fees at government hospitals for
inpatient care.”74

After Russell completed his report in 1945, Huggins appointed a Commission to
investigate a National Health Service. The chair of this commission (which included
Russell) was Dr. Charles Frederic Morris Saint, Professor of Surgery at the University of
Cape Town. This report concurred with Russell’s. “There must be thousands of patients
who never see a doctor…No doctor could possibly attend to 100,000 patients, or even
72
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50,000, as is the case in several districts of the Colony.”75 It argued for increased medical
training for Africans (which would, in turn, demand expanded secondary education), and
the construction of hospitals and clinics in more remote regions around the country. The
commissioners argued against fees for African patients, and said that spending on health
services for Africans should not be related to the taxes they paid, “for the poorer the
community, the greater is the need for health expenditure upon it.”76

Some of the report’s plans were acted upon in the following years, though the expansion
in access to care was not dramatic. Training of “African female nurses” had previously
been left entirely to the missions, but in 1945 a new government-run training program
was begun at the Memorial Hospital in Bulawayo.77 Care remained free at the point of
care for Africans. The number of government rural clinics increased from 76 in 1946 to
88 in 1952, and additional wards were added existing clinics. 78

But the muted expansion was entirely inadequate to keep up with burgeoning demand. At
Gwelo’s African Hospital, for instance, the number of beds rose from 62 to 72 between
1945 and 1950, but the number of inpatients more than doubled, from 2175 to 4092. Even
colonial apologist Michael Gelfand, then a medical officer at Gwelo Hospital,
remembered how patients covered all the floors and blocked the hallways. He also
recounted that the European Hospital in Gwelo received a new X-ray machine after the
75
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war, while the African hospital remained without any until 1954. Huggins’ administration
in Salisbury rebuffed requests additional staff, facilities, and equipment, citing “financial
constraints.”79

d) Beveridge’s aborted mission to advise on “freedom from want” in India, 1945

At the end of the war, Beveridge had an opportunity to apply the lessons of his Report to
India, where he had been born in 1879. In July 1945 the Labor Department of the
Government of India invited Beveridge to chair a Planning Committee tasked with
designing social security measures for industrial laborers.80 Beveridge was eager to
accept the invitation, but strongly suggested the committee’s scope should be broader, for
“an Enquiry limited to the very small part of the population engaged in industrial labour,
however valuable in itself, would not justify…such words as ‘freedom from want.’” A
broader report that examined rural labor and urban non-industrial labor would, Beveridge
believed, be “something quite different” from his report on social insurance in Britain.81
But India’s colonial Labor Department insisted on limiting the terms of reference to
industrial labor, and Beveridge eventually turned down the offer. He focused his efforts
instead on an upcoming tour of the United States.82
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Had he returned to India, what programs might Beveridge have proposed? Would social
services have played a role in his scheme? Beveridge’s papers offer little insight, though
there is one hint that he might have had an interest in health in particular. Of the five
candidates he considered to serve as his assistant on the India report, the only one
stationed in India was Major Geoffrey Stone, a young Brit whose focus in the previous
decade had been nutrition research. But Beveridge himself never seems to have authored
a plan to achieve freedom from want in any British colony.83
IV.

Conclusion

Descriptions of welfare regimes in the political science literature are often based on idealtypes, such as Esping-Anderson’s tripartite division into the social democratic, the
conservative and the liberal. These, in turn, are abstracted from regimes of social
protection in Europe.84 In recent years the number of typologies has expanded to include
“liberal-informal” welfare states in Latin America and “productivist” welfare states of
East Asia.85 African states, however, are mostly grouped among regimes of social
insecurity wherein large swaths of the population can rely on little protection.86 But the
categories of welfare regimes in this literature tend to elide the long-standing debates
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over the proper scope and scale of social protection among impoverished, mostly rural
colonial subjects in Africa and South Asia.87

This chapter recounted a contingent moment, when various sorts of social welfare were
considered in late-colonial southern Africa. This era was a brief one. Though old-age
pensions would be retained for black South Africans throughout the apartheid era that
began in 1948, the value of such pensions differed sharply along racial lines. And, as the
next chapter will make clear using Nyasaland as a case study, the Beveridgean moment
did precious little to ensure material subsistence among Africans facing famine and other
forms of dire want during the late 1940s.88

Still, the early 1940s was a watershed moment, one driven in part by crises and changing
expectations of government in Britain and its Empire. From relatively industrialized and
independent South Africa to the heavily agricultural British colony of Nyasaland,
discussions over welfare state policy during the 1940s fostered ideas about public sector
health care, subvention for agricultural inputs, and public pensions that have had lasting
consequences for African political discourse and public budgets. As the next chapter will
demonstrate, the shift in thinking in Britain about the role of the state in social provision
would prove especially influencial in debates over the quality and reach of medicine in
the colonies. While officials tried to write off other portions of the Beveridge Report as
inapplicable to rural Africa, the universality of disease and the growing efficacy of
87
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medical therapeutics made medical spending appear all the more urgent in places like
Nyasaland.
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Chapter 6
“The old imperialism has come to an end”: Nyasaland as case study of postwar
development, 1944-1952
Abstract
Though Beveridge’s plan for social security in the United Kingdom interested a number
of colonial commentators and colonial officials, plans to extend such programs
throughout the Empire were almost invariably limited to waged labor. Still, increased
access to health services was a piece of Beveridge’s vision most officials agreed should
apply even in rural Africa. Health services also figured in the colonial plans of the Labour
Party, which came to power following a landslide victory in the 1945 UK general
election. Arthur Creech Jones, a leading light in the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the new
Colonial Secretary under Labour, touted a promised expansion of health services to
buttress his claim that “the old imperialism has come to an end.” But, at least initially, the
rise of Labour did not seem to usher in any new era in colonial medical services. This
new era would follow another wave of unrest, which swept across Empire in the late
1940s. Only then did the Colonial Office begin to increase spending on hospitals, clinics,
and training institutions. Between 1944 and 1952 Nyasaland received some aid for
venereal disease treatment, and officials in Zomba finally began to improve and expand
training of African medical auxiliaries. But, in these years just before the advent of a
controversial Federation with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland’s politics
remained too quiet to merit any concerted attempt to expand African health care services.
Prelude: No money for diapers: seeking social security in communal and chiefly
obligations
Izeki is pressed for cash. Before she departed for the afternoon, his wife told him she
needed cloth diapers for their new baby. She expected Izeki to give her money to buy the
diapers by the end of the day. On this point, she was very insistent. She warned that she
did not want find him still empty-handed upon her return.

At first, Izeki did not know what to do. He simply did not have the money. But all of a
sudden, he had an idea! He walked from the porch of his mud-brick hut down the narrow
path to the dirt road. There he tore small branches from a short tree. He laid the branches
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on the road, in two lines separated by five meters. Between the lines he placed a small
plastic bowl. Then he returned to his porch and sat down.

Soon, this exercise had the desired effect. One passerby dismounted his bike when he
came to the branches, and walked between the two lines before remounting his bike once
he passed them. Then, another passerby—a man walking a goat—stopped to drop a few
bills into the bowl. Two women stopped to drop money in the bowl, then walked up the
path to talk to Izeki. A few moments later, a man named Jakobo followed suit.

Izeki had made use of a local practice used to collect funds for an impending funeral. The
passers-by were under the impression that there had been a recent death in Izeki’s home.
Those who had come to his home were coming to pay their condolences. When Jakobo
reached the porch, he rattled off a string of lamentations. Nkani basi! Nyimbo basi!
Azimayi watopa! (Enough of this news! Enough of this [funeral] music! The women are
tired [of mourning!]).

Izeki, acting downtrodden, thanked Jakobo for coming. “What happened?” asked Jakobo.

“One of my children was hit by a car in town while walking to school,” Izeki explained.

“Where will the funeral be held?” Jakobo asked. “In town? Or in the village?”
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Tentatively, sensing he was being a bit too far into the lie, Izeki answered, “Here, in the
village.”

“Well, in that case, I will bring the money to the mfumu,” Jakobo offered. “He will
organize the funeral, of course. That is his job.”

“No!” yelled Jakobo. Composing himself, he explained, “I want to plan it myself.”

Izeki’s wife returned to this scene, and fell into inconsolable sobbing. Seeing the
branches and the bowl and the assembled mourners, she naturally assumed that someone
had died.

Unable to maintain the lie any longer, Izeki admitted no one had died. “I just didn’t know
where to find the money to buy diapers,” he confessed. His wife stopped crying, and
joined the rest of the crowd in angry yelling. Jakobo grabbed the money and returned to
everyone the donations they had given.

The story of Izeki’s spectacular failure is fiction. It was a Chichewa-language sketch
performed by the popular Malawi comedy duo Izeki and Jakobo. A video of this 18minute sketch, titled Matewera amwana (“Children’s diapers”), had over 30,000 views
on YouTube in the three years since it was first posted on January 18, 2013. The sketch
resonates with its Malawian audience because it makes light of one of the most binding
community obligations in present-day Malawian villages, that of helping to pay for and
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attending local funerals. Izeki and Jakobo’s sketches often draw upon anxieties about
trust in impoverished village communities. In a more recent sketch, which garnered over
16,000 views on YouTube in its first eighteen months, a crooked preacher is found to be
pocketing money donated by his congregation in a collection for the sick.1

In real life, the village chief must navigate these anxieties about distrust and expectations
of protection. He (or sometimes she) serves as a tenuous link between the (limited and
patchwork) support provided by the central government and the (strained) networks of
support within kinship groups. Even though, as the last chapter detailed, chiefs were
lauded as wealthy providers for the needy during the colonial era, now (as then) they
have neither the capacity to provide in times of need, nor the social expectation that they
should do so.

In Nyanza village, the chief does not appear formidable. Chief Nyanza (the village is
always an eponym of the chief) is an elderly man with the kind of face that looks stern
even when that is not his intention. He has a prominent brow, sunken, slit-like eyes and
hollowed-out cheeks. His body is incredibly slender, though he says he is in good health.
At one meeting he sports a bright pink button-down shirt, gray pants that are too short for
his legs, and worn black sneakers. Like most chiefs in the Mangochi area, he wears a
white kufi cap during official meetings. Though the chief is a Catholic, the chiefly garb
in the region has been influenced by the Yao Muslims who have held sway in the region
since they invaded from the south in the mid-nineteenth century.
1
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Writing about fieldwork he had performed in the late 1940s in a village not far away,
social anthropologist Clyde Mitchell had concluded, “A village headman may expect
little material benefit from his position of authority…the position of headman is no
sinecure.”2 The same could be said almost three-quarters of a century later. Chief Nyanza
lived in a modest home similar to Francis’. It was not the most well-appointed home in
the village, though its construction had been paid for by the owners of a resort lodge
nearby. The lodge owners had sought to make a display of goodwill to counteract their
reputation as a forbidding and miserly neighbor, and the chief had accepted the gift. At
meetings the chief almost always looked tired. Sitting in what looks like a beach chair on
the porch of his home, he delivers an opening statement, then looks as though he might
be sleeping until he opens his eyes at the end of the meeting to deliver a concluding
statement.

But he was trusted. He became chief in 2008 following the death of his brother, who had
been chief since the late 1960s. He had been born in the village but had spent most of his
life in his wife’s village twenty kilometers to the south. He was summoned to return to
Nyanza because he was widely reputed to be an honest man and a strong advocate. After
one meeting where he had appeared to be sleeping through the entire proceedings, he
perked up to deliver a concluding statement. The meeting had mostly consisted of a
lecture delivered well-dressed local officials with desk jobs in the Parks Department.
They had driven to the meeting in a pickup truck to warn the assembled residents of
2
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Nyanza that they would be fined if they were found to be illegally cutting down branches
in the surrounding the protected forest that surrounded their village. The Nyanza
residents were annoyed by what they heard as condescension and unwillingness to
consider their needs. They did not wish to contribute to deforestation, but none could
afford gas stoves, and few could by charcoal. Without firewood, how could they cook
their food?

When the chief spoke, he seemed to channel their frustrations. “We were here before this
land was named a national park, and we will be here long after you have left your jobs,”
he told the officials. “The lodge has cordoned off so much of the land where we used to
collect firewood,” he continued. “We were not consulted about this, but now we have to
go even further to find wood.” He concluded with a barely veiled challenge, “We will do
what we must to live.”

Though his subjects appreciated such proud soliloquies, the chief could to little else to
improve their lot. In an interview, the chief explained his responsibilities. First, he was a
gatekeeper for some forms of public provision. So, for instance, he decided which of the
households in his village should be given limited coupons for fertilizer subsidies, or food
packages distributed during emergencies. Second, he was charged with allocating land to
new entrants to the village. Third, as Izeki and Jakobo’s skit averred, he was responsible
for organizing the funeral when anyone in the villages 300 homes died. Fourth, he
adjudicated disputes within the village. This last responsibility, he said, was work rife

265

with difficulties (ntchito wavuto) that often involved him getting yelled at by drunken
combatants.

Chief Nyanza was not a rich man. He worried about money; like Francis, he had spent
much of his income seeking a remedy for a family member in chronic pain. His wife had
felt pain in her chest after meals for the past year. The hospital in Monkey Bay had
prescribed cimetidine (an H2-receptor antagonist used to treat heartburn and peptic
ulcers), but this treatment provided no relief. She had felt no relief after visits to the feecharging clinic in at the Catholic mission nearby, or the private hospital in Cape Maclear.

The chief and his wife had even traveled hours to see a famed sing’anga (traditional
healer). The sing’anga had told the chief that his wife was dying because she had been
taking on improper responsibilities. She had, he said, been helping to manage the
mfumu’s relationship with his people, hearing stories that she was not meant to hear.
Since that time the chief had tried to shield his wife from his official duties, but there had
been little improvement. He hoped to go back to the sing’anga for another consultation,
but lacked the money for transport and fees. Like Francis he feared that the year’s maize
harvest would be poor; unlike Francis he had no livestock to sell off in times of need.
Like Izeki in the comedic sketch, the chief was trying to find money to meet his wife’s
needs. While his office held some vestigial authority, it was not a fount of power and
wealth. Much as he might wish to be, he was no great provider for his people. He could
not even salve his own wife’s pain.
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1.

Introduction

Beveridge’s ideas did not prove as influential in the colonies as they would at home.
Though his 1942 report on social security in the United Kingdom interested a number of
colonial commentators and officials, plans to extend such programs throughout the
Empire were almost invariably limited to waged labor. Still, increased access to health
services was a piece of Beveridge’s vision most officials agreed should apply even in
rural Africa. Health services also figured in the colonial plans of the Labour Party, which
came to power following a landslide victory in the 1945 UK general election. Arthur
Creech Jones, a leading light in the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the new Colonial
Secretary under Labour, touted a promised expansion of health services to buttress his
claim that “the old imperialism has come to an end.” But, at least initially, the rise of
Labour did not seem to usher in any new era in colonial medical services. This new era
would follow another wave of unrest, which swept across Empire in the late 1940s. Only
then did the Colonial Office begin to increase spending on hospitals, clinics, and training
institutions. Between 1944 and 1952 Nyasaland received some CDW aid for medicine
and public health, and officials in Zomba finally began to improve and expand training of
African medical auxiliaries. But, in these years just before the advent of a controversial
Federation with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland’s politics remained too
quiet to merit any concerted attempt to expand African health care services.
II.

Social Security in “subsistence economies”

a) Idealizing traditional village systems of social security in Nyasaland, 1944-1949
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The India Office’s refusal to allow Beveridge to propose social security programs outside
of industrialized urban areas reflected a broader prejudice in colonial orthodoxy. During
the 1930s and 1940s, the Colonial Office propounded an idealized vision of African
villages with their own robust, if primordial, forms of social security. This portrait,
buttressed by ethnographic work and repeated in numerous reports, had the useful
function of deflecting demands to increase public expenditure on social welfare
programs. The argument that villages had their own sufficient social security mechanisms
proved of great use for penny-pinching officials in heavily rural colonies—colonies like
Nyasaland. In fact, the only participants in the debate who did not seem to believe in the
immense capacities of traditional mechanisms of African social protection were Africans
themselves, who insisted they should be included in social security programs.

The assumption of “traditional” village African welfare was especially prominent in
publications immediately following the fervor surrounding the Beveridge Report, which
had increased expectations for colonial social security programs. In May 1943, the
London-based Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society drafted “An International
Colonial Convention.” The Convention called for immediate implementation of expanded
social insurance programs, but focused most of its attention on waged laborers. It did
include more generalized demands, namely that “free education shall be made available
to all colonial peoples,” and that “measures for improving health and preventing disease
shall be expanded and medical research increased.” But in calling for social insurance to
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mitigate “the effects of sickness, unemployment and old age,” the draft convention
focused on “persons dependent on the money economy.”3

Assumptions about the robustness of village social protection was more explicit in the
writings of Lucy Mair, a former student of Bronislaw Malinowski who had aided Lord
Hailey in producing the African Survey (she was also Beveridge’s stepdaughter).4 In
1944, while working for the UK Ministry of Information, Mair wrote a report titled
Welfare in the British Colonies that was published by the non-governmental Royal
Institute for International Affairs. Mair argued that in “traditional African societies…the
aged and sick were cared for by their relatives.”5 Moreover, in the more centralized of
these societies people were protected by “a king or paramount chief” against disasters
that threatened to overwhelm the resources of smaller kinship groups. Political leaders
used the wealth garnered from the tributes of their followers to “store up a reserve of food
against famine” or “offer hospitality to the many people who visited his fort.”6 Mair
concluded that African societies offered “a complete system of social security provided
for by the obligations of kinship.”7

3
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In April 1945, the Colonial Office echoed these arguments in a report entitled Social
Welfare in the Colonies. The report claimed that prior to the imposition of colonial rule,
the peoples of the British Empire “had worked out their own methods of dealing with
social problems according to the resources at their disposal, often with remarkable
success.”8 In Great Britain public provision of welfare was necessitated by the fact that
there had been, until recently, little credence in the idea of a community as “an organic
whole whose health and vitality depend upon the well-being of all its constituent
members.”9 Lacking such a belief, the weak, poor and unconnected were left without
support in European societies. By contrast, the report claimed, in African villages notions
of communal obligation had been widely accepted since time immemorial. Europeanstyle systems of social security were needed, then, only in urban areas, where the social
norms of traditional life were threatened by “contact” with “industrial civilization.”10

The authors of these works could turn to earlier ethnographic work to support their claim
that African villages offered their systems of social protection sufficient to obviate the
need for social security. But, as John Iliffe has pointed out, anthropologists based their
analyses of communal obligations on the testimony of chiefs, who in the 1930s had an
8
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book, Malinowski decried the “anarchy and disorganization” resulting from “detribalization”
among the “floating population of the copper belt and in the lowest Black proletariat of Native
townships and locations.” Bronislaw Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry
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interest in telling tales of “aristocratic philanthropy.”11 When the anthropologist Margaret
Read wrote of the Ngoni—whom she had lived amongst before joining the Nyasaland
Nutrition Survey—she recounted social expectations that chiefs would feed the hungry
and house the homeless.12 But Read heard these stories from chiefs themselves, who
sought to legitimate their rule by portraying themselves as providers for their material
security. Iliffe found contrary reports from missionaries and travelers in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, of neglected orphans, abandoned epileptics, discarded blind or
mentally ill men and women.13 But in the early decades of indirect rule, which afforded
chiefs wealth and power while allowing colonial administrations to shirk responsibility
for social provision, it was convenient for both groups to promote the mythology of a
robust system of primordial social security.

Even when chiefs abandoned this mythology, officials holding the purse-strings of the
budget held fast. British colonial officials claimed publicly that they were seeking both to
modernize agricultural production in rural areas without upsetting the existing systems of
social protection. It is unclear whether officials really believed in the existence of
primordial systems of social protection, or that they could preserve them while
completely transforming the economic base. Nevertheless, repeating this fiction seemed
useful in justifying the paucity of government social services and social insurance. Take,
for instance, the official response to chiefs in Mlanje District in May 1949, when they
asked “whether government through the Native Treasuries would agree to financial
11
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assistance being given to orphans.” The Provincial Commissioner replied that he had
rarely ever seen an abandoned orphan. The chiefs’ requests grew more urgent in the
coming months, as a poor harvest in the previous years made it clear that famine was
approaching. Chief Chikumbu argued that aged, disabled and orphaned who were without
relatives were the most vulnerable in such times. The African Council of the Southern
Province proposed that three-pence from each annual tax should be placed into a fund to
aid such cases, but Nyasaland’s Financial Secretary objected: “If any sort of arrangement
was set up on the lines contemplated by the PC, the whole thing would snowball and
become a crippling financial liability in a very short time.” When, that same year, the
Colonial Office Adviser on Social Welfare wrote a report urging the administration in
Zomba to pursue social welfare with greater vigor, the Chief Secretary demurred: “The
conclusions are to spend more money,” he summarized, “and we have no more to
spend.”14 While Southern Nyasaland hurtled toward a deadly famine—one in which
officials would express their shock at widespread social abandonment of the aged, the
disabled, the orphaned—the Nyasaland Government ruled that “special funds” for the aid
of the vulnerable were counterproductive, as they “would lead to a further breaking down
of the system of social security which has in the past been a feature of African rural
society.”15

Both during the war and in the years immediately following it, British administrators in
Africa saw the need for government provision of social security as particular to waged
labor. Peasant producers of cash crops could be afforded a measure of protection through
14
15

Iliffe, The African Poor. P 267
Iliffe, “The Poor in the Modern History of Malawi.” Page 266.

272

agricultural marketing boards, which “provide the peasant proprietor with the maximum
safeguards against wide fluctuation in the prices of the produce upon the sale of which
his livelihood depends.”16 But for “subsistence economies,” including most of
Nyasaland, the colonial administration did not plan to provide the family allowances,
disability insurance and old age pensions then being universalized in the UK. The
mythology of robust traditional social security was a useful crutch: as a 1944 Colonial
Office report, titled “Social Security in the Colonial Territories,” insisted: “In subsistence
economies…the tribe or the family still helps substantially to provide against old age,
indigence and, to a more limited extent, sickness,” so “the first consideration should be to
support, for the time being at least, the existing social structure which ensures this
traditional provision.” The main point of this report was not to plot out progressive steps
towards an African welfare state, but to ensure that the reader understood that social
security in the Colonies was not a responsibility of the Imperial exchequer. “In all cases
the process must be visualized as one of an internal redistribution…The importance of
avoiding the establishment of a standard of minimum maintenance which may prove
beyond the capacity of the community cannot be overemphasized.”17 Cash payments to
individuals would only follow increases in aggregate production within the colonies, and
would not be financed from outside.

It was not only stingy colonial officials who argued that social security was unnecessary
in Nyasaland. The problem lay also in prevailing conceptions of the function of social
16
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security according to leading reformers. In the United States and Europe, mid-twentiethcentury architects of social insurance often saw their goal as the replacement of
“traditional” protections that had disintegrated during the proletarianization of labor. In
the United States, for instance, New Dealers in the administration of President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt looked to the idealized solidarity of villages in Poland for the ethos
they were trying to recapture.18 Because state social security was supposed to function as
a photographic negative of residual traditional social supports, it was easy to see it as an
unnecessary redundancy in seemingly remote agrarian locales (e.g. much of Nyasaland)
where village life appeared intact.
b) Health as an exception to Colonial Office insistence on village social security
And yet there was at least one piece of Beveridge’s vision of “freedom from want” that
did figure in Colonial Office plans for non-wage-earning populations. Increasing
spending on preventive and curative health care was a major part of the stated intent of
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, and continued to be included in
colonial plans for post-war development. Lucy Mair may have extolled the virtues of “a
complete system of social security” in “traditional” African societies, but she also argued
that because disease remained widespread in these societies “the importance of
[government] medical work is particularly great.”19 The same Colonial Office reports
that insisted that cash payments to the needy could only be financed by funds raised
within the colonies also stated that colonial health and education were a metropolitan
responsibility. “Even where the traditional organization is fully maintained, it is generally
itself quite incapable of providing allied social services, particularly of public health and
18
19
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education, and the village or tribal social security provision needs to be systematically
supplemented by extension of Government public health and education services.”20

Beveridge had called for universal access to health care as a pillar of his plan for
“freedom from want.” This was one pillar of the Beveridge Report that would extend to
colonial plans for Africans even in rural areas.21 While they insisted most colonized
Africans would have to make do with traditional social security mechanisms, no
prominent contemporaries in the Colonial Office argued these traditional support
mechanisms could cure the sick as readily as the recently released antibiotic and
antimalarial drugs. These drugs, which had already begun to transform medicine in both
rich nations and poor colonies, would figure prominently in postwar plans.

III. The realities of postwar development
a) Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee, 1944-1945
Many officials in Nyasaland’s colonial administration hoped that health would be a
significant beneficiary of postwar CDW grants. Director of Medical Services Arthur
Williams, who had been educated at Cambridge and who had worked in West London
Hospital before joining the Colonial Medical Service in 1912, offered a litany of
complaints about the state of his department in the introduction to his 1944 proposal for
postwar development.22 While the hospitals built in the 1930s were in fair repair, “the

20
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same cannot be said with respect to the standard of nursing, diagnostic facilities and
transport services for the seriously sick and injured, and in the development of maternity
and child welfare clinics at Government hospitals.” Only a single hospital in the entire
country had an X-ray machine, which Williams insisted was “an essential part of the
doctor’s diagnostic equipment.” Most of the hospitals lacked electricity. To those who
doubted the handicap this posed, he advised ‘the difficulties of doing either surgical or
maternity work at night with no illumination other than a hurricane lantern or
temperamental pressure lamp have to be experienced to be appreciated.” The entirety of
Nyasaland had two ambulances, and both were intended primarily for the use of
Europeans. The personnel of rural dispensaries were equipped with few diagnostic skills
or—because few were entrusted with intravenous injections or pills in short supply—
medicines capable of effecting cure.23

Preventive health campaigns fared little better: the existing contingent of 50 African
“sanitary assistants,” charged mainly with vaccination efforts in rural areas, lacked the
education to understand or explain their work to fellow Africans. Williams criticized
those distant officials who lamented Africans’ unwillingness to build cement floors in
homes and pit latrines, or to use soap, or wear shoes (all necessary to prevent hookworm
and other endemic infections). These critics, he said, propounded the virtues of
prevention without helping Africans pay for cement, or soap, or footwear.24
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All of these deficiencies, Williams argued, could be addressed if he was given sufficient
funding. Nyasaland’s Post-War Development Committee, a body composed of officials
and Europeans serving on the Legislative Council, agreed. In 1945, the committee
submitted a report requesting a vast increase in the quantity and quality of medical
provision. Their ten-year plan even proposed an increase in the number rural medical
centers from the current figure of just over 100 to 400. Such an increase would be made
possible by of a concomitant increase in primary education and a new Medical Training
School in Blantyre to supplement the number of hospital assistants emerging from
existing institutions in Zomba and at mission stations. The Committee’s ten-year plan
foresaw an increase in capital and recurrent health spending over the ten-year period
totaling £1.8 million.

Nyasaland’s Post-War Development Committee argued that this new funding should
come from metropolitan grants and the repayment of money owed by the Imperial
exchequer, not from domestic revenue. In sum, the Committee’s proposals (for health and
all other departments) planned for £7.5 million in capital and new recurrent costs
associated with the development schemes it had proposed between 1946 and 1955. The
committee requested that £6.5 million of this funding should come from CDWF grants.
The remaining £1.0 million, they suggested, should be paid for by “the Protectorate’s
surplus balances which have been loaned to His Majesty’s Government during the war.”

bathing places and protected wells are available, contaminated water from Lake Chilwa must be
used and schistosomiasis will continue to be a menace to the health of the people.” Williams,
“Annual Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year Ending 31st December 1935.” Page 91.
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The Exchequer had called these transfers “gifts” from the colonies, but Nyasaland
officials wanted the money back.25
b) Effects on postwar colonial health spending of Labour’s victory in the 1945 UK
general election
The prospects for such plans, in Nyasaland and elsewhere, appeared brighter following
the July 1945 UK general election. In the nation’s first general election in ten years,
Clement Attlee’s Labour won a landslide victory, increasing its seats in the House of
Commons (a 640-seat body) from 154 to 393. The Conservatives, led by Winston
Churchill, lost nearly half their seats, plummeting from 385 to 197. With a sizable
majority of seats in Commons, Labour claimed a mandate to remake British society in the
postwar dawn. They set to work implementing Beveridge’s recommendations, including
the National Health Service. Transformation seemed certain to reach the colonies,
especially after Attlee named Fabian Colonial Bureau chair Arthur Creech Jones his
Secretary of State for the Colonies in October 1946. Indeed, just as he assumed this
office, Creech Jones spoke before the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society,
the same group before which Lord Hailey had called for a Colonial Charter in 1942.
Creech Jones’ address was full of grand promises:
So far as Britain is concerned, I think we can assume today that the old
Imperialism has come to an end…We are determined as a people now to face up
to the problems presented to us in the territories which we have to administer. We
have to try to convey to the world as well as to the people in the territories for
which we are responsible some understanding of our purpose and we have to win
their completest confidence…The past has left a legacy of trouble. It has
somehow to be dealt with in the progressive work we seek to do today…We have

25

“Report of the Post-War Development Committee,” 1945.

278

to harness nature to the will of man and to safeguard the life of man and hold in
check disease.26
A more prosaic manifestation of this almost millenarian rhetoric could be seen in the
revamped Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The renewal of the Act was begun
before the election and completed in October 1945, three months after Clement Attlee
had moved into 10 Downing Street. The 1945 Act extended the Colonial Development
and Welfare Fund’s term of existence from 1951 to 1956, and increased funding to a total
of £120 million between 1946 and 1956.27 Even before Labour’s 1945 victory, the
Colonial Office deployed development officers to the colonies to help draft new
schemes.28

Yet if these new development officers and Labour’s victory seemed to augur a flood of
new money, Nyasaland’s administration would soon learn—as Shircore and De Boer had
before—that recent unrest was a more powerful motivator for development funding than
dismal indices of poverty and medical provision. When the Colonial Office announced
the CDW allocations to every colony on November 12, 1945, Nyasaland was promised
only £2 million, less than one-third of its request.29
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Per-capita allocations were much higher for Caribbean colonies that had experienced
significant strike action in the 1930s. Nyasaland, a colony with 2 million inhabitants in
1945, was allocated £2 million (£1 per capita). Trinidad, with a population of 547,000 in
1945, received £1 million (£1.83 per capita). And Barbados, a colony with 187,000,
received £800,000 (£4.28 per capita). Jamaica, a colony with 1.3 million inhabitants in
1945, was allocated £6.5 million (£5 per capita).30 Between 1940 and 1946, over half of
the £10.4 million expended from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund had gone
to the West Indies. It was still seen as a potential locus of unrest, and as America’s
window to British imperialism.31 The post-war allocation announcement indicated
development spending would continue to favor the West Indies. Following this
announcement, Williams had to curtail his planned expansion of the medical services
that Nyasaland received from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund between 1946 and
1955, £348,830 (17.4 percent) was spent on the Medical Department. This included £205,000 for
hospitals and training schools, £111,770 for health units and dispensaries, £9,440 for ambulances
and other equipment, and £22,620 for leprosy settlement). By the early 1950s, though, some of
these projects (such as the training schools) had been delayed. See “Colonial Development and
Welfare Act 1945, Nyasaland, Public Health Plan, CDWAC No 1077, 17 February 1947, CO
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30
“Return of Schemes Made Under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, by the Secretary
of State for the Colonies with the Concurrence of the Treasury in the Period from 1st April, 1946
to 31st March 1947” (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, July 1947), House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers Online.
31
Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940. P 201. Criticism
from American officials and celebrities was especially concerning to colonial officials. In an
October 1946 speech, Secretary of State for the Colonies Creech-Jones lamented, “There has
been, only recently, a number of statements by responsible people in American public life in
which Britain has ben characterized as an imperial power pursuing her own material aims and
little actuated by the purpose of winning freedom and building up the social life of the people in
the Colonies. It is unfortunate, too, that this view is shared by those of negro descent in the
United Sates…The latest statement I saw came from Paul Robeson himself after his interview
with President Truman last month when it is alleged he said: ‘The British Empire is one of the
greatest enslavers of human beings..’” “An Address by Rt Hon A Creech Jones, Secretary of
State for the Colonies, to the Annual Meeting of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection
Society.” P 4.

280

considerably. The post-war development plan written in 1947 had reduced new
expenditures over the coming ten years from £1.8 million to £1.0 million. 32

c) Labor unrest, once more: Colonial development following strike waves of 19461948
But if stated intentions and welfarist ideology were not enough to significantly increase
spending for health, colonial unrest could do wonders. In 1946, another wave of strikes
began; this time the focus was not the West Indies, but British Africa. A range of laborers
from dockworkers to domestic servants organized general strikes in Mombasa (in Kenya)
and Dar es Salaam (in Tanganyika) in 1947, while railway workers and miners struck in
the Gold Coast.33 In 1948 general strikes paralyzed both Zanzibar and the Southern
Rhodesian city of Bulawayo.34 Between 1946 and 1948 agricultural tenants, railway
workers and hospital orderlies struck to protest price controls, low pay and poor working
conditions in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.35 In 1949-1950, 46 strikes in Nigeria resulted in
577,000 man-days of labor lost.36

Major grievances motivating these actions included shortages of consumer goods,
inflation, low wages and poor working conditions, but as in the late 1930s health would
figure prominently in the Colonial Office’s response. In 1950 the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act was revised once more, adding another £20 million to the total fund
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(bringing the maximum to be awarded by March 1956 up to £140 million).37 In the
November 1950 House of Commons debate over this increased funding, Members of
Parliament once more made the link between unrest and social welfare spending. Stanley
Awbery, a former trade union leader and Labour MP from Bristol, was most explicit. He
urged his colleagues to spend far more than the planned £140 million. “We have to win
the confidence of the people of the Colonies,” he declared. “A little help given two
decades ago might have prevented the mountain of trouble we are experiencing today.
Our record of omissions in this field of social welfare has proved fruitful soil for both
unrest and Communism.”38

The wave of labor strikes in Africa had helped greater rhetorical (and financial)
commitments to social services, including health.39 A significant portion of the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act would go toward health schemes. Between 1946 and
1955, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act approved £17.0 million in grants and
loans for health services schemes. The only category of funding receiving a larger
amount was education, which received £19.0 million.40
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In apportioning these additional CDW funds (as well as the reserves from the initial
allocation), both African and West Indian colonies were among those receiving new
funds. Some of the largest increases were allocated to postwar hotbeds of unrest.
Between 1945 and 1960 the Federation of Nigeria (including Cameroons) was allocated
£36.4 million and Kenya was allocated £9.7 million, more than any other colonies in the
entire British Empire. Nyasaland, though it was not such a hotbed until the Federation
period, also saw some benefit to the increased funding. Between 1945 and 1960,
Nyasaland was allocated £4.9 million in CDW grant aid.41

To be sure, the increase in spending is not entirely attributable to colonial unrest. Creech
Jones would later point to larger postwar forces that had not allowed for full and
immediate implementation of the Act: “The new Government in Britain had to cope with
confused international relations, with anarchical economic conditions, with scarcities of
supplies and low production, with complicated issues of finance, and with demands for
capital and goods at home and in the Commonwealth which could not be satisfied.”42
With these pressures abated, Parliament and the Treasury were less opposed to increased
CDW expenditure. The CDW Fund expended only £3.5 million in 1946-1947, but this
figure rose to £16 million by 1954-55.43
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There was increasing recognition of the benefits of a “stabilized,” productive labor force.
After the Second World War, the UK Government sought to bolster its dwindling dollar
reserves by expanding exports of African primary products. Part of the strategy to do so
was to render labor more productive through “stabilization,” allowing families to live
together rather than relying on migrant labor to mines and plantations. In order to allow
for this stabilization, companies and colonial administrations built better housing and
expanded health and education facilities near these centers of production.44 But while this
move toward stabilized labor was an important factor in expanding health services in
some places, it was less important in Nyasaland. Some workers on Northern Rhodesia’s
copper mines enjoyed greater social service provision and higher wages, but the
economic logic of labor stabilization affected few among Nyasaland’s overwhelmingly
rural smallholder population.45

d) Assessing the impact of Labour rule on health services in Nyasaland
In the end, what difference did it make to African patients in Nyasaland that Labour held
power in Britain? Did the ideals of the Fabian Colonial Bureau actually impact decisionmaking in Whitehall?

The existing historiography insinuates that the Labour Party’s rhetoric of socialist
planning “for the Common Weal” in the colonies masked a basic continuity with imperial
policy of the previous half-century. In a discussion of the mostly abortive large-scale
agricultural mechanization programs (e.g. the Tanganyika groundnut scheme) pursued
44
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during under Labour, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton point to “the obvious
similarity of Labour’s policies to those enunciated by the ‘archimperialist’ Joseph
Chamberlain some four decades earlier.” Chamberlain, who became Colonial Secretary
in 1895, had argued that the British were “the landlords of a great estate,” and had
favored policies favorable to settler-run plantations.46 Historian Paul Kelemen recounts
that by the 1951 UK general election, both the Conservatives and the Labour left argued
that Attlee’s government had exploited the colonies. Noting the increasing sterling
balances of the colonies, in 1952 the leftist editorial board of the weekly Tribune argued
that even considering the CDW aid provided by the Imperial Exchequer, “the
colonies…are financing us!” These histories argue that the ideological commitments of
the Fabian Colonial Bureau seem to have had little impact on the actual practice of
economic policy-making in the 1945-51 Labour Government.47

In the realm of health policy, though, the archives reveal that Creech Jones’ subordinates
echoed some of his ideological commitments in consequential policy deliberations. In
February 1949, the Colonial Office heard from the Crown Agents for the Colonies that
UK manufacturers were declining to fill their orders because of instructions from other
government ministries “that their output, or a large proportion of it, must be retained for
the home market.” The Colonial Office was particularly concerned about export controls
on medical supplies, namely “surgical dressings, surgical instruments, and electrical
medical machinery.” X-ray machines were a particular concern. This technology had
46
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become particularly important for tuberculosis diagnosis and monitoring, as new
chemotherapeutics (especially streptomycin) began to reach clinics around the world.
One manufacturer of X-ray machines had told the Crown Agents in February 1949 that
“he was allowed by the Ministry [of Health] a small quota merely to maintain his export
connections,” and that the company planned to export only one mobile X-ray machine
(which was destined for Nigeria) in the next two years.48 “Orders for hospital and
medical equipment placed as long ago as 1945 have still often not been executed,”
complained Morris in a letter to the Ministry of Health.49

Henry Wilkinson, Comptroller of Supplies for the Ministry of Health, confirmed that he
had placed some controls on exports, but noted that even though orders of X-ray
machines for the NHS were “seriously in arrears,” he had “released” one unit to the
Tanganyika groundnut scheme in 1948 in addition to the unit recently promised to
Nigeria. Wilkinson explained that, due to acute shortages and arrears in orders of gauze,
lint and bandages in the UK, only one-quarter of surgical dressings produced
domestically were exported. He noted further that, despite shortages of surgical
instruments and streptomycin in NHS facilities, all Crown Agents orders for these items
were being met. In all, he concluded, the colonies were “getting a fair share of the
available supplies.”50
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At a March 28 meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Colonial Development, this issue
became the subject of heated dispute. According to the meeting minutes, Wilkinson
insisted he was “not willing to contemplate the diversion to export of anything which
would endanger the health of this country.” Hilton Poynton, an Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonies who had previously served in Sierra Leone, “stressed that this view was
not acceptable…as His Majesty’s Government had an equal responsibility for
safeguarding health in the Colonies.”51 Poynton and Wilkinson eventually agreed to a
proposal put forward by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, in which the Colonial
Office would provide other ministries “guidance on particular items which were for the
time being of concern to the colonies.” Poynton inserted the proviso that “colonial orders
for these items should be treated on an equal footing with home orders.”52

Shortly after this agreement was reached, Nyasaland finally received long-sought
additional X-ray machines. Nyasaland’s Postwar Development Committee had called, in
1944, for an increase in the Medical Department’s supply of X-ray machines from one to
eight. By 1952, this figure had increased only to three, with machines in Lilongwe,
Blantyre and Zomba. In 1951 the department was also afforded its first radiologist, who
in turn trained three African hospital assistants. The number of X-rays performed had
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risen from 1,570 in 1950 to 2,956 in 1952.53 Still, this expansion paled in comparison to
the concurrent increase in X-ray facilities in the home market. Between 1950 and 1952
the National Health Service added 560 X-ray units across the United Kingdom.54 Thus,
the United Kingdom received more than 280 times more X-ray units than Nyasaland,
though the population of the former was only 17 times larger than that of the latter.55
“Home favoritism” in the form of budgets if not export controls, was alive and well.
IV. Staff, space, and stuff in the postwar health system
a) The fight against venereal disease: new treatments for the postwar moment, 1944
Shircore was unwilling to await the end of the war to see a new dispensary built in his
district. But the war did end, and soon retrenchment of colonial budgets turned to
expansion. In 1944 Nyasaland’s government convened a Post-War Development
Committee, chaired by a veteran administrator named Juxon Barton who was then
serving as Chief Secretary. One of the committee’s reports concerned public health in
Nyasaland. This report began with a warning, that the “economic development of
Nyasaland…is not likely to be satisfactory because a large proportion of the Native
population suffers from the debilitating effects of malaria, hook-worm, bilharzia and
other parasites.”56 The Colonial Office was also concerned with health in Nyasaland,
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particularly with venereal diseases brought back by African soldiers returning from war
(many had served in South Asia, notably Burma).57 Given the concern with underpopulation in the colonies in the 1930s and early 1940s (see Chapter 1), the anticipated
spread of gonorrhea and syphilis, the “great preventer of life” and “great destroyer of
life,” respectively, justified spending on medical services.58 There was also new funding
available for medical provision across the British Empire; the Colonial Development and
Welfare Act (CDW), which had first passed Parliament in late 1939, finally secured
funds from the Imperial Treasury toward the war’s end.59 In May of 1945, the Colonial
Office granted Nyasaland its first tranche of CDW funding when it approved an
application for a five-year, £42,000 grant to Nyasaland to provide free medical treatment
for gonorrhea and syphilis at government and mission institutions.60
b) Buildings and drugs are not enough: a call for better training and equipment,
1944
Arguments that venereal and other diseases would stanch Nyasaland’s postwar growth
helped spur a broader reappraisal of the quality of care in government health facilities. As
57
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of July 1944, treatments for gonorrhea (sulphapyridine tablets) and syphilis (bismuth and
neosalvarsan tablets) were provided at all district hospitals. But of the 91 rural
dispensaries, only the four staffed by African hospital assistants (with four years of
training) were allowed to administer these drugs. Because of the toxicity of the most
important injections, and presumably because of the scarcity of sulphapyridine tablets,
African auxiliaries at the rest of the dispensaries were entrusted only with “palliative
treatment” such as dressings and bandages for traumatic wounds.61 A 1944 commission
on venereal disease in Nyasaland recognized the inadequacy of training not only as an
impediment to venereal disease control, but also to “the diagnosis and treatment of other
prevalent and preventable diseases.” Many of the most commonly used drugs in this era
could be highly toxic. Injections of quinine (for malaria), antimony tartrate (for
schistosomiasis), emetic (for amoebiasis), and bismuth and mercuric compounds (for
syphilis and gonorrhea) were prepared by boiling a tablet on a tablespoon over a spirit
lamp, then injecting the dissolved solution. In addition to the toxic effects of the drugs
themselves—antimony tartrate, for instance, was known to cause splenic contraction and
a subsequent rise in circulating malaria parasites—poor preparation and administration
technique could result in abscesses or even death.62 Nyasaland’s venereal disease
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commission recommended expanding the availability of treatment through increased
training of African hospital assistants (to be posted, contrary to the name, at both
hospitals and dispensaries) and laboratory assistants.63

The Postwar Development Committee argued that while Nyasaland’s medical buildings
were “said to compare favourably with similar institutions in other African territories,”
the Protectorate lagged in “the standard of nursing, diagnostic facilities, equipment and
medical transport services,” and “in the development of maternity and child welfare
clinics.” They requested funds for X-ray machines and electric lighting at eight district
hospitals, 11 new ambulances (to be added to the current stock of only two), and the
transfer of patients at the Lunatic Asylum (then under the Prison Department) to a new
200-bed Mental Hospital (to be administered by the Medical Department). The
committee recommended 18 additional European medical officers and 30 additional
European nurses. Most importantly, the training of hospital assistants should be
undertaken at a four-year Medical Training School able to accommodate four classes of
15 students each. The committee did not seek a medical school—Nyasaland lacked even
a single government secondary school until 1946—but instead recommended sending
“those of outstanding ability’ to Makerere College in Uganda.64
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Finally, the Postwar Development Committee recommended a rapid of increase in
recurrent expenditure on health. Over the ten years between 1934 and 1943 the Medical
Department had averaged £54,100 in annual recurrent expenditure. Between 1941 and
1943 the average was £66,000. The report recommended increasing annual recurrent
expenditure to £157,500 by 1949. They also recommended £453,125 in development
spending on health facilities and equipment over five years.65

c) Postwar growth of medical spending and staffing, 1945-1952
Nyasaland’s medical department did enjoy increasing recurrent and capital budgets
during this postwar period. By 1949, recurrent expenditure on health in Nyasaland was
£163,321; its peak in the years prior to the 1953 advent of the Federation came in 1951,
when recurrent health expenditure in Nyasaland reached £185,800. Between 1945 and
1952 recurrent spending in current pounds sterling more than tripled. Capital expenditure
in the medical department came a few years later than requested, but between 1948 and
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1953 it totaled over £284,368 (with additional expenditure on health facilities included in
the Public Works Vote).66

But the postwar expansion of Nyasaland’s health sector was not as impressive as these
numbers appear to indicate. First, the postwar years were a period of increasing primary
commodity prices and intensified tax collection drives. As a result, domestic public
revenues (not including grants-in-aid) rose substantially, from £1.2 million in 1946 to
£3.9 million in 1952. Yet the postwar Governor, Geoffrey Colby, who held this post
between 1948-1956, did not prioritize health. When he requested additional CDW
funding from the Colonial Office, it was not for health care but rather for roads,
telecommunications, and electricity. During his tenure, even the Protectorate
government’s applications to the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund claimed the
medical system was already quite adequate: “There is at present a reasonably
comprehensive curative service in relation to the economic and social development of the
Territory.”67 Colby’s only interest in health, as indicated by his requests to the Colonial
Office, was in improving clean water.68 The share of recurrent expenditure devoted to
Nyasaland’s medical department fell from 7.2 percent in 1947 (the year before Colby
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arrived) to 4.1 percent in 1951, before beginning to rebound to 5.9 percent in 1952 (the
year before the start of Federation).69

d) Training African medical providers in postwar Nyasaland, 1945-1952
Auxiliary medical training finally increased after the war, following decades of smaller
efforts. These African providers included dressers, dispensers (used interchangeably with
“dressers” in Nyasaland), hospital assistants, medical assistants, and varied “classes” of
nurses and midwives. Though these cadres had long formed the front line of Nyasaland’s
government medical provision, governments in British Africa only began to assume
responsibility for training (previously done entirely by missions) in the mid-1930s. There
were relatively few educated Africans from whom these training institutions could draw.
As detailed in Chapter 3, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 did not include funding
for primary or secondary education. Shircore (in 1930) and De Boer (in 1938) had both
lamented the limited training and knowledge of dressers put in charge of dispensaries. De
Boer claimed that the only improvement in the training of dressers since Shircore had
called for an overhaul of dresser training was a two-month course at the Zomba African
Hospital.70 By the early 1940s dressers had usually completed Standard 4, and were able
to read and write, but their lack of fluency in English often frustrated medical officers.71
A few dressers were trained by medical officers at district hospitals to deliver anesthesia
during surgery (sometimes medical officers’ wives also filled this role), but here the
69
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“minimal qualification was to be able to render the patient unconscious without killing
him!”72

For decades the colony’s few African hospital assistants were trained in courses at the
Universities’ Mission for Central Africa (UMCA) hospitals, first in Livingstonia before
then in Blantyre after 1928. The Nyasaland government had first accredited the UMCA
curriculum in 1909, and the Blantyre mission school received public subsidies.73 Some of
the graduates of these programs joined Nyasaland’s medical department.74 In the 1910s
and 1920s the course of study was three years, including 850 lectures on subjects
spanning the basic sciences as well as public health, clinical medicine and surgery, and
even medical jurisprudence. This curriculum increased to four years in 1928, lengthening
to include additional clinical training in medicine, surgery, pathology, nursing and
anesthesia. The prerequisite educational requirements also increased over the years, from
completion of Standard 3 in 1911 to completion of Standard 6 by the 1930s.75 Hospital
assistants’ literacy, numeracy, work ethic, social grace, and medical knowledge often
impressed medical officers; Berry remembered a case in the early 1940s when a hospital
assistant corrected his own failure to order a blood film to check for malaria in a febrile
patient admitted for schistosomiasis treatment.76 Berry recalled another, Dan Ngurube, as
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the “cleverest of all our hospital assistants.” At times, Berry reminisced, Ngurube
“corrected the diagnoses made by (unidentified) white Rhodesian or South African
doctors” on patients sent home as invalids from the mines.77

Organized training of African hospital assistants in a Nyasaland government facility
finally began after the Second World War. The Zomba African Hospital was renovated
with CDW funds with new classrooms, male and female student hostels, and a recreation
hall, as well as additional exam rooms, a new pharmacy, a bigger pathological laboratory
and an antenatal clinic.78 The new hospital drew its senior African staff largely from the
UMCA mission hospitals or from veterans of the Kings’ African Rifles.79 The most
educated of the new male matriculants were expected to become Medical Assistants after
two years of training; the top performers among them would go on to train as Hospital
Assistants. Other male students could become medical aides (below medical assistants),
health assistants (a cadre focused on community public health campaigns) and laboratory
assistants, while female trainees could become midwives or (after 1951) nurses.80

Austin Mkandawire completed Standard 6 in 1948. To his chagrin, he had not been
selected to attend Blantyre Secondary School, then the only government secondary
school in Nyasaland. Mkandawire applied and was accepted to the Zomba Medical
Assistant training course along with fifteen other new students. After two years of
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training he passed his exams with distinction, and was among the four selected to proceed
with the hospital assistant training course. In his memoirs, Mkandawire recalls his pride
in this moment:
The hospital assistant course gave one status and therefore was the envy of
everyone in the medical field. It was a prestigious position to reach and I felt
privileged to have had the honour of being selected. I was thrilled knowing my
financial position would also improve substantially so that I could at last pay for
my studies. The highest hospital assistant scale was £240 per annum and that of a
senior medical assistant was £198 per annum...I reached the highest point of £240
when I was promoted to principal hospital assistant in 1957.81
Mkandawire admitted, with characteristic forthrightness, that he enjoyed the status
afforded hospital assistants. But the “status”—or lack thereof—due African auxiliaries
became a point of contention in the micro-politics of Nyasaland’s African hospitals.
Among the few Africans to with the financial resources to complete primary school, the
students at Zomba were, for the most part, born into relative wealth; Mkandawire, for
instance, was the son of a teacher at the Livingstonia Mission. Many former students at
Zomba’s African Hospital came to occupy positions of power and privilege outside
medicine after independence. John Kadzamira, who decided not to work in medicine after
completing the medical assistant course without being selected for hospital assistant
training, joined the Postal Service and became Postmaster General following
independence. Another classmate became Secretary General of the Malawi Congress
Party, another became a diplomat, and a third rose to a high rank position in the Malawi
Police Force.82 Mkandawire himself eventually completed a medical degree in Ireland in
1971.

81
82

Ibid. Page 105.
Ibid.

297

Despite the status they brought to medical training and the status they earned by dint of
that training, in the early 1950s these students were Africans in a segregated colonial
society, and were treated accordingly. Mkandawire recalled an Irish surgeon named
Roberts who had been posted in Nyasaland since 1942. He was Nyasaland’s first surgical
specialist, “loved, revered and almost worshipped by the Africans, to whom he was
dedicated and with whom he formed a special relationship.” Mkandawire remembers
himself as Roberts’ favorite trainee in his cohort, and he often assisted on cases. But
Mkandawire vividly remembered one night while preparing for a surgery, he was “kicked
in the ribs” by his mentor because he accidentally placed Roberts’ boots on the wrong
feet.83
e) Politics of health in Nyasaland on the eve of Federation: protesting nursing care,
1952
While they suffered the condescension—and even physical abuse—of European doctors
and nurses, African medical professionals were sometimes seen by African patients as
haughty and uncaring. In a January 1953 letter from Rose Chibambo and other members
of the Nyasaland African Women’s League to the Director of Medical Services, the
Women’s League leaders complained about the treatment of women by African nurses in
Zomba’s African Hospital:
It is a sorrowful thing that these criticisms are directed on the African Nurses who
should be more aware of their responsibility in caring for their fellow African
Women, than anybody else…In most cases those women who are admitted are
dangerously ill and are incapable of doing anything on their own, but when the
patients seek Nurses’ help, it is very surprising that they are very resentful and
care very little. Indeed, the men are doing far better than the Nurses in these
wards, for they really have their spirit of service to their fellow people. The
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Nurses unlike the men have no sense of responsibility towards their fellow
women patients. …When a patient asks for a bedpan she finds that it takes a
considerable time before she can receive help; and when it is too late she cannot
help but spoil her beddings. When this happens the nurses become very
cross...The result is that the patient loses all the confidence in both medicine and
the staff and also discourages many from coming to the hospital…It seems a rule
at the hospital to make patients to take water for drinking from the taps by
themselves. But in most cases the patients are so ill that they cannot rise and walk
to bring water and in this regard it is the duty of the Nurse to bring the water for
the patients…In the Labour Ward when the pains are so severe that some of the
women cry…the Nurses turn round to mock and frighten the women…Through
the medium of the authorities they should learn of their immense responsibility
and duty to their people.84
While in the late 1930s Colonial Office officials claimed Africans could do without
nursing at hospitals, by the early 1950s Africans themselves were demanding better
nursing care. Caregiving by strangers was proving a thorny issue. The Women’s League
invoked their status as “fellow people” to argue that African nurses should render
impartially solicitous care.85

This episode also demonstrates a markedly different politics of medicine than the one that
would begin under Federation the next year. Here, African patients complained to
European administrators about the unprofessional behavior of African health care
workers. Under Federation rule, African publics (and leaders like Rose Chibambo) would
be united in their protests against the Federation regime and its medical system, even as
they accessed government health facilities ever more frequently.
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V.

Conclusion

Though spending on health in Nyasaland rose in absolute terms between the end of
World War II and the start of Federation, it was not a distinct priority of Governor
Colby’s administration. And Nyasaland, a quiet backwater of the imperial estate, was not
afforded anywhere near the level of financial support given to development projects in
Jamaica after the 1938 protests, or to schemes in Kenya and Nigeria following their late1940s bouts of labor unrest. Nyasaland was economically insignificant and politically
peaceful. It seemed, to many observers, to be fated to remain a land filled with semisubsistence farmers and a few European settler plantations. Exports had grown during the
postwar boom in commodity prices, but Nyasaland not seem to present any particular
prospects for anything other than a handful of tobacco and tea estates, or recruitment for
mine labor elsewhere in southern Africa.

In 1953, the imposition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would change all of
this. Many Nyasaland Africans had spent time in Southern Rhodesia, and they did not
relish the prospect of having their home soil ruled by whites in Salisbury. They did not
react with their characteristic calm and good cheer to Whitehall’s accession to Southern
Rhodesian demands for federated rule. Nyasaland became, in the 1950s, a focal point of
organizing, agitating, civil unrest and violent repression. Not coincidentally, the colony
also experienced its most rapid expansion in health spending and health services in its
history. During the prior decades of quietus, Nyasaland only received metropolitan
resources for health after unrest elsewhere. But in the Federation era, Nyasaland itself
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became the dramatic lead. For a tumultuous decade, officials would portray popular
hospitals and health centers as symbols of beneficence. Nyasaland’s health sector would
expand far more under the thumb of a regime of avowed white supremacists (in Southern
Rhodesia, between 1953 and 1963) than under rule by democratic socialists (in the UK
Labour Party, between 1945 and 1951). The politics of health would become especially
potent, though, because government medicine had rather suddenly become incredibly
popular.
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Chapter 7
Patients finally arrive, but may not be welcome: the simultaneous rise in
attendances for health services and modernization theory, 1945-1970
Abstract
During the 1950s and 1960s the number of Africans attending government health
facilities in Malawi increased rapidly, from 1.3 million in 1954 to 10.2 million in 1967.
The rise in attendance at medical facilities was driven primarily by the training of
auxiliaries than by the entrance of new chemotherapeutic agents with demonstrated
efficacy and fewer adverse effects. At the same time, many prominent development
experts of the era believed government spending on curative medicine was fiscally
imprudent. University economists from the US and the UK argued for “modernization,” a
strategy for rapid industrialization that required focusing public expenditure on
infrastructure and industry. To modernization theorists, health was an unproductive
welfare state benefit, inapposite to the primary goal of GDP growth. This chapter
highlights a conflict between a newly popular government medical service and a disfavor
for medical spending among economic experts. The tension between public demand for
biomedicine and expert opinion arrayed against it serves as a prelude to the political
propaganda and contests over government medicine during the Federation and early postcolonial eras.
Prelude: “Life is capital”
Tsinu lina nditadwala (One day after falling ill)
Ndinapita kuchipatala (I went to the hospital)
Nditafika kumeneko (When I got there)
Ndinapeza odwala ena (I found some patients)
Ataimana pakhomo (Waiting by the door)
Kukanizidwa kulowa (Forbidden to enter)
Ndinafunsa ndichiani (I asked what it was about)
Akuti nthawi sinakwane (They said it was not time yet)
…
Patapita nthawi pang’ono (After a short while)
Atavala suti yache (Some gent arrived)
Alonda ananjemnjemela (Wearing his suit)
Awana inu lowani (The guard shook with deference)
Kukodola mkulu uja (Pointing at the gent)
Tonsefe tinyanganana (We just looked at each other)
Tati dziko lathu lokondedwa (Wondering about our beloved nation)
Kukhala tidzikhala chonchi? (Is this to be our lot?)
Pakuti tilibe maina (Because we are nobodies.)
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--Charles Nsaku, Kuchipatala (At the Hospital), 19991
It was finally clear to my why Chisomo insisted on arriving so early. By the time we
dismounted the bicycles and paid the cyclists who took us the 12 kilometers from
Chisomo’s home to the Monkey Bay hospital, it was already 7:30AM. Entering the
outpatient department of this hospital, rebuilt with funds from Iceland’s government a
decade ago, there were already 30 other people waiting to be seen. They sat along the
wall of a long hallway, mostly in silence. Some sat on benches with their heads in their
hands. Most of the women were seated on the floor, their legs stuck out ramrod straight,
in the manner I had seen many women sit while eating in Mbeya village.

The medical assistant (MA) arrives a half-hour late, 8:30AM. She was a young woman
wearing a white coat and a tired, harried expression. As soon as she unlocked the door,
there was a mad dash to follow her inside. The queue formed in the hallway was less the
agreed order in which the patients were to be seen be seen than the starting line of a race
every time the door opened. The visits were incredibly short. Each patient spent two to
three minutes in the room before exiting to fight through another crowd to gather the
prescribed medicines at the dispensary.

Chisomo eventually cajoled and cornered his way into the room, and invited me to join
him. He did not wait for the MA to ask him a question. Instead he handed over a tattered
yellow booklet. This was the same booklet that everyone in the country keeps in their
1

John Lwanda, “Poverty, Prophets and Politics: ‘Marxist’ Discourses in Malawi Music, 19942012,” in Indigenous Language Media, Language Politics and Democracy in Africa, Eds.
Abiodun Salawu and Monica Chabita (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 211–34.
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possession and brings to such visits. (Most Malawians are in the habit of calling it a
“passbook,” a relic, perhaps, of the passbooks blacks were made to carry in Southern
Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa.2) Chisomo explained that he needed a new urinary
catheter. Looking at his passbook, the MA could gather as much. The book contained
cursory notes scribbled during his recent visits. Most contain only two or three lines. The
last one, from six weeks prior, read simply: “BPH, catheter change, return 2 weeks.”
Chisomo said he had not returned for so long because he was in too much pain to walk,
and did not have other means of transport until I offered to pay two young men to take us
to Monkey Bay by bicycle.

The MA stepped out of the room to get a new urinary catheter set from the equipment
room. She returned, asks Chisomo to lie on an exam table, and proceeded to replace the
catheter without keeping the catheter tubing, or her gloves, sterile. When she finished
Chisomo sat up and pulled up his pants. The MA wrote a prescription for ciprofloxacin in
his passbook. This was, she explained, to treat a urinary tract infection that he had all but
certainly developed from having catheter in his bladder for so long. She told him to return
in another three weeks.

To any American medical provider this whole scene would seem highly unusual. BPH, a
condition in which the prostate enlarges, is a common condition in older men around the
world. It is almost never a life-threatening condition; its main effect is to render urination
more difficult by blocking outflow of the bladder into the urethra. In the United States it
2

Wicken, “African Contrasts.” Pages 23-24.
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is often treated with medicines that allow urine to flow more readily. If symptoms do not
improve, surgery to remove some of the prostate tissue might be indicated. In some
cases, a catheter is placed directly into the bladder—this is known as a suprapubic
catheter. But aside from some significantly impaired elderly patients, few people in the
United States use Foley catheters (which run up the urethra to the bladder) for longer than
a few months. Such a treatment almost invariably leads to a urinary tract infection that
can damage the bladder and the kidneys.

Another curious feature of the way in which Chisomo was managed was the ready
assumption, at all his visits, that BPH was his diagnosis. Difficulty passing urine in an
elderly male does not automatically mean that male has BPH. He may, or he may not.
There are other, more worrying diagnoses, including kidney stones, prostate cancer or
bladder cancer that can cause similar symptoms. The notes in Chisomo’s passbook
detailed no prior workup to rule out these diagnoses. The persistence of Chisomo’s pain
(which left him on writhing in agony on a mat most days) and the high prevalence of
Schistosoma haematobium (a well-established cause of bladder cancer) on the southern
shores of Lake Malawi rendered unjustifiable the assumption that his only diagnosis was
BPH.

A complete workup might have required a referral to one of Malawi’s central hospitals,
but there were things that could have been done even in the office. For instance, a rectal
exam can help differentiate between BPH and prostate cancer. No such exam was noted
in Chisomo’s passbook. With only two years of training after secondary school, the MA
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might not have known the full differential diagnosis for Chisomo’s presenting
complaints. More importantly, though, she felt rushed. More importantly, she was rushed.
By the time Chisomo’s visit was complete—which, unlike the others, had taken ten
minutes—the line for the outpatient department had grown to sixty people. The MA was
the only provider in the department that day. She expected to see about 100 patients, as
she did most days. Thus, for want of time and training, a sick man was given a cursory
exam and poor treatment for a condition he may not even have.

Even still, Chisomo reported feeling better in the days after his clinic visits. Like many,
he found government medicine valuable, if hard to access and not at all adequate. Like
many, he brought home the stories of relief (albeit partial and temporary) that lead many
of Malawi’s sick to form long queues outside outpatient departments every morning. But
a week after his visit, I found Chisomo again lying on the ground outside his home,
writing in pain. He was struggling to pass any urine, and reported the return of his
excruciating abdominal pain.

Better care was on offer nearby, for those who could pay. After one of Francis’s
neighbors, an elderly woman named Dalitso, complained of diffuse abdominal pain, I
offered to accompany her to Catholic Mission at Nankwhali. The mission was about six
kilometers east of Mbeya village on a windy dirt path. The clinic was part of a beautiful
campus, thick with foliage. Walking up the hill to the clinic on Wednesday morning,
churchgoers could be heard singing hymns inside a majestic church. The walls of the
clinic were painted white and sky blue. The floors looked freshly cleaned. Only one other
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patient (a mother with a baby) was waiting to be seen on the bench outside the
immaculate exam rooms. Patients at the mission clinic were seen by a clinical officer;
clinical officers are given more training than medical assistants.3 The clinical officer,
named Paul, admitted that his job was much easier than it would be in the public sector.4
The fees, he acknowledged, kept many sick people away, so he ended up seeing no more
than 20 patients on an average day. This gave him more time to treat the patients who
were able to afford to pay. After having her vitals taken by an attendant, Dalitso was
examined by Paul. Rather than simply listening to a chief complaint and scribbling in her
passbook, Paul took her history and performed a physical exam. Finding symptoms
consistent with intestinal amoebiasis, he prescribed erythromycin. The visit and the
medicine cost 1500 kwacha (roughly US$5 dollars), much more than Dalitso, who lived

3

Medical assistants and clinical officers are the two major “mid-level” or “auxiliary” health
cadres in Malawi. Medical assistants (and hospital assistants) have been trained at missionary
schools in Malawi (by various names, with varied requirements), since the nineteenth century
(see Chapter 1), and at government institutions beginning in the mid-1930s (see Chapter 6). Since
2000, the required training to become a medical assistant (by obtaining a Certificate in Clinical
Medicine) was two years of post-secondary, pre-service didactic training. Since independence,
medical assistants have mostly been tasked with outpatient care. Clinical officers were introduced
in Malawi in 1980. To become a clinical officer (by obtaining a Diploma in Clinical Medicine),
one must complete three years of post-secondary, pre-service didactic training and one year of
internship. Clinical officers are expected to care for hospitalized patients and outpatients as well
and to perform some surgical procedures, including Caesarean sections. While most of the
country’s few physicians (260 for a population of 13 million) work in urban areas, medical
assistants and clinical officers are often tasked with providing care in rural dispensaries and
district hospitals. Government and missionary training institutions offer a number of nursing
degrees, which require between one and three years of pre-service and in-service training. See
Adamson S. Muula, “Case for clinical officers and medical assistants in Malawi,” Croatian
Medical Journal 50 (2009); 1: 77-78. Also see “Nurse/Midwife Training Operational Plan: Field
Assessments, Analysis and Scale-up Plans for Nurse Training Institutions.” Lilongwe: Ministry
of Health, 2011.
4
In order of number of filled posts in 2010, the cadres of health workers in Malawi’s public
health sector were nurses (including midwives), then medical assistants, then clinical officers,
then environmental health officers (who are tasked with community public health work), and
finally physicians. See Annex 2, Malawi Health Sector Strategic Plan, 2011-2016. Lilongwe:
Ministry of Health, 2010.
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alone in a decaying wattle-and-daub hut with a porous thatch roof and a wasp infestation,
would have ever paid on her own.

The disparity between the care for those who can pay to attend the private clinics, and
those who must attend the public sector clinics, is perhaps best summed up by the slogan
for a USAID-funded behavior-change campaign. One such poster was taped to a wall
near the hospital dispensary in Monkey Bay, but they can be seen at all public facilities.
In brightly-colored lettering above a smiling African face, the sign reads “Moyo ndi
mpamba, samalireni!” The literal translation, from Chichewa, is “Life is capital, take care
of it!” The campaign’s purpose was to encourage Malawians to wash their hands and
treat their drinking water with chlorine to prevent diarrheal disease. No Malawians I
asked had ever heard the aphorism before the Moyo ndi mpamba campaign began
running radio advertisements three years prior. But the mantra “life is capital” seemed to
encapsulate much of the experience of being both ill and impoverished in Malawi.
Unable to pay for the superior care offered at private clinics and missions, most relied on
a perpetually-underfunded public sector, where a few overworked, underpaid staff
struggle to deal with Malawi’s massive disease burden. Few Malawians doubted that
more “capital” would help them to live longer, healthier lives. They needed no ad
campaign to be convinced of what is perhaps the most obvious fact of Malawian life. The
mantra, repeated in posters plastered on the walls of crowded hospitals, seemed less an
exhortation than a cruel joke.
I.

Introduction
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“The native likes cough mixtures.” So explained Nyasaland Director of Medical Services
Henry de Boer in a letter to the Chief Secretary in Zomba in June 1941. This was both an
observation and a lamentation. De Boer wished it were not so; he yearned for the day
when those prescriptions that were “actually necessary” were the same as those “desired
by the patient.” But given the distance between prevailing medical opinion and the
expectations of African patients, de Boer found it necessary to instruct his staff to use
drugs with “great care” and not exhaust scarce supplies simply to appease patients.5

De Boer’s letter came in response to a request for medicines made by local chiefs a few
weeks prior. Two native authorities (Mbwana and Boghogo) in Chinteche District told
the Senior Medical Officer in Lilongwe that many of their people suffered from
“coughing,” while the nearest dispensary had no drugs to treat them.6 The Medical
Officer deployed Fred Nyirenda, a Hospital Assistant then stationed at Chinteche District
Hospital—and a graduate of the Livingstonia Mission’s training course in the early
1920s—to tour the villages.7 Nyirenda reported that he found “only coughs and colds,”
seasonal ailments that demanded no special treatment.8 The native authorities, and their
people, would have to go without cough mixtures (the contents of the mixtures were not
described in the letters, but they likely included opiates).

5

HS De Boer, “Letter from Director of Medical Services to Honorable Chief Secretary, Ref. Cen.
Regy. MP No 1273/21,” June 21, 1941, S40/1/3/2, no. 124, MNA.
6
Mbwana, “Letter from Native Authority Mbwana to Senior Medical Officer, Medical
Department, Lilongwe,” June 10, 1941, S40/1/3/2, no. 127, MNA.
7
Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 47.
8
De Boer, “Letter from Director of Medical Services to Honorable Chief Secretary, Ref. Cen.
Regy. MP No 1273/21.”
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Even if Nyirenda had found seriously ill patients—he was likely worried about
tuberculosis—the discord between patient and provider would not have been resolved.
Through the late 1940s, the mainstay of tuberculosis treatment for Nyasaland’s African
patients was indoor bed-rest. But, as colonial medical officer John Goodall remembered,
patients were loath to follow these instructions, and preferred to “flock outside and lie in
the sun.”9 The few tuberculosis patients who submitted to more heroic measures, at the
hands of colony’s sole surgeon, had a procedure in which the affected lung was
collapsed, and the phrenic nerve crushed.10 While patients suffering persistent coughs
eagerly sought cough mixtures, few submitted to long hospitalizations or painful (and
most often futile) surgical procedures.

But by the 1950s, the preferences of physicians and patients had both changed. With the
arrival of novel therapeutics for a whole host of diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria,
syphilis, gonorrhea), European doctors and African hospital assistants secured a new
therapeutic armamentarium. Patients and providers had far greater confidence in the
efficacy of the new therapeutics. Take, for instance, tuberculosis. The number of patients
voluntarily presenting for treatment increased from 366 in 1948 (before the use of
streptomycin, PAS and isoniazid) to 1,946 in 1958 (after these drugs had been
introduced). As this chapter will show, this pattern was repeated for a number of
symptoms and ailments. There was, then, a convergence of perceptions of efficacy

9

John Goodall, Goodbye to Empire: A Doctor Remembers (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1987).
Page 79.
10
RM Morris, “Annual Report on the Public Health of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
for the Year 1956” (Salisbury, Rhodesia: Government Printer, n.d.), BL. Page 15.
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between doctors and patients. As a result, inpatient admission and outpatient attendances
rose markedly in the first two post war decades.

In an influential 1977 article, historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg described a
“therapeutic revolution” in the United States during the nineteenth century. This
revolution entailed a divergence of perception between doctor and patient. At the
beginning of the century, Rosenberg explains, therapeutics was “part of a system of belief
and behavior participated in by physician and layman alike.” This system was so
convincing to both physician and layman because “all the weapons in the physician’s
normal armamentarium worked—“worked,” that is, by providing visible and predictable
physiological effects: purges purged, emetics induced vomiting, opium soothed pain and
moderated diarrhea.”11 Such visible activity demonstrated both the drug’s efficacy, and
the physician’s competence.

The “revolution” over the course of the nineteenth century involved a divergence of
perception between doctor and patient. By the second half of the twentieth century,
physicians and patients no longer shared a view of the body, nor did they have the same
understandings of drugs’ actions on it. Patients retained faith in therapeutics, but since
many drugs no longer had perceptible physiological effects, patients’ faith was based on
the “imputed status” of the physician.12

11

Charles Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning and Social Change in
Nineteenth-Century America,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 20, no. 4 (1977): 485–506.
12
Ibid.
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This chapter chronicles the consequences of the mid-twentieth century antibiotic
revolution in British Nyasaland. This revolution can be likened to Rosenberg’s revolution
in reverse. Instead of a divergence of perceptions of efficacy between (both European and
African) medical practitioners and (African) patients, this revolution involved a
convergence of belief. Patients began appearing at government hospitals and dispensaries
in far greater numbers once the drugs could meet shared expectations of efficacy. Patients
did not seek drugs providing immediate physiologic effects, but rather those that
provided lasting relief from their ills. Africans in pain were more likely to ask for aspirin
than purgatives.13 “The native only judges by results,” the missionary physician J.B.
Christopherson had concluded in 1921.14 While yaws treatment of the 1920s had
provided some temporary relief, and hookworm therapy of the 1930s could clear parasitic
infestations, European therapeutics could not cure Nyasaland’s worst illnesses before
1945. And thanks to the experience of the hut tax and the carrier service, Africans had
little trust in government institutions. Unlike the American physicians described by
Rosenberg, British colonial doctors could not rely on “imputed status” to secure patients’
trust in Nyasaland. Colonial doctors were all too aware that news of their failures spread
rapidly among Africans; patients, their families, and “witch doctors” shared these tales of
woe.15 But the sick and their families proved ever willing to judge for themselves. When

13

Thomas D. Thomson, “Domasi Community Development Scheme Report, 1949-1954”
(Zomba: Government Printer, 1956). Page 68. “There is no doubt about the popularity of
European curative medicine. Bandages are displayed with pride, and there is a great local
fondness for the taste of the stock cough mixture; Epsom salts are preferred to purgative pills and
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Christopherson, “The UMCA and Medical Work at Magila.”
15
Gopsill, “A Few Notes on My Life in Zanzibar and Nyasaland from 1926 to 1945.” Page 11.
After a recovering surgical patient died in Port Herald after being struck by lightning, Gopsill
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more effective therapeutics entered public clinics after the war so, too, did African
patients.

A number of histories of colonial medicine in southern and eastern Africa have posited
that the influx of these novel therapeutic agents, capable of curing common illnesses with
fewer side-effects than their predecessors, drew patients to biomedical facilities.16 This
argument is consistent with, but extends further, the ethnographic empirical data
collected by John Janzen in what was then Zaire, which found that patients and the close
kin who directed medical care-seeking decisions were empiricists. That is, the patients
were likely to be brought to whichever healer—biomedical or “traditional”—had proven
able to heal the sort of illness the patient seemed to be suffering.17 A number of other
anthropologists studying patterns of care-seeking behavior among what used to be known

lamented the loss of “good propaganda.” He explained: “Apart from the loss of life we were sad
to lose the male patient because he could have been good propaganda. He had a stone removed
from his bladder, the stone was the size of a large duck’s egg, and the patient was due to be
discharged in a few days time. I had imagined him trotting round the villages with his stone in his
hand. What a story in the beer gatherings. In a new area a Medical Officer has to build up his
surgical and medical reputation. The African Witchdoctors are quick to seize on failures. They
also have the habit of sending one cases at death’s door. Those patients through neglect or sorry
treatment are in such a bad way that they are cheerfully awaiting death to release them from their
pains. They are too far gone to save. The Witch doctors taunt ‘See what happens when you go to
hospital.’”
16
Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies”; The Steamer Parish; Iliffe, East African
Doctors.
17
See John M. Janzen, The Quest for Therapy in Lower Zaire (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978). Janzen explains the general course of care-seeking behavior for illness episodes
among the patients he followed in the Lower Zaire in 1969: “All cases begin, by preference,
either with Western medicine or with an nganga. If, in due course, healing results, or the expected
death of someone like an old person occurs, a tacit evaluation is made that the illness was naturel,
‘of God.’ Many illnesses and etiological evaluations end here. But if the affliction does not
respond to symptomatic treatment, then it is suspected to be ‘human caused,’ or ‘supernaturally
caused’…These areas are researched, evaluated, and dealt with by the therapy managing group on
its own or with the help of a ritual counselor.” p. 221.
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as “traditional peoples” have argued in favor of what we can call the “pragmatic
empiricist” hypothesis.18

But in the forty years since Janzen’s work, other anthropologists have posited
determinants of demand for biomedicine among Africans that appear, to the allopathic
physician, far less rational. Caroline Bledsoe and Monica Goubaud allowed that one
criterion that the Mende of Sierra Leone used to determine whether to seek out “Western
medicine” was “the reputed success of the drug in curing an ailment of a friend or relative
that seems similar to their own.” Nevertheless, in her estimation, “the most important
elements of logical consistency that governed people’s choices of medicines…seemed to
be qualities such as shape, color, taste and consistency.” The logics underlying these
criteria were unrelated to notions of efficacy recognizable to practitioners of Western
medicine, relying instead on “Mende beliefs about the causes and cures of various types
of illness.”19

Bledsoe and others have provided convincing evidence of the importance of locally- or
regionally-specific beliefs about illness causation in their health care decision-making.20

18

Writing in 1977, the anthropologist George Foster argued: “When, on the basis of empirical
evidence, traditional peoples see that scientific medicine is more effective than their own, and
when they can have scientific medicine on terms they deem acceptable, they are happy to turn to
it.” George Foster, “Medical anthropology and international health policy,” Social Science and
Medicine. 11 (1977); 10: 527-534.
19
Caroline Bledsoe and Monica Goubaud, “The reinterpretation of Western pharmaceuticals
among the Mende of Sierra Leone,” Social Science & Medicine 21 (1985); 3: 275-282.
20
For a brief and (somewhat dated) review of this literature, see Sjaak van der Geest, Anita
Hardon and Susan Reynolds Whyte, “Planning for essential drugs: are we missing the cultural
dimension?” Health Policy and Planning 5 (1990); 2: 182-185. A more recent bibliography of
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Yet most of these studies are based on intensive ethnographic methods rather than
extensive statistical analysis. Few such investigations were conducted prior to the late
1960s, meaning that they mostly missed the changing dynamics of health care seeking
behavior with the initial introduction of effective antibiotic and anti-parasitic therapies
during the colonial era. It remains unclear, then, how various logics of care-seeking
behavior shaped patterns of demand for biomedicine in Africa, particularly during the
late colonial era. This study uses colonial government disease returns over six decades to
demonstrate that pragmatic empiricism is able to explain the major changes in patient
attendances in Nyasaland’s public sector hospitals and dispensaries. Even with the
necessary caveats about the accuracy of this data (see the next section), this analysis
demonstrates a rapid increase in attendance at government facilities after the introduction
of novel, more effective, chemotherapeutics.

Even though it confirms an existing hypothesis, this study contributes to this literature in
three ways. First, because care at government clinics was provided without charge
throughout the colonial era, cost barriers to treatment were less important here than in
settings with user fees, which include many post-colonial settings in which such careseeking investigations have been carried out. This lessens the influence of the variable—
access—that remains the overriding determinant of patient attendance figures in many
impoverished settings, and allows for the more direct examination of patient

this literature is provided in Susan Reynolds Whyte, Sjaak van der Geest, Anita Hardon. Social
lives of medicines (New York: Cmabridge Universtiy Press, 2002).
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preferences.21 Second, this is the first study of mid-twentieth century care-seeking
behavior in southern or eastern Africa to make extensive use of colonial disease returns.22
In doing so, it provides national-level statistical series in which the pragmatic empiricist
hypothesis holds tremendous explanatory power. Finally, this study uses both qualitative
and quantitative archival data demonstrate more precisely the timing of the increase in
attendance in Nyasaland for a number of common ailments. In doing so, this chapter
shows the profound specificity of mid-century demand for government medical care
among Africans in Nyasaland. Patients began to present in greater numbers for a given
disease after new, more efficacious treatments reached the clinic shelves. The increases in
attendances for common diseases were independent of one another, and almost entirely
determined by the introduction of novel therapeutics.

This chapter seeks to address a literature on care-seeing behavior that was initially
motivated by colonial-era concerns about “traditional…peoples’ underutilization of, or
noncompliance with, the Western scientific medical system.”23 The evidence below
suggests that Africans’ reticence to seek care at government facilities for specific
21

A 1996 review of studies of treatment seeking for malaria concluded that “access, severity of
illness, and cost are the major factors that determine the use of health facilities.” Even in colonial
Nyasaland and postcolonial Malawi, health care was not accessible simply because it was free at
the point of care. As this chapter will demonstrate, there remained significant barriers such as
transport to distant facilities. SC McCombie, “Treatment seeking for malaria: a review of recent
research,” Social Science & Medicine 43(1996); 6: 933-945.
22
For a West African study of care-seeking behavior that uses colonial disease returns, see S.
Kojo Addae, The Evolution of Modern Medicine in a Developing Country: Ghana 1880-1960
(Durham Academic Press, 1997). Though Addae does not foreground the pragmatic empiricist
hypothesis, the timing of the introduction of new therapeutics and the increase in attendances at
government clinics in the Gold Coast is consistent with it.
23
Bledsoe and Goubaud, “The reinterpretation of Western pharmaceuticals among the Mende of
Sierra Leone,” 276. Interest in this literature was reinvigorated in the 1980s by a concern among
international health experts about the “irrational” use of antibiotics in developing nations.
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ailments at certain historical moments might not be wholly attributable to locally-specific
beliefs about illness causation. Instead, demand for biomedical care might be readily
explained by perceptions of therapeutic efficacy that were shared by both physicians and
patients. The rising popularity of biomedical facilities documented in this chapter also
sets the scene for Chapters 8 and 9, which concern the political consequences of the
newfound demand for government medical facilities.

II.

The rise in attendances and spending at public sector health facilities, 1945-

1969
a)

A note on statistical production and interpretation

The use of medical and fiscal statistics in this chapter and the next demands at least a
brief discussion of the circumstances attending their production. I take most government
budget figures on revenues and expenditures at face value. Colonial-era figures,
presented to the UK Colonial Office and Treasury, were so central to governance and so
closely monitored that their veracity can be generally accepted. Even in the post-colonial
era, Hastings Kamuzu Banda was widely reputed to run an efficient and honest civil
service, and his supporters and detractors alike deemed his budget figures accurate.24

Greater difficulties arise in the use of statistics related to the number of patients attending
medical facilities. I base much of my account on the rise in annual outpatient
“attendances.” These figures are based on monthly reports filed by medical officers at
hospitals and medical assistants at dispensaries. These figures are surely not entirely
24

Gerhard Anders, In the Shadow of Good Governance : An Ethnography of Civil Service Reform
in Africa (Boston: Brill, 2010).
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accurate, but there is little evidence to suggest any systematic bias that could account for
the increase in attendance figures over time. One possible problem is raised in the work
of David Stevenson, a former missionary doctor, who wrote of the government figure for
1962 that “out-patient attendances” represented “the number of treatments given, not the
number of patients.”25 This definition is not repeated in the Medical Department’s annual
reports. Yet if this was indeed the definition of “attendances” during this period, the rise
in this figure might conceivably reflect an increase in the number of prescriptions written
for each patient, and not just an increase in the absolute number of patients. While this
might account for some of the increase in this index, it is unlikely to provide the whole,
or even much, of the explanation for its phenomenal increase. The first-hand accounts to
follow of once-empty facilities that had become, by the 1960s, incredibly crowded speak
to the increase in patient numbers, and not just prescriptions.26

Other statistics have even more profound questions surrounding accuracy and
interpretation. Disease returns are, of course, based on individual diagnoses. For diseases
where diagnoses were particularly uncertain—syphilis, tuberculosis, and malaria were
famously difficult diagnoses at mid-century—disease returns cannot be read as the
number of patients presenting with undeniable evidence of a given infection or other
malady. In fact, after the Second World War Nyasaland’s Directors of Medical Services
were sufficiently doubtful of the accuracy of diagnoses by medical aides in dispensaries

25
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that they did not include their disease returns in official statistics.27 Thus, after 1940 the
figures presented in Figures 7.6a and 7.6b include only those returns submitted by
hospitals (though the total number of patient visits included dispensary attendance). But
this actually renders the increase in attendance for certain diseases (e.g. tuberculosis,
syphilis) after the advent of novel therapeutics after the war all the more impressive.
Even though the figures compiled after the war included statistics from fewer facilities,
total attendances nonetheless increased dramatically.

While statistics on patient attendance are uncertain, data on the incidence and prevalence
of various diseases in the general African population were rarely collected. Individual
medical officers conducted small surveys of such diseases as hookworm and
schistosomiasis during the interwar era, but rigorous, large-scale studies of more lifethreatening conditions were uncommon. Commentator (and committed Fabian) Joan
Wicken surmised that the dearth of epidemiological studies may have been a deliberate
omission in colonial data-collection, as the absence of evidence of disease helped mute
calls for greater spending. She pointed to a temporary impasse in negotiations with the
WHO and UNICEF to conduct a survey of tuberculosis incidence in Nairobi’s slums

27

Before 1940, the disease returns for African outpatients included both rural dispensaries and
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“because the [City] Council would not undertake the necessary treatment and follow-up
work.”28 Colonial settlers and officials recognized the fiscal benefits of ignorance.

Population statistics were also dubious. Little is known of the methods used in the 1901
“population count,” the first attempt to quantify the African population of Nyasaland (or,
as it was known at the time, the British Central African Protectorate). The 1911 “census”
was estimated by multiplying the number of hut-taxes paid by 2.8 (a protectorate-wide
average of 2.8 people per hut had been estimated based on counts of people per hut in
“certain selected villages”). Subsequent censuses in 1921, 1926, and 1931 ostensibly
involved visits to by “enumerators” to every village.29 Budget retrenchments led to the
cancellation of the census in 1936, and the war led to the cancellation of the 1941
census.30 The 1945 census was the last of the colonial era. Population statistics of the
late colonial years were notoriously inexact, and recapitulated the methods of the 1911
census. David Stevenson remembered a Blantyre accountant admit that “the method of
estimating the total population, in 1962, was to take the number of taxpayers, (supposedly
all adult men, apart from those granted specific exemption for medical or other reasons),
multiply by two to allow for those who avoided paying tax, and again by five to allow for
dependents.”31
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The first post-independence census was conducted in 1966. In this census, enumerators
visited all 1.5 million “dwelling units” in the country.32 Censuses then followed roughly
every decade, with one in 1977, and another in 1987.33 The relative infrequency of
rigorous censuses during the twentieth century, and the lack of resources with which they
were performed, should call into question the accuracy of any per-capita statistics. In the
coming chapters, I use population statistics in order to provide rough per-capita figures.
Though there is little evidence to indicate a systematic bias in these figures, they should
not be regarded as accurate.

The same cannot be said of GDP figures, perhaps the most contentious statistic of all.
Nyasaland was one of the first colonies for which national income was estimated. But, as
I have explored in other work (and mentioned in Chapter 2), these figures systematically
discounted the contributions of smallholder agriculture in general and women’s labor in
particular. The rapid growth in GDP during the post-independence years was a product of
increasing production of cash crops on large agricultural estates, and the rising prices
these crops fetched on international markets. But, as I will explain in Chapter 10, this
growth in cash crop production was hastened by exploitation of the smallholder
agriculture, and justified by GDP statistics that discounted the contribution of
smallholders to economic indices. Meanwhile, surveys of actual production in rural areas
were so rare and so poorly funded that it is impossible to invest much faith in them. So
32
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profound was the systematic bias in GDP figures that I will present them only rarely, and
even then usually to explore their political uses.

And to say much about the effects of medicine on mortality statistics would require vital
statistics. But the British colonial administration did not systematically register births and
deaths in the African population.34 Theirs was not a biopolitical regime. There was
relatively little inquiry into the kinds of concerns Foucault believes characterize such
regimes: “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.”35 The colonial
administration certainly preferred to govern a productive and docile population, but it did
little to achieve such an ideal. Its main interest in monitoring the population was in
ensuring universal payment of the hut tax. This, in turn, was an instrument to force the
men to work in the region’s plantations and mines.36 In sum, there are few statistics

34
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available for scholars seeking to discern the course of economic and demographic shifts
in Nyasaland’s population. Those statistics that are available were designed not for
accuracy, but to buttress the interests of the colony’s European elite.
b) Charting the post-war rise in patient attendance at government facilities
Writing in the British Medical Journal in 1960 Dr. Harry S. Gear, a Consultant to the
Federal Ministry of Health in Salisbury, marveled at “the insatiable demand for European
medicine. Where less than a quarter of a century ago the large majority of Africans
avoided European hospitals and clinics, they are now overwhelming them.” The situation
had changed drastically since both Shircore (in his 1930 report) and de Boer (in his 1938
report) had lamented the sparse attendance by Africans in government hospitals and
dispensaries (see Chapter 3). Africans in Nyasaland were turning to hospitals in much
larger numbers than ever before. The number of outpatient attendances by Africans in
1965 (8,710,732), the first full year of Malawi’s independence, was more than three times
higher than in 1955 (2,505,547), and more than twelve times higher than in 1945
(719,316). On a per-capita basis, attendance increased from 0.45 in 1953 to 2.52 in 1969
(Figure 7.1). African inpatient admissions rose as well. Admissions in 1965 (92,892)
were over two times greater than in 1955 (42,218), and almost four times greater than in
1945 (23,369).

has been achieved largely by means other than anatamo- and bio-politics. Biopower may be a
two-edged sword, but its weakness in many parts of the globe cannot be called a blessing. See J.A. Mbembé, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); J. Comaroff,
“Beyond Bare Life: AIDS, (Bio)Politics, and the Neoliberal Order,” Public Culture 19, no. 1
(January 1, 2007): 197–219.
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Figure 7.1: African outpatient attendances per capita at Nyasaland/Malawi government
facilities. Sources: Annual medical reports (colonial era, 1914-1964) and World Bank
reports (postcolonial era, 1965-1982).
c) Comparing government and mission outpatient attendances, 1940-1970
The attendance figures also reveal something else. By the end of the 1960s, African
outpatients attended government facilities far more often than they attended missions.
Figure 7.2 shows that in 1940 outpatient attendances were more than six times higher at
government facilities (559,189) than at missions (85,427). This ratio decreased during the
1950s: in 1957, government facilities (2,237,514) and missions (1,770,701) had similar
numbers of African outpatient attendances. But by the late 1960s, the figures were
disparate once more; in 1969 government facilities treated more than four times as many
African outpatients (11,075,729) than missions (2,428,034).37 Data on inpatients,
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Figure 7.2 Government vs. Mission outpatient attendances in Nyasaland/Malawi. Source:
Annual reports for Medical Department, 1914-1964 and World Bank Reports, 19651982.
depicted in Figure 7.3, indicate that government facilities and missions admitted
remarkably similar numbers of patients throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

The parity between government and mission inpatient figures, and the disproportionate
share of outpatients going to government facilities, complicates the portrait of Malawi,
still shared by many Africanists, as a land dominated by missions. To some extent this
assumption is a result of the comparatively rich trove of histories and memoirs of
missions in Malawi, and particularly those connected to the nineteenth-century physicianexplorer David Livingstone.38 Colonial officials often highlighted the number of
38
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Figure 7.3: Government vs. Mission inpatient admissions in Nyasaland/Malawi. Source:
Annual Medical Department Reports, 1914-1964.
missions, perhaps because making missions seem numerous absolved them of
responsibility for expanding government healthcare. One historical account of medical
services in Malawi begins with the observation that “the part played by the various
Missions has been considerable.”39 While missions were, in Gear’s words, “the early
predominant medical force” in Nyasaland, by the Federation years that age had surely
passed. By mid-century medical missions were no more important for most Africans in
Nyasaland than for Africans in other British colonies of southern Africa. Nyasaland’s
Africans were, during the mid-twentieth century, no more amply served by mission

A History of the Anglican Church 1861-2010 (Zomba Malawi: Kachere Series, 2010); Mary
McCulloch, A Time to Remember: The Story of the Diocese of Nyasaland (Published for the
Diocese of Nyasaland by the Universities’ Mission to Central Africa, 1959).
39
Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.”

326

hospitals than were Africans elsewhere in the region. In 1962 Nyasaland had fewer
mission hospitals (61) than either Southern Rhodesia (65) or Northern Rhodesia (80),
even though Nyasaland had an estimated African population (2.93 million) higher than
Northern Rhodesia’s (2.46 million) and only somewhat lower than Southern Rhodesia’s
(3.64 million).40

As the last chapter detailed, Government medicine for Africans was so absent in the early
decades of the twentieth century that missions really were the only facilities open to
them, even if few could reach them and even fewer could afford the fees most charged
for care. But during the two decades after the Second World War Africans turned in
larger numbers to both government facilities and missions. Most Africans able to afford
mission fees preferred them to government facilities, as many had reputations for bettertrained practitioners and better-stocked dispensaries. But the availability of care free at
the point of service drew far more outpatients to government facilities. Missions also
received grants from the government to pay salaries and purchase drugs. These grants
became considerable during the Federation years, rising from £10,477 in 1952 to £72,000
in 1958, and continued to rise after independence, reaching £102,000 in 1969.
d) Explaining the rise in attendance at government facilities
What can account for the rise in attendance at government medical facilities during the
quarter-century after the close of World War II? Here I examine four possible
explanations: first, a growing appreciation for European culture; second, increasingly
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accessible facilities; third, better-stocked and better-staffed facilities; and fourth, the
successful demonstration of new drugs.

The idea that newly crowded hospitals were evidence of a wholesale turn away from
African “tradition” and towards “modern” European culture was often invoked by
Southern Rhodesian officials during the Federation years. One of Gear’s explanations for
“the insatiable demand for European medicine” by 1960 was “the general acceptance of
European culture and education.”41 This claim is less than convincing, as it seems
unlikely that appreciation for “European culture” would reach a zenith during the years of
the Federation government. These were years marked by popular protests against rule by
a white supremacist regime based in Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, Africans living in
Nyasaland had been exposed to Europeans for centuries, from the Portuguese traders and
British missionaries of the nineteenth century, to the British and German troops of the
First World War, to the employers and foremen in the mines and plantations of Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa (where hundreds of thousands had sought paid labor since the
start of the twentieth century). Most Africans in Nyasaland were no more familiar with
European life and culture than they had been during the last half-century. The peak
population of European settlers in Nyasaland (most of whom lived in Blantyre or Zomba)
during the 1950s and 1960s was 9300 (in 1960); the ratio of Africans to Europeans in
Nyasaland during that year was 302:1. The penetration of “European culture” via mass
media could not have been too deep; in 1968 less than 7 percent of rural Malawians (who
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made of 92 percent of the population) lived in a household with a radio.42 The timing and
precipitous nature of the rise in attendance do not support the contention that it was a
manifestation of some general love of things European.
ii) Hypothesis 2: increased access to medicine (new transport and facilities)
A second possible explanation is that the rise in attendance might be attributed to more
accessible medical facilities. But available statistical data offer relatively little support to
this claim. The number of rural dispensaries and rural hospitals (usually defined as
hospitals not staffed by a medical doctor) did not increase much, growing only from 96 in
1946 to 112 in 1965. Though the Federal Ministry of Health proudly declared that the
number of African hospitals had increased from 19 to 30 under their rule, most of these
were smaller rural hospitals without medical doctors. Only three hospital construction
projects with costs to the Federation of over £50,000 pounds were completed in
Nyasaland between 1954 and 1960.43 This rather slight increase in facilities is
insufficient to explain a twelve-fold increase in outpatient attendances.

Changes in transportation, and in particular the spread of bicycle transport, did make
medical facilities more accessible, but this can explain only a small part of the increase in
attendances. While motor vehicle transport remained sparse throughout the colonial
period, Nyasaland did experience a boom in bicycle ownership after the Second World
War. The value of bicycle imports increased more than tenfold, from £26,000 in 1945 to
42
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Figure 7.4: Scene outside Mlanje African Hospital, February 1964. Note the bicycle in
the bottom right. Source: British Information Services, Central Office of Information,
London, UKNA.
£310,000 in 1953.44 By 1955, it was estimated that one in four able-bodied adult males in
Zomba District owned a bicycle (Figure 7.4).45 These bicycles increased the range over
which the sick could be transported; they remain a popular means of transport to health
facilities in the twenty-first century. For patients unable to walk (but able to sit), transport
on the back of a bicycle could replace the much slower stretcher that often required four
carriers. But the role of this rise in bicycle transport, concentrated in urban areas and
lakeshore communities, should not be overstated. In the late 1960s patients presenting to
hospitals and dispensaries still came overwhelmingly from the immediate areas
44
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surrounding hospitals. Even at the district hospital in the small lakeshore town of Nkhata
Bay, 61 percent of outpatients came from less than two miles away.46 In 1970 there was
still only one “health unit” [a facility the size of a dispensary and above] for every 20,000
Malawians, about half of the recommended World Health Organization minimum at the
time.47
iii) Hypothesis 3: improved staffing and buildings
The third argument, that patients came because the quality of the facilities had improved,
has much to recommend it. Roughly coincident with the rise in attendance at government
facilities was a marked increase in recurrent expenditure on the government health sector.
As seen in Figure 7.5, recurrent expenditure on health (in current UK pounds sterling) in
1965 (£1,068,377) was almost three times higher than in 1955 (£395,000) and nearly
fifteen times higher than in 1945 (£72,896). The rate of the rise in spending far outpaced
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Figure 7.5: Recurrent government health spending in Nyasaland/Malawi (current UK
pounds sterling). Source: Annual reports of Medical Department, 1914-1964.
the rate of population growth; recurrent expenditure on health per capita increased from
3/100 pounds sterling in 1945 to 55/100 pound sterling in 1965. Almost 40 percent of the
increase in recurrent expenditure during the decade 1955-1965 went towards the
personnel budget, which rose from £204,528 in 1955 to £471,672 in 1965. Much of the
rest of the increase is accounted for by spending on supplies and medicines, which rose
from £108,000 in 1954 to £381,000 in 1962.

Yet many deficiencies in staffing and procurement were never resolved. The budget
included funding sufficient to employ 12 non-specialist, non-administrative government
medical officers in 1949; this rose to 38 in 1953 before falling again to 12 again at
independence in 1964. During most of these years the number of actual medical officers
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did not reach these budgetary limits. For a few months in 1964 Malawi had only 3
government medical officers. And, as the next sections will elucidate, while spending on
supplies and drugs rose significantly, rationing of drugs and supplies and even prolonged
stock-outs of widely used medicines plagued government facilities throughout the
colonial, Federation, and independence eras. Staffing and procurement improved during
some of the postwar years, but it also deteriorated in others. All the while, patients came
in ever increasing numbers.
iv) Hypothesis 4: new drugs and equipment
This leads to the final and, in many ways, most convincing of the explanations for the rise
in attendance: the introduction of new drugs. The main event here is the revolution in
antimicrobial therapeutics.48 In the United States, the first sulfa drug reached the general
public in the late 1930s; penicillin was first mass-marketed in 1945, followed in the
coming years by bacitracin (1948) and chlortetracycline (1948). Effective therapy against
pulmonary tuberculosis arrived with the use of streptomycin (1948) and isoniazid (1952)
in combination.49 The antimalarial chloroquine reached US markets in 1946, replacing
mepacrine, a drug used by American troops during the Second World War and widely
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reviled for its neurologic side-effects.50 Promin, the first in the class of sulfone drugs,
was used to halt the ravages of leprosy (also known as Hansen’s disease) in patients in
Carville, Louisiana in 1941; a less painful drug, Dapsone, came into use in the early
1950s.51

Years—even decades—passed between the introduction of these drugs in the United
States and their arrival in Nyasaland’s public facilities. Even after their introduction to
Nyasaland, these drugs were often strictly rationed (see Chapter 8). But compared to the
therapeutic armamentarium available to colonial medical officers and African auxiliaries
before the war, these were powerful new tools. Penicillin began to arrive, in small
quantities, at the end of the war. This drug would save patients with many serious
bacterial infections. It came, lamented WTC Berry, “too late to save the life of one of our
medical officers who died from septicemia, contracted after doing a postmortem in
1944.”52 Penicillin also transformed therapy for syphilis. Previous therapy for Africans
diagnosed with syphilis was a series of sodium bismuth tartrate injections (see Chapter
3). These were painful and did not lead to permanent cure. Berry, a medical officer in
Mulanje between 1936 and 1943, remembered that he had responded “unfeelingly” to a
syphilitic male who complained of the pain of this injection “that he would have been
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wiser to have thought of that when he was making love with the woman.”53 By the late
1940s, physicians could rid bodies of syphilis and prevent its ravages with a single
injection of penicillin.54

As demonstrated by Figures 7.6a and 7.6b, the number of patients suffering from a given
disease who attended public sector clinics rose precipitously in the immediate aftermath
of the introduction of novel therapeutics. For yaws, this increase followed the
introduction of bismuth injections in the mid-1920s (see Chapter 1).

For hookworm, the rise in attendance followed the introduction of carbon tetrachloride.
In the late 1920s this drug, which was first used earlier in the decade by American
veterinarians on dogs, was distributed free of charge to plantations for use by employers
of African labor.55 By the early 1930s, mass voluntary anti-helminthic campaigns in the
countryside drew thousands of African patients. Doctors ascribed the popularity of this
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Figure 7.6a: Disease returns at public sector health facilities and new drug introductions
for TB, yaws, hookworm, and schistosomiasis. Source: Annual reports of Medical
Department, 1920-1964.
campaign to the visible and dramatic consequences of the therapy. While the doctors’
main target in administering carbon tetrachloride was the microscopic hookworm
(thought be a major cause of anemia and low productivity, see chapter 2), patients given
this therapy would also defecate macroscopic tapeworms.56 One of the doctors leading
the campaign, William Watson, became known as Dr. Chimbudzi, which translates to Dr.
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Feces.57 By the 1950s Nyasaland’s doctors would complain what they saw as Africans’
tendency to ascribe great therapeutic efficacy to over-the-counter laxatives, but at least in
the 1930s they were grateful to see perceptions dovetail.58 Yet carbon tetrachloride could
also be highly toxic and even caused the death of a few patients; in medical reports, the
deceased patients were blamed for not having heeded warnings to abstain from alcohol
prior to treatment.59

For gonorrhea, the rise in attendance followed the introduction of sulphapyridine in the
1940s. Sulpha drugs had been strictly rationed in the late 1930s (see Chapter 5). But in
May 1945, the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund awarded Nyasaland a five-year,
£42,000 grant for free treatment of gonorrhea and syphilis at government and mission
institutions. 60 This money allowed more patients to access sulphapyridine than ever
before, and patients receiving treatment for this condition rose accordingly.

During the 1950s demand for leprosy treatment increased after the introduction of
another novel therapeutic. Dapsone was, leprologist Dr. Gordon Currie explained, “far
from being the ideal drug.” It had to be administered weekly, sometimes
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Figure 7.6b: Disease returns at public sector health facilities and new drug introductions
for malaria, leprosy, syphilis and gonorrhoea. Source: Annual reports of Medical
Department, 1920-1964.
for years, and it sometimes caused permanent nerve damage.61 But patients, doctors and
nurses welcomed the end of the long era in which the mainstay of treatment had been
infamously ineffective hydnocarpus oil. A number of missions had shuttered their
leprosaria in previous decades, in part because, as John Iliffe explains, “the drugs did not
work.”62 Many people had flocked to the mission leprosaria after the introduction of
hydnocarpus oil injections in the 1920s. But by the 1940s neither patients nor providers
had confidence in the efficacy of these drugs; those who lived on the settlements might
61
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have stayed for the meager food and shelter they provided, while outpatients often came
for treatment because the staff could excuse them from the obligation to pay hut tax.63
Electra Dory, who directed the UMCA leprosarium in Likwenu during the Second World
War, recalled the “apparent dejection and indifference” of the lepers. “They called
themselves The Dead.” She remembered the futility of their therapeutic regimens: “We
rammed—I fear that is the only word that describes the treatment—we rammed in the
oleaginous product of the hydnocarpus wightiana, causing in some cases more pain and
destruction than the lepra bacilli.”64 Curative treatment was only possible with the arrival
of sulphone therapy.65

This new efflorescence of public confidence was also seen in the patients with
tuberculosis (following the release of streptomycin and isoniazid at public hospitals in the
mid-1950s). In the 1960s attendances increased for schistosomiasis (after the introduction
of lucanthone hydrochloride) and malaria (upon the dissemination of chloroquine).66
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Some prominent contemporary commentators on colonial medicine interpreted the
increasing numbers of patients presenting for treatment (in the absence of any robust
epidemiologic surveillance) as evidence of rising incidence of disease.67 But the rise in
attendance was more likely a product of greater confidence in the efficacy of biomedicine
among those who were already sick. Such was the opinion of the medical officer in
Mzimba, who reported in 1956 that “the increase in patients in hospital with Pulmonary
Tuberculosis is not thought to represent an increase of the disease in the district as much
as an increase in propaganda by Medical Aides in rural dispensaries. All but one of the
cases in hospital were chronic in nature, mostly with fibrosis and cavitation.” Prior to the
arrival of chemotherapy, the primary treatment for patients with tuberculosis in
Nyasaland (and a common procedure elsewhere in the world) was a surgical procedure in
which the affected lung was collapsed.68 This treatment was invasive and largely
palliative.69 But by 1956, routine curative treatment in Nyasaland’s district hospitals was
two out of three drugs (streptomycin, isoniazid, and PAS) “over a long period of time.”
This was not, by Malawian standards, inexpensive therapy, and stock-outs of these drugs
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were common in the 1950s (see Chapter 8). Still, they were standard of care, and the
earlier surgical interventions were rarely performed.70

Recent studies of AIDS treatment (with antiretrovirals) demonstrate that, in similarly
impoverished settings, there exists a correlation between the introduction of effective
chemotherapeutic agents and reported cases, particularly when treatment is given free at
the point of care.71 There is plenty of reason to believe that the (often-delayed)
availability of drugs was a major factor driving the increased attendance at government
health facilities in Nyasaland.

But even as African patients began to appear in far greater numbers at hospitals and
dispensaries, many government officials wished they would stay home. Whereas in the
1930s government officials had sought to bring more African patients to the clinic, by the
late 1950s their successors were trying to stem the flow.72 Economic planners in Malawi
(and their expatriate advisors) saw the claims on the government’s purse that the rush of
patients had created as a drain on economic growth. The government finally had healing
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technologies that Africans patients wanted, but as the next section will demonstrate those
patients were, in some ways, no longer welcome.
III.

Defying the experts: Increasing health spending against the tenets of

modernization theory, 1950s-1960s
a) Modernization lessons from a prison cell: Dunduzu Chisiza and Walt Rostow,
1960
Sitting in a prison cell in Southern Rhodesia in January 1960, Dunduzu Chisiza penned a
letter. He was continuing a correspondence with Walt Rostow, a renowned economist at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and advisor to the presidential campaign of
then-Senator John F. Kennedy. Chisiza apologized for his brevity: “We can use only two
sheets of paper for each letter.” He continued, “There are many questions I would have
liked to ask…but most of them would be classified as political by the authorities here—
and we are not allowed to mail out anything political.”73 The rest of Chisiza’s letter was
not focused on his captivity, nor his captors, but rather on the future of his native
Nyasaland, still under rule by the Federal Government in Southern Rhodesia. He sought,
he explained, to write a “Master Economic Plan” [presumably to take effect after
securing independence, though he could not write this from prison], and had found
helpful guidance in this endeavor in summaries of Rostow’s Cambridge lectures on “the
stages of economic growth,” which had recently been published in The Economist
magazine.
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In his letters Chisiza was effusive in his praise of Rostow’s lectures. Rostow responded
personally, and mailed him a draft of his soon-to-be-published book, The stages of
economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. Chisiza’s next letter called this work a
“masterpiece” and “a very handy guide to those who are concerned with the problem of
economic development in the underdeveloped countries.”74 Though still a young man—
only 29 when he wrote to Rostow—Chisiza had a deep interest in economic planning.
Educated at the Livingstonia Mission in northern Nyasaland and at the Aggrey Memorial
College in Uganda, he secured a scholarship to study the Economics of Underdeveloped
Countries and Political Science at Fircroft College in Birmingham in 1958.75 During his
time in the UK, Chisiza also took classes at the London School of Economics. But he had
been in the UK only a few months before Hastings Kamuzu Banda asked him to return to
Nyasaland to aid in the struggle to dissolve the Federation of Nyasaland with the
Rhodesias. Within a year Chisiza, Banda and other nationalist leaders had been charged
with attempted assassination and imprisoned in Gwelo, Southern Rhodesia, where
Chisiza continued to read economics and struck up his correspondence with Rostow.

In his book, Rostow drew upon his analysis of the previous two centuries of European
industrialization to propose that all societies fell somewhere along a five-stage process of
economic growth. First, in traditional society “pre-Newtonian” science and “preNewtonian attitudes toward the physical world” do not allow people to systematically
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apply knowable laws to increase productivity. People maintain a “long-run fatalism” in
which they assume their grandchildren’s lot will be the same as their own. In the second
stage came the “preconditions for takeoff”—which can be introduced by endogenous
change (as in Europe) or by external shocks (the colonized world)—including the belief
that economic progress was both possible and good; the emergence of enterprising men
willing to mobilize savings in the pursuit of profit; and the establishment of centralized
national states. Third, in the “takeoff” phase, growth became a normal condition, as the
effective rate of investment and savings rose to 10% of national income, new industries
in leading sectors expanded, and political authorities came to see modernization as
“serious, high-order political business.” After this 20-year “takeoff” period came the
penultimate stage, a 40-year-long “drive to maturity” involving “sustained if fluctuating
progress, as the now regularly growing economy drives to extend modern technology
over the whole front of its economic activity.” Finally came the shift from sector-led
growth to expansion involving all sectors of the economy; this was the fifth phase, which
Rostow called “the age of high mass-consumption.” Leading sectors of the economy had
given way to “durable consumers’ goods and services,” income per capita had risen to
allow most people to transcend concerns with “basic food, shelter, and clothing.” Much
of the population was urban and employed in skilled factory labor or office work. Then,
and only then, could society cease “to accept the further extension of modern technology
as an overriding objective.”76 In sum, government spending on medical care and other
social services would have to wait.
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Figure 7.7: A campaign pamphlet for Dunduzu Chisiza’s candidacy in the 1961
Nyasaland Parliamentary elections. Hastings Kamuzu Banda led the Malawi Congress
Party, which had as a mascot the rooster (hence, “Vote Kamuzu and the Cock”). Printed
by Malawi Press Ltd, Limbe, Nyasaland. From George Shepperson Papers, University of
Edinburgh Archives.
b) Chisiza’s vision for African modernization, 1961-1962
For Chisiza, the primary benefit of this schematization of the process of modernization
was that it seemed to indicate a practical roadmap explaining “what and how much to
undertake during the various stages of economic modernization.”77 Soon after his release
from prison in 1960 Chisiza would win become a Member of Parliament in Nyasaland
and become a prominent voice in postcolonial African economic thought (Figure 7.7).
Though he did not criticize Rostow explicitly his writings indicated disagreement with a
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particular facet of his theory.78 First, Chisiza believed that the establishment of social
security programs—including state-supported healthcare—should begin immediately
rather than await the arrival of the fifth and final stage, “the age of mass consumption.”79
On this point, above all, Chisiza believed that Nyasaland could—and, largely due to new
expectations among postwar publics, should—diverge from the historical experience of
the United Kingdom and other Western nations:
Social security in an under-developed economy is something very close to a
luxury. Scarcely any of the advanced countries ever provided it in the early stages
of development. None could have afforded it without arresting capital formation.
The same would seem to go for present-day under-developed countries. But there
is a difference. At the time the advanced countries were shaping their economies,
humanitarian ideals as we know them today had not been fully developed. The
idea of social security had neither taken form nor caught the imagination of
politicians. Today, however, the idea is echoed everywhere—even in the underdeveloped countries themselves. For the governments of under-developed
countries, therefore, to refrain completely from making an initial step towards the
provision of social security on an appreciable scale, would be a dangerous
political omission for the ruling parties. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
full-scale social security is simply not possible. The compromise seems to be the
provision of some measure of social security for those of the aged, infirm and
disabled who have no one to depend upon.80
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The history of the idea of “social security,” particularly following the 1942 Beveridge
Report, in Nyasaland and the rest of the British Empire, was explored in Chapters 5 and
6. But here, it is important for our argument to note that Chisiza did not disagree with
Rostow’s argument that social security was economically unproductive—he, too, saw
state spending on ill and the aged as contrary to the primary goal of capital formation.
Nevertheless, Chisiza warned that the absence of social security programs in a
modernizing nation was “a dangerous political omission”—a lesson that Malawi’s postindependence leaders would learn following the unpopular and ultimately brief
introduction of healthcare user fees in 1964 (see Chapter 8). Chisiza’s influence was
evident in the 1961 election manifesto of the Malawi Congress Party—an election the
party would win in a landslide—which decried existing health services under the
Federation Government as “grossly inadequate” and “deplorably poor,” and promised to
provide “social security for those of the aged, infirm and disabled who have no one to
depend upon.”81

Chisiza believed the prolonged deferral of social spending was particularly unwise in
African countries because Africans were social by nature. After winning a seat as a
Member of Parliament in the 1961 Nyasaland elections, Chisiza became Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Finance. After securing funding from the Ford Foundation,
he convened a symposium of international development economists in Zomba. Yet
though he had long shown deep interest in the quantitative tools and generalizable
schemata of development economics, Chisiza’s speech at the symposium concerned not
81
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input-output ratios, but his vision of an essential African outlook. Chisiza argued that
economists and other policymakers had to respect that Africans were temperamentally
predisposed to concern themselves with the lot of their neighbors:
We of Africa…are fundamentally observers, penetrating others, relying more on
intuition than on the process of reasoning. We excel in neither mysticism nor in
science and technology, but in the field of human relations…We pursue happiness
by rejecting isolationism, individualism, negative emotions, and tension, on the
one hand; and by laying emphasis on a communal way of life, by encouraging
positive emotions and habitual relaxation, and by restraining our desires, on the
other…We believe in strong family relations, We have been urged by wellmeaning foreigners to break these ties for one reason or another. No advice could
be more dangerous to the fabric of our society. Charity begins at home. So does
the love of our fellow human beings…But I believe that, once so conditioned, one
behaves in this way not only to one’s family, but also to the clan, the tribe, the
nation, and to humanity as a whole.82
Let us put aside the problematic essentialism of Chisiza’s ideal-type African, and turn to
his point of contention with “well-meaning foreigners.” Chisiza was concerned here with
the belief system that modernizers insisted that citizens of a developed nation must have.
Chisiza believed Africans need not abandon their communal spirit in order to secure a
prosperous future. In this claim Chisiza contradicted Rostow’s MIT colleagues MF
Millikan and Donald Blackmer, who in a 1960 report for the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations lamented the sharing of income amongst extended family members as
a traditionalist practice that would prevent the accumulation of savings necessary for
economic growth.83 As Nils Gilman observed wryly in his history of modernization
theory, “Letting the extended family go hungry was apparently one of the prices of
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modernization.”84 Chisiza was an advocate of “economic modernization,” but not the
kind envisioned by the MIT researchers, where social ties of obligation would shrink to
the level of the nuclear family.

Much like the Colonial Office reports of the 1940s (see Chapter 6), Chisiza glorified
“traditional” village social security, but unlike them he saw it as a supplement (rather
than a substitute) for state social security. He believed Africans were demanding social
security even though it not had been a part of the early history of European
industrialization. Reducing inequality, taxing the wealthiest citizens, and providing for
the vulnerable were part of Chisiza’s plans, he said, because they had become a part of
the global social imaginary. Even if their country was not yet rich enough to provide
benefits on the scale seen in Britain, they could not wait to make a start.

The nationalist leaders imprisoned in Gwelo were a cosmopolitan bunch. Many of them
had witnessed the expansion of health services and social security elsewhere. For his part,
Hastings Kamuzu Banda had lived his life on three continents. He was a student in the
United States during the Great Depression and the Roosevelt’s New Deal.85 He was a
doctor in a working-class neighborhood in London at the dawn of the National Health
Service in 1948. And when, in 1957, Ghana became the first black African nation to gain
independence from colonial rule, Banda was there. In the years following Ghana’s
independence—while Banda sweltered in a Rhodesian prison—the new nation would
84
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vastly increase spending on its Ministry of Health.86 Spending on health rose from 2.7
percent of total recurrent government expenditure in 1954 to 6.3 percent in 1961.87

But it was Chisiza, not Banda, who would speak at length about the need to bring the
revolution in social and economic rights to Nyasaland. Shortly after independence in
1964, Banda warned civil servants seeking pay raises and generous pensions that Malawi
would be “no welfare state.” But, for the most part, with Chisiza dead, Malawi’s
discourse on development did not include much talk of social security or economic rights.
Still, the furor that followed the introduction of healthcare user fees in 1964 would prove
Chisiza’s warnings about the political significance of government social provision
prescient (Chapter 9). Despite the propagandistic simplicity in his description of African
culture, Chisiza was by no means the only observer to note the centrality of obligation
and mutuality to southern African thought and social practice. His thought was both pathbreaking in its own right and reflective of broader trends in thought and politics in late
colonial British Africa.
c) The quest for growth: GDP in Malawian development policy, 1962-1968
Yet Chisiza’s influence should not be overstated, if only because he did not live long
enough to exert it. On September 3, 1962, less than three months after the Nyasaland
Economic Symposium, Chisiza was found dead in a car in a ditch. The historian Joey
Power has written about both widespread rumors and a circumstantial evidence which
point to Banda as the leader of a plot to murder Chisiza and frame his death as a car
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accident.88 Power interviewed a number of Malawians who believe Banda orchestrated
Chisiza’s death for fear of his rising prominence; Banda saw the young and charismatic
speaker, with his international connections and a sterling reputation as a thoughtful,
learned and popular leader, as a nascent threat.89 In the habit of calling other nationalist
leaders his “boys,” Prime Minister Banda---whose autocratic tendencies would become
clearer in the years to come, and who would be linked to politically motivated killings for
the next three decades—was known to be unhappy with the regard given a man thirty
years his junior.90 But no one has ever produced definitive evidence of Banda’s
involvement in Chisiza’s demise. Whatever the cause of his death, Chisiza did not live to
see his country secure independence. It would not be Chisiza, but Banda (and the external
financiers of development loans and grants) who would dictate Malawi’s postcolonial
economic policy.

Chisiza’s objections to modernization theory’s disregard for health and other “social”
services largely concerned its philosophical underpinnings and political ramifications.
But he did not question the widespread belief among development experts of the era that
88
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health spending was not a productive investment.91 By the 1960s, referring to public
sector spending on healthcare as unproductive “consumption” was not terribly
controversial. And both Rostow and Chisiza agreed with colonial officials and nationalist
leaders across the continent agreed that the first task of development was aggregate
production growth. Nyasaland itself had been the site of one of the first experiments in
“national” income accounting for a colony. During the 1940s, the British researcher
Phyllis Deane had dug up Platt’s papers and conducted her own surveys and fieldwork to
estimate Nyasaland’s national income in 1938 and 1948. Though Deane herself had
argued that the distribution of income should be as important to development as
aggregate national income, this was not a widely shared concern among economists prior
to the 1970s.92 During the 1950s and 1960s, an increasing gross national product was
synonymous with development. As Derek Blades, Malawi’s chief statistician, explained
in Malawi’s 1968 National Accounts Report, “The simplest indicator of economic
progress of a community is the movement of real income per head of the population. This
is not an unqualified measure of improvements in the standard of living for the average
inhabitant of a country but has been found a useful guide.”93
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d) Origins of modernization: capital investment as the key to development, 19391946
Rostow may have been one of the most famous proselytizers of growth through the
ruthless accumulation of savings for industrialization, but he was neither the first nor the
only advocate of this approach. During the 1940s, widely cited theories of economic
growth posited a central role for aggressive state-directed accumulation of financial
resources (through external grants and loans and domestic taxation) to be spent on the
machines, dams power plants and roads needed to operate factories and transport goods
to markets. This was true for the (very similar) formal mathematical models devised
independently by the British economist Roy Harrod in 1939 and the Russian émigré
Evsey Domar in 1946; in both, aggregate production was assumed to be a linear function
of the capital stock. And since “capital stock” was considered by development
economists to refer primarily to physical capital (machinery, power, buildings, materials,
etc.), prioritizing saving for “investment” over spending on “consumption”—that is,
spending that did not build the capital stock—was the surest path to achieve growth.94
The stock of physical capital was also central to a highly influential 1943 paper entitled
“Problems of industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe” by Paul RosensteinRodan, an economist then based at the London School of Economics (he would join
Rostow’s institute at MIT a decade later). Rosenstein-Rodan argued governments had to
rapidly build up the “social overhead capital” (power, transport and communications) that

94

Roy Harrod, “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal 49 (March 1939): 14–33;
Evsey D. Domar, “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment,” Econometrica 14, no.
2 (April 1946): 137–47.; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking
of the Third World, With a New preface by the author edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 2011)., page 70

353

was a necessary precondition of industrial production before private companies could
profitably pursue directly productive investments.95

These authors did not directly address the potential for a productive role for healthcare
services or healthy labor. They did not think to do so because health was not thought to
play a role in the production function. The supply of labor was often assumed to be
abundant, even “unlimited” (as the poor masses were occupied only with relatively
unproductive subsistence agriculture), and because the productivity of factory labor was
thought to depend mostly on physical capital and not on the workers’ level of health and
education, the stock of physical capital was—in these models— the only meaningful
determinant of economic growth.96
e) Role of technology in economic growth and the continued absence of health, 19551958
Econometric analyses in the 1950s demonstrated that supplies of capital and labor were
insufficient to explain past growth, but at the same time these methods seemed unable to
establish the contribution of health interventions to macroeconomic statistics. Another
MIT economist, Robert Solow, used a time-series of GDP estimates from the United
States between 1909, and tested the relative contributions of capital and labor supplies
(i.e. movement along the “production function”), on the one hand, and “technical
progress” (i.e. a shift in the production function) on the other. Solow’s analysis found that
95
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the 2.9 percent average annual growth rate of the US economy during the four-decade
period could be explained as follows: 0.32 percentage points came from capital
accumulation, 1.09 percentage points from labor, and 1.49 percent from “technical
change in its broadest sense,” which he also called “total factor productivity.”97 Over the
coming decades economists studying growth would propose to explain the elements of
total factor productivity, but at least in the 1950s and 1960s health was rarely among
them.98 Part of the problem was that rigorous investigation of the effects of populationlevel health interventions on aggregate production remained statistically intractable.
Whereas in 1955 the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Board justified malaria
eradication by declaring that malaria was “a serious burden on the economy of every
malarious country,” by 1958 the chief of malaria eradication for the Pan American Health
Organization lamented that it had proven impossible to ‘affirm that [economic] progress
has been the result of the control or reduction of malaria.’”99 Among development
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experts credence in the classification of health interventions as economic “investments”
was, by the late 1950s, waning.100
f) Arthur Lewis and health as consumption, 1954-1966
A clear articulation of the disbelief among development experts in the “health is wealth”
argument came in 1966, when the LSE economist Arthur Lewis published Development
Planning: the essentials of economic policy. Lewis was already an eminence in the field;
his 1954 article entitled “Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor” was—
and remains—a fixture in the canon of modernization. His “dual sector model” posited
that growth through industrialization could be achieved fastest by drawing in laborers
from “backward” rural areas and maintaining them at near-subsistence wages.101 By
1966, he had heard enough from advocates of the “health is wealth” argument to include
the following passage:
rearing of children who will die before they are able to make any economic return to society and
in the support by those adults who remain in good health, of a large proportion of invalids
crippled by preventable disease, it is difficult to see how one can seriously question the
importance of the contribution of public health to global prosperity.’ CEA Winslow, The
Economic Values of Preventive Medicine (Geneva, Switzerland, 1952),
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The social services are desirable in their own right, as a form of consumption,
capable of competing with all other forms of consumption, and do not need to be
defended as ‘investment.’ This defense, in any case, does not work, since in most
cases, notably education and health, the quantity of service which the public
seems to want is significantly greater than can be justified in the language of
investment...At the margin the social services are consumption rather than
investment.102
Expanding on this argument, Lewis explained, “One cannot rest the case for medical
expenditure in underdeveloped countries primarily on the economic value of the
increased number of man-hours which it will provide, since most of them already have as
many man-hours as they can cope with.” Lewis thought non-commercial agriculture
inherently unproductive, and did not count small farmers as “employed” in his models.
To his mind, economic production was in heavy industry and commercial large-scale
agriculture, not smallholder farming. Farmers were not economically significant, whether
healthy or ill.103 There was, he believed, economic utility in some public health
measures—in particular water supply improvements, environmental sanitation, and
vaccination—as these decreased the prevalence of diseases that made even employed
workers less productive while making more land habitable. But, Lewis continued, most
governments already invested in these measures, and the question for the development
102
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planner was whether or not more expensive outlays for curative medicine were merited
on economic grounds. The answer, to Lewis, was no.

Lewis spoke from a position of some experience. He had spent a year (1957-1958) in
Ghana as an advisor to Kwame Nkrumah. At first he was excited to work with the first
black-led postcolonial state in sub-Saharan Africa. But he had quickly become frustrated
with what he saw as officials’ inability to prioritize interventions, to recognize that with
limited resources spending had to focus on projects most likely to spur rapid growth.104
Given the imperative to focus resources on investment activities, the governments of poor
countries could not afford to provide enough general physicians to care for their entire
populations.105 Still, Lewis admitted, as curative medicine was “the part of the medical
service with which the public comes most into contact” and “what the public wants
most,” he allowed that some government spending might go towards it if only in the
name of “sentiment.”106
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The classification of healthcare provision as “consumption” and the general disregard for
the role of health in economic growth helped to turn policy advisors and international aid
agencies against health projects during the 1950s and 1960s. Sometimes it was just a
useful cover for budget cuts. This was evident in Tanganyika’s Development and Welfare
Plan for 1950-1956, which recommended a decrease in “social services” [including
medicine] from the 16 percent of government expenditure it had claimed in 1947-1949, to
12 percent for the coming seven-year period. Though the decline was motivated in large
part by the fact that the UK Colonial Office had made clear that all recurrent expenditure
would have to be paid for by territorial revenues, the plan’s authors justified the cut in
social service spending by declaring outlays on medical expenditures “are considered to
be as large as can reasonably be set aside in view of their non-productive nature, except
in the very widest sense of the term.”107
g) Health as consumption in Nyasaland and Malawi, 1954-1971
Policymakers in Nyasaland during this two-decade period shared this opinion of health’s
role as consumption and not investment. In a 1956 speech, Nyasaland Governor Geoffrey
Colby explained that he planned to use grants from the UK Colonial Development and
Welfare Fund on electricity, roads, communications and piped water in cities—the kinds
of investments he believed could spur private enterprise and bolster public revenues—
rather than social services.108 A 1959 “Economic survey of Nyasaland” chaired by the
British economist Daniel Jack acknowledged the territory’s inadequate health services
but claimed “the need is so great it can only be me fully in the future when Africans are
107
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able to meet the bulk of the cost themselves.”109 Health and education were, according to
Jack, “unproductive” social services, which should claim a far smaller portion of public
budgets than “services on which industry depends.”110

This bright-line distinction between health as a social service, rather than an economic
investment, continued after independence. Though the UK Treasury continued to provide
budgetary support to the Malawi government from independence in 1964 through 1971,
both Banda and the UK government sought to end such assistance as soon as possible;
the UK advised spending on activities with rapid budgetary returns, and according to the
historian Kathryn Morton these did not include health services.111 In the annual reports
prepared by Malawi’s Economic Planning Division, health was not even included in the
body of the report until 1973, and even then it was included in a chapter entitled
“education and social services.”

It can be difficult to trace the intellectual connections between the epistemic framework
structuring reports by Malawi’s civil service and the peer-reviewed publications of
leading development economists. But in this case, at least one connection is fairly direct.
Henry Ord, a University of Edinburgh economics professor seconded to Malawi to serve
as President Banda’s Chief Economist in the Economic Planning Division between 1968
109
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and 1970, wrote that he considered Lewis one of the world’s leading theorists of
economic planning, and observed that Lewis’ writings had long been a mainstay of
syllabi in courses on economic planning.112 Like Lewis, Ord advised the government to
concentrate its spending on “productive investment projects,” namely “transport and
power”; health is rarely mentioned in his papers.113 Malawi’s civil service, still heavily
European in the late 1960s, was steeped in an intellectual milieu in which health was not
an integral component of development. If Malawi did need a “big push” of outside
financing to get its economy growing, health interventions were not seen as part of the
effort.
V.

Conclusion

Historians of medicine have documented many shifts in health seeking behavior impelled
by the promise—rather than the proof—of better health outcomes.114 But the history told
in this chapter is not one of overblown and un-kept promises. With the arrival of new
therapeutics there were diseases cured and sufferings relieved. According to physicians,
patients and historians alike, the new drugs of the postwar moment to counter bacterial
112
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and parasitic infections had demonstrable effects on mortality.115 The increase in demand
for therapy was not based solely on promised benefits. As the next chapter will
demonstrate, Nyasaland’s Africans were unlikely to trust the promises of white officials
and physicians during the late colonial era, an era of anti-colonial mobilization and
profound racial strife. The colonized found proof of medicine’s efficacy not in official
propaganda, but in experiences of family members and neighbors once on death’s door
returning home healthy. This newly demonstrated efficacy had profound consequences.
In the late colonial moment, medicine moved to the center of Nyasaland’s contentious—
even deadly—politics.
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Chapter 8
Counterrevolutionary therapeutics: medicine as a political palliative under
Federation rule, 1953-1963
Abstract
This chapter is a political and social history of government medical care in Nyasaland
during its final decade as a colony. During the 1950s and 1960s, recurrent government
health spending in Nyasaland rose markedly. But what explains this rise in spending?
After all, to many contemporary development experts government spending on curative
medicine was fiscally imprudent, inapposite to the goal of GDP growth. Yet leading
officials the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) publicized financial
commitments to hospitals and health centers. This chapter argues that increased public
outlays on medicine were a response to (and an attempt to quiet) protests among latecolonial African publics, particularly as new chemotherapeutics made government
hospitals and dispensaries increasingly popular sources of health care. In the face of
popular protests against rule by white supremacists in Southern Rhodesia, the Federation
Government spent surprising sums on medicine in Nyasaland. But once the fate of
Federation was sealed, officials in Salisbury cut spending and even shipped supplies from
Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesia. Once the Federation’s propaganda campaign was over,
healthcare providers found themselves deprived of the tools of their trade.
Prelude: A brief history of ‘medical pacification’ in Africa
In southern African history, medicine has often been used to demonstrate good will and
secure legitimacy, particularly during moments of great strife and uncertainty. Writing of
his dealings with a people in what is today Botswana during his first African expedition
(1852-1856), the Scottish missionary physician claimed, “English medicines were
eagerly asked for and accepted by all; and we always found medical knowledge an
important aid in convincing the people that we were really anxious for their welfare.”1
Livingstone and his acolytes would continue use medicine as such an “aid” when they
established missions in present-day Malawi. It was, Livingstone and his followers
believed, an important display of the beneficence of European civilization, and a peaceful
1
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counterpoint to the wars they had begun with Yao communities that continued to engage
in the East African slave trade.2

Within a few months of establishing the Livingstonia Mission at Cape Maclear (only a
few kilometers from present-day Mbeya Village) in 1875, another Scottish doctor, Robert
Laws, was performing surgeries on African patients. In his 1921 biography of Laws,
William Pringle Livingstone attributes the early support the mission garnered among
locals to Laws’ medical work: “The natives were quietly taking stock of the white men,
observing all their actions, and reading their character more accurately than perhaps they
knew. What chiefly won them was the medical work of the Doctor. Stories of his skill
and kindliness were carried by the few whom he attended and retold in the villages, and
one after another they ventured to the Station for medicine.” 3

French imperialists would come to share this creed about the power of medicine to secure
political support, or at least quietus. In 1901, at the height of campaign to quell rebellious
subjects in Madagascar, French military official Hubert Lyautey was reputed to have
cabled his commanding general the following: “If you can send me four doctors, I will
send you back four companies.” In his later posts in North Africa, Lyautey became a
leading proponent of what the historian Jim Paul has called “medical pacification.” In
western Algeria and later, as the first Resident General of the French Protectorate of
Morocco, he saw medical teams as key components of any invasion or
counterinsurgency.
2
3
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Often the very public demonstrations of goodwill were meant to quell critics of
imperialism in Europe as much as restive African subjects. Concluding a speech before a
medical audience in Brussels in 1926, shortly after his departure from Morocco, Lyautey
described this strategy of pacification in terms both Machiavellian and principled:
From the day when a notable, a qaid, or just some suffering devil decides to see a French
doctor and leaves his office cured, the ice is broken, the first step is taken, and the
relationship begins to be established…Certainly the colonial expansion has its harsh
aspects. It is not either beyond reproach or without blemish. But if there is something that
ennobles it and justifies it, it is the action of the doctor, understood as a mission and an
apostleship.4

As the coming chapter will demonstrate, this deployment of medicine as an antidote to
political opposition was especially common during the late colonial era. Besieged by
wholesale critiques of colonialism from prominent voices in Africa, Europe and the
United States, colonial governments sought to propound the virtues medicine as proof of
the veracity of the doctrines of “trusteeship” and “development.” Medicine figured
prominently in political combat between proponents and opponents of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the 1950s and early 1960s, and it continues to play a
major feature of in debates over the nature of late colonial British rule elsewhere in
Africa. In a Letter to the Editor of the British daily The Guardian in 2012, a veteran
British soldier who served in Kenya during the Mau Mau Revolt, objected to the
assertion by columnist George Monbiot (drawing on Caroline Elkins’ Imperial
Reckoning) that “the British detained…almost the entire population of one and a half
million people, in camps and fortified villages” where thousands were beaten or left to
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die of treatable illnesses.5 Allen contended these settlements were not “gulags,” as Elkins
had called them, but rather humanely devised villages “where proper security could be
provided.” As evidence of British intent, he pointed to the “health centres” built by the
British in those new villages, as well as “water supplies…sports grounds, markets and
schools.” The provision of health care was the key to Allen’s case. For Allen, the
existence of clinics helped prove colonial officials were “fully dedicated to the wellbeing
and advancement of the people they served.”

More recently, a number of African regimes have sought to make universal access to
public sector health care a cornerstone of the post-conflict social contract. Côte d’Ivoire
is one such example. After President Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down after losing an
election in November 2010, forces loyal to challenger Alassane Ouattara revolted. An
estimated 3,000 people were killed in six months of violence before French forces helped
Ouattara’s militia capture Gbagbo in mid-April 2011.6 Immediately after Ouattara
assumed the presidency, his government announced that long-standing fees at
government health clinics had been suspended.7 The provision of free care was originally
planned to last only until the end of May 2011, but in the government clinics remained
free at the point of care for months. But after Laurent Gbagbo (who retained significant
political support) been extradited to the International Criminal Court in The Hague in
5
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November 2011, Ouattara’s government felt more firmly ensconced in power. Two
months later, in January 2012 the health minister announced the government could no
longer afford to maintain the policy of free care. Even after some fees were reinstituted,
care for mothers and children under six years old remained free.8

The most well-documented and dramatic example of the use of health in post-conflict
reconstruction is Rwanda. In the decades after leading the invading army that put an end
to the 1994 genocide—“the fastest mass extermination in history,” in the words of
journalist Tom Burgis9—Rwandan President Paul Kagame made health care a key
priority of his rule. Writing in the pages of the Wall Street Journal on April 7, 2014, the
twentieth anniversary of the start of the genocide, President Kagame recounted the
deliberate efforts his administration had made to integrate health into the long process of
reconciliation:
In Rwanda, we are relying on universal human values, which include our culture
and traditions, to find modern solutions to the unique challenges we faced in
terms of justice and reconciliation following the genocide…We chose to stay
together…We passed a new constitution that transcends politics based on
division…We extended comprehensive health and education benefits to all our
citizens.10
Facing ongoing threats to internal instability, and external criticism of heavy-handed rule
and meddling in Congolese affairs, President Kagame made public sector health care a
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showcase of his government’s benevolence and seriousness of purpose. In the immediate
aftermath of the genocide the country was the poorest on the planet, political violence
persisted and the infrastructure (in health and other areas) was completely wrecked. But
even after the improvement of health and economic indices to pre-genocide levels,
Kagame’s government secured remarkable gains. Between 2000 and 2010 the maternal
mortality ratio declined by 59.5 percent. Between 2000 and 2011 the under-five child
mortality rate decreased by 70.4 percent. The decline in the crude mortality rate between
2000 and 2012 was the fastest in the world during that period.11 The means by which
these feats were accomplished—including high rates of community-based insurance
enrollment and vaccination coverage—have been well documented.12 By 2011, Rwanda
devoted a higher share of its government expenditure to health than any other nation in
the African Union.13 This dissertation suggests that the fact that such intense efforts came
in the wake of genocide should not be entirely surprising.

Malawi has not experienced violence on the scale of Rwanda or Côte d’Ivoire in recent
decades, but in the wake of its own (more peaceful) political transition the politics of
health care showed some similarities. After years of labor strikes and ever more vocal
calls from prominent quarters (including the Catholic Church) for an end to Hastings
Kamuzu Banda’s 30-year-long dictatorship, Malawi’s held its first multi-party elections
11
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in May 1994.14 Bakili Muluzi defeated the nonagenarian Banda, becoming Malawi’s
second president. Shortly after taking office, Muluzi took steps to consolidate support
among the rural poor (some of whom had seen Banda not as a democrat, but as a
protector of material subsistence). He immediately abolished fees at government primary
schools. Enrollment at primary schools increased from 1.7 million in 1993 to 3.9 million
in 1994.15 He also refused to follow recommendations by the World Bank to institute
user fees at Malawi’s health clinics. Whereas Banda had repeatedly told the World Bank
he would institute the fees without ever doing so, Muluzi spoke publicly about his
disagreement with the Bank, He was particularly vocal about his opposition to user fees
in the months leading up to Malawi’s 1999 general elections.16 Heading into an uncertain
election, which Muluzi’s United Democratic Front would ultimately win, the President
clearly wanted his name associated with free health care access for Malawi’s people.

But do health services consummate officials’ dreams of pacified populace? This chapter
suggests the interaction between health and political unrest is more complicated.
Unprecedented expenditure on health could not prevent anti-Federation forces from
winning the public support and imperial acquiescence necessary to end the regime they
so detested. But, as Chapter 9 demonstrates, the new government of independent Malawi
added kindling to an incipient rebellion when it tried to end the long-standing policy of
free public sector health care. The provision of health services has not always proven an
14
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effective measure to pacify ongoing unrest, but the denial of public sector health care to
the Malawian public has been a potent means to foster discontent. Health services may
not be a cure-all for political regimes facing crises of legitimacy, but such regimes ignore
health at their peril.
I.

Introduction: Disobeying the economists: Malawi health spending peaks in

the heyday of modernization
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland marked a decade-long, and ultimately
abortive, political experiment at the close of the Nyasaland’s colonial era. Beginning in
the interwar years, white settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia sought to join their
two territories under a single government. By the mid-1930s, white settlers in Nyasaland
and then-Governor Harold Kittermaster argued that shared government would bring
economic benefits to their territory as well. After putting their efforts on hold during the
Second World War, settlers resumed advocacy for a shared regional government in the
late 1940s. The white settlers were, as John McCracken explains, increasingly fearful that
without a stronger union between their previously separate colonies, the seemingly
inevitable move in holdings of the British Empire toward majority rule would sweep
them from power. When the Conservatives retook power from Labour in the 1951 UK
elections, the Colonial Office’s erstwhile objections to a federated government vanished.
In 1953, the Central African Federation—including Southern Rhodesia, Northern
Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, with a capital in Salisbury—was inaugurated.17
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The Federation era (1953-1963) coincided with the heyday of modernization theory; as
shown in the previous chapter, modernizers tended to view public sector health spending
as unproductive consumption. Given the esteem in which modernization theory was held
by Federation and nationalist planners alike, it is surprising that health spending as a
proportion of government spending rose to new heights during this period (see Figure
0.1). Particularly during the years when Nyasaland was a part of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this ratio reached unprecedented levels. The share of total
recurrent government expenditure devoted to the Medical Department’s budget rose from
4.2 percent in 1951 to 9.9 percent in 1958, before losing most (though not all) of the
gains of the 1950s by falling to 5.7 percent in 1964. Combined with the preceding
narrative, these figures reveal a curious fact: Malawi’s health spending reached an apex
(as a share of government revenue) at the very moment when regard for health spending
among international development experts was at its nadir. The thesis (encapsulated by
Keynes’ dictum from the beginning of the chapter) that policymakers’ prescriptions
follow the ideas of academic economists overstates the influence of the latter on the
former. As this chapter and the next will demonstrate, the trends in government outlays
for health during the Federation and post-independence era had much more to do with
local popular politics than with the advice of international advisers.

The relative impotence of the advice of modernization theorists during this period is all
the more intriguing because officials in the governments of late-colonial Nyasaland and
early postcolonial Malawi read—and actively sought out—the counsel of these leading
lights in development economics. These officials believed the modernization theorists
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were right about the unproductivity of spending on healthcare, but they devoted more
money to it than ever before. Federation officials believed healthcare provision might
mollify restive African publics. But if economic experts from the US and UK were
unable to dampen outlays for health services in late-colonial Nyasaland and early
postcolonial Malawi, the proponents of a new economic orthodoxy tried to shape health
spending and health policy in Malawi during the late 1960s and 1970s. This period saw a
recrudescence of interest in health among economic experts, but in contrast to the
interwar era the most salient aspect of Malawian bodies was neither the microbes in their
blood or the emptiness of their stomachs, but the fullness of their wombs (Chapter 9).

This chapter will proceed in three main parts. The first section examines the politics of
medicine during the years in which Nyasaland was a part of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland (1953-1963); during these years, Federation officials in Southern
Rhodesia made medicine the cornerstone of their public campaign to prove the
beneficence of their rule and the moral depravity of the anti-Federation campaigners. The
second section moves to medical practice in Nyasaland under the Federation, where the
rhetoric of largesse encountered the quotidian realities of stock-outs and overcrowding.
The next section moves to the close of Federation and the dawn of independence, when
British officials demanded cuts in spending at public sector health facilities.
II.

The tangled politics of medicine and Federation

a) The tumultuous advent of Federation: a partnership between a rider and a horse,
1953
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The increase in demand for biomedicine generally and for certain proven treatments in
particular, took place during a period of profound political ferment in Nyasaland. Though
the construction of renovation of health facilities, the hiring and training of health
professionals, and the stocking of pharmacy shelves did not keep pace with the demand,
all increased during the 1950s and 1960s. Though medicine became a more central
component of colonial development in most parts of British Africa during this period, the
increases in spending in Nyasaland during this period were particularly marked. This
newfound attention was tied to the fact that the health sector was a central locus of
political conflict in the years of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (September
1953-December 1963). Both elite urban Africans and rural smallholders in Nyasaland
objected to a political system which moved political authority from London to Salisbury,
where the white settler government had long presided over a more segregationist and
exploitative regime than the UK’s Colonial Office had ever pursued. Many Africans in
Nyasaland had spent time in Southern Rhodesia; they knew its racist policies. They did
not trust Godfrey Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (and a physician
himself), when promised the new federation would be a “partnership” between whites
and blacks. Perhaps their concern derived from the fact that shortly after Huggins pledged
to the Colonial Office that he would pursue “partnership,” he reassured his fellow white
settlers that it would be “the partnership between a rider and his horse.”18 So opposed to
Federation was Nyasaland’s African population that on a tour of British Africa, the
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traveling writer Joan Wicken wrote, “Nowhere else in East or Central Africa did I find so
much bitterness or nationalism among the emerging indigenous population.”19 This
attitude surprised her, “for public discrimination is less widespread [in Nyasaland] than in
many other places.” Africans there did not have to carry passes, and the colonial
administration had alienated a relatively small portion of the land for European settlers.
Wicken ultimately inferred that Nyasaland’s African population must have been so
politically charged because they believed they “must do something now before we get
into a position like that in Southern Rhodesia.”20

Recognizing a crisis of legitimacy, officials in Salisbury consistently highlighted their
concern for health in Nyasaland. At the same time, they sought to pin responsibility for
epidemics on anti-Federation organizers.

Some aspects of the formation of the Federation remain a mystery. “For all the hundreds
of pages that have been written on the introduction of the Federation,” notes
McCracken,” no convincing explanation has yet been provided as to why Whitehall
insisted on the inclusion of Nyasaland.” The Bledisoe Commission, convened by the UK
19
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Government in 1937, found that native authorities, native associations, and other
organized groups of Africans in Nyasaland were adamantly opposed to any closer
political ties to settler-dominated Southern Rhodesia. In the early 1950s even the
Nyasaland Governor Geoffrey Colby, opposed the new union out of fear it would lead to
unrest among his colony’s African population. The inclusion of Nyasaland was,
McCracken believes, likely part of a deal in which British officials agreed to allow
Federation in exchange for handing off Nyasaland’s debts to the new government.21
When, in the years following Federation, Africans in Nyasaland agitated for its
dissolution officials in Salisbury reminded them that Britain was in no rush to take on
these fiscal burdens again. In a 1962 pamphlet, Federation officials claimed they had
included Nyasaland “at the insistence of the British Government…Britain had found the
financial burden of the backward and impoverished Protectorate becoming increasingly
onerous.”22 Whatever the motivation, in 1953 Nyasaland became the unwanted,
impoverished, rebellious third member in a Federation dominated by the white settlers of
the other two territories.23
b) Moving the Ministry of Health to Salisbury, 1954
Under the Federal constitution health was a federal, rather than a territorial,
responsibility. Many governmental functions—including native and provincial
administration, African education, European and African agriculture, fisheries, police,
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environmental sanitation, and social welfare—remained in the portfolio of a Nyasaland’s
Governor, who answered to the Colonial Office. The Federal Government was to take
responsibility for immigration, import and export controls, railways, posts and
communications, external affairs, and health. Health was something of an outlier on this
list; the general logic of the division of responsibilities was to leave functions
“predominantly or exclusively affecting Africans” with the territorial governments. 24 But
health, which would seem to fit into this category, was placed under the direction of a
Federal Ministry of Health based in Salisbury.

The Southern Rhodesian negotiators who helped shape the Federal Constitution had two
reasons to favor the designation of health as a federal responsibility. The first was that a
Federal health service would be a good propaganda tool of the new government. As early
as 1939, Viscount Bledisloe—chair of a 1937 Commission that had argued in favor of a
Central African Federation—had argued before the UK House of Lords that Southern
Rhodesian settlers were devoted to improving the health and education of Africans.25 By
the 1950s, the pro-Federation politicians thought the accomplishments of a Federal health
service might help counter those British observers (including Fabian Colonial Bureau

24
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members Rita Hinden and Margery Perham, as well as the Nyasaland-born, Londonbased physician Hastings Kamuzu Banda) who argued the Federation would spread
Southern Rhodesia’s regressive racial policies to neighboring territories.26

The second, and more important reason why Southern Rhodesian negotiators pressed to
make health a responsibility of the Federal government was that doing so promised to
save their own government a good deal of money. The Federation Government was in
essence a massive financial transfer from Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines (which had
been nationalized in the early postwar years) to Southern Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent,
Nyasaland. Between 1955 and 1961, Southern Rhodesia received roughly 64 percent of
Federal expenditure, though it contributed only 50 percent of Federal revenue.27
Foreseeing this advantageous arrangement, Southern Rhodesian officials at the Lancaster
House constitutional negotiations in 1952 were eager to see expensive departments
delegated to the Federal government. Northern Rhodesian settlers, who sought

26
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amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in order to defend their place in the racial
hierarchy, agreed, as did the UK and Nyasaland negotiators present.28

Federal control over health took effect on July 1, 1954. Thereafter, health budgets for the
three territories were decided by the Federal Parliament, a legislature designed to protect
settler interests. The Parliament consisted of 35 members, 26 of whom were elected by
European settlers in their respective territories. Nyasaland had only seven members of
parliament. Four of these were elected by European settlers, while the Governor
nominated two Africans and one missionary. The missionary was ostensibly selected to
represent “African interests.”
c) “Our Mr. Chirwa must, like Oliver Twist, ask for more”: African discontent over
health in an era of expansion, 1954-1960
In many ways, this was an unlikely historical moment for rapid increases in health sector
spending. As was discussed in Chapter 7, the tenets of modernization theory—ascendant
in the academy and among Western aid agencies during this period—referred to state
appropriations for health as “consumption” that did not contribute urgent aim of
increasing aggregate production. This argument against health expenditure on Africans
beyond tax revenues garnered from Africans themselves recurred during the Federation
years. A 1960 economic survey of Nyasaland, commissioned by the Federal Government
and led by the University of Durham economics professor—and Federation apologist—
Daniel Jack, explained that Nyasaland “is already receiving better health services than it
can afford to pay for on account of heavy expenditure by the Federal Government, but the
28
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need is so great that it can only be met fully in the future when Africans are able to meet
the bulk of the cost themselves.”29

Yet under Federation rule, spending on services in Nyasaland (including medical
services) was not tied to taxation. In net terms, Nyasaland received more funding than it
contributed to the Federal budget, and officials in Salisbury eagerly took every
opportunity to remind anti-Federation African leaders of this fact. In the very first month
of Federal responsibility for health, Manoah Chirwa, one of the two African members of
parliament from Nyasaland, complained that African interests had been neglected in the
Federation budget.30 Reverend Percy Ibbotson, a white missionary selected to represent
Southern Rhodesia’s “African interests,” chided Chirwa for his “slight exaggeration” and
proceeded to list the projects related to African health and welfare slated for construction
under the Public Works Vote. He also noted that even prior to Federation, the Southern
Rhodesian government estimated it spent five times as much on African health,
education, and welfare as it collected from Africans in taxes.31 An anonymous Letter to
29
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the Editor of the Nyasaland Times (signed by “’Thoughtful, Limbe”), repeated Ibbotson’s
statistics and concluded “Africans cannot have much to complain about in the provision
of essential services. Our Mr. Chirwa must naturally ask for more, like Oliver Twist, but
even he must agree that the Federal Development Plan coupled with the local projects in
our own estimates, give Africans a very wide range of services that would take a long
time to be paid with taxation.”32
d) Health spending as a political palliative
Why might Federation government officials have felt the need to tout spending on the
health sector in Nyasaland? As is evidenced by Ibbotson’s response to Chirwa, they did it
to demonstrate beneficent intentions while countering accusations of neglect and
exploitation. From the outset, the Federation Government was unpopular among Africans
in Nyasaland. Hastings Kamuzu Banda had penned arguments against Federation
beginning with a letter to the Bledisloe Commission in 1938. By 1949, as a doctor with a
thriving practice in North London, Banda co-authored a pamphlet outlining his
opposition to Federation.33 In April 1953, just before the Federation came into being, the
Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) organized a non-violent resistance campaign that
included a strike by civil servants and farm laborers as well as boycotts of tax payments
and purchases at European-owned stores.34
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The NAC’s campaign happened to coincide with growing resistance among smallholder
farmers to other colonial policies. Chief Gomani of Ncheu told his people to disregard
unpopular soil erosion regulations enacted by the Department of Agriculture (see Chapter
2). In May 1953 Geoffrey Morton, a colonial policeman who had become famous in 1942
after men in his command killed Zionist militant Avraham Stern in Palestine, went to
Ncheu with thirty constables to apprehend Gomani. But Morton’s mission ended in
failure, as a crowd fended off the policemen while the chief escaped.35 Though the
agricultural regulations preceded the Federation, and though they were the work of
Kettlewell and Colby far more than Federation officials, the NAC leadership linked
opposition to the agricultural regulations with the anti-Federation campaign. In the Lower
Shire Valley, women could be heard singing a song promising “death” to the “Federation
capitãos” and to the “contour ridging capitãos.”36

None of these protests succeeded in preventing the advent of the Federation in August 1,
1953. But unrest—spurred by a variety of grievances—continued. In mid-August on the
European-owned tea and tobacco estates of southern Nyasaland, African tenants (many of
whom had come from Mozambique in previous decades) rebelled against increasing
labor demands and shrinking land allocations. The tenants were particularly enraged by
two stories, one of a plantation manager who had stripped naked a woman he had found
collecting firewood on his estate, and another a rumor of a planter who had killed two
35
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men who were stealing oranges. These stories confirmed the commonly held image of
whites as chifwamba (cannibals), seeking African bodies. After many tenants refused to
work on the estates, strikes spread to the railway as well as a plywood factory. Gangs of
men blocked roads with trees and trenches, cut telephone wires, destroyed the homes of a
half dozen chiefs, vandalized European-owned homes and businesses, and beat tax
collectors. With Nyasaland’s police overwhelmed while the colony’s troops fought
Chinese guerillas in Malaya, Governor Geoffrey Colby had to request policemen from
neighboring colonies to reassert control. They did so, but only after killing 11 Africans
and injuring 72 more.37

These kinds of mobilization were far more concerning to colonial officials than the
mchape movement of the early 1930s (see Chapter 4). Unlike mchape, the work
stoppages and sabotage campaigns of 1953 threatened both the profits of settler
companies and the authority of the colonial state. While most officials in London and
Zomba were content to focus on tax collection and budget retrenchment in Nyasaland
during the 1930s and 1940s (even as they responded with increased health spending to
riots in the West Indies and West Africa), the unrest of 1953 impelled Governor Colby
and Federal Prime Minister Huggins to seek to expand both policing and health services
in order to quell unrest in Nyasaland.

The police force remained a territorial responsibility under the Federal Constitution, so
Colby worked to expand the police force. In 1954 Nyasaland’s Police Commissioner,
37
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Charles Apthorp, established a branch, called the Police Mobile Force, consisting of 14
European officers and 200 Africans. The main qualification was experience in battle.
Most of the officers had served in Palestine before coming to Nyasaland, and each of the
Africans had served at least five years in the Army. The force, designed for ‘use in
disturbed areas,’ was quickly deployed to the restive southern districts, often beating
villagers in house-to-house raids. By 1958 an expanded Mobile Force was tasked with
patrolling the country to help enforce agricultural rules and put down civil
disobedience.38

But, as Bourdieu observed, the carceral “right hand” of the state is often accompanied by
welfarist “left hand.”39 In Nyasaland’s case, health services were not nearly so robust as
in Bourdieu’s France (nor were they simply tools of state social control), but officials in
Zomba and Salisbury did tout them in an effort to draw attention away from popular
discontent. Government officials made medicine the symbol of imperial virtue, often in
lavish ceremony and florid language. Built at a cost of £702,000, the Queen Elizabeth
Central Hospital was dedicated at a ceremony attended by the Queen Mother in Blantyre
in 1957, and opened to patients in 1958 (Figure 8.1).

The years after the start of Federation also saw rapid increases in spending on health,
both in absolute terms and in the percentage of public spending. Recurrent Medical
Department expenditure in Nyasaland more than quadrupled between 1951 and 1958,
38
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Figure 8.1: Queen Mother planting a rose tree on hospital grounds of Queen Elizabeth
Hospital, Blantyre, Nyasaland, 1957. Source: Central African Journal of Medicine,
August 1957.40
increasing from £233,000 to £798,000 in that period (Figure 8.2).41 Recurrent medical
expenditure as a total of total recurrent expenditure (including territorial expenditure as
well as Federal expenditure on Nyasaland) increased during this period, rising from 7.3
percent in 1952 to 9.9 percent in 1958.42 New construction of hospitals and dispensaries
also accelerated. While the Nyasaland Medical Department’s capital expenditure (on new
hospitals and dispensaries and equipment) totaled £26,082 in 1953, by 1959 this figure
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Figure 8.2: Medical Department recurrent expenditure, 1952-1964. Note: Years 19521958 drawn from Daniel Jack, Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1959. Table 15. Years
1959-1964 drawn from Malawi Ministry of Health, A Conspectus, 1965.
had risen to £198,554.43 All in all, the increase in medical expenditure during Federation
era far outpaced the expansions of the interwar or post-independence periods.

Despite the increase in medical spending, opposition to the Federation Government
continued. Nyasaland was a net recipient from the Federation budget, but Africans
scarcely felt like beneficiaries from this arrangement. Rural Africans opposed the
continuation of the thangata system and the harsh enforcement of malimidwe regulations.
Native poll tax rates increased during the Federation years, from 17s-6d in 1954 to 30s in
1961.44 Indirect tax increases and cuts to maize subsidies disproportionately affected
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Africans. At the same time, spending on social services (particularly on education)
favored Europeans.45

In any case, to many of Nyasaland’s Africans the problem with Federation lay not in
fiscal policy. They fundamentally resented being ruled by avowed white supremacists in
Southern Rhodesia. In July 1958 Hastings Kamuzu Banda returned to Nyasaland to a
hero’s welcome, after a cadre of young anti-Federation organizers had deliberately built
him into a sort of Messiah that could garner the support of rural Africans. Banda and
other members of the recently formed Malawi Congress Party toured the nation,
denouncing the “stupid Federation.”46 SJ Kaphale was, in 1958, a 24-year-old
schoolteacher. He was among the crowd at Chileka airport outside Blantyre to welcome
Kamuzu back to Nyasaland after a half-century abroad. In a 2013 interview, Kaphale
recounted his political commitments in that moment:
In those days, the colonial government, once you misused cultivation in the
garden, without putting bunds or, you were taken to prison, and they would uproot
your entire maize stock. So when you come back, after six months, you get
nothing. You are hungry. So we were not happy about what the colonial
government was doing. So that is why we stood hard, fighting against the colonial
government so that we should have our own government.47
In March 1959, rumors circulated among settlers that members of the MCP were plotting
a massacre. Nyasaland’s Governor’s declared a “State of Emergency,” and imposed
martial law. Hundreds of Africans (including Kamuzu) were imprisoned, and over 50
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Figure 8.3: Protest during Nyasaland’s State of Emergency at Chileka airport, Blantyre,
26 January 1960. Source: HK Banda Archives, University of Indiana Library.
were killed.48 During the State of Emergency, protests continued (see Figure 8.3), as
Africans called for Kamuzu’s release and an end to Federation rule.

In the midst of the resurgence of unrest, Federation officials redoubled their efforts to
demonstrate legitimacy (to Whitehall as well as Nyasaland’s Africans) by increasing
health spending, and by publicizing this spending. Recurrent expenditure on Nyasaland’s
Medical Department rose from £766,329 in 1959 to £1,034,549 in 1962. This spending
also showed health to be a greater priority in government budgets than ever before.
48
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Medical Department expenditure accounted for 9.9 percent of Nyasaland’s total recurrent
expenditure (including both the Federation and territorial budgets) in 1958.49

Health also occupied a central position in official rhetoric during and after the State of
Emergency. On New Year’s Day in 1960, the Nyasaland Times announced that the new
90-bed Nkata Bay District Hospital was “virtually complete”; it had been built, the article
noted “with funds provided by the Federal Government,” and it had “a modern operating
theatre and X-ray plant.”50 That same year, Dr. Harry S. Gear, who had been a senior
official in South African before leaving government to become assistant SecretaryGeneral of the World Health Organization, penned an essay in the pages of the Lancet,
declaring: “Medicine’s true teachers and disciples give more to Africa than medical care
in a hospital or clinic. Their integrity and philosophy are a demonstration of the goodness
to be found in their culture.”51 Citing Proud Record, an apologia written by Southern
Rhodesian physician Michael Gelfand and published by the Government Printer in
Salisbury, the Nyasaland Times announced in May 1960 that there was “twice as much
for health” in 1958 as in the year before federation (1952).52 Recognizing that the
ultimate fate of their regime lay in the hands of London-based officials, Federation
officials ran advertisements in British dailies. One such ad, in the November 23rd edition
49
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of the Evening Standard, made health care facilities a barometer of benefits of the
Federation to African subjects: “Only a rapidly expanding Federal economy can provide
the educational and health facilities and employment needed by this rapidly growing
population…The health service has been greatly extended.”53

Federation Prime Minister Roy Welensky lost no opportunity to brandish health care as a
political weapon. He spoke of the “diagnostic X-rays and simple laboratories and
operating theatres” that had become “a sine qua non at all hospitals from the district level
upward.” He concluded that the Federation had “made a very great effort” in expanding
the capacities of the health sector.54 He made clear links between his own efforts to
highlight public sector medical provision and the need to quell social unrest. Speaking in
the immediate aftermath of Nyasaland’s State of Emergency, he noted “the time is now
more than ripe for the Federation to take a completely fresh look at what the nation now
has provided in capital works and all the recurrent expenditure that results therefrom in
the provision and maintenance of the…services and facilities, staff to run the institutions,
drugs, food for the patients and all the other items that contribute to the total cost of
providing hospital services.”55
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By early 1962, Federation officials were engaged in a last-ditch struggle to maintain a
regime on the verge of dissolution. Wearied by years of rebellion in restive territories,
particularly Mau Mau in Kenya and the Emergency in Malaya, the UK Government
under Conservative Prime Minister Harold MacMillan had long signaled his preparedness
to grant independence to many of the Empire’s remaining holdings. As early as January
1960, after a visit to Nyasaland, MacMillan had a dour opinion of “the cause of
Federation.” It was, he observed, “almost desperate because of the strength of African
opinion against it.”56 In response to Macmillan’s acknowledgement of a “wind of
change,” the Ministry of Information in Salisbury published a pamphlet on the benefits of
the Federation to Nyasaland. The introduction sounded like a plea: “In light of current
developments…it now seems opportune to survey the tremendous benefits Nyasaland has
received from Federation and what the cost would be should that Territory decide to
break away.”57 The first chapter was a paean to the growth of the health sector. The
pamphlet told of “the human drama of the most undeveloped and backward part of the
Federation being lifted in less than a decade to a parity in health services with its more
highly industrialized and sophisticated neighbors.”58
e) Did the Malawi Congress Party sabotage health? 1959-1962
It was during this period (the early 1960s), as the Malawi Congress Party gained popular
support and the Colonial Office edged closer to dissolution of the fractious Federation,
that Federation officials in Salisbury and Zomba accused Banda and other MCP leaders
of denying patients access to health facilities. In a session of Nyasaland’s Legislative
56
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Council in July 1960, Michael Blackwood said MCP members were forcing sick African
patients to leave government and mission hospitals. Turning to MCP members on the
council, he chided, “I hope you are ashamed of this.”59 Nyasaland Governor Glyn Jones
claimed similar acts of “foul and monstrous” intimidation had occurred in the Central
Province, where a pregnant woman was made to deliver her child in the bush and the
superior of the mission had warned personnel against reporting such incidents to the
police. Kanyama Chiume, the MCP’s Publicity Secretary, denied the accusations, calling
them “a pack of fabrications like the massacre plot [a reference to an alleged plot to kill
Europeans that officials had used in 1959 to declare a State of Emergency] to try and
discredit the Malawi Congress Party in the eyes of the world.” 60

Accusations against the MCP only grew more heated in the coming months. In October
1960, the Nyasaland Times reported that a compulsory smallpox vaccination campaign
had run into opposition in the Central Province: young children ran away from
vaccination teams; a Native Authority told another team to leave his area before they
could do their work; and another team was chased and stoned by a crowd.61 Initially this
resistance was reported without any mention of the Malawi Congress Party. But by late
November, the pro-Federation Nyasaland Times blamed the opposition to smallpox
vaccination on “intimidation” by “Malawi Congress Party followers.”62 On December 6,
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Figure 8.4: Infant with smallpox, Central Province, Nyasaland. Source: Nyasaland
Times, December 6, 1960, MNA.
the Times ran a front-page photo of an African infant suffering from smallpox (Figure
8.4). Below the horrifically pock-marked body, a caption read:
Take a good look at this little pain-ridden child. He’s barely six months old—and
will be scarred for life if he does not die. This picture is not a ‘Federal’ picture. It
was taken by a man with no political axe to grind. Take another good look at
smallpox and remember the handiwork of political agitators in the Central
Province of Nyasaland.63
Public health reports and medical publications echoed the accusation of “political”
sabotage of the campaigns, though they did not always explicitly name the MCP as the
culprit. The Annual Report on Public Health in the Federation for 1960 lamented,
“Attempts to bring the outbreak under control were hampered by the political unrest and
the incitement and intimidation of the people to evade and disrupt vaccination
63
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programmes. Apart from the circulation of rumours that vaccinations were intended to
cause sterility and death, there were many instances of active hostility and on several
occasions teams had to be withdrawn for their protection.”64 Writing in the pages of the
British Medical Journal in July 1961, months after resistance to vaccination had ceased,
J. Mowat Sword, the Senior Medical Officer for the Central Province, attributed the
smallpox “epidemic” to “political opposition to vaccination campaigns.”65

A full-throated denunciation of MCP interference in the health sector is found in the 1962
pamphlet Federation and Nyasaland: The Facts, which refers to health in Nyasaland
during the Federation as a “Success—marred by politics.” After recounting statistics on
the increases in spending, patient attendance, and new facilities, the pamphlet lamented:
But this happy picture was sadly marred some 18 months ago when a campaign of
disturbance and intimidation was started against the Federal health services…The
efforts of Ministry of Health teams to vaccinate the people of Nyasaland against
smallpox and other diseases were largely frustrated by leading officials of this
political party who, while taking great care to obtain their own vaccinations, travelled
around the country, urging villagers and schoolchildren to boycott the
vaccinators…Nyasaland’s Minister of Education refused to allow the staff of the
Federal Ministry of Health to visit African schools for that purpose and, in some
areas, smallpox epidemics broke out among schoolchildren, and many of them died as
a result.66
The Federation pamphlet argued, “The attitude of extremist politicians in Nyasaland is
that if health services have to be Federal Government ones they would rather have no
64
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health services at all.” But, it continued hopefully, “with the wonderful hospital facilities
all over the country, and the experience of the deaths from smallpox of unvaccinated
children…the people of Nyasaland…are becoming more and more aware of the anarchy
in health matters which would arise once the Federal services were completely taken
away.” The use of health services as a symbol of legitimacy and beneficence was now
explicit.

Malawi Congress Party leaders denied these charges in their entirety. In the pages of
Tsopano, an MCP newsletter, Publicity Secretary Kanyama Chiume called the
accusations “unfounded and false.” Instead, he countered, “it was a man with UFP
[Welensky’s party] sympathies, perhaps employed as an agent provocateur, who went to
persuade people not to accept vaccination as it would cause sterility” to incite the people
to boycott the vaccination teams. Far from being the culprits, he continued, MCP leaders
were the saviors: “It is our officers who helped to save the situation.” Aboard a taxi
bearing the flag of the party, the Provincial Chairman of the MCP had taken a vaccination
team to a resistant village, “and since that time, work has been going on smoothly.” The
entire “comic opera,” Chiume wrote, was an attempt to slander Dr. Banda and the MCP,
similar to the “massacre plots” that served as pretext for the State of Emergency. Turning
the charge of sabotaging health against the Federation, Chiume chided, “This sort of
thing must come to an end so that…the nation can canalize the energy of its people into
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doing those things that can and will eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance in the
country.”67

Historian John McCracken and Banda biographer Philip Short both dispute the charge of
MCP intimidation. Resistance to vaccination was, McCracken argues, “more an
expression of popular mistrust than the result of political action.”68 Given the
contemporary reaction to agricultural regulations and the imposition of the Federation
government, compulsory vaccination campaigns were likely to face as least as much
opposition as they had in the past.69

The resistance was also likely a function of the demonstrable lack of efficacy of
vaccination. Africans in Nyasaland had long experience with smallpox vaccination.
Compulsory since 1908, it was the only vaccine that black Malawians routinely received
prior to 1973.70 The inability of government-run campaigns to prevent recurrent
epidemics had become evident to many Africans by the first decade of the twentieth
67
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century (see Chapter 1). By the 1930s, official reports of “evasion” and even refusal to
submit to compulsory vaccination were commonplace.71 Another intensive campaign had
been launched in the Central and Southern Provinces in 1948, but a new epidemic arose
less than a decade later, in 1956. When vaccinators returned to affected villages in
Kasungu in 1956, they found “a great deal of prejudice against vaccinations. The women
and children run away and hide in the bush until the vaccinators have left. Some of the
villages have been visited five or six times without managing to vaccinate all the
inhabitants.”72

It is unsurprising then, that in the midst of the State of Emergency in 1960, rural Africans
in some villages would again prove unwilling to submit to a procedure of seemingly
dubious merit administered by a regime that had already shown nefarious intent through
mass incarceration.73 Compulsory vaccination (as well as the burning of huts of smallpox
cases) resembled other forms of commonly practiced coercive state action, including tax
collection, forcible labor recruitment or door-to-door beatings by the Police Mobile
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Force. While voluntary curative medicine at hospitals and dispensary was becoming
increasingly popular in Nyasaland, compulsory vaccination was as unpopular as ever.

The inefficacy of the vaccine itself, or the poor coverage of previous vaccination
campaigns, could also explain the 1960-61 epidemic. According to Federation statistics,
the smallpox epidemic of 1960 was no worse than other recent epidemics in the
Federation. Sword’s article in the British Medical Journal reported 620 cases and 95
deaths during the five months between November 1960 and March 1961.74 Compare this
to the 1955-56 outbreak, which was worst in Northern Rhodesia though it did spread to
Nyasaland. During 1955, Federation authorities reported 3,526 cases and 499 deaths in
Northern Rhodesia alone.75 In 1956, Nyasaland officials reported 248 smallpox cases and
6 deaths.76

Official reports did not blame this epidemic on political agitation, either in Nyasaland or
Northern Rhodesia. In fact, medical authorities in both territories mainly blamed
inefficacious vaccines. “Many cases showed signs of previous vaccination,” and few
newly vaccinated children showed “takes” (a “take” is a central lesion at the injection
site, appearing between days 6 and 8 post-injection, which demonstrates a successful
immune reaction to the vaccine).77 By 1956, the Federation Ministry of Health had
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discontinued use of lanolinated lymph, which had been produced in the Central
Laboratory in Zomba, in favor of glycerinated lymph. This new lymph showed
“immediate and noticeable improvement” in the rate of takes, but it was known to lose
potency at high ambient temperatures, and in many of Nyasaland’s facilities it was not
refrigerated.78 Anticipating this, Southern Rhodesian officials used more expensive
freeze-dried vaccines (which had been available since 1909), but only in parts of their
own territory.79 Yet four years later, during the 1960-61 epidemic in Nyasaland,
Federation authorities blamed only the Malawi Congress Party; there reports contained
no discussion of the rate of takes, or of potential problems with the vaccine itself.

At the same time, Banda did not do as much as he could have to quell opposition to
vaccination. Having just arrived in London on November 27, 1960 for negotiations with
Welensky and Whitehall officials over the future of the Federation, Banda held a photo
opportunity. As Banda stood holding a spear (“Because I am here to take and not to
give,” he explained), a reporter from the Salisbury-based Rhodesia Herald asked him to
tell his people to stop resisting smallpox vaccinators. The reporter claimed (in an account
not repeated in other newspapers) that Banda refused to do so. Instead he insisted there
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was no smallpox epidemic in Nyasaland, only a propaganda campaign by the proWelensky press. Furthermore, he explained, he had come to London not as a physician,
but as a politician.80

Though it was recounted by an unsympathetic newspaper, Banda’s response does seem to
indicate a disinclination to quiet popular resistance, whatever the form, if it could
destabilize the Federation’s hold on power. Unrest, Banda knew, was his ally in fighting
the Federation. When addressing crowds of thousands or the press, he did not use
measured tones. His message was simple and direct; he sought an immediate end to the
“stupid Federation.”81 So even as the MCP blamed the opposition to vaccination on an
agent provocateur, Banda, the most popular figure in the country at the time, would not
speak out to end it.

Banda’s refusal to explicitly call for Africans to follow the edicts of government
authorities also reveals how crucial it seemed to him not to admit the value of any Federal
government activities, even vaccination. To do so would, to the colonizer’s ear, be to
concede the truth of Gear’s claims of Federal beneficence. The physician and
revolutionary anti-colonial writer Frantz Fanon argued as much a few years later, when
he explained the conundrum faced by the colonized who sought out European medicine:
“In certain periods of calm, in certain free confrontations, the colonized individual
frankly recognizes what is positive in the dominator’s action. But this good faith is
80
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immediately taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into a justification of
the occupation…The colonizer perverts his meaning and translates, ‘Don’t leave, for
what would we do without you?’”82

The contrast between Banda’s rhetoric during this era, and the language he used once he
became Life President a few years later, is striking. As President, Banda extolled
“discipline” and “obedience” as paramount ideals of citizenship. As will be demonstrated
in later chapters, he swiftly and violently put down any hint of disquiet. Jehovah’s
Witnesses who refused to buy the compulsory Malawi Congress Party (because the cards
carried Banda’s image, Jehovah’s Witnesses considered them a blasphemous challenge to
God the Father) found their religion outlawed. Popular healers who tried to claim earthly
authority were forced to end their practices. Cabinet ministers who criticized government
policies were found dead in ditches (see Chapters 7 and 9).83

More importantly for public health, Banda’s leadership in the fight for independence won
for him and his government the trust of many Malawians. Popular belief in the
beneficence of Banda’s new government helped break the cycle of self-reinforcing doubt,
in which resistance to vaccination campaigns (by a distrusted colonial government) had
helped spur repeated outbreaks, which in turn spurred more distrust of the vaccination
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campaigns.84 Medical authorities in the Federation reported a “much readier acceptance
of vaccinations” in Nyasaland in the year following the 1961 elections, which Banda’s
Malawi Congress Party won in a landslide.85 Progress against smallpox accelerated after
independence. With freeze-dried vaccine donated by UNICEF and without popular
opposition, smallpox was eradicated from Malawi in 1971.86 But a decade earlier this feat
seemed a long way off, and smallpox control remained an arena for political conflict.
Banda, for his part, was a fomenter of opposition. Disorder of any kind, even in public
health, was his ally.

A contemporary—and much more successful—disease eradication campaign in
Nyasaland during the late Federation years demonstrates that Nyasaland’s Africans were
discriminating in their shows of resistance. While smallpox vaccination had a longstanding association with coercion, anti-yaws campaigns had always been voluntary (see
Chapter 1). And though bismuth injections for yaws had only temporarily resolved
lesions, they were sought out by patients in the 1920s. By the 1930s, on the other hand,
smallpox vaccinators were already facing opposition in Nyasaland villages. Little
wonder, then, that when another novel therapeutic, procaine penicillin, was used to
conduct a yaws eradication campaign in Nyasaland during the Federation years, it was
welcomed around the country. The yaws campaign, promoted worldwide by the World
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Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), was launched in
1952, the year before Nyasaland was forced into the Federation. By the early 1960s,
according to Austin Mkandawire, then a hospital assistant, “yaws had been entirely
eradicated in Nyasaland.”87 The disparate experiences of yaws and smallpox campaigns
suggests that opposition to vaccination was a product not only of anti-Federation politics,
but of a legacy of coercion and recurring epidemics that left itinerant vaccinators without
the trust they needed to convince communities to submit their bodies yet again.

III.

Medical practice under Federation: quotidian experience

Beneath the slogans and propaganda campaigns that formed the discursive contests over
medicine, what was the lived experience of medical practice in Nyasaland during the
Federation years? In this section, the focus turns from political parties and pamphlets to
correspondence between doctors, auxiliaries and pharmacists. Given the centrality of
drug availability to the rise in attendance at public sector hospitals and dispensaries—and
to the propaganda campaigns chronicled earlier—healthcare providers’ near-constant
frustration over stock-outs and rationing of essential medicines and supplies is a jarring
departure from public rhetoric. The administrators running central pharmacy stores and
apportioning medical budgets denied hospitals and dispensaries the supplies they said
they needed to treat the influx of patients. Yet medical practitioners—even those British
doctors with a firm belief in the superiority of European over African life—were loath to

87

Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Page 129. Worldwide, the eradication campaign effected an
estimated 95 percent reduction in the prevalence of yaws. See Kingsley Asiedu, Bernard
Amouzou, and Akshay Dhariwal, “Yaws Eradication: Past Efforts and Future Perspectives,”
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 86, no. 7 (July 2008): 499–500.

402

practice what they considered sub-standard medicine.88 The acrimony of these debates
recapitulates (at a lower level of the colonial administration) the ardor of the disputes
between a miserly Colonial Office and Directors of Medical Services (like de Boer and
Shircore) calling for greater spending during the 1930s (see chapters 3 and 4).
a)

Rationing drugs to African patients

i) Penicillin
Limits on spending for new drugs meant that, for the average patient in Nyasaland, new
therapeutics arrived much later than in America or Western Europe. This delay is clearest
in the cases of penicillin and streptomycin, perhaps the two most famous drugs of the
postwar decade. In the first years of their availability, Director of Medical Services had to
personally decide how to apportion scarce supplies of these drugs. Penicillin, a
remarkable new treatment available to Allied troops during the Second World War, was
first mass marketed in the United States in 1945. But in Nyasaland, procaine penicillin
was distributed to hospitals on a strict quota system as late as 1953. The three European
hospitals (in Blantyre, Zomba, and Lilongwe) received far more, for their patient loads,
than any of the African hospitals, but all were asked to limit its use to the treatment of
88
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venereal diseases (“in particular congenital and primary syphilis and gonorrhea”).89
Supplies were so limited that as late as 1954, venereal disease cases in rural dispensaries
were not treated with penicillin, but rather with the arsenical compound neosalvarsan, a
less effective drug with much more severe side effects that had been in use since 1912.90
In August 1953 the Director of Medical Services informed hospitals that another
formulation of penicillin—crystalline penicillin—was more abundant and could be used
for bacterial infections beyond gonorrhea and syphilis, but within months the Medical
Officers in charge of the African Hospital in Lilongwe and Mlanje complained that
despite placing strict controls on their use both formulations were either out of stock or in
short supply.91 In March 1954 the Director of Medical Services continued to warn against
“indiscriminate use” of penicillin, but announced that the procaine penicillin quota would
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Hospital Mlanje to DMS, and Response from DMS to Medical Officer in charge Mlanje on 15th
March 1954.
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be doubled.92 Three years later, the Medical Officer at Zomba African Hospital was still
writing letters pleading for a larger supply of procaine penicillin.93
ii) Ampicillin
For years following the introduction of new treatments, Nyasaland officials closely
guarded their use. In 1961 the British pharmaceutical company Beecham began selling
ampicillin, a drug in the penicillin family with greater efficacy against gram-negative
bacteria than earlier drugs. In January 1962 DJ Bail, the Medical Superintendent
overseeing Zomba’s European and African hospitals asked HR Durrant, the Director of
Medical Services (hereafter, DMS), if he could obtain a supply of the new drug.94
Durrant’s staff replied that a very limited supply of ampicillin would be purchased for the
Protectorate, and distributed in individual cases upon the personal approval of the
Medical Specialist based at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. The letter made clear that
Durrant’s primary concern in limiting the use of the new drug was cost containment.95
iii) Streptomycin
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New drugs against tuberculosis also arrived in African health facilities in Nyasaland
much later than in wealthier countries.96 While supplies of streptomycin had been limited
in the United Kingdom in 1946, patients in Nyasaland faced stock-outs of the drug almost
a decade later.97 In 1954, streptomycin was distributed to Nyasaland’s hospitals on a
strict quota that was insufficient to treat all of the patients with active pulmonary
tuberculosis infections, while isoniazid (INH) remained completely out of stock at the
central pharmacy for months at a time.98 “What do I do for pulmonary TB?” asked an
exasperated Medical Officer at Mzimba in a letter to the Director of Medical Services.99

Two years later Dr. John Goodall, Nyasaland’s Medical Specialist, complained to
Director of Medical Services Howard Murcott that patients were again being denied
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treatment because the central pharmacy was completely out of streptomycin. The Federal
Ministry of Health in Salisbury, he lamented, had not dispatched the amount ordered.
“Under these circumstances,” Goodall reported, “it appears that it is impossible to
continue to treat tuberculosis patients in any satisfactory way.”100

Treatment of tuberculosis with the newer therapeutics was, in the scope of Nyasaland’s
meager Ministry of Health budget, expensive. In a 1964, a year of therapy for a single
patient using isoniazid plus PAS cost £7-7s per person, while a year of therapy with
isoniazid plus streptomycin cost £15-19s per person.101 That same year, per-capita
government spending on the Medical Department was approximately 9s.102 The
missionary physician David Stevenson estimated that the 2173 patients receiving
tuberculosis treatment (at missionary and government facilities) in 1962 represented less
than ten percent of total cases of active tuberculosis in the colony.103
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But Goodall was not satisfied with persistent shortages of necessary drugs. Like Henry de
Boer, Goodall had first witnessed colonial medicine in South Asia, where he had grown
used to medical services more amply funded than in Nyasaland. Goodall had trained in
Edinburgh before taking a post in the Indian Medical Service prior to the Second World
War. During the war, he was stationed in Singapore, and even endured captivity under
the Japanese. His sympathies were definitely pro-colonial, and he had no personal
objections to the Federation. Goodall blamed Hastings Kamuzu Banda for “starting off
riots and civil strife” after his arrival in 1958. “Until Dr. Banda arrived on the scene,”
Goodall wrote in his memoirs, “Nyasaland was a happy and contented country.” When,
prior to his imprisonment, Banda came to visit patients in Queen Elizabeth Central
Hospital, Goodall refused to be formally introduced to him, “because I thought he was
anti-government.”104 Like the colonial physicians who had preceded him, Goodall did
not see Africans and Europeans as equals. But, like them, he did expect to find the drugs
and equipment he felt necessary to maintain his own professional standards.
iv) Mepacrine
In the treatment of malaria, one of the most common illnesses among Africans in
Nyasaland, patients attending government facilities suffered even greater delays in access
to new treatment. Mepacrine, an antimalarial synthesized in Germany in 1931 (and used
extensively by Allied troops during World War II after the Japanese cut off access to
cinchona, which was needed for quinine), fell into disuse in the pharmacies of wealthier
countries by the mid-1940s. The drug, known for its severe neurologic side effects and
prolonged treatment course, was overtaken by chloroquine. But in the early 1960s
104
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mepacrine was still the standard of care for the treatment of Africans in Nyasaland. Again
cost was a factor in the delay; in 1954 the DMS noted that chloroquine was almost seven
times the cost of mepacrine.105 Even among the Federation’s African population there
were discrepancies in the standard of care. In 1957, malaria eradication activities in
Southern Rhodesia included mass treatment campaigns with over half a million tablets of
chloroquine.106 A year later, the Medical Superintendent at the Zomba African Hospital
complained to the DMS that there was no chloroquine at all in Nyasaland’s central
pharmacy.107 Only when the price of chloroquine treatment for pediatric cases (by
injection) fell below that of mepacrine did it become the treatment of choice in
Nyasaland.108
v) Alcopar for hookworm
A new treatment for hookworm emerged during the later years of the Federation but, to
the chagrin of medical officers, it would not be made available in public clinics in
Nyasaland. In 1958, clinical trials in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) of bephenium
hydroxynaphthoate found the recently synthesized compound to be an effective cure for
hookworm infection. Burroughs Wellcome began to market the drug as “Alcopar.”
Alcopar was as effective and less toxic than tetrachlorethylene, then the standard of care
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for hookworm, which caused nausea and dizziness in many patients. Unlike
tetrachlorethylene (chemically similar to the carbon tetrachloride used in the 1930s, see
chapter 7), treatment with Alcopar did not require patients to fast and drink saline before
and after treatment to prevent (potentially fatal) gut absorption.109 Despite these benefits,
the Federal Ministry of Health refused to procure Alcopar, claiming its cost (2 shillings
per dose) was too high. David Stevenson, then a missionary doctor with the Anglican
Church, considered the Federation’s decision penny-wise and pound foolish. Though
tetrachlorethylene itself was cheap, many patients had to be hospitalized in preparation
for treatment.110
b) Equipment
i) X-ray machines
Physicians also complained about long delays in obtaining equipment they considered
necessary. In a March 1957 letter to the DMS, Medical Specialist Dr. John Goodall
described the condition of the X-ray machine at the Zomba African Hospital:
I cannot at present screen chests or do barium meals. In addition, X-rays of spines
and skulls are unsatisfactory…It appears that the requisite number of milliamps
are not forthcoming to enable good pictures to be taken. The machine has given
shocks to the radiographer. I have had to inform [a patient] today that I cannot Xray him till the machine is put in order.111
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Dr. William Oliver Petrie, Medical Superintendent of the Zomba African Hospital,
followed up two months later with another letter on the same topic, explaining that the Xray unit had broken down “once every fortnight” for two years.112 The problem
remained unresolved in October 1957, when Goodall’s tone became more pointed: “I
think you will agree that a Medical Specialist without X-ray facilities is extremely
handicapped.”113 DMS Durrant approved the purchase of a new machine in December
1957, but it was not installed until October 1958.114
ii) Bone drills
Medical officers reserved their most colorful expressions of frustration for the poor
quality of their surgical supplies. One said the set of plaster shears in a European hospital
“would make a very suitable foundation exhibit when a medical museum is started.”115
In commenting on the DMS’ decision to substitute his request for bone drills with
“ordinary engineer’s twist drills” supplied by a local firm,116 another physician resorted
to language that was—by the standards of this genre of correspondence—dripping with
condescension:
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The drills fit. However unless they are made from Vitallium or stainless steel
there is a very real risk of bone porosis due to small pieces of the drill metal
wearing off in the process of drilling. I imagine that is why the proper bone drills
are more expensive—they are made for the job.117
c) Personnel
Drugs and equipment were not the only essential components of a health system that
were in short supply during the Federation era. Even as overall spending increased
rapidly, the number of personnel in Nyasaland’s Medical Department steadily decreased
during the 1950s. In 1959, doctors, nurses, and hospital assistants and other medical
personnel stationed in Nyasaland and working for the UK Colonial Medical Service had
to decide whether they would transfer into the Federal Service or resign. Up until that
point, they had been allowed to remain in the Colonial Service (and work for the Federal
Ministry of Health on secondment) for the first five years of the Federation. Many did not
wish to make the transfer. African staff objected to rule by Southern Rhodesia. Some
expatriate physicians also had political and ideological objections to Southern Rhodesian
racial policy, but for many the greater drawback to the transfer was the fact that they
would have to relinquish the career prospects and benefits (including pensions) of the
Colonial Service. In the years leading up to this mandatory transfer, many of Nyasaland’s
medical personnel resigned. The Medical Department’s staff numbered 1241 in 1951, but
by the end of June 1958 it had dropped to 599. In all, less than half of the African staff
employed by Nyasaland’s Medical Department at the start of Federation transferred to the
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Federal Service.118 So even as health spending increased, the number of African and
expatriate medical staff fell during the Federation years.
d) Colonial Service medical officers: not socialized for scarcity
Physician-anthropologist Paul Farmer and others have written of the phenomenon of
“socialization for scarcity,” wherein doctors, public health professionals, and patients in
resource-poor settings become accustomed, after years of paltry budgets, to dismal
standards of medical provision.119 But in Nyasaland, the persistence of such vocal
dissatisfaction from medical officers indicates that many of them never became
socialized for scarcity. In unceasing demands for sufficient stocks of essential medicines,
better drugs, functional diagnostic equipment and proper surgical supplies, the doctors
objected to irksome delays, requisition denials and substitutions made in the name of cost
containment. The tone of correspondence between medical officers and officials in the
colonial capital often turned testy, as central administrators objected to cost overruns
while medical officers rested their claims on inviolable professional standards. A Medical
Officer in Karonga justified his request for a bronchoscope in a district hospital by
declaring: “I would be failing in my duty if I did not ask for one.”120
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In Chapter 5, I argued that the prosopographical profiles of the colonial medical service
helped explain their expectations of colonial medicine. Nyasaland’s doctors were not a
racially progressive lot, even for their times. Joan Wicken observed during the mid-1950s
that while the Gold Coast had integrated hospitals (even before independence),
Nyasaland retained racially segregated facilities.121 Nyasaland’s white doctors did not
object to this segregation, but they did resent stock-outs of drugs and broken equipment.
Rather than resorting to claims of racial equality or rights to healthcare, medical officers
invoked the dignity of their profession. Facing budgets so limited that officials rationed
soap and denied requests for bed sheets, medical officers persisted in demanding recently
released chemotherapeutics and specialized equipment.122 They insisted that they could
only faithfully discharge their duties if given the tools they had been trained to use.
e) Wars for legitimacy lost, London and Salisbury order cuts in health spending,
1962-1964
Federal officials had worked assiduously to paint a picture of generosity in Nyasaland’s
medical provision, but once the Federation’s fate was sealed budget cuts sparked a crisis
in public sector health facilities. After years of accusing the MCP of sabotaging health
campaigns, by 1963 Federal Officials were shipping drugs and supplies out of
Nyasaland’s hospitals and back to Southern Rhodesia.123
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By early 1962, officials in the Colonial Office in London had concluded that popular
opposition in Nyasaland was too widespread for the Federation government to survive. In
August 1961, in the most open elections before Banda’s fall from power in the 1990s, the
MCP (running on a secessionist platform) won 99 percent of the vote on the
overwhelmingly African “lower roll” of voters. MCP candidates even secured some
European votes in three of the eight seats elected by the mostly European and Asian
“higher roll.”124 Hastings Kamuzu Banda had been transformed from imprisoned
firebrand to legitimate politician in little more than a year. British officials feared his
threats of unrest could cause Nyasaland to devolve into their own version of France’s
Algeria, or Belgium’s Congo, where insurgent wars and social conflagration had turned
decolonization into imperial nightmares. One month after a conference in London to
decide upon details of the transition, Richard Austen (“Rab”) Butler, head of the Colonial
Office’s Central African Office, announced to Parliament in December 1962 that
Nyasaland would withdraw from Federation. Butler and Banda had agreed, by that point,
that Nyasaland would gain full independence from Britain by mid-1964.125

Welensky and other Federal officials were incensed by Britain’s decision to allow
Nyasaland to secede. They feared, above all, that if Nyasaland left the Federation, Britain
would not allow the Federation to continue. Nyasaland remained a debt-ridden,
economically insignificant, and restive colony. One of the primary benefits of the
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Federation to the UK Treasury had been the displacement of Nyasaland’s financial
burdens on to the Rhodesias. Southern Rhodesians feared (rightly) that once Britain’s
Colonial Office regained full responsibility for Nyasaland’s finances, it would side with
opponents Federation (namely, British leftists and African nationalists). Settler control of
both colonies would face grave threats.126

While anti-Federation forces in Nyasaland finally convinced the Colonial Office to end
the experiment in amalgamation, the balance of power in Southern Rhodesia shifted in
favor of more ardent white supremacists. In Southern Rhodesia’s December 1962
election the Federal Party lost power to the Rhodesian Front, a white nationalist
organization that sought to make Southern Rhodesia an independent state under white
rule. This they would do in November 1965, but in the interim the Rhodesian Front
dispensed with the pretense of “partnership.”127 Officials in Salisbury used the final
months of Federation rule to remove supplies and equipment from north of the Zambezi.
Between July 1962 and July 1963, the Federal Ministry of Health organized the
uncompensated transfer of £11,000 in medical stores from Nyasaland to Southern
Rhodesia.128 Sally Hubbard, a visiting British nurse working in Zomba’s African
Hospital in 1963, ruefully recalled “a frustrating morning with an official who could not
believe that there just was not any more linen or other equipment lurking somewhere.”129
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After the handover of health services to Nyasaland’s government, budget cuts and a rash
of resignations further depleted Nyasaland’s medical system. As Prime Minister in preindependence Nyasaland—then as Prime Minister of independent Malawi, Banda tried to
limit spending on health and other social services. The main impetus for these cuts was
Banda’s determination to keep a promise he had made to Butler in their 1962 negotiations
on the transition to independence; Banda had pledged to move the new country from an
unavoidable initial reliance on British aid to budgetary self-reliance (with domestic
revenues matching recurrent government expenditure) within ten years.130 In a move
intended to keep this pledge, at the end of 1963 Henry Phillips (Banda’s Minister of
Finance until independence) slashed spending on all former Federal services—including
health—by 15 percent.131

At the same time, so many doctors and professionals left the payroll that Nyasaland had
trouble spending even its newly shrunken personnel budget. Most of Nyasaland’s small
cadre of physicians, fearing for their livelihoods after the dissolution of Federation and
independence, left the colony. A large number of health staff had already left in 1959, the
year in which Nyasaland’s health sector employees had been required to transfer from the
UK Colonial Service to the Federal Ministry of Health. But even for those few who had
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stayed, this second transition seemed more uncertain. In May 1964, two months before
independence, Nyasaland had no radiologist, no psychiatrist, and no Director for its
Public Health Laboratory. Only 3 of 13 District Hospitals had a medical officer, while
Medical Assistants ran the rest by themselves.132 The number of government medical
officers in Nyasaland fell from 30 in 1962 to 12 in 1964.133 Largely as a result of this
exodus, Ministry of Health spending on “personal emoluments” fell not by the required
15 percent, but by over 27 percent (from £514,754 in 1963 to £375,650 in 1964).134

Spending on drug supplies also decreased during this transitional period. Once the
dissolution of Federation had been decided, officials in Salisbury cut spending on drugs
in Nyasaland, from £380,922 in 1962 to £347,378 in 1963.135 This was, according to a
1965 report by the Malawi Ministry of Health, a deliberate “running-down of stocks in
Nyasaland before the Ministry was handed over.”136

Between the announcement of dissolution in 1962 and the transfer of responsibility for
health services to Nyasaland on November 1, 1963, doctors and nurses complained ever
more bitterly about stock-outs and shortages. Hubbard remembers a trip to visit a Medical
Assistant at rural dispensary in a mud hut: “The poor man had totally run out of
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penicillin, the most commonly used and cheapest antibiotic, dressings and bandages. We
had to tell him to wash the dressings and bandages and use them again, as we had none to
spare in Zomba. We were able to send some penicillin…but he would then have to send a
messenger to collect it.”137 To save money, Hubbard remembers, an administrator in
Zomba’s African Hospital removed light bulbs at random from the wooden boxes being
used to incubate premature babies. Orders of more specialized drugs were out of the
question; in April 1963 Acting Director of Medical Services Durrant wrote to Zomba’s
Medical Superintendent that his requisition for Viomycin, a second-line drug for
tuberculosis, had to be denied “because of the present financial stringencies.”138
Spending on drugs decreased further after the handover of responsibility of the medical
services, falling to £315,092 in 1964. This was due less to Phillips’ cuts (which had
already been achieved through the personnel exodus) than to the absence of an
administrative staff sufficient to monitor stocks and place orders.139
V.

Conclusion

Biomedicine was a political symbol put to creative use by both rulers and ruled,
Europeans and Africans, practitioners and patients. Medicine proved such a powerful
symbol—of beneficence to some, or neglect to others—because of a rapid change in the
popularity of government medical facilities among Africans during the 1950s and 1960s
(see Chapter 7). The increase in attendance in the years immediately following the
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Second World War only accelerated in the 1960s. The number of outpatient attendances
at government facilities increased from 1.05 million in 1951 to 11.08 million in 1969.

Such rapid change had profound political effects. Government hospitals and dispensaries
were more popular than ever during the Federation era. As officials in Salisbury were
wont to point out, African patients flocked in increasing numbers to health facilities.
Their celebratory rhetoric about health became ever more self-laudatory during moments
of unrest and political uncertainty. This pattern is evident in Figures 8.5 and 8.6, which
track mentions of Nyasaland in Hansard, the official record of the UK legislatures
(House of Commons and House of Lords). Mentions of Nyasaland peaked during the
Federation era, and particularly during the two moments of the most profound unrest,
1953 and 1959-1960. During these moments, when politicians in the UK debated the
political future of Nyasaland, health became a central point of propaganda for both proand anti-Federation forces.

But while public spending on medical services increased at unprecedented rates, and to
unprecedented heights, both medical providers and patients realized that public facilities
left much to be desired. Nyasaland’s overcrowded facilities were always low on drugs
and short of personnel. These shortages would only grow worse as Malawi moved toward
independence. But to the millions of Malawians who had endured colonial and
Federation rule, free medicine had become, by 1964, a popular and widely expected
service. So when, just after independence, the new government of Hastings Kamuzu
Banda decreed that government health services would no longer be free at the point of
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Figure 8.5: Number of “Nyasaland” in UK Hansard (Houses of Commons and Lords),
1900-1970.

Figure 8.6: Number of “Nyasaland” in UK Hansard (Houses of Commons and Lords),
1950-1960.
care, the backlash was swift and fierce. Malawians would remind Banda, in ways he
could not afford to ignore, that they had not fought for freedom only to lose access to
medicine.
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Chapter 9
Birthing a nation: the role of health in Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s political calculus,
1964-1975
Abstract
This chapter examines two controversies in health policy in the years immediately
following Malawi’s independence in 1964. The first is the short-lived “ticky fee,”
Malawi’s first and—thus far—its only experiment with health care user fees. Popular
outrage over the fee, and Banda’s need to retain legitimacy among the country’s rural
masses in the midst of the Cabinet Crisis and, led him to renounce the fees. The second
moment is President Banda’s debate with the World Bank over population policy.
Malawi’s government was not unique in opposing outside efforts at population control,
but Banda’s ideology, which invoked what anthropologists of the 1970s called “wealthin-people,” made birth control particularly unacceptable. Medicine was not a priority of
Banda’s early years. But there were certain policies that Banda would not enact, for he
saw in them the potential for unrest. After 1964, he would countenance neither user fees
nor birth control, and he would make grand displays of any of his government’s few
developments in the health sector. Health, of a certain kind, remained a part of Banda’s
ideology of protection and abundance, even if the budgets for health were anything but
plentiful.
Prelude: “They were not very helpful, I daresay”
Growing up in the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (today’s Botswana), Quett
Masire was a true believer in the Protestant Ethic. Fiscal prudence and hard work figure
prominently the stories he tells of his own life. He heard these virtues lauded as a student
at Tiger Kloof, a secondary school for blacks in South Africa founded by the London
Missionary Society. Masire also saw them in his father, a “jack-of-all-trades” and a man
of great “drive.” As his family’s eldest son, at age 21 it fell to Masire to look after his
siblings when his parents died. He admits he could be a harsh taskmaster with his
brothers on the family farm. “It was,” he remembers, “virtually a punishment to work
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with me.”1 He imbibed—and preached—colonial officials’ exhortations that “if one did
things properly, then one would be properly rewarded.”2

Later in life, as Botswana’s Minister of Development Planning and Minister of Finance
(1966-1980) and President of Botswana (1980-1998), he made fiscal prudence a central
tenet of policymaking. Though it had been a poor backwater during the colonial era and
was considered economically unviable by many upon independence in 1966, some of the
world’s richest seams of diamonds were discovered in the next decade. After driving a
surprisingly hard bargain in negotiations with the DeBeers diamond cartel, the
government began to receive half of the revenues from mining by the mid-1970s. Thanks
in large part to diamond mining, Botswana had the world’s fastest growing economy
between 1970 and 2000.3 But despite the poverty of Botswana’s populace, and the
enormity of social needs, under Masire’s stewardship Botswana’s government would
consistently store away a significant portion of its diamond revenues as savings. “As
farmers,” he wrote in his autobiography, “we have always known the importance of
saving for a rainy day, or in our case for a dry day. So it was easy for us to adopt the idea
of a budget policy that would build up reserves of foreign exchange or government cash
deposits in relatively good years, knowing we would have to use them in years of
difficulty.”4 Development economists have hailed Botswana its record of prudent

1

Sir Quett Ketumile Joni Masire, Masire: Memoirs of an African Democrat: Very Brave or Very
Foolish?, ed. Stephen R. Lewis Jr. (Gaborone, Botswana: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Page 9.
2
Ibid. Page 15.
3
Dickson Eyoh and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, Encyclopedia of Twentieth-Century African History
(Routledge, 2005).
4
Masire, Masire. Pages 163-164.
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macroeconomic management, which has it to escape the “resource curse” that leaves
many other countries wholly reliant upon volatile global mineral prices.5

But even the fiscally conservative Masire thought that World Bank policy of the late
1960s took a too-narrow view of the determinants of growth and the aims of
development. In the immediate post-independence years, Botswana and Malawi occupied
similar positions as labor reserves on the periphery of the global economy. Not yet able to
draw upon domestic mineral revenues to finance government programs, Botswana’s new
government sought donor funding. When I spoke to the still-sharp-witted nonagenarian
Masire in his Gaborone home in November 2015, he recalled his conversations with
Bank officials during those years:
The World Bank didn’t want to touch social infrastructure, because the rule of the
day was expenditure should have a rate of return…And so we had a very difficult
time to justify raising money for schools, raising money for hospitals.6
“Social infrastructure” was Masire’s favored term of government health and education
spending. He said that while the Bank and would provide concessional loans for
“physical infrastructure” (e.g. roads, bridges, power plants and factories), they would not
support additional social infrastructure.

5

In a 2001 paper, economists Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson wrote that Botswana’s “fiscal
policy has been prudent in the extreme and he exchange rate has remained closely tied to
fundamentals.” Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “An African Success
Story: Botswana,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network,
July 1, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290791. Page 3.
6
Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana., November 6,
2015.
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During this era, the most important source of support for newly-independent British
colonies was the UK Treasury.7 The UK government agreed to provide transitional grantin-aid to a number of former colonies for a few years immediately independence. But
with the aim of ending grant-in-aid as soon as possible, the British government allowed
its funds to be used only for projects it thought would result in rapid increases in
aggregate production. Recounting discussions with the British during Botswana’s grantin-aid period (1966-1972), Masire said:
They were not very helpful, I daresay. They wanted to finance [health] only to the
extent they were doing it during the colonial period, which was so minimal,
because at the time the only government hospital was the Athlone Hospital in
Lobatse, and even that hospital was built by the people of the Southern District,
who had paid 1 shilling six pence each. Any other hospitals were church
hospitals.8
Botswana’s officials were constrained even from spending their own paltry domestic
revenues to increase health expenditures. Even after independence, the British Treasury
maintained effective veto power over Botswana’s government expenditures. Between
1966 and 1972 they reviewed every proposed budget. “If they did not like something we
proposed to do with our own resources, they would reduce their Grant-in-Aid by the
same amount. Their pretext was that, since we used it for something they did not think
appropriate, we did not need the money!”9 Because the British had made it known that
they did not think health expenditure a good use of public funds, and because they so
readily exercised their veto power, Masire and his staff did not seek to include significant
increases in health spending in budgets during the grant-in-aid period.
7

“Britain was our only major donor and financial supporter at independence. We could never
have succeeded without that aid which initially provided over half our total expenditures of P12
million.” Masire, Masire. Pages 153-154.
8
Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana.
9
Masire, Masire. Page 218.
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By the mid-1970s, however, World Bank President Robert McNamara and a number of
bilateral aid agencies (including the UK’s Department for International Development)
expressed greater enthusiasm for health spending in poor countries. Breaking into a grin,
Masire suggested African political leaders should claim some credit for this shift:
We would like to think we educated them. Because we said to them, look, without
health, people cannot be productive. Without education, people cannot improve
their production. It’s a question of time. It’s a long-term investment. For health,
sometimes you can even look at it in the short-term. If people don’t show up for
work, if people who are experts in a certain sector are dying, what they were
doing suddenly were doing suddenly will come to a stop…So slowly, slowly,
slowly, the penny dropped.10
By the time this shift occurred, however, Botswana’s government was less reliant on
donors, and could chart its own development policy.11 With substantial diamond
revenues on the horizon, in 1972 the government announced it no longer needed British
grant-in-aid.12 Nine years later, when plunging commodity prices and soaring interest
rates led the leadership International Monetary Fund to insist that developing nations
seeking assistance adopt fiscal austerity in exchange for financial assistance, Botswana
declined their conditioned aid. Early in his first term as President, Masire was
“determined” to use savings accrued from previous years so that “development efforts

10

Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana.
“Before 1972, every thebe of development expenditure was funded by donors. In the late
1970s, over half was donor-funded, and in the late 1980s, one-third of our development
expenditures were funded by donors. Even during my last few years in office, donors contributed
10% of our development budget, and donor aid was substantial in absolute amounts.” Masire,
Masire. Page 153.
12
Ibid. Page 156.
11
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should proceed and not be seriously interrupted.” Botswana successfully weathered the
temporary downturn without IMF aid.13

Botswana’s government was quite explicit in categorizing public sector health spending
as “investment expenditure.” While modernization theorists like W. Arthur Lewis had
long argued that health spending was unproductive “consumption,” Botswana’s policymakers framed improvements in health as integral to economic growth. The government
began to use mineral revenues to finance recurrent health expenditures as soon as the
grants-in-aid period ended.14 Beginning in the 1980s, the Ministry of Finance set a
“Sustainable Budget Index” that directed the vast majority of spending derived from
mineral revenues to “investment expenditure.” The government’s definition of
“investment expenditure” included the entire development budget (one-time spending on
infrastructural projects); the only categories of recurrent expenditure considered to be
“investment expenditure” were education and health. Most of the recurrent expenditures
for, say, the police or military or general administration had to be funded from nonmineral revenues.15

None of this is to suggest that Botswana’s government has proved particularly ambitious
in its health spending, or that it has achieved particularly good outcomes. Absolute
spending on health increased, but did not ever command pride of place among the
13

Ibid. Pages 165-166.
Personal Interview with former President Quett Masire, Gaborone, Botswana.
15
Atsushi Iimi, “Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the
World,” IMF Staff Papers, 663-699, 54, no. 4 (2007). Page 675. Also see “The Changing Wealth
of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development for the New Millennium” (Washington, DC:
The World Bank, 2011), http://data.worldbank.org/news/the-changing-wealth-of-nations.
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government’s fiscal priorities. In fiscal year 1969/1970, in the middle of the grant-in-aid
period, health accounted for 7.2 of total recurrent government expenditure.16 Fifteen
years later, with the country benefiting from growing mineral revenues and mostly free of
influence over its budget process, health still accounted for 7.2 percent of total recurrent
expenditure.17 In his 2008 autobiography, Masire lamented that his administration’s
delayed response to AIDS might have facilitated the epidemic’s spread into one of the
world’s worst.18 UNAIDS estimated that by 2005, the prevalence of HIV infection among
adults aged 15-49 had reached to 25.4 percent, second only to Swaziland (26.2 percent).19
Since 2003 Botswana’s government has mounted an aggressive response to AIDS. Today
every citizen with AIDS has free access to antiretroviral treatment. These life-saving
drugs have been supplied with support from the US President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief.

16

Recurrent health expenditure in 1969/1970 was 1.003 million rand. Total recurrent expenditure
during that year was 14.012 million rand. See “Memorandum on Recent Economic Development
and Prospects of Botswana,” Eastern Africa Department (International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and International Development Association, June 16, 1971), Documents and
Reports Website, WBGA,
file:///Users/lukemessac/Desktop/1971%20memorandum%20on%20recent%20economic%20dev
elopment%20and%20prospects%20of%20botswana.pdf.Table 16.
17
Using 1985/1986 prices, recurrent expenditure on health in fiscal year 1984/1985 was 24.489
million pula, while total recurrent expenditure was 338.794 million pula. See “Public Expenditure
and Development in Botswana,” Country Programs I: Eastern and Southern African Region,
(June 3, 1986), Documents and Reports Website, WBGA, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1986/06/03/000009265_3960
925235906/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. Pages 17, 78.
18
Masire admits: “Our failure to deal with HIV/AIDS in an effective way” was “perhaps my
greatest regret.” Still, he continued, “the disease is indicative of a lack of morality in the nation.”
Masire, Masire. Page 237-239.
19
“The Gap Report: Beginning the End of the AIDS Epidemic” (UNAIDS, 2014),
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/UNAIDS_Gap_report_en.pdf. Annex:
Table 1.
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Still, other parts of the health sector remain wanting. Access to care is not universal. Noncitizens living in Botswana (including many thousands of Zimbabwean migrants) must
pay the full cost of their drugs, diagnostics and consultation fees upfront at government
clinics. Many cannot afford these costs and forgo treatment altogether. The quality of
care is also less than one might expect from so wealthy a country. In 2015, long after
Botswana had “graduated” to middle-income country status, doctors in some of the
nation’s government hospitals struggled to care for inpatients without functional X-ray
machines or reliable stocks of the reagents needed to run basic metabolic panels.

Botswana, like Malawi and many other former British colonies, devoted rather small
portions of government budgets to health in the decades following independence. The
tone was set early on, in late 1960s, when almost all of the advice they received from
donors and advisers was to focus spending elsewhere. The practice continued, even in
Botswana, which challenged the categorization of health as “consumption” rather than
“investment.” Botswana provides yet another instance where discourses of economic
development (even a discourse, like Botswana’s, that is hospitable to health) cannot fully
explain patterns of spending on health care.

But there is another factor in Botswana’s history that could explain the surprising
inattention to health. The nation’s transition to independence was bloodless, and it has
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enjoyed prolonged internal peace in the years since then.20 As the coming chapters will
demonstrate using the example of Malawi, placidity has its costs, and unrest its benefits.

I.
Introduction: historiography of Banda’s post-independence health policy:
neglect from the good doctor?
The historiography of medicine in post-independence Malawi is much thinner than that of
its colonial precursor, Nyasaland. Probably the most widely read history of medicine in
Malawi is Megan Vaughan’s Curing Their Ills, but this book focuses on the period 18901950. John McCracken’s history of Malawi—titled, aptly enough, A History of Malawi—
ends its narrative in 1966. Colin Baker’s “The government medical service in Malawi: an
administrative history, 1891-1974” published as an article in Medical History in 1975,
contains only two pages on the health sector since independence. Malawi-born physician
John Lwanda has two works (Politics, culture and medicine in Malawi (2005), and Color,
class and culture: a preliminary communication into the creation of doctors in Malawi
(2008)) containing helpful discussions of post-colonial medicine, but even he calls these
works “preliminary” in recognition of the dearth of original research.21 Public health and
medical journals contain countless studies of the AIDS epidemic, but the period between
1964 and 1980 is rarely mentioned.

20

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “An African Success Story.”
The discrepancy between pre- and post-independence historiography may be attributable in part
to the fact that post-colonial records in Malawi’s National Archives (which maintains a 30-year
embargo before files can be opened) are poorly funded compared to colonial-era records. The
European Union has provided funding to catalogue and maintain the Malawi National Archives’
colonial-era records. Many colonial-era documents pertaining to Nyasaland can also be found in
the UK National Archives at Kew. The dearth of research is also partly a function of Banda’s
effective ban on critical ethnographic and historical research in Malawi during his rule.
21
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Much of the history that is written of the post-1964 period stresses continued neglect of
government medical services for the new nation’s black population during the long reign
of Kamuzu Banda (1964-1993). In one of the few studies of post-independence medical
services, Eric de Winter notes that between 1964 and 1971, the Government completed
only two new hospitals (at Rumpi and Kasungu).22 Lwanda argued that “the colonial,
Banda, and post-Banda regimes did not…prioritise the health sector.”23 Another
Malawian physician, Austin Mkandawire, observed that as late as 1975, the Government
of Malawi retained the colonial-era system of segregated hospitals. In Zomba the hospital
for whites, commonly known as “Top Hospital” (ostensibly because of its location above
the main city center), received better funding than the “Bottom Hospital” (lower on the
hill) attended by black Malawians.24 In 1975, Kathryn Morton concluded “there has been
little expansion of government health facilities since independence.”25 In his study of the
Banda regime, Malawian theologian and author Harvey Sindima referred to the
government health sector as an “area where attention was not as high as it should have
been.”26 Poet and Banda-era political prisoner Jack Mapanje remarked, “Dr. Banda built
more prisons than hospitals—rather strange for a medical doctor.”27

It is quite true that during the Banda regime health was not a top priority. But together
these authors paint a picture of abject political neglect that must be complicated in light
22

Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi., 85.
Lwanda, Colour, Class and Culture. Page 10.
24
Mkandawire, Living My Destiny. Pages 114-115.
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Morton, Aid and Dependence. Page 45.
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Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis (Lanham, Md: UPA, 2002). Page
127.
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Reginald Sydney (‘Reggie’ ) Murley,” BMJ 316, no. 7134 (March 14, 1998): 868.
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of other facts. For instance, as Baker notes (in his uniquely sanguine appraisal of the
health sector in this period), recurrent expenditure nearly doubled in the decade after
independence, from £987,000 in 1964 to £1,906,000 in 1974. Spending on medical stores
and equipment—where shortages during the Federation period were (as this chapter has
shown) a constant source of aggravation for providers and poor outcomes for patients—
more than doubled during this decade, from £219,000 in 1964 to £505,000 in 1974.28
Further still, since the ticky fee episode in 1964 Malawi remained one of very few
African countries to provide government healthcare without fees at the point of care (save
for the obstetric fees).29

How do we reconcile these seemingly contradictory sets of facts? Malawi’s health sector
expanded in the fifteen years after independence, but not nearly as much as it might have
given the nation’s impressive growth record during this period. At the same time, neither
Banda nor Malawi’s international donors considered healthcare a key priority in the years
following independence. But the political backlash to the ticky fee and Banda’s need to
retain legitimacy among the country’s impoverished rural masses did not permit him to
ignore the sector entirely. Even while he remained devoted to weaning Malawi from
British aid, Banda used domestic revenues and what assistance he could find abroad to
build hospitals and recruit medical personnel.

II.

The freedom we had told the people to die for? User fees in Malawi

a) Malawi’s brief experiment with health care user fees, 1964
28
29

Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi,” 308.
Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies.”

432

The budgetary decision that would prove most controversial came on Malawi’s first day
as an independent nation (July 6, 1964) when outpatients attending government hospitals
and rural health centers began to be charged a fee. Throughout the colonial era, Africans
had not been charged fees at the point of care at government at (segregated and inferior)
government hospitals and rural dispensaries.30 Glyn Jones, Nyasaland’s last colonial
governor, looked back on these fees as a wise policy aimed to restrain expenditure: “I
regarded [Banda] as being a very honourable man in that he did his best to fulfill the
conditions that the British Government tried to attach to the secession…you wouldn’t
have blamed him for playing for popularity—and my God, he didn’t, he brought in
those…charges for the health services.”31 The fees were not much publicized; the
announcement came in a notice, authored by Secretary for Health Dr. Robert Park,
published in the first issue of Malawi’s government gazette. Outpatients were to be
charged three pence (3d), an amount known in much of British southern Africa as a
“ticky” (the name for the three-pence coin).

30

Colin Baker suggests, rather vaguely, that Nyasaland’s colonial government medical services
were “not necessarily free.” He does not explain whether he is referring to fees for non-official
Europeans or specialty services. But other sources are clear that African inpatients and outpatients
received care free at the point of service in segregated facilities maintained by the colonial
government. Baker, “The Government Medical Service in Malawi.” Page 309. In 1906, Sir
Hector Livingston Duff, who worked in the administration of British Central Africa (the name of
Nyasaland between 1891 and 1907), wrote that the British had “erected free hospitals for the
treatment of the sick.” HL Duff, Nyasaland under the Foreign Office (London: George Bell,
1906). Page 361. While decrying the imposition of user fees after independence in the September
1964 debate in Malawi’s Parliament, Paliani Gomani Chinguwo claimed that the “ordinary
African…had been receiving free medical attention all along under the colonial government.”
Paliani Gomani Chinguwo, in In the Parliament of Malawi, Official Report of the Proceedings,
First Session-Second Meeting, 1964,
http://www.kanyamachiume.com/docs/CABINETCRISIS1964.pdf.
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Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Pages 64-65.

433

Park’s notice stated a number of exemptions from the fee: “children at school, adult men
enjoying tax exemption for reasons of age or debility; adult women who are old or
otherwise enfeebled; in-patients after admittance; those who can prove they are indigent”
[emphasis in original]. Also exempted were patients found to be suffering from
bilharziasis [schistosomiasis], venereal disease, tuberculosis, smallpox, and leprosy.32
Even with the exemptions, the fee marked a drastic departure from the policy, maintained
during the colonial period (with one exception, to be mentioned below), of treatment for
Africans at government health facilities without fees at the point of care.

But the new policy did not come from thin air. For decades, a number of commentators
and colonial administrators had called for fees. In the first edition of his African Survey,
published in 1938, Malcolm Hailey had weighed the advantages and disadvantages of
medical fees for African subjects in British colonies, but he did not make any firm
recommendation either way.33 For their part, in recognition of the political significance
of medical care, the medical directors of in most British East African colonies had
rejected suggestions to impose fees; Dr. RR Scott, director of medical and sanitary
32

Robert Park, “General Notice No. 3: Ministry of Health: Out-Patient and Maternity Fees,” in
Malawi Government Gazette, vol. 1, 1, 1964.
33
Lord Malcolm Hailey, An African Survey: a study of the problems arising in Africa South of the
Sahara (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), 1201-1202. Hailey noted: “In the French
colonies no payment is asked in return for medical attention save in exceptional cases where
patients can obviously afford it.” In the Belgian Congo, he observed that “infectious diseases,
including sleeping sickness and all epidemic and endemic diseases, are treated free,” while “in the
case of other diseases and of accidents and most surgical cases, some payment is expected from
patients who can afford it.” In the colonies of British Africa, on the other hand, “it is usual for
natives to receive free attention, but in many cases those who can afford to do so are required,
both by government and mission institutions, to make small payments for treatment or
medicines…In support of the view that treatment should be gratuitous it is said that in many parts
of Africa medical attention is one of the few obvious returns which the African sees for payment
of tax...On the other hand, it is held that Africans are more likely to appreciate medical aid and
come for treatment with greater readiness if the service is not taken entirely for granted.”
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services of Tanganyika, explained medical services were one of the benefits Africans had
been led to expect in return for taxes.34

Late in the Federation period, calls for fees reemerged. To these observers, the existing
system of healthcare financing was guilty either of hindering social progress or of
advancing a revolutionary socialist agenda.35 For those who thought it halted the march
of civilization, the system of free care perpetuated atavistic tribal laziness and colonial
paternalism. Speaking to a branch of the British Medical Association in Northern
Rhodesia in 1960, Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky said it was time for an end to
the days of “something for nothing.”36 Others thought “free” medical care was a foretaste
of socialism, a policy that seemed too close to those concocted in the Eastern Bloc. Dr.
Harry Gear, a consultant to the Federal Ministry of Health, worried both Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were on path toward a “socialized medical service which in a
relatively few years will be irreversible…It is a phenomenon,” he continued, “not entirely
reassuring to those nervous of over-organization and excessive officialdom.”37 This
warning may have been intended for audiences in the United States, where private sector

34
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provision dominated, rather than in the United Kingdom, where the NHS provided health
care without user fees.38

UK Minister of Home Affairs Rab Butler, who had been tasked by Prime Minister Harold
MacMillan with Central African affairs in March 1962, raised the issue of fees in
negotiations with Banda over Nyasaland’s secession from the Federation. During a
December 1962 meeting in London, Butler told Nyasaland Governor Glyn Jones that he
had made it clear to Banda that he would have to cut the government budget and raise
revenues to pay for education and health services.39 In a visit to Nyasaland in late
January 1963, Butler clarified how revenues would be raised and costs cut. At some point
“in the future,” Africans would be made to pay fees at government health facilities.40

Banda would later claim to have no knowledge of the new government fees, but his own
history indicates he had little aversion to them. In November 1960, an official in the
Federation intelligence service in Salisbury had sought unflattering stories about Banda
from his years as a doctor in Ghana (until 1957, the British Gold Coast) between 1953
38

For another call for fees, this one on the basis of cost alone, see a 1961 annual report on health
in the Federation: “It seems pretty obvious that a country whose population increases at the rate
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and 1958. The Federation official reported hearing from a former Gold Coast officer that
Banda had set up an unlicensed network of 22 dispensaries in a rural region of north
Ashanti. There, the story went, Banda had his attendants—trained in a “week-end
course”—charge patients 10 shillings 6 pence per consultation. Banda, who kept 90
percent of the fees even as he stocked the dispensaries with government supplies and
drugs, would earn £1,000 each month from this network for years.41 Shortly after
independence, Ghana’s Ministry of Health suspended his medical license for six
months.42 Biographies of Banda have noted that he maintained a private practice in
Kumasi, and that he briefly had his license suspended, but none have yet offered a
convincing reason for the punishment. Given that the provenance of this account was a
Federation official, it may be exaggerated or even fabricated. But Ghanaian officers were
unsurprised by the story; “similar practices are common among Ghanaian doctors in
Government service.”43 Banda himself was likely no stranger to—or opponent of—fees
for patients when Butler made his demand.

The first fees, introduced before independence, were aimed at pregnant women.
Throughout the colonial period, “non-official” Europeans and Asians were charged for
care at European government hospitals in Lilongwe, Blantyre and Zomba.44 Then, in
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April 1963, seeking to save on expenditures at the close of Federation and no longer
worried about currying favor with the general African population, the Ministry of Health
took what the Central African Journal of Medicine—published by pro-Federation doctors
in Salisbury—hailed as “the first step towards charging Africans for medical services.”45
The fee, of £1 10s, would cover “ante-natal attention, the confinement and any attendant
medical or surgical care and also post-natal attention if necessary.” It was to be charged
only at the African hospitals in Blantyre (Queen Elizabeth), Lilongwe, and Zomba.
Hubbard, the visiting British nurse, described the effects on the maternity ward in
Zomba:
Where anyone thought the women would be able to get the money from was a
mystery. The maternity ward emptied overnight and the fear spread to other wards
where the patients thought they would also be charged. Suddenly every patient
had a bed as most had absconded. 46
In Hubbard’s reminiscence the maternity fees were cancelled, but Park’s notice in July
1964 stated, “The charge is at present and will remain 30s.” Park’s 1964 notice also
instituted a 10s fee for maternity cases at Malawi’s other hospitals and rural health
centres.

The notion that maternity patients would be the first to be charged fees would have been
unthinkable to colonial medical administrators during the interwar years, when underpopulation and insufficient fertility were considered major problems and health officials
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encouraged clinic-based births (see Chapters 1 and 3).47 But by the 1960s, the pendulum
had swung and the concern had become overpopulation. In The Story of an African
Famine, Megan Vaughan describes how Nyasaland officials laid the blame for a deadly
1949 famine on neo-Malthusian claims about population growth and resulting pressure
on land.48 The discursive shift helped move health policy away from de Boer’s late 1930s
focus on maternal and child health and skilled attendance for all births (see Chapter 3).
As Eric de Winter, a Dutch physician who had worked at the Nkhata Bay District
Hospital in the late 1960s, explained, “It is often considered acceptable in developing
countries not to let all pregnant women deliver in a hospital, but only to select high-risk
patients.”49

But if the empty maternity wards that followed the 1963 fees were disquieting to
Hubbard and others, these sights paled in comparison to the far more dramatic effects of
outpatient charges that came the following year. Three-pence was, at the time, considered
a standard hourly wage for unskilled urban laborers.50 But particularly for rural
Malawians (and that, of course, was the vast majority of the population) rarely had cash
readily available. For them, the fee would prove a significant deterrent. In June 1964, the
last month before the fee was instituted, 308,381 outpatients attended government
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facilities. In July 1964, outpatient attendance fell to 126,559 (fees were instituted on July
6). In August 1964, the first (and as it turned out, the only) full month of the outpatient
fee, attendances fell still further, to 122,996. Figure 9.1, a graph drawing upon a 1965
Ministry of Health report that analyzed the effects of the fees, shows this precipitous
decrease in attendance.

Most of this decrease is attributable to the fee itself. Yet there is another factor at work:
the seasonal variations in attendance. February, March, and April, the months following
the onset of rains, were long known as the annual period of the most widespread illness;
many went hungry before the harvest (which began in May), while the rains brought
diarrheal disease and malaria. In any given year, then, one would expect to see
attendances increase to a peak in March or April, then fall as the dry season set in and the
harvest began in May or June. The 1964 figures do follow this pattern; monthly
outpatient attendance peaked in 439,675 in March, and fell to a nadir in August. But the
1964 fall in attendance was far more precipitous than the previous year’s; 295,300
outpatients attended government facilities in July 1963, more than twice as many as in
July 1964.51

As the fees led fewer outpatients to present for treatment, fewer inpatients were admitted.
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Outpatient Attendances at Government Facilities
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Figure 9.1: Outpatient attendances at government facilities, 1963-64, from A Conspectus
including the Development Plan for 1965-69, Malawi Ministry of Health.52
The number of inpatient days in government facilities fell from 106,702 in June 1964 to
84,916 in July and 84,317 in August, before rebounding to 91,727 in September and
95,727 in October. The fall in inpatient days is less marked than the fall in outpatient
attendances; this is predictable, as “a number of chronically ill patients remained to
occupy their beds while fewer new patients were admitted.”53

In the weeks after the fees were begun, prominent Members of Parliament heard
52
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complaints from their constituencies. Kanyama Chiume claimed Banda (who had
retained the Ministry of Health portfolio for himself) had instituted the fees without
consulting his Cabinet: “All of us were pre-occupied with the independence celebrations
at this time and so we hardly realized that this charge had been levied.” But soon enough,
Chiume remembered, no Cabinet members could ignore the fees:
Wherever we went, we were bombarded with questions as to whether this was the
freedom we had told people to die for. One old man in Usisya, my home, showed
me a wound caused by an axe which was becoming septic because he could not
afford the new fees. ‘How do you expect us to be enthusiastic about self-help
schemes?’ he asked me, ‘when if we hurt ourselves in the process, you ask us to
produce money to be treated in a country where you cannot give us jobs from
which to earn our living?’54
This question invoked politically powerful obligations, namely to provide remunerative
employment and medical care in exchange for both labor and legitimacy from the people
(for more on these obligations, see the conclusion to this chapter).

Cabinet members who opposed the fees would invoke these notions of obligation ever
more vocally in the months to come, as the fees became one among many issues that
alienated Banda from his erstwhile allies in the party. In September 1964, Chiume and
other members of Banda’s Cabinet confronted the Prime Minister over the fees as well as
low pay for civil servants and slow pace of “Africanization” of government posts, as well
as Banda’s budding alliances with Mozambique, southern Rhodesia and South Africa,
white-ruled regimes considered pariahs by other independent African states. After a
conversation with Glyn Jones over whether he should resign (where Jones advised him
not to), Banda scheduled a vote of confidence in Parliament. During the debate, Banda’s
54
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opponents decried the fees. Henry Chipembere, a young minister who had been among
those who invited Banda to return to Nyasaland six years earlier, said the three-pence fee
was “a heavy burden which prevented many people from taking their fever-stricken
children to the dispensary.” He lamented the government’s attempt to limit expenditure
using such charges, a tactic he called “economizing at the expense of the people’s
health.”55 At a rally near his home in Fort Johnston later that week, Chipembere said the
fees demonstrated that “The present Malawi government is worse than Welensky’s
Federal government.”56

During the parliamentary debate, Banda’s supporters tried to justify the fees. One
Member claimed, “People don’t complain.” After all, he noted, the three pence charge
was less than the fees patients had long paid at mission hospitals. “You refuse to
pay…yet expect Ngwazi Kamuzu to tell medicine manufacturers to send them millions of
drugs without sending them a cheque, eh?” he asked. “No,” answered other supporters of
the Prime Minister.57

Banda won the vote of confidence. But for months, Banda’s hold on power remained
uncertain. Through late 1964 and early 1965, Chipembere and a few hundred followers
hid in the Namizimu Forest north of Fort Johnston. Banda put a price on Chipembere’s
55
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head, but either out of fear or loyalty, locals would not reveal his whereabouts. In
February 1965 his forces briefly captured Fort Johnston, but they dispersed along the
road to Zomba after finding that the ferry needed to cross the Shire River at Liwonde was
tethered at the opposite bank.58 In late April 1965, Chipembere fled to the United States.
Ironically, part of the reason for his departure was that he sought treatment for his Type II
diabetes not available to him in Malawi. 59 Banda’s regime was saved, in part, by the
government’s poor health system.60

This entire episode, which came to be known as the Cabinet Crisis, marked the greatest
threat to his rule until he was finally forced from power in the early 1990s. Banda did not
change his foreign policy, or increase pay for civil servants, but he rather quickly
distanced himself from the fee policy. A newspaper reported Banda’ speech at a rally in
Palombe a week after the Parliamentary debate in which he claimed that his rebellious
ministers “had bribed medical aides in the hospitals to refuse treatment to poor people so
that there would be resentment.” The article continued: “The Prime Minister promised
the people that no one would be refused medical treatment because he had not got a
‘tickee.’ He said the doctors and medical assistants should have made that clear from the
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beginning.”61 Though there is no documentation of any official repeal of the fee, the
Ministry of Health reported in 1965 that the outpatient fee “fell into desuetude.”62 The
maternity fees, on the other hand, continued to be collected at most hospitals.63

b) Reasserting legitimacy through displays of care: Banda’s symbolic health agenda,
1964
In addition to turning the blame for the fees back onto his rivals, Prime Minister Banda
sought to reassert legitimacy through acts of generosity. Three days after his Palombe
speech, Banda ordered that an earlier donation he had made to hospitals—a gift of more
than 2000 chickens and over 250,000 eggs—was to be used “only to feed poor African
patients.” Banda’s clarification that his gift was to go directly to the destitute sick
demonstrated his need to respond the uproar over the fees. The need to demonstrate
concern for the poor after the battle over fees showed that biomedicine had become a
powerful political symbol and even a weapon capable of inflicting lasting harm.64 This
was a lesson that Banda would not forget.
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A week later the nation’s largest daily newspaper, by that point solidly pro-Banda,
featured a number of health-related items on its front page. The first was the
announcement of a “£100,000 leper scheme” to be funded by the Brown Memorial Trust
and the British Leprosy Relief Association and directed by the Ministry of Health.65 The
second item announced the arrival of 41 laboratory technicians and nurses from the
United States to work on a tuberculosis control campaign under the auspices of the US
Peace Corps.66 The third was a photograph of Dr. Banda, wearing a dark three-piece suit
and tinted glasses, leaning over the bed of a female patient during a visit to the Queen
Elizabeth Hospital (Figure 9.2). His left arm is outstretched but his hand is obscured from
view; he appears to be examining the patient. The reminder of his career as a doctor is
none too subtle. Sunlight streams in from a window, illuminating a soft smile on Banda’s
lips. In the background other patients look over, seemingly waiting their turn. The article
accompanying the photo explained that in Banda’s speech on the grounds of the hospital,
before “several thousands,” he reminded the audience that this visit was his third to the
hospital in his official capacity. The article also noted that he had given £5 10s of his own
money to individual patients in the wards.67 In the midst of the greatest threat to his
political career to date, Banda centered his publicity campaign shows of solicitude to the
plight of the sick.
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Figure 9.2: Prime Minister Banda at Queen Elizabeth Hospital. From The Nyasaland
Times, September 25, 1964, page 1.
b) Politics of healthcare fees in the former British Africa, 1964-1968
Malawi was not the only newly independent African nation for which healthcare user
fees became a major issue during the 1960s. Following the rise of the Rhodesian Front
and the end of the Federation, leading settler politicians in Southern Rhodesia were far
less concerned than their forebears about British or African opinion. Their desire to
appear beneficent toward their African subjects had dissolved along with the Federation.
In November 1965, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith would issue a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. Without the
fiscal subsidy it had garnered from Northern Rhodesia’s copper mines, Southern
Rhodesia also sought to find ways to cut government spending and raise revenues. So in
October 1964, shortly after Banda reneged on the ticky fee, Southern Rhodesia instituted
447

fees at African hospitals and dispensaries. The fees were much higher than Malawi’s 3pence charge. In Southern Rhodesia, the outpatient fee for men was 1 shilling 6 pence,
and for women and children the fee was 1 shilling. For inpatients, the charges were even
higher: £2 for men, £1 for women, and 10 shillings for children per admission at
Bulawayo and Salisbury African Hospitals, and 10 shillings for adults and 5 shillings for
children at general and district hospitals. Thus the end of the Federation spelled far higher
healthcare fees for Southern Rhodesia’s Africans than it ever did for Malawians.68

In other former British colonies, where independence brought majority rule, the politics
of medical financing were similar to Malawi’s. In 1957, the colonial government of
Kenya introduced fees for Africans for many dispensary and hospital services. The
administration increased these fees in 1961.69 Yet the charges proved so unpopular that
Kenya’s major nationalist party (the Kenya African National Union, or KANU) promised
free medical care in its party platform for the 1963 elections.70 KANU won the election
handily, securing 83 of 124 seats. In 1965, Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta honored his
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promise and abolished most of the fees.71 Immediately thereafter, outpatient attendances
quadrupled.72

In Uganda, popular opposition to the healthcare fees prevented the government from
imposing them in immediate postcolonial era. Africans had been provided treatment
without charge in all Government medical units since 1938.73 In 1956, a Colonial Office
commission on medical and health services in Uganda chaired by Birmingham University
Professor AC Frazer had recommended for both outpatients and inpatients in government
facilities.74 In 1962, the same year Uganda became an independent nation, a World Bank
Mission echoed this advice, proposing that the Ministry of Health impose outpatient fees
of at least 1s per attendance and inpatient fees of at least 3s per admission.75 But
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Uganda’s postcolonial government did not heed this counsel. The state would not impose
user fees at government health facilities until 1993.76

VI. Post-ticky politics: the dueling imperatives of health and fiscal restraint
a) Failed self-help and paltry foreign aid: forced scarcity for health in the postindependence economic boom, 1965-1975
Expansion of the health sector was limited during the post-independence decade.
Malawi’s economy grew rapidly during this period, buoyed by high global prices for the
cash crops produced by a burgeoning estate agricultural sector (see Chapters 1 and 2).
The health sector grew as well, but it did not claim a greater share of resources (relative
the size of the economy) than it had during the late colonial era. Total health spending
(public and private) as a percentage of GDP barely budged between 1964 (1.5 percent)
and 1973 (1.4 percent).77 And while recurrent expenditure for health increased, scarcely
more than one percent of the government’s development budget went toward health
services.78 Most of this expenditure went to “maintenance of existing facilities.”79 This
76

GM Burnham et al., “Discontinuation of Cost Sharing in Uganda,” Bulletin of the World Health
Organization 82, no. 3 (2004): 187–95.
77
Morton, Aid and Dependence, 29.
78
This level of spending was far less than was foreseen in the development plan publicized by
The Times of Nyasaland on 2 June 1964, four days before independence. It “gave some details of
a five year development plan for Malawi, announced by the government. £32,837,000 was to be
spent, in the period 1964-1969, under the plan. Of this, £2,331,000 was to be spent on health,
including an increase of hospital beds by 75% by 1969 and the opening of a nurses’ training
school in Blantyre-Limbe to train to S.R.N level. The plan incorporates a sewerage scheme for
Blantyre-Limbe. £75,000 was to be spent on a census, £38,000 on market surveys and £126,000
on Blantyre airport. (Overall, 7.1% of development spending would go to health, and a further 2.9
percent to water and sanitation)..." The Times' Independence souvenir, July 1964, gave the total
cost of the plan as £44 million again with £2,331,000 for health." See Stevenson, “The Health
Services of Malawi.” Page 176.
79
Developing Malawi: Office of the President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division
(Zomba, Malawi: Government Press, 1971).

450

stasis occurred in a country with few facilities even compared to the rest of the generally
impoverished southern African region.80

Under Banda, the government’s response to the many requests from local leaders for new
facilities was to require the localities to undertake construction on their own using
voluntary “self-help.”81 Supporters of the government tended to paint an image of vibrant
grassroots efforts involving enthusiastic villagers. A doctor writing in the Salisbury-based
Central African Medical Journal in 1966 extolled Banda for having “inspired the rural
population to self-help schemes. Schools, roads, hospital wards, rural medical units were
built all over the country by voluntary efforts.”82 A 1974 Malawi government publication
declared “a remarkable spirit of self-help has achieved magnificent results in the rural
areas…Malawians have freely given their labour to build a better future for themselves
and their children. Permanent school buildings, postal agencies, clinics and dispensaries,
bridges, roads and dipping tanks are only some of the many projects tackled willingly and
effectively by local communities.”83

Unsurprisingly, the perspective from the villages was far less rosy. Local administrators
found it exceedingly difficult to convince poor peasant farmers to contribute funds (over
80
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and above already burdensome taxes) and time to what were often poorly coordinated
construction projects. In 1968 the Government of Malawi secured funding from the Beit
Trust Fund—a charitable donation using funds bequeathed by an early investor in the
British South Africa Company—to replace a dispensary located 50 miles from Fort
Johnston District Hospital. While the Government had used the Beit funds to build a new
dispensary by the year’s end, officials in Zomba stipulated that the unit’s staff housing
must be built by self-help. Two years later the new unit it had still yet to receive any
patients because, as the Secretary for Health reported, “the spirit of self-help was not
coming forth in order to get the staff homes constructed.”84 Ministry of Health officials
had made a request in 1969 to the Development Division (an office in the Executive that
held the purse-strings for all development expenditures) to use savings from other
projects to in order to complete the staff housing, but the Division refused. One official
suggested sending field staff “to encourage the growth of local initiative which, it would
appear, is lacking among the people in the area.”85 By 1971 there was still no staff
housing, and the roof of the still-unused unit had been blown off. 86
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Not everyone was asked to sacrifice as much as the rural denizens made to pay for their
own clinics. The post-colonial Ministry of Health operated “private wards” for
outpatients and inpatients in government hospitals. These facilities promised prompt
attention and the most expert care for paying patients. Most of these patients came from
the few thousand “Europeans” and “Asians” who continued to dominate the commercial
and professional classes of Malawi’s towns and cities. But the most troublesome patients
in the private wards—according to the Ministry of Health—were “VIPs.” Members of
Parliament, Cabinet Ministers and their families were supposed to pay for care in private
wards, but a number of them built up substantial debts to the Ministry of Health after
using these facilities. The Ministry’s accountants were frustrated, but impotent, when the
officials ignored their plaintive letters asking for payment. As of March 31, 1973,
prominent political figures with long-standing unpaid debts included: President Banda’s
private secretary Cecilia Kadzamira; Minister of Finance Aleke K. Banda; and Reserve
Bank of Malawi Governor John Z. Tembo.87 While other patients in private wards who
refused to pay could eventually face legal action and wage garnishments, the Ministry of
Health accountant was instructed that “accounts relating to prominent figures are not to
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be referred to the State Counsel without the prior authority of the Principal Secretary.”88
Lessons about responsibility and self-help, it appeared, were only meant for the poor. The
politically well-connected, on the other hand, received superior medical care without any
obligation to pay.
b) “When considered in light of the funds available”: overcrowded hospitals and
drug shortages, 1965-1969
For doctors and medical assistants in Malawi’s public sector, independence did not bring
an end to their struggles to provide decent care. After the brief dip during the threemonth-long ticky fee period, outpatient attendance at public facilities continued to rise,
climbing from 8.7 million in 1965 to 11.1 million in 1969.89 Decrepit facilities struggled
to keep up with the influx of sick bodies. “Many rural health units are old, dilapidated,
and ill equipped, even for the provision of the most rudimentary outpatient services and
elementary medication,” wrote Maurice King, an eminence in international health who
had been invited to write a development plan for Malawi’s health sector, in 1970.90 Even
at the nation’s flagship hospital, Queen Elizabeth in Blantyre, staff felt overwhelmed. In
1967 the Hospital Secretary wrote the Secretary for Health to explain that his hospital
urgently needed an inpatient intensive care unit for critical cases, as well as a completely
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new outpatient and casualty block. If the rate of increased attendance continued at its
current pace, by 1975 his hospital alone would be visited by 2,000 to 3,000 outpatients
every day.91

Correspondence between physicians and administrators remained contentious. In a 1965
letter to the Medical Superintendent of Zomba’s hospitals, Director of Medical Services
Durrant wrote, “My impression is that your health units have been receiving excessive
quantities—not excessive to their needs, but excessive when considered in light of the
funds available for Zomba Hospital. I am sure that this matter will cure itself in time.”92
But Durrant’s condescending tone did not quiet the small but vocal cadre of physicians in
district hospitals who could not accustom themselves to the practice of medicine without
medicines. A Dutch doctor working at Nkhata Bay District Hospital in the late 1960s
bitterly recalled the futility of his pleading letters to the Central Medical Stores. The
central stores, he remembered, often ran out of such basic items as “tetracycline, ferrous
sulphate, chloroquine, penicillin, Lysol, acetyl salicylate and dressings (all sizes).”93 He
could not intubate his surgical patients even when they were put under general anesthesia
“because the proper tubes were not obtainable for a long time and because nobody was
trained in this technique.”94
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Malawi’s facilities were not only under-equipped; most were run by a few harried staff
with minimal training. In 1965 there were only 27 doctors in the government service; 22
worked in the three central hospitals, and five staffed district hospitals.95 That same year
the country had 83 nurses (graduate or state-registered); 75 worked at the central
hospitals, and 8 at district hospitals. In the nation’s first full year of independence,
auxiliaries (e.g. medical assistants, maternity assistants, midwives and health assistants)
were the only staff at all 112 rural hospitals and rural health centers. These cadres
required no more than seven years of elementary education and two to three years of
technical training.96 Supervision was almost entirely absent; some Medical Assistants
worked alone at rural dispensaries for years without even a visit from a doctor or nurse.97

While doctors and nurses in the central hospitals complained of deficiencies at their
facilities, the auxiliaries at rural facilities toiled in far worse conditions. In the late 1960s,
while serving on a Rockefeller Foundation commission, US physician John Bryant
visited a hospital in the town of Port Herald. He wrote:
There is not a single doctor, not a single nurse…The outpatient service is jammed
with a pressing, murmuring throng…Two medical assistants are surrounded at
their desks. Some intangible feeling of sequence in the crowd tells each whose
turn it is. Diagnoses are made on the basis of the first words uttered by the patient
and are at the simplest possible level. Each takes one or two minutes. Cases that
cannot be handled in this way may be set aside for a more thorough examination,
and perhaps for a laboratory test (the lab is small, closetlike, with a microscope, a
95
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hand-driven centrifuge, and a few bottles of stain) and consultation with one of
the more senior medical assistants. The medical assistants see about three hundred
patients during the morning. A baby has ‘warmth of the body.’ The blood is
examined for malaria: positive. The treatment: chloroquine. Everyone with fever
is assumed to have malaria. If he has a cough, pneumonia or bronchitis is
suspected and penicillin is added…The next has abdominal pain. What do you do
about abdominal pain in two minutes?98
Bryant described this scene to illustrate a conundrum facing contemporary international
health experts about the value of biomedical care delivered by unsupervised medical
auxiliaries in rural Africa. Was their care worse than none at all? Bryant did not put
himself on either side of the debate, nor did he condemn the auxiliaries or the Ministry of
Health for the low standards. But Malawi’s public sector was to no one’s eyes a model of
medical provision.
c) Keeping it free: Banda’s refusal to reintroduce health care user fees
According to Kathryn Morton, at independence Banda did not consider education and
medicine “investments,” but rather “consumption” items. But despite the fact that Banda,
like other modernizers, thought health and education unproductive social services, he
believed that Malawians should reasonably expect some such services from their new
government. Banda worked to provide, in the first few years of his rule, a district hospital
(staffed by a medical officer) and a secondary school in every district. As of the late
1960s, he also ensured that food was provided to inpatients free of charge in government
hospitals.99 While he was not willing to spend much of Malawi’s development or
recurrent budgets on health, Banda was loath to risk further unrest by attempting to
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reenact health care user fees. Throughout his long rule, Banda did not reinstitute point-ofcare user fees at public sector facilities.

This insistence on free care was particularly striking because there was a general move
early in Banda’s rule toward shifting costs of social services onto Malawi’s citizens. In its
1961 election manifesto the Malawi Congress Party had pledged universal free primary
education.100 But by 1963, Banda instituted fees at government primary schools in order
to limit public expenditure. The number of primary school graduates decreased in
Malawi’s first decade of independence.101

But Banda did not forget how Chipembere used the ticky fees to foster discontent against
him. And through the first decades of his rule, Banda saw his hold on power as
precarious. In the first year of Malawi’s independence his public speeches were entirely
occupied with the hunt for Chipembere.102 After Chipembere fled, Banda remained
concerned about other ex-ministers in exile, particularly Yatuta Chisiza, elder brother of
the late Dunduzu Chisiza and Banda’s own former bodyguard. Like Chipembere, the
elder Chisiza had defected from Banda’s government during the 1964 Cabinet Crisis.
100
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While in exile in Tanzania, he founded the Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA). He
and his followers launched small guerilla incursions into Malawi until October 1967,
when he was shot by Malawian troops during a failed invasion.103

No sooner had this threat abated than another arose, this time in the form of a rumor.
Between November 1968 and March 1970, at least 33 people died in a series of murders
in the Blantyre suburb of Chilobwe. One of the most popular explanations for the spate of
killings was that the government was allowing white South Africans to take Malawians’
blood as repayment for loans Banda had taken out to build the new capital at Lilongwe.
These rumors had a context. Malawians had long experience repaying odious debts (see
Chapter 1), and vampire rumors were a well-known genre used to critique exploitation in
southern and eastern Africa. 104

The rumors fanned unrest, particularly near estates in the South, where protesters
attacked MCP officials. Banda tried to appease the discontents by making summary
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arrests for the murders. He also ordered estates to surrender 14,000 acres of land, which
were redistributed to the landless.105

Health policy must be understood in the context of this unrest. In this uncertain political
environment, Banda would not risk such an unpopular decision as the imposition of user
fees. Yet to expatriate physicians and advisers, health care user fees remained a necessary
policy. In a health sector development plan commissioned by the Ministry of Health in
1970, Dr. Maurice King—an eminence in international health circles—acknowledged
that fees were a “highly contentious issue” but insisted that they were “only too likely to
be the practical option.” His assumption was that fees would improve the quality of
health services: “Services which have to be paid for,” he chided, “are better than no
services at all.”106 Two years later, Dutch physician Eric de Winter marveled that “about
30-40 per cent of the outpatients [at Nkhata Bay District Hospital] seemed to be without
organic disease.” De Winter reckoned that auxiliaries used most of their penicillin
injections on such patients in order to engender a placebo effect.107 Echoing economist
Mark Pauly’s claim that point-of-care fees were a defense against a rational “moral
hazard” among the insured, de Winter presented fees as the answer to the overcrowding
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of hospitals by patients who were not truly sick.108 “Even the raising of a minimal fee
from each outpatient for each attendance would greatly reduce the number of unnecessary
attendances. For political reasons,” de Winter continued, “such a measure is not likely to
be taken by the Malawi government.”109 As of 2015, health fees had never been
reinstituted in Malawi, in spite of the counsel of the World Bank (in the 1990s) as well as
University of Malawi economists and prominent domestic commentators (in the
2010s).110
III.

Fertility control vs. mortality control: the Banda-McNamara debate over
population policy and a national health budget held hostage

a) Seeking international assistance for health, 1964-1969
A few bilateral aid programs continued to provide modest funding for health projects
during the 1960s. Immediately after independence in 1964, with Malawi’s health sector
almost devoid of doctors, Israel sent seven to work in the Ministry of Health; it also
funded scholarships for nurses to train in Israel. In 1966, the West German government
began to help plan and fund the renovation of the African Hospital in Zomba. Between
1965 and 1967, UNICEF provided $114,000 for teaching equipment, drugs, vehicles, and
training sessions focused on maternal and child health.111

108

See Mark Pauly, “The economics of moral hazards: comment,” American Economic Review
1968 58, no. 3 (1968): 531-537.
109
Winter, Health Services of a District Hospital in Malawi.
110
Muluzi, Mau Anga; Messac, “Moral Hazards and Moral Economies”; Handbook of Micro
Health Insurance in Africa, 1 edition (Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2012).
111
“Economic and Social Developments, Including Assistance Programmes Other than the
UNDP, January-June 1966,” Quarterly Reports, United Nations Development Programme,
(November 10, 1966), Item No. 1047167, WBGA.

461

But by the 1960s most of the largest bilateral and multilateral aid agencies counseled
“patience in the face of poverty,” as Kapur summarizes the World Bank’s approach to
financing (or, rather, not financing) health and education during the postwar decades.
During the early 1950s the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) had funded malaria eradication programs and vaccination programs. Such
funding was particularly focused on Southeast Asia, where American officials devoted
funds toward rural health and agriculture for security purposes rather than more strictly
economic ones; they hoped that mitigating rural poverty in this region might lessen the
appeal of communist propaganda.112 But in the late 1950s USAID began to cut its grant
support for malaria eradication programs, and by the mid-1960s its health programming
was almost entirely focused on family planning.113 At the same time, UN agencies such
as the Food and Agriculture Organization also turned their attention away disease
control.114 Malawi may have found a few donors willing to fund small initiatives or
provide a few personnel, but the lack of donor support for health made it nearly
impossible for the new nation to fund improvements to its medical services with external
loans and grants. In the seven years following independence, health spending made up
only one percent of the government’s development (capital) budget.

Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s, then, mainstream development thought as
well as bilateral and multilateral aid agencies gave less and less attention to health in poor
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countries. The most influential studies of development were no longer surveys conducted
by nutritionists, anthropologists, botanists and agricultural experts, but econometric
analyses using formal mathematical models constructed by economists. This new cadre
of development experts saw little use for health programs; their impact was difficult to
measure and appeared to have a long and uncertain gestation. The World Bank, USAID,
the UK Treasury, UN agencies and other donors echoed the economists’ counsel. In this
intellectual and financial environment, the holders of budgetary purse-strings in latecolonial Nyasaland and post-colonial Malawi found little support for efforts to undertake
new health interventions, or even to maintain existing programs in public health and
curative medicine.
b) Coolness to health at the World Bank, 1946-1968
When Malawi’s development planners did actively seek funding for health projects from
international aid agencies, they were rebuffed. At the October 1969 annual meeting of the
World Bank in Washington, DC, Malawi Minister of Finance Aleke Banda [no relation to
Kamuzu] and his team of advisers met with Abdel El-Emary, Director of the Africa
Department. Late in the meeting, the Minister of Finance mentioned that Malawi was
planning to approach the bank for assistance in financing health. Banda argued health
projects “could be justified on social and economic grounds, although he was fully aware
of the difficulty of evaluating a health project economically.” El-Emary’s response was
not promising; he said he “could not make any positive statement on Bank interest or
involvement in the area of health.”115
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El-Emary’s response was in keeping with the position maintained toward Malawi since it
joined the World Bank as an independent nation in 1964. In 1967, El-Emary had written
approvingly to the United Nations Development Programme about Malawi’s economic
policy thus far:
Although Government expenditure must be spread over the whole range of
Government services, including social and security services as well as economic
ones, the greatest emphasis is given to those projects which resulting an increase
in the national product. Projects which result in increased exports (or a reduction
of imports) find special favour.116
The World Bank’s unwillingness to finance health care in Malawi was simply a
recapitulation of its approach to all countries prior to the 1970s.117 The vast majority of
World Bank lending to poor countries the first quarter-century after Bretton Woods was
for power and transportation projects, with much of the balance going toward industry
and telecommunications, industry, and a pittance for agriculture. None went toward
education or health. Bank historians Mason and Asher argue this omission stemmed both
from the difficulty of measuring the effect of education and health programs on aggregate
production, and the concern that such financing would raise among the Wall Street
independence in 1966, Botswana’s new government sought funding from the World Bank for
health projects. Quett Masire, Botswana’s first Minister of Finance, recalled his conversations
with Bank officials during those years. “The World Bank didn’t want to touch social
infrastructure, because the rule of the day was expenditure should have a rate of return…We had
a very difficult time to justify raising money for schools, raising money for hospitals.” “Social
infrastructure” was Masire’s favored term for government health and education spending. While
the Bank provided loans for “physical infrastructure” (e.g. roads, bridges, power plants and
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financiers who held much of the Bank’s debt.118 The tone had been set as early as 1949,
when Lauchlin Currie, a former special adviser to US President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, had tried to persuade World Bank Vice President Robert Garner to finance
health and education programs in Colombia. Garner recoiled: “Damn it, Lauch. We can’t
go messing around with education and health. We’re a bank!”119
b) Malawi and the World Bank battle over population control, 1969
When John Adelman returned to World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. from a
visit to Malawi in July 1969, the findings he included in his report amplified two
arguments that were then gaining attention in development circles. The first was that
health was not getting enough attention. “Public health,” he began, “is another area where
I believe present thinking in Malawi may be too cautious. A growth rate of only 4% is
being allowed for in current health expenditures, most of which are for curative purposes.
Malaria, tuberculosis, and malnutrition are still widespread, as are intestinal parasites and
bilharzia.”120 But this claim was tempered by the second idea rising to prominence—that
disease control in the absence of family planning was a waste of money. “Still,” he
continued, “it is difficult to press for a large scale general attack on these problems, both
because of financial limitations and also because one is reluctant to encourage a major
118

Edward Sagendorph Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods: The
Origins, Policies, Operations, and Impact of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the Other Members of the World Bank Group: The International Finance
Corporation, the International Development Association [and] the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Brookings Institution Press, 1973)., p 189-190, 151-152;
Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 109-110.
119
Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 111. A 1952 World Bank Survey Mission report
on Nicaragua recommended “expenditures to improve sanitation, education and public health
should, without question, be given first priority in any program to increase the long range growth
and
120
John A Adelman, “Back-to-Office Report, Mission to Malawi. Submitted to Mr Abdel G El
Emary,” July 31, 1969, Item No. 1860299, WBGA. Page 15.

465

mortality control campaign prior to seeing some official receptivity to a fertility control
campaign. The latter is definitely absent at this time.”121 These linked ideas, that health
was worthy of additional funding, but only alongside population control, would help
shape development experts’ writings on Malawi for the next decade.
Adelman had shared these thoughts with Malawian officials prior to his departure,
prompting a critical response from President Hastings Kamuzu Banda. At the end of his
October 14, 1969 meeting with Abdel El-Emary in Washington (where El-Emary had
discouraged any application for health funding), Malawi Minister of Finance Aleke
Banda handed him a letter from President Banda. The letter, addressed to World Bank
Group President Robert McNamara, included the following passage:
One of the officials of the Bank who was here recently, among other things,
mentioned the question of population explosion in this country. He said that our
annual birth rate was too high and that we should do something about it. I
disagreed with him. Although by African standards Malawi is relatively a small
country, it is not true to say that our population is too big for the size of the
country. Malawi is 45,000 square miles as against Taiwan’s 14,000 and Israel’s
8,000 square miles as of June 1967. Yet Taiwan supports a population of 14
million and Israel at least 2 million. I sincerely and honestly believe that properly
developed, Malawi can support a population of even 20 million. Because although
it is small in area, Malawi has very rich agricultural soil. As I am writing there are
vast rich agricultural areas unoccupied…Population explosion is not a problem in
Malawi for the next fifty years, if not a hundred years. The problem is
development for which we need finance.122
Banda could scarcely have written a passage more offensive to McNamara. An adamant
proponent of population control as a prerequisite for prosperity in developing nations,
McNamara believed that decreasing the fertility rate should be a central goal of Malawi’s
121
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health policy.123 He said as much when he responded to Malawi’s President, less than a
week after receiving the letter: “The concern I have expressed on a number of occasions
is with a situation in which the rate of population increase, is outstripping, or threatens to
outstrip, the rate of economic growth, with the result that economic development does not
result in human development...I…firmly believe that family planning is important for all
developing countries which have excessively high rates of population increase.”124

This profound disagreement on population policy, born of deeply held beliefs and
political interests on both sides, would prove a sticking point in Malawi’s discussions
with the World Bank. The disagreement would sour personal relationships between
Banda and many of the holders of the purse-strings of aid, and for a few years in the late
1960s and early 1970s seemed to threaten the possibility of external aid for health
reaching Malawi. But, as this section will explain, Banda had his own reasons for his pronatalist position, and eventually McNamara and the World Bank, and some other funders,
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moved toward more comprehensive (though still not amply funded) support for health
programming in Malawi.

c) Population control in international health, 1964-1970
The idea that per-capita economic growth in poor countries was being hindered not just
by slow aggregate production increases, but by rapid population increases, became ever
more prominent in international development planning during the early 1960s. Less than
three decades after the Holocaust had rendered discussions of mass sterilization suspect
in Western political discourse, private and public sources of international aid dollars
(particularly in the United States) opened their wallets and propounded the virtues of
population control. At their June 1962 annual meeting, the Board of Directors of the Ford
Foundation approved $10.7 million in funding for population projects, surpassing its
support for such work over all years in the prior decade combined.125 In April 1963, US
President John F Kennedy endorsed the idea of international aid for family planning in
response to a reporters’ question (in an exchange choreographed by Planned Parenthood
employees).126 Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, initially appeared
averse to funding for population control policies; early in his tenure he even declined to
meet with the (hereditarily) wealthy activists John D. Rockefeller III and William Draper
to discuss the issue. But beginning in 1966, with support from Johnson and leading
members of the United States Senate, USAID began receiving ever-larger appropriations
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to fund intrauterine device (IUD) insertion and mass sterilization campaigns in the
developing world, with a particular focus on India.127

President Johnson’s conversion from skeptic to believer on population control is another
example of the political potency of economic projections that rely on heroic assumptions
rather than any grounded data. The key to Johnson’s persuasion was a paper written in
1965 by the economist Stephen Enke, then working at the RAND Corporation (Enke
would later become deputy assistant secretary of state). Enke’s projections made use of,
and drove to logical extremes, Arthur Lewis’ ideas about the surfeit of labor supplies in
poor nations and the backwardness of the “traditional sector.” He assumed that children
were unproductive consumers until age 15. Then he discounted the value of consumption
during childhood by 15 percent per year. Using these two priors, Enke calculated that in
the average poor country the net present value of a newborn was -$279; that is to say, for
every child not born a nation stood to save a net $279 on unproductive consumption.128

Enke admitted that this calculation of the value of a life should consider the negative net
present value of a child’s 15 years of consumption alongside the positive net present
value of her future production as an adult, but he did not even include a calculation the
latter, as he assumed this discounted value was so negligible as not to merit inclusion in
127
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his equation. Instead, using the negative consumption figure alongside assumptions about
fertility rates and capital/output ratios, Enke estimated that when compared to
“investment for extra output...a birth control program would be 250 times more effective
a means of raising per capita income per unit of resources so employed.”129

The lack of evidence supporting Enke’s calculations did not prevent them from reaching
the desks of powerful decision-makers.130 Upon reading this study in April 1965, Robert
Komer, a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council, sent it along with a note to
McGeorge Bundy, Johnson’s National Security Advisor. Komer wrote that the “hard
dollar and cents argument” in the paper “might just penetrate LBJ’s defenses.” Indeed,
Komer’s memo did pique President Johnson’s interest, and in June 1965 he publicly
called for greater investments in population control, claiming—in a downward revision of
Enke’s projections that might be attributed to forgetfulness—“less than five dollars
invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic
growth.”131
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The focus on population control quickly migrated the few blocks from the White House
to 1818 H Street NW, headquarters of the World Bank. By 1966, Komer had convinced
George Woods, then the Bank’s President, to condition its aid to India (including food
aid) on satisfactory population control policies.132 In 1967, the Bank began including
information on population growth and population policies in borrower nations as “one
indicator of their commitment to economic growth.”133 Woods’ successor, Robert
McNamara, who had served as US Defense Secretary under Johnson, was an even more
vigorous proponent of population control upon assuming the position of Bank President
in 1968. McNamara joined the Board of Trustees of the Ford Foundation in the same
month he began as Bank President. His speeches, including an address at the University
of Notre Dame in 1969, echoed a finding of a World Bank-commissioned study led by
Lester Pearson that same year, which argued that increasing fertility rates were
overwhelming investments in development.134 His dire warnings that high fertility rates
were a threat to the economies of poor nations also coincided with increasing popular
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concern in Western publics, seen most notably in the rapid sales and intense media
coverage of Paul and Anne Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, published in 1968.135
McNamara had not abandoned the maximization of per capita output as a measure of
development, but for him it was as important to keep the denominator in the measure
(population) low even as other development lending strove to push up the numerator
(aggregate output).

McNamara’s focus on stemming rising populations was so myopic that he was unwilling
to contemplate support for health care before achieving declines in borrower nations’
fertility rates. His own justifications for this requirement pitted mortality control against
fertility control in the same way as Adelman did in his report on Malawi. In a March
1969 response to a Bank official who had proposed financial support for preventive
health services in Jamaica, McNamara said “he was reluctant to consider financing of
health care unless it was very strictly related to population control, because usually health
facilities contributed to the decline of the death rate, and thereby to the population
explosion.”136
135

Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer Books, 1968).
Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 249-250, World Bank, minutes of president’s
council meeting, march 3, 1969. These neo-Malthusian arguments against health services were
revived once more during the 1990s, when leading global public health journals published articles
by experts who claimed that reducing child mortality would only increase populations to
ecologically unsustainable levels and doom them to famine or other forms of ruin. In a 1990
article published in the Lancet, Maurice King counseled against “such desustaining measures as
oral rehydration…since they increase the man-years of human misery,” and urged the realization
that “health services may not be a priority for [poor] communities.” Yet healthcare provision has
been nowhere shown to be a threat to demographic stability. AIDS mortality has inconsistent
effects on population-level fertility rates. Meanwhile, nations that have achieved substantial
fertility declines have often done so not by permitting mass die-off, but by expanding human
capabilities. For instance, an analysis in India found that female literacy accounts for
approximately three-quarters of fertility decline in regression models, while the relationship
136

472

d) Population control in World Bank reports on Malawi, 1971
In its reports on Malawi during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the World Bank made the
new nation’s rising population a much more central concern than its dearth of healthcare
providers and facilities. The report of a 1971 Bank mission to Malawi included no
discrete section on health services. In fact, the only mention came in the section devoted
to “population pressure,” which made a virtue of the country’s absence of health services.
“The structure of population and the high fertility ratios, in addition to the pressure of
population on land, could create a serious demographic problem, particularly if there is
some improvement in health services on which expenditure is at present very low.”137
The report noted per capita recurrent public expenditure on health was only about $0.85
per year, and guessed that it “might amount to just over $1 when accounting for the
expenditures by missionaries.” Between 1964 and 1971, yearly per capita development
expenditure on health had declined, “and currently averages only 3 cents.” The authors
predicted that this situation was politically untenable, as “sooner or later, there is bound
to be increased pressure for an improvement in health.” But the authors did not look
forward to such political pressure, as it would bring forth “a marked reduction in infant
between fertility and per-capita income was not statistically significant. See Farmer, Basilico,
Messac, “After McKeown.” Shane Doyle’s Before HIV, a careful demographic study of a few
selected regions in Uganda and Tanzania, finds that fertility declines followed improvements in
child survival. Apparently, women had fewer children once they could expect more of them to
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mortality” (from its current level of “240 deaths per 1,000 live births which makes it
probably one of the highest in Africa”), and a subsequent rise in population. To the
itinerant prognosticators who authored this report, astronomical rates of infant mortality
were a rather useful check on overpopulation.
e) Explaining pro-natalism in Banda’s Malawi, 1965-1975
While the World Bank, USAID, the Ford Foundation and other sources of international
aid focused on IUD insertion and sterilization campaigns in India and elsewhere, Banda
would lend no public support to birth control measures in Malawi. He banned books on
birth control, and deported a Dutch missionary who had delivered lectures on the subject.
In early 1965, a Medical Officer’s request for the oral contraceptive Anovular from
Malawi’s Medical Stores was cancelled on the grounds that “contraceptives are not
supplied from Government Hospitals.”138 Historians of Malawi, and Banda himself, have
offered varied reasons for his opposition to birth control in particular, and population
control more generally. First, he saw Malawi’s rising population not as a threat, but as a
desirable trend. In public addresses he often declared Malawi was blessed with vast
expanses of fertile soil, which could support many millions more.139 Banda told his critics
that he would reconsider his position on birth control only when Malawi was peopled
enough to have every acre of its arable land under cultivation.140 Banda may have also
relished this stand against the opinion of “so-called experts,” whose counsel ran counter
to the tested wisdom of “the ordinary man and woman in the village.”141
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To some observers Banda’s position on birth control could be attributed to his puritanical
beliefs and authoritarian dealings on matters of personal conduct. Banda did not drink or
smoke, and promulgated laws against drunkenness within a year of Malawi’s
independence. Most famously, beginning in the late 1960s he banned Malawian women
from wearing mini-dresses or even trousers.142 But if in some ways Banda’s cultural
views fit well with the contemporary Western backlash against the sexual revolution, in
other ways his stance on population drew upon views of sexual morality that cultural
conservatives elsewhere would have considered scandalous.143 In 1947, while working as
a physician in North London, Banda and the Scottish missionary Cullen Young
coauthored a preface to Our African Way of Life, a volume of essays by written by
African students in Nyasaland. In the preface, Banda and Young wrote in defense of the
“fertility orgy” practiced by Banda’s people, the Chewa:
For some sixty years we have frowned upon and, indeed, opposed what we—
Government and Mission—took to be a more or less licentious ‘harvest’ or ‘fertility’
orgy local to the Chewa and Chipeta areas. Actually, as will be seen in these pages—
it is a central part of the educational technique, fundamental to the preparation of the
male for adult life within the community and maintaining at the heart of the
community itself a continuing reverence for the social ideal as Africa sees it.144
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The logical consistency in Banda’s sexual politics lies not in its adherence to cultural
conservatism along the lines of some Christian churches, but in what anthropologists and
historians of Africa have called “wealth in people.” The idea that people—rather than
money or other resources—were primary in understandings of wealth in land-rich, laborscarce African societies has been central to tracts on equatorial and southern Africa since
the 1970s.145 It has been used to make sense of the rapid assimilation of the conquered
and the destitute into new social groupings as well as inclusive definitions of kinship.146
Even if he did not use this term, Banda’s politics could scarcely have been more focused
on demonstrating wealth-in-people. Metaphors of abundance and of vastly extended
kinship relations were central to his rule. Wherever Banda delivered a public address, the
organizers of the Malawi Congress Party made sure he was greeted not only by cheering
145
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thousands, but also by enthusiastic and well-rehearsed groups of praise-singing local
women. Banda called these women his mbumba, which among the matrilineal Chewa
refers to a group of sisters and their daughters living under the protection of a maternal
uncle or eldest brother known as an nkhoswe. By assuming the role of nkhoswe to women
throughout Malawi, Banda indicated he was responsible for their flourishing, and he
would in turn be made ever more wealthy and powerful by the fruits of their wombs.147
This political symbolism was on full display on Christmas Day, 1980, when Life
President Banda came to the Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital to open a new maternity
wing. The opening of the wing—which, as the Ministry of Information touted, had been
built using personal funds donated by “His Excellency the Life President” himself—was
a joyous celebration of this abundance, with Banda surrounded by throngs of mbumba
clad in blue and red zitenje (cloths) bearing likenesses of his face (see Figure 9.3). Statedirected population control measures, particularly the kind of coercive sterilizations
pursued in India at the behest of the World Bank and other international agencies during
the 1970s, would have run directly counter to the legitimizing ideology Banda had so
carefully constructed.
IV.

Conclusion

In The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence, social anthropologist Max Gluckman argued that
relations resembling kinship could be established through acts of material generosity.
This materiality of obligation was especially true in relations between ruler and subject.
A Barotse maxim held that: “The good subject is the one who is generous as a child is to
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Figure 9.3: President Hastings Kamuzu Banda, surrounded by his mbumba, opening the
Gogo Chatinkha Maternity wing at Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital, Blantyre,
December 25, 1980. Source: Ministry of Information.
a parent; the good lord is the one who is generous as a parent is to a child.”148 The
anthropologist Meyer Fortes found much the same thing among the Tallensi in West
Africa: “A kinsman of any degree is a person whose welfare one is interested in and
whom one is under a moral obligation to help in difficulties, if possible.”149
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This understanding of popular expectations of kin (and those who would claim to be kin)
can help explain the politics of medicine in Malawi at the dawn of independence. Since
the arrival of effective antibiotics and anti-tuberculosis agents after the Second World
War, government hospitals and dispensaries had grown ever more popular among the
general population. Medicine’s newfound capacity to protect the sick from suffering and
premature death carried with it a new set of political obligations. This was particularly
true for Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the doctor-cum-president who constantly portrayed
himself as the benevolent nkhoswe of his people.

Banda learned the potency of this obligation shortly after independence, when he sought
to quell the popular reaction to the imposition of user fees. Banda quickly learned the
lesson and abandoned the fees. Though he did not invest heavily in medicine in the early
post-independence years, he did make grand displays of any new government
developments in the health sector. His annual Christmas pilgrimages to visit patients at
Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital and his “personal” donations to hospitals were public
demonstrations of solicitude for the destitute ill. Banda had spent much of his life outside
Southern Africa. In his manner and historical sensibility, he identified more with the
London bourgeoisie among whom he had lived for so long. But, as leader of Malawi,
there were certain social facts that he could not afford to ignore. The obligation to
provide for the sick, or to at least appear to do so, was such a fact. Even if budget figures
do not demonstrate Banda’s concern for health, medicine was a central component in the
symbolism of his long rule.
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Chapter 10
Sovereignty and citizenship in an age of aid: financing health in 1970s Malawi
Abstract
Malawi’s health expenditures and policies during the early postcolonial period closely
tracked perceptions of instability within the new regime. Whereas the Cabinet Crisis of
the immediate post-independence years led Banda to abandon user fees, by the 1970s
Banda saw few remaining threats to his rule. He turned his attention (and government
resources) away from health, even as the rise of “human capital” in development
discourse prompted greater tolerance for health spending among cosmopolitan economic
experts. During the 1970s Banda did not increase the share of domestic revenues spent on
health. Instead he relied on external donors, particularly governments facing their own
crises of legitimacy, for health financing. Drawing upon the National Archives of Malawi
and the World Bank Group archives this chapter demonstrates once again while changing
fashions in economic development can at times coincide with changes in outlays for
health, the greatest influence on health spending were political crises. This time, though,
the crises took place outside Malawi, and were deliberately exploited by Malawi’s
president to secure financial support for (among other aims) health facilities.
Prelude: Memories of strong medicine
When, during my stay in Nyanza village, people asked me to explain my research, there
frequently ensued a moment of confusion. Ndikuphunzira mbiri ya mankhwala, I would
say. The closest literal translation of this statement is: “I am studying the history of
medicine.” But people often assumed, at first, that I meant “traditional” or herbal
medicine. “History” is not an exact translation for the word mbiri, which also means
“culture,” so mbiri ya mankhwala is ambiguous. But the confusion also stemmed from
the widely shared memory, among Malawians in the Nyanza, that the medicine delivered
in hospitals was of recent provenance in Malawi.

In this area, my interlocutors often insisted there really were not any hospitals or clinics
around until nthawi ya Kamuzu (“the time of Kamuzu Banda,” aka post-independence).
One group of women, all in their seventies, had a shared response when I asked about
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government health care during the colonial era: Panalibe! (“There were none!”).1 They
insisted on this despite the fact that there had been a government dispensary in Sombe—
which was within two hours’ walk of Nyanza—since the 1920s.2 Nyanza was not in some
blank space on the colonial medical map. But over his long reign, Hastings Kamuzu
Banda had repeated so often that there were hardly any medical facilities before him, and
that so many of those in existence were built under his rule, that these women seemed to
have accepted it as the truth.3

During the colonial era, the women explained, people found medicine “in trees.” One
woman, Linda, showed me the scars on the inside of her lower leg below the knee where,
as a child, she had chronic pain treated with herbs poured into cuts made with a razor.
The treatment worked, she remembered, for the pain was soon gone, and never returned.
Yet even though Linda had lost two children to measles, and another to AIDS, she
maintained that mankhwala wa mzungu (“white people’s medicine”) was stronger than
the herbs of the past.

The popular narrative about mankhwala wa mzungu among the elderly in Nyanza is that
medicines grew in potency during nthawi ya Kamuzu, but then weakened during
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by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official Opening of
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“multiparty” (the era of multiparty democratic elections that followed the end of Banda’s
reign in 1994). Francis’s septuagenarian mother, Anna, remembers well-stocked, wellmanned, well-maintained health facilities, especially early in Banda’s reign. Even longtime Malawian government employees shared some version of this narrative. On a drive
home from an outreach cervical cancer-screening clinic in the rural Neno District, a
veteran female nurse remembered “there were many medicines in the time of Kamuzu
Banda,” and “fewer stock-outs.” Today, the narrative goes, things are much worse.
Mankhwala kulibe (“There are no medicines”), laments Francis’s wife Edith. She recalls
recent instances when nearby government facilities have been stocked out of antibiotics
like chloramphenicol, and even cheap analgesics like Panadol (acetaminophen) or aspirin.
The staff at the hospital, she said, have only one piece of advice: “Buy them yourself!”
(“Mugule!”).

This story of rise and decline is similar to the one people in Nyanza village tell about
agricultural production. Anna said that food was most abundant during the reign of
Kamuzu Banda. She remembered receiving two bags of fertilizer for free every year.
Unlike the current fertilizer subsidy program (“coupons”), these bags went to everyone.
This program went away, she said, at the start of the multiparty era. Anna was
remembering the large fertilizer subsidy program of the Banda era. The government had
abolished the program in the late 1980s as a condition of its second World Bank
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structural adjustment loan.4 Even though the subsidies were abolished in 1990, four years
before the start of the multiparty era, in popular memory the two events are linked.5

Things grew even worse in the 1990s. The “multiparty” era came to be associated in the
popular imagination with famines, the likes of which the country had not seen since the
late 1940s. After a weak maize harvest led the government to seek advice from the
Rockefeller Foundation, the Malawian government began a universal (and universally
popular) “starter pack” program, in which every household received a small packet of
food and fertilizer. But facing pressure from donor governments, the government
drastically scaled back the scale of the program in 2001. Smallholder maize production
fell precipitously, from over 2 million metric tons in 2000 to less than 1.5 million metric
tons in 2001.6 Under Banda government had often made up for such shortfalls in
production in part by selling maize from its “strategic grain reserve.” In 1979 Malawi had
constructed massive concrete silos at Kanengo, outside Lilongwe. The Kanengo silos,
which housed grain bought from farmers in good harvest years to be resold at reasonable
prices in bad ones, had for decades been trumpeted as a symbol of Banda’s protection of
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his people.7 In 1990, near the end of Kamuzu Banda’s tenure, the Bank of Malawi even
introduced a 100-kwacha note with the Life President on the front (as always) and the
Kanengo grain silos on the reverse.8 But this symbol of dictatorial beneficence would
soon transform, in the public eye, into an icon of democracy’s false promises. As part of
its campaign to tear down the idols of the former regime, President Bakili Muluzi’s
government removed the grain silo from the 100-kwacha bill in 1997.9 Far less popular
was the action the government took in 1999 when, in fulfillment of a condition of a
World Bank loan, Muluzi’s government privatized the grain reserve. By June 2000 all the
grain in the silos had had been sold off, mostly to private speculators within Malawi.10
When the next year’s harvest proved weak, the government had no stores to sell back to
its people, while speculators could charge exorbitant prices. After a half-century without
widespread famine, the scourge had returned.11
The advent of multiparty democracy also coincided with another disaster. AIDS ravaged
communities, including Nyanza, where most everyone mentioned a son, daughter,
brother, sister, mother or father lost to the disease. Many would speak of the death of a
young adult during this period without invoking AIDS (edzi), though the cause could be
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inferred given the age of the decedent and the era. Almost no one had access to lifesaving
antiretroviral therapy before 2005.

The result of this confluence of conflagrations is a decided distrust of the present political
system. In Nyanza, this distrust is often expressed with reference to medicines and food.
Anna, who lost one child to AIDS in the late 1990s, explains that medicine had the
greatest mphamvu (strength, potency) during the time of Kamuzu Banda. She also
remembers food being most abundant during his reign (she attributes this to the fertilizer
subsidies). Bamusa says that rains fell at the right time and in the right amount during
nthawi atsamunda (the colonial era) and nthawi ya Kamuzu Banda. But under Muluzi, he
says, there was too little rain, and under the then-current president, Arthur Peter
Mutharika, there was too much. Bamusa remembers the starter pack program fondly, and
believes the cause of the 2002 famine was the privatization of the grain reserve. For this,
he blames former President Muluzi.

Thus, Banda’s legacy was burnished not only by his ideologies of protection and
abundance, but also by coincidence. He returned to Malawi from a near-lifelong exile in
1958, in the midst of the marked increase in attendance at government medical facilities.
Though the women of Nyanza insisted he had built all of Malawi’s government hospitals
and health centers, the country had almost 100 dispensaries, and over a dozen clinics, as
early as the mid-1930s. But until shortly before he came the medicines were “weaker,”
even in the eyes of the colonial doctors. The doctor’s return at the same time as
biomedicine was growing in popularity became linked in popular memory. Decades,
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later, in 1994, as the aged Banda left office, an incurable and inevitably fatal disease
claimed the lives of ever-more men, women and children. Though Banda had himself had
acceded to some of the Bank’s demands for privatization and budget cuts in agriculture,
these changes became associated in popular memory with multiparty democracy.
Historians have noted that Banda pursued agricultural policies that exploited smallholder
farmers. His government marketing board (ADMARC) paid maize producers far lower
than prevailing global prices. He then funneled the profits realized by the marketing
boards to provide aid and credit to plantations and unproductive factories, many of which
he owned personally.12 Malawians did not forget the Malawi Congress Party cards he
made every single Malawian purchase yearly and carry everywhere.13

At tea one morning, Francis told stories of tax collection. In the time of Kamuzu Banda,
he said everyone had to pay taxes in form of party card. Everyone had to have one. And
this meant everyone: babies, old people, even unborn children still in the womb. Tax
collectors would scour the country every year. If you didn’t have the money ready when
they came, you might hide in the forest. If you were caught without money to pay, you
would be rounded up into police vans and driven to police station in Monkey Bay. One
tax collector in Nankwhali was infamous for beating people to death if they didn’t have
the kwacha for the card. “He killed many people,” Francis said. Buying the card was not
enough. You had to keep card with you at all times. If a collector or policeman asked you
to produce it while you walked down the street and you couldn’t, you would be arrested
12

Jonathan Kydd and Robert Christiansen, “Structural Change in Malawi since Independence:
Consequences of a Development Strategy Based on Large-Scale Agriculture,” World
Development 10, no. 5 (1982): 355–75.
13
Interview with Francis, March 20, 2015.
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and often beaten. If you went to hospital without your party card, you could be refused
treatment. There were, Francis said, no exceptions to this system, even for the indigent
(Look up this law). When ‘multiparty” came, people were happy at first, as they no
longer had to buy party cards. But Muluzi’s regime was marked by hunger and disease,
so people associate multiparty with as much bitterness as sweetness, if not more.14

An elderly woman living in Nyanza named Dalitso remembered the beatings by tax
collectors. But she did not consider the present to be a marked improvement—far from it.
People may have lacked “peace” under Kamuzu Banda, but they did not starve. Now,
Dalitso said, she begs her grandson for food, only to hear him respond palibe (“I have
none.”) Her husband died a decade ago after a painful illness that she did not name. She
is too frail to walk to the field or the clinic. She lives alone in a wattle-and-daub hut, with
a thatch roof infested with wasps. She suffers from chronic abdominal pain, but (aside
from our trip to Nankwhali together, see Chapter 7a prelude) she goes to a clinic no more
than once a year. Her main sources of income are her son, who lives nearby with his large
family, and the banana-leaf mats (nkeka) that she weaves by hand. Each one takes her
two weeks to make, and sells for 1500 kwacha (about US$5). Today in Nyanza, the hopes
that attended the much-vaunted “third-wave of African democratization” are a thing of
the past.

14

Interview with Francis, March 20, 2015.
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I. Introduction
By the early 1970s, the unrest of Malawi’s 1960s had quieted. The cabinet ministers who
had rebelled against Banda were exiled and largely forgotten; a few of the most
prominent were dead. Banda relished this quietude, and used the opportunity to centralize
power. He extolled “obedience” and “unity” as two of the cardinal virtues for citizens in
the new nation. In 1971, the Malawi Congress party named him “Life President.” The
following year, Banda declared “everything is my business…When people think of the
government in the village, to them it’s Kamuzu.”1

Indeed, everything was his business. By the mid-1970s, Banda came to own many of the
nation’s grandest agricultural estates. He also purchased much of the nation’s industrial
sector. Secure in his perch, Banda felt little of the disquiet that had motivated the
Federation government (and his own government, in its first few years) to spend on
health as a political palliative.

But Banda knew the potency of medicine as a political symbol. He also knew how to
exploit crises elsewhere in order to garner financial resources. By publicly supporting
foreign governments with poor reputations in Black Africa (such as apartheid South
Africa, Portuguese Mozambique, or post-1973 Israel), Banda was able to secure aid for
health projects. He also found aid from other international sources, including

1

“His Excellency the Life President’s Speeches: Opening of the Education Conference, Soche
Hill College” (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, April 17, 1972), MNA. Page 4.
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McNamara’s World Bank, which began to provide more financing for health activities
outside of population control in the mid-1970s.

Banda made use of this aid for personal political gain. In grand displays, he made every
new hospital and clinic a demonstration of his personal generosity. Yet, because neither
international donors nor Malawi’s own government were willing to significantly increase
recurrent (as opposed to capital) spending on health, the nation’s health facilities
remained without the staff, drugs and equipment necessary to deliver decent care.

II. Human Capital and Foreign aid availability
a) Human capital: health as wealth enters development economics theory, 1964-1972
By the mid-1970s, the debate over population control did not so dominate discussions of
health policy, either in transnational academic discussions of development or in Malawi.
Instead, another paradigm was on the rise, one that would move health services beyond
contraception, and closer to the center of development discourse. This paradigm was
called “investment in man” or “human capital.” The idea posited that human abilities—
and not just the number of miles of road or the stock of factory equipment—might be the
rate-limiting step in achieving aggregate economic growth. During the mid-1960s,
economists Gary Becker and Yoram Ben-Porath had produced models in which
individuals’ “investment” in formal schooling or on-the-job training raised their levels of
productivity, thereby yielding higher aggregate output for the economy as a whole.2
2

Gary Becker, Human Capital, 1964; Gary Becker, Human capital and the personal distribution
of income: an analytical approach. WS Woytinsky Lecture no. 1. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, 1967; Yoram Ben-Porath, “The production of human capital and the life cycle of
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Several prominent economists, including Victor Fuchs, suggested health might be another
form of human capital.3 Yet throughout the 1960s health remained a poor relation to
education in the human capital literature. Only the latter was included in the formal
mathematical models that were so prized among academic economists.

This began to change in 1972, when Michael Grossman, a recently minted PhD from
Columbia University who had worked with Victor Fuchs at the US National Bureau of
Economic Research, published such a model in The Journal of Political Economy. In
Grossman’s model, the main effect of increasing a person’s “stock” of health was not
greater productivity (as was the case for a higher “stock” of education)—but rather an
increase in the “total amount of time he can spend producing money earnings and
commodities.”4 A person’s initial stock of health was inherited at birth and depreciated
with age, but could be increased through investments in “medical care, diet, exercise,
recreation, and housing,” as well as in “environmental variables” such as “the level of
education of the producer.”5 Grossman became an influential voice in health economics;

earnings, Journal of Political Economy 75 (August 1967): 353-367. For even earlier invocations
of education as a form of human capital, see TW Schultz, “Investment in human Capital,” The
American Economic Review, Vol 51, No 1, March 1961, pp 1-17, and J Mincer, “Investment
inhuman capital and personal income distribution,” Journal of Political Economy 66 (1958); 3:
281-302.
3
Selma Mushkin, “Health as an investment,” Journal of Political Economy 70, no 2, suppl
(October 1962): 129-57; Victor Fuchs, “The contribution of health services to the American
economy,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 44 (October 21966): 65-102; Gary Becker, Human
Capital. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
4
Michael Grossman, “On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health,” The
Journal of Political Economy 80, no. 2 (1972): 223–55.
5
Ibid. Environmental variables were, to Grossman, outside the control of the consumer, while the
other investments were choices made by individuals themselves, p. 225. For another discussion of
the history of human capital arguments in the economics literature, see Muhammad Jami Husain,
“Contribution of health to economic development: a survey and overview,” Economics E-journal,
September 2009.
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in 1972 he was appointed head of the health economics division of the National Bureau
of Economic Research, a post he retained as of 2016. His model complicated those that
saw only physical capital as a productive investment.

At the same time, more prominent economic thinkers called into question the hegemony
of such formalistic model-making altogether. In a massive tome titled An Asian Drama,
the Swedish economist, sociologist and former politician Gunnar Myrdal, lamented the
postwar infatuation with abstracted growth models focused on physical capital:
Models centered on the concept of a capital/output ratio have dictated the
direction of economic planning in underdeveloped countries. One implication of
this postwar approach is the assumption that ‘non-economic’ factors—not only
institutions and attitudes but also levels of living, including health and educational
facilities—can be disregarded. The primary and often exclusive importance given
to investment in physical capital for economic development requires this
assumption.6
Myrdal believed “there can be no warrant for leaving health out of the development
picture,” as “ill health is a very serious deterrent to a rise in labour input and efficiency in
the underdeveloped countries of South Asia.” But Myrdal did not favor a mere expansion
of the definition of “capital” in capital/output models to include health. Rather, he
advised development economists to abandon these hopelessly inaccurate models. Solow
had demonstrated in the 1950s that capital/output models could not explain historical
patterns of growth through physical capital alone (see Chapter 7). But Myrdal believed
adding health and education to these capital/output models was no panacea. Health, after
all, required a large number of inputs, most notably (but not exclusively) food, clothing,
housing and sanitary facilities. A capital/output model that included health as an input
6
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of Nations (New Delhi: Kalyani Publishers, 2008).
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would, of necessity, include every input that affected health. This would, Myrdal
claimed, result in a model that lacked the benefits of reductionism. Such a model would
be “virtually empty of theoretical content”—it could offer only a “vague propaganda term
for a more rational and circumspect development planning that takes into account not
only physical investment but all other induced changes.” Myrdal insisted he did not
oppose formal models or quantitative social science per se but, he insisted, “Both models
and quantitative pronouncements must be logically consistent and thoroughly grounded
in the facts.”

Myrdal’s book, published in 1968, came at a moment of profound uncertainty within
development economics. Postwar development planning based on capital/output ratios
and an overwhelming focus on physical capital had not resulted in disappointment. The
implementation of five-year development plans focused on industry and agriculture in
India yielded average annual GNP growth of only 3.5 percent during the 1950s and
1960s.7 Schematized trajectories of Western economic growth such as Rostow’s were
proving difficult to recapitulate in South Asia and Africa. Lester Pearson’s 1968 World
Bank report (referenced earlier for its support of population control) documented the
manifold disappointments of recent decades of investment.8

Even the gross national product (GNP), the preeminent measure of development during
the heyday of modernization, came under attack. In a November 1969 speech, Dudley
7

Paul Joseph Cruickshank, “The Teleology of Care: Reinventing International Health, 19681989” (PhD Dissertation, History of Science, Harvard, 2011).
8
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Seers, one of the founders of the Institute for Development Studies at the University of
Sussex in the UK and a leading light in development thought, argued that economic
growth and development had been conflated. He offered another definition of
development: “Development means creating conditions for the realization of the human
personality.” Seers argued that, by this definition, development meant a reduction in
poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Growth was no proxy for development, as
metrics of poverty, unemployment and inequality could all fall in the absence of
aggregate economic growth. 9

The more expansive definition of “capital” and “investment” began to displace the
theories favored by the Lewis, Rostow and other doyens of modernization, who saw
government spending on public health and medicine mainly as “consumption.” The
claims in the economic literature that health was a form of “human capital,” as worthy as
public investment as physical capital like roads and bridges and power plants, created a
more hospitable intellectual environment for health spending in Malawi. This was
particularly true in the development (capital) budget—made up almost entirely of
external financing. The share of the capital budget devoted to public health and medicine
projects increased from 1.1 percent in 1971 (since independence, it had hovered around 1
to 2 percent) to 6.4 percent in 1974.

9

Dudley Seers, “What Are We Trying to Measure?” (World Conference of the Society for
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Still, the enabling influence of human capital arguments had a relatively muted impact on
the recurrent budget for health in Malawi, which largely came from domestic revenues.
The share of government recurrent expenditure going toward the Ministry of Health did
increase from 6.1 percent in 1971 to 7.6 percent in 1976, but it never approached
Federation-era levels. Compared to the turbulent 1950s and 1960s, this was a decade of
political quietus; the still-paltry public sector health budget was, more than anything else,
a reflection of this fact.
b) McNamara’s World Bank expands health beyond contraception, 1971-1973
Much of Malawi’s newfound health funding in the 1970s came from international aid
agencies, both bilateral and multilateral. Even though a détente between Malawi and the
World Bank over the population issue would prove elusive for decades, the Bank and
other external agencies did begin to provide aid for health activities other than family
planning in Malawi by the mid-1970s. As detailed in Chapter 9, population control
aroused great controversy not only in Malawi but also in a number of developing
countries. This controversy only grew with revelations that the intrauterine devices
promoted by population control advocates could cause dire adverse effects.10

The inclusion of health in growth models, challenges to model-making itself, and
concomitant efforts to redefine development beyond GNP growth all created an
intellectual opening for international aid agencies seeking to move beyond a
modernization paradigm focused on physical capital. In the early 1970s, McNamara
10

Andrea Tone, Devices and Desires : A History of Contraceptives in America, 1st ed. (New
York: Hill and Wang, 2001). Tone details how the Dalkon Shield, an IUD promoted by
international institutions in India in the 1970s caused uterine perforation and (sometimes fatal)
hemorrhage.
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began to expand his focus on health beyond birth control to nutrition and, to a limited
extent, curative health services. McNamara appointed a biochemist as his science advisor
in 1970, and listed nutrition as one of his areas of focus. In 1972, the Bank opened a
Nutrition Unit devoted to research and recommendations on the problems of malnutrition.
That same year, the World Bank joined an international consortium to eradicate river
blindness in West Africa, and began including lending for primary health care to larger
project loans primarily aimed at improving agriculture or reducing population growth.11

This change in course at the Bank moved discussions with Malawi beyond the impasse
over population policy. In April 1971, John Malone (of the Bank’s Eastern African
Department) reminded his boss that in an upcoming meeting Malawi’s Minister of
Finance was “almost certain” to reiterate “the Government’s long-standing request” to
use Bank loans to build health facilities within regions of the country already supported
by agricultural loans, including Karonga, Lilongwe, and the Lower Shire.12 Whereas in
1969 the Bank had declined to finance programs aimed at “mortality control” (see
Chapter 9), Malone’s 1971 memo explained that the Eastern African Department was
actively considering Malawi’s request and had recently hired Eric de Winter, a Dutch
missionary doctor who had worked in Nkhata Bay during the late 1960s, as a
consultant.13

11
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De Winter’s influence was apparent immediately. Compared to the Report of a World
Bank Mission to Malawi in 1969, a report that had not included a health consultant and
focused only on population pressures, De Winter’s team produced a report with a detailed
and, for the era, ambitious plan for health services. The team evaluated a proposed “Rural
Development Program” in Karonga District. The proposed loan would be provided on
concessional terms to Malawi by the arm of the Bank called the International
Development Association (IDA). This project aimed to increase agricultural yields
through the construction of irrigation canals, feeder roads, dipping tanks for cattle, and
the provision of extension services and farm credit. But the report also lamented the
Malawi government’s dismally low expenditure on health (though it placed the blame
“financial constraints” rather than deliberate neglect), and referred to recent surveys
demonstrating that that nine percent of farmers’ labor time was being lost due to illness.14
The report recommended the inclusion of a bilharzia control program in newly irrigated
areas (irrigation was known to provide ideal environment for the snails that carry the

14
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parasites causing bilharzia), the construction and operation of five rural health outposts,
and improvements to the Chilumba Rural Hospital and the Karonga District Hospital.15

Yet these line items made up only a small part of the project’s budget. Furthermore, the
report’s authors did not even envision that the project’s health-related spending would be
financed by the IDA loan. Over five years, the entire project was slated to cost a total of
$7,761,000, with slightly more than half ($4,109,000) to be financed by the IDA loan.
The remainder ($3,652,000) would come from Malawi’s own current domestic tax
revenues. Of the total project spending only $307,000 (4.0%) would be spent on health
activities. Most of the health spending ($181,000) was to be funded by Malawi’s current
revenues, while the remainder ($126,000) would be financed by the IDA loan.16

Still, the Karonga project marked a departure from the Bank’s earlier position of
wholesale opposition to health financing. Prior to De Winter’s involvement in the 1971
report, IDA loans for Rural Development Projects in Lilongwe and the Lower Shire
Valley had not included any health care components.17 But in Malawi and elsewhere,
15
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new Bank funding for disease control and health facilities remained only a minor part of
its development financing. The Bank did not provide “standalone” funding for preventive
and curative health care activities (as opposed to health care components of agriculture
project budgets) until 1979, the same year McNamara established a Health Department
within the Bank.18

III. Exploiting foreign crises and building Banda’s image as protector
a) Health in a political economy of exploitation
By the early 1970s, Banda had secured firm political control in Malawi. Gone were the
rebellious ministers who sparked the Cabinet Crisis, or the widespread fear and rumor
fanned by the Chilobwe murders (see Chapter 9). Whereas the unrest of the 1960s
compelled Banda restrain his pursuit of his economic vision, by the 1970s political
quietus left Banda free to pursue profoundly inegalitarian policies. A number of
historians have noted the systematic impoverishment of smallholder agriculture under
Banda’s rule. The state-run agricultural marketing board, ADMARC, purchased tobacco
from smallholder farmers at prices far below prevailing global market prices, then resold
the crop on international markets. Even when international prices rose dramatically in the
mid-1960s, ADMARC did not increase the price it paid smallholders for their crops.
ADMARC’s burgeoning profits were invested in elite-owned agricultural estates, largely
tea and tobacco estates in the south. 19 Banda and other prominent members of the

Proposed Loan to the Republic of Malawi for a Karonga Rural Development Project--Phase II,”
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Malawi Congress Party had purchased these estates for themselves after cancelling the
leases of European and Indian farmers so as to obtain the land at firesale prices.20 Banda
also used state funds to build ornate homes for himself around the country. During the
grants-in-aid period British officials criticized these “palaces” as unseemly and wasteful
uses of public funds, but Banda argued that his people expected him to live in such
residences.21

Banda’s regime faced few existential threats, either internally or externally, during the
1970s. The World Bank and bilateral donors thought Banda’s economic policies
masterful.22 And without the armed rebellions that had so preoccupied him during 1960s,
the form of ADMARC the form of concessionary loans, assistance from agricultural extension
agents, and inputs such as fertilizer. Also see Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS and Hunger: Breaking
the Poverty Trap in Malawi.
20
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Banda faced, from a cynical political perspective, less of an imperative to spend on health
as a political palliative. He could, and did, resort to other ways of dealing with discontent,
such as jailing, exiling or killing those who challenged his rule.23

Still, Banda also sought to demonstrate his concern for his people, to make good on his
promise to be the “nkhoswe number 1.”24 Part of this came in his taxation policy. The
colonial systems of hut taxation and thangata ended with independence. Still, rural
Malawians were still made to buy Malawi Congress Party cards every year. And as in the
colonial era, Malawians paid direct and indirect taxes on consumption, in the form of
import duties and sales taxes.25

averaged over 7 percent yearly, domestic savings went from virtually nothing to about 12 percent
of GDP, and investment quickly rose and is now over 20 percent of GDP (public fixed investment
was about 11 percent during 1937-74). Exports boomed, the import elasticity to GDP was held to
less than one, rural-urban income differentials were reduced by a tough, austere urban wage
policy, and public sector management (and IDA disbursements) resembles more that of a
forthcoming Bank ‘graduate’ than a ‘least developed country.’ Malawi can feed itself and is even
exporting surpluses of its staple food crops.” Meo also justified Banda’s estate and industrial
policies that fostered inequality: “There remains a continued concern by the Bank on ‘income
distribution.’ This, apparently, is more related to our concern over the enrichment of a few
cabinet ministers and private sector expatriates in the estates and industrial sector. While these
managers and entrepreneurs may be getting rich, they have provided employment, exports and
production almost unique in the area. We now know that more than half of smallholder income
stems from cash payments provided from non-farming activities; much of it from jobs provided
on the estates and industries. Could Malawi have increased smallholder output (and incomes)
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Some of Banda’s most ostentatious demonstrations of beneficence came in the realm of
health. In a December 1975 speech at the official opening of Dedza’s new District
Hospital, Banda thanked District Chairman Juma for introducing him as “Jesus Christ for
this country.” Banda proceeded to explain how he, personally, had improved Malawi’s
health sector:
That is why I wanted power—to improve the standard of living of my people.
And not only food and dress, no, but also education and health…When I came
here in 1958, true there were some hospitals, there were some clinics and
dispensaries, but very few. I wanted more…Anyone who respects the truth will
admit that there are more hospitals in the country now, more clinics and more
dispensaries, than there were in 1958 when I came here…Take, for example, the
hospital at Kasungu. There was a hospital there when I came but I did not like it,
so I built another one. At Rumphi, up North, there was no hospital at all. I had to
order the building of a hospital at Rumphi. There was a hospital here, but…I did
not like it…That place was too small to cope with the population, far too small,
and there were not enough facilities there. That was why I decided to build a new
one and began to find means of financing and building the hospital.26
In a 1972 article, health economist Peter Ruderman observed, “To many presidents and
prime ministers, a hospital is a more satisfactory monument than an arch of triumph.”27
This was certainly the case in Malawi. If this was not abundantly clear at the Dedza
Hospital opening in 1975, it surely was two years later when the Banda named
Lilongwe’s new central hospital (financed mainly through a loan from the Danish
government) after himself.28
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At times Banda constructed narratives in which it was not the Malawian state, but rather
his own personal fortune, that made improvements in the health sector possible. Officials
publicized Banda’s “donations” to buy food for hospital inpatients. Here the parallel
between caregiving by kin and Banda’s “gift” to the sick is striking. Among friends and
kin, the gift of food, particularly the ndiwo (relish, or side dish) that accompanies the
staple maize meal, is a particularly potent demonstration of generosity. LJ Chimango,
Banda’s Minister of Health, used one of Banda’s donations to purchase “poultry
products, bread, fruit, green maize and fresh fish.” While the government budget covered
the cost of nsima, the basic maize staple, Banda himself contributed the ndiwo. As if the
parallel between caregiving by kin and Banda’s role as nkhoswe was not clear enough,
Banda’s officials arranged to have this food distributed by the League of Malawi
Women.29

Unlike Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and other stalwarts of African socialism, Banda
did not portray himself as a common man.30 He amassed great wealth and showed it.31
29

“Address by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda after Inspecting
and Approving the Site for the Kamuzu College of Nursing, Lilongwe, 8 December 1975,” in His
Excellency the Life President’s Speeches: Central Region Tour, December 2-15, 1975, n.d., 18–
25; “Letter from LJ Chimango, Minister of Health, to Life President Hastings Kamuzu Banda,
‘Annual Report on Gift of K160,000 to Four Hospitals,’” 1979, 9-12-1AF, MNA.
30
Banda’s officials were often quite direct that their priority was increasing aggregate production,
and not equalizing the distribution of wealth. In a speech on March 12, 1971, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources AW Mwafulerwa explained: “Our
duty here is to create wealth which our children who come later will come and dispute on its
share. How they are going to divide that wealth. But it is no good now for us to scramble how we
should divide the wealth here which does not exist. Therefore our main task in this country is to
create wealth…and later our children will come and argue how to share this wealth.” Thomas,
“Economic Developments in Malawi Since Independence.” Page 50.
31
At the same time, he did not wish everyone to know the extent of his wealth. Glyn Jones
remembered that part of the reason Banda opposed the Africanization of bank management at
Malawian branches of the British-based Standard Bank. “I don’t really think that I would like any
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He often reminded the crowds at his public addresses that he was “not poor.” 32 But, he
continued, he used his wealth to help people. Explaining in a 1975 speech why he had
paid out of his own pocket to construct student housing at the new College of Nursing in
Lilongwe, Banda declared: “To me, money is of importance only for what I can do with
it, not just for its own sake, not just for the sake of accumulating money, no—only for the
use to which I can put it.”33 Banda justified his personal wealth and inegalitarian policies
by the good work he did through his donations. The very modesty of his regime’s
accomplishments in health made these grand rhetorical, symbolic, and material
demonstrations of largesse so important.

The Life President exercised a considerable measure of personal control over the health
sector. Perhaps because he knew the esteem in which doctors were held, Banda
personally oversaw the approval process for individual expatriate physicians, nurses, and
laboratory technicians seeking temporary licenses to work in Malawi’s government and
mission hospitals.34 This fear of fellow professionals may also have motivated his
consistent refusal to build a medical school in Malawi. As late as 1979, 100 of the 130
doctors working in Malawi (in missions and government facilities) were expatriates. A
of my chaps to be handling my account,” Banda had said, according to Jones. “Their sisters and
their cousins and their aunts would know the next day what my balance was...An African woman
teller—you know jolly well that her uncle will be on to her and say, ‘How much was that cheque
deposited on behalf of Dr. Banda?’” Jones et al., Colloquium on Nyasaland Finance. Page 76.
31
Ibid. Pages 74-75.
32
“Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975.” Page 17.
33
“Address by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda after Inspecting
and Approving the Site for the Kamuzu College of Nursing, Lilongwe, 8 December 1975.” Page
23.
34
LJ Chimango, “Memorandum to His Excellency the Life President re: ‘Japanese Volunteers,’”
January 4, 1980, 9-12-1AF, MNA.
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few Malawian-born students were sent abroad for medical training, but this number
averaged only five per year.35
b) Preying on crises of legitimacy: Banda’s search for foreign aid among
international outcasts
Much of Banda’s time during his early years as Prime Minister (and, after 1967, as
President) of Malawi was spent traveling the world asking foreign leaders for
development aid. Banda sought funds from many nations, including the United States,
Germany, Portugal, South Africa, Israel, and, of course, the UK. These pilgrimages
dominated the schedules of many postcolonial African leaders, and even determined the
capacities of many to remain in power.36

In his requests for aid, health was not Banda’s first priority. For many years Banda
remained intent on grand infrastructure projects, chief among them his plan to move the
capital from Zomba to Lilongwe.37 But, as the last chapter detailed, before the mid-1970s
even when Banda did seek funds for health projects his requests mostly fell on
unreceptive ears. Walt Rostow and Arthur Lewis’ characterizations of spending on
healthcare as “consumption,” inapposite to the goal of economic growth, was taken as
gospel by the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies.

35

LJ Chimango, “Letter to His Excellency the Life President re: ‘Medical School - Feasibility
Study,’” November 29, 1979, 9-12-1AF, MNA. A medical school finally opened in Malawi in the
early 1990s, toward the end of Banda’s rule. See Wendland, A Heart for the Work.
36
Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002). Pages 156-157.
37
Sindima, Malawi’s First Republic: An Economic and Political Analysis. Page 69.
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After Malawi gained independence, the UK provided budgetary support. Though
substantial at first, by 1972 Banda had weaned Malawi off of this support, a year earlier
than planned. Banda saw fiscal reliance on the British—and the strings that came along
with it—as degrading. But he did not see other kinds of aid in the same way. The search
for aid was, to Banda a demonstration of both personal skill and national sovereignty. By
securing support from a variety of sources, Banda could make the claim that he had not
surrendered the nation’s independence to any outside power.38 So Banda made a grand
show of this search, organizing large crowds to send him off at the airport and to greet
him on his return.

In his public speeches, Banda made a virtue of his skills at securing aid. Addressing a
crowd in Neno in 1968, Banda declared, “I, your Kamuzu, have to find money
somewhere to build more roads, more bridges, more schools, more hospitals everywhere
in the country.”39 The following year at the Malawi Congress Party convention, Banda
told the assembled delegates, “When you work hard…you make it easier for your
Kamuzu to go to Britain, Germany, and the United States of America to ask for more
money.”40
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For a description of a similar political dynamic at work in post-colonial Lesotho, see John
Aerni-Flessner, “Development in Lesotho, 1970-75: Authoritarianism, Aid Increases, and the
Anti-Politics Machine.” Paper presented at Northeastern Workshop on Southern Africa,
Burlington, VT, April 15, 2016.
39
“The President Speaks: Speech Made by His Excellency the President, Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu
Banda at Neno, on Sunday, December 8, 1968.” Page 2.
40
“The President Speaks: Malawi Congress Party Convention” (Blantyre: Department of
Information, September 1969). Page 16.
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As a small, impoverished nation with few mineral resources, Banda had little to offer
foreign leaders in return for grants, concessional loans, or in-kind aid. But Malawi did
have a seat on the UN General Assembly, and—as an African nation ruled by a black
leader (rather than white settlers), some embattled governments sought out Malawi as an
ally.41 Banda realized the uses to which international controversy could be put. Rather
than siding with other southern African “frontline” states (e.g. Northern Rhodesia,
Botswana) in opposing apartheid South Africa, Smith’s Southern Rhodesia and
Portuguese Mozambique, Banda sought resources from these white-ruled governments in
exchange for support in the international arena.

When Banda did succeed in securing funding for new health facilities, he often secured it
from such politically besieged regimes interested in maintaining diplomatic ties to a black
African government. In 1965, the Beit Trust (tied to Southern Rhodesia) offered to help
purchase a radiotherapy unit for Malawi.42 In the mid-1970s the Gulbenkian Foundation,
a private foundation based in Portugal, and the Witswatersrand Native Labour
Association (WENELA), a South African agency that recruited Malawians to work in
South African’s mines, funded the construction of the new district hospital in Dedza.
Banda explained to the crowd at the hospital’s official opening that he had obtained the
funds by proposing diplomatic deals with both Portugal (then facing armed resistance in
Mozambique) and apartheid South Africa:
41

Harri Englund explains this diplomatic power in a discussion of the Republic of China
(Taiwan), which Banda made an ally of Malawi in 1966. “Taiwan depended on countries like
Malawi, however small and poor, in its attempt to gain recognition from the United Nations as a
sovereign state vis-à-vis mainland China’s claims to the contrary.” Englund, “Extreme Poverty
and Existential Obligations: Beyond Morality in the Anthropology of Africa?” Page 36.
42
“A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.”
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I happened to have known this foundation called Gulbenkian…I happened to
know the man who was running it. So I sent word to him saying I wanted
money…I said, ‘Tell your chairman I know your government says it wants
friendship with us here, particularly with me. If your government wants to be
friendly with me it must help me build a new hospital at Dedza. If it refuses then I
will not believe it if it says it is my friend.’ I was blunt…Within two or three
weeks I got a letter to say, ‘O, we can at least let you have K144,000’…It was
after I had that word that I began to ask WENELA to add to what the others had
given. I said, ‘All right, WENELA, you are recruiting my people here. That is
what someone away from here has promised, so what have you to offer me?’...So
they were ashamed into promising me. 43
During the Cabinet Crisis Banda’s rebellious ministers had denounced his willingness to
ally Malawi with odious colonialists like the Portuguese or the white supremacists ruling
South Africa. But, in this address as in others, Banda defended his policies by trying to
demonstrate how they provided direct and tangible benefits to the people of Malawi.

Outside of southern Africa, Banda sought assistance from other nations who were eager
for more allies. One of these nations was Israel. In 1964, Israel contributed five Medical
Officers to the sorely understaffed Ministry of Health, still reeling from a raft of
departures. In the first months of Malawi’s independence, these Israeli doctors would run
some of the nation’s largest hospitals, including those in Lilongwe and Zomba. Also in
1964, the Ministry of Health signed contracts to employ Israeli physicians as Medical
Superintendent and Medical Specialist at Blantyre’s Queen Elizabeth Hospital.44 The
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“Speech by His Excellency the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda at the Official
Opening of Dedza District Hospital, December 4, 1975.”
44
“Annual Report on the Work of the Nyasaland/Malawi Ministry of Health for the Year 1964.”
Page 3. In his inaugural address at the State opening of Parliament in 1966, Banda recounted how
he obtained support from Israel: “It is the endeavor of my Government to ensure that health
services which it provides meet the aspirations of the people of Malawi. When we took over
responsibility for health three years ago, the staff of the Medical Department was seriously
depleted. In anticipation of that event I had asked the Israeli Government for a medical mission,
which that government immediately provided…The Israeli team enabled us to preserve the health
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majority of the more than one hundred Malawian-born nurses trained between 1964 and
1972 were trained in Israel.45

When Israel first set up an embassy in Nyasaland in 1960, it was not yet the pariah it
would later become among most of the majority-rule nations in Africa. A handful of
Black African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the years following the
June 1967 Six Days’ War.46 The more decisive break between Black African states and
Israel followed the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the vast majority broke off
diplomatic relations. In November 1973, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Council of Ministers issued a resolution denouncing Israel for its annexation of Arab
Territory, likening Israeli policies to European imperialism. In the wake of this divorce,
Malawi was one of only four Black African countries (the others were Swaziland,
Lesotho, and Mauritius) that maintained relations with Israel.47 Banda preferred to
request aid, rather than changes in policy, from nations facing international crises.48
Banda knew how to reap the dividends of disquiet.

services, and since then the staffing position has gradually improved both by way of normal
recruitment and by technical assistance from many countries, until there are today more doctors
employed by the Government in this country than ever before. They are drawn from no less than
13 countries, including Malawi itself.” See Mowschenson, “Dr. H Kamuzu Banda: President of
the Republic of Malawi.”
45
Colin Arthur Baker, “The Development of the Civil Service in Malawi from 1891 to 1972”
(PhD Dissertation, University of London, 1981). Page 330. Crucially, Israel also provided
training to Banda’s paramilitary force, the Young Pioneers.
46
These countries were: Guinea (severed relations in June 1967), Uganda (March 1972), Chad
(November 1972), Congo (Brazzaville) (December 1972), Niger (January 1973), Mali (January
1973), Burundi (May 1973), and Togo (September 1973). Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The
Problematic Friendship (I.B.Tauris, 1992). Page 37.
47
Ibid. Pages 37-38.
48
This stance was similar to the one Banda had taken vis-à-vis the United States. I In 1966
Banda declared that his government supported President Lyndon Johnson’s policy in Vietnam
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Not all of Malawi’s external health funding came from sources so anathema in Black
Africa as Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa. Still, Banda entered the
fray of international debates in such a way as to secure resources from wealthy donor
governments. In 1965 Banda told the UN General Assembly that “history, logic, justice
and fair play leave Malawi but with no choice but to recognize the government in Bonn
as the legal government of Germany.” Shortly thereafter, the West German Government
expressed its appreciation by offering a £1 million loan to replace Zomba’s General
Hospital with a new teaching hospital.49

During the 1960s and 1970s, Malawi’s health sector also benefited from increased
funding from a number of Western charities and bilateral and multilateral donor agencies.
UNICEF continued to provide supplies of vaccines, medicines and equipment, but also
funded programs in water and sanitation, primary health care, nutrition and primary
education. The European Development Fund financed the replacement of two district
hospitals. In 1971 the UK-based charity Oxfam provided a grant of £16,000 for the
construction of new blocks at mission hospitals at Malindi and Nkope.50 During the
1970s ten foreign governments, including Japan, The United Kingdom and the United
States also provided support for health care projects.51

“150 per cent.” Among other aid, the United States was, at this time, providing Peace Corps
Volunteers and funds for tuberculosis treatment. Short, Banda. Pages 239-240.
49
“A Conspectus Including the Development Plan for 1965-69.” Also see Short, Banda. Pages
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50
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51
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Though he consistently presented a pro-Western, pro-capitalist position after
independence, Banda was not averse to non-Western alliances if he thought he could
garner significant support.52 He approached the People’s Republic of China shortly after
independence, before siding with Taiwan after learning that Mao’s regime was aiding
some of the ministers who had rebelled against him.53 His general approach was to
support any government that would support his own.54
c) Re-conceptualizing health as an investment in Malawi’s Economic Planning
Department
52

Though he was a member of the Fabian Society in England during the 1940s, this membership
appears to have been driven largely by his involvement in the movement to stop the formation of
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nysaaland. There is no record of him espousing socialism as a
philosophical or political commitment. In a speech before the Zomba Debating Society in April
1964, Banda explained that his own preference was neither Soviet Communism nor the “rigid
Capitalism such as is known in America,” but rather “the kind of economic and political
life…which they have in Britain and the Scandinavian countries,” where “the State has a great
deal of power of control over business and businessmen, but without owning all the means of
production and distribution and without the power of conscription over capital and labour, except
in times of war…The individual still has a great deal of freedom and liberty to do what he likes.
But, at the same time, the state exercises a measure of control over him and his business, in the
interest of the whole community. And this to me, is the ideal system or ideal thing, in this unideal world.” See “What Is Communism? Speech by Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister
of Malawi, to Zomba Debating Society” (Ministry of Information, April 1964), Pam 1127,
1963/64, MNA. Pages 17-18. Once in power he pursued a mix of economic planning and marketbased policy.
53
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of Africa?” Page 38.
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Banda promised as much in April 1964, when he told the Zomba Debating Society that he
would pursue a policy of “discretional alignment.” “I will be friendly to everyone, or I will be
friendly to every corner of the globe, East or West, as you have heard me say so many times…In
America, I spoke at Harvard and Yale Universities in 1961…In each of the lectures and at each of
these universities, I said that so far as I was concerned, the policy of Nyasaland when
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non-alignment…And this is my policy now. Yes, discretional alignment and neutralism. When
the West is doing what I think is the right thing—what is good for Malawi—I will align myself
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Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, to Zomba Debating Society.” Pages 1920.
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By the mid-1970s, as international aid for health became increasingly available and as
prominent development economists challenged the “health-as-consumption” consensus,
economists within Malawi’s own Economic Planning Department began to reframe
health care as a productive investment. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, health was
mentioned but briefly in the Economic Planning Division’s annual Economic Report, and
even only to explain that health spending had been limited in order to cut the budget
deficit.55 But the 1974 Economic Report marked a shift. “Established policy is to
maintain existing services and concentrate improvements on those areas where the
greatest economic return is to be expected from better health—e.g. agricultural project
areas, where under-employment is at a minimum.”56 Though the idea that health could
bring a substantial “economic return” was circumscribed to certain areas (and was
articulated in order to justify the domestic revenues that would have to be spent on health
on the World Bank agricultural projects), this language was nevertheless a departure from
the view that health care was unproductive consumption. The 1974 report was also the
first in which health secured its own place in the table of contents.

That same year, the Ministry of Finance began to allow more rapid increases in the
Ministry of Health budget. In the Finance Ministry’s announcement of planned annual

55

See the 1969 Economic Report: “Because of constraints imposed by the need to reduce the
budgetary deficit, it is not possible to undertake any significant expansion of health services and
attention is therefore being concentrated on finding means of making the best possible use of
existing facilities and personnel.” “Economic Report 1969, Prepared by the Office of the
President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division and the Ministry of Finance” (Zomba,
Malawi: Government Printer, 1970), Box 3, No 4, SoMA. Page 72
56
“Economic Report 1974, Office of the President and Cabinet, Economic Planning Division”
(Zomba, Malawi: Government Printer, 1975), Centre for African Studies Pamphlets, Malawi Box
16, UoELA. Page 55.
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“ceilings” on increases in recurrent expenditure in the coming three-year period, the
Ministries of Works and Agriculture were each allotted a 10 percent increase, while the
Ministries of Education and Health were allowed to increase spending by 7.5 percent.
Other departments secured less: the University of Malawi, once such a priority of
President Banda, was allowed only a 5 percent annual increase; and most other Ministries
and Departments were given a ceiling of 4 percent.57

As external funding became more available in the coming years, the authors of
subsequent reports indicated a commitment to health for the general population (and not
just those working in specified “agricultural project areas”). While reiterating the general
principle that health spending should be focused where “the greatest economic return is
to be expected,” the 1976 Report added: “But the inheritance at independence by the
Malawi Government of a health system which was inadequate and contained many illequipped and outdated hospitals has meant that a considerable part of the development
budget must be spent on maintaining and improving existing facilities.”58 Whereas in the
1960s health was not included among Banda’s budgetary priorities (which included a
new capital at Lilongwe, new roads and railways, and the University of Malawi), the
Ministry of Health came, by the mid-1970s, to occupy a more privileged place in
budgetary discussions.
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“Recent Economic Development and Prospects of Malawi” (International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, Eastern Africa
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Still, these shifts in the priority accorded to health were relatively minor. Ministry of
Health expenditure (including recurrent and capital expenditures) rose 25 percent in real
terms between fiscal years 1975/76 and 1980/81, but did not keep pace with the rise in
overall government spending.59 During the fiscal years 1976/77 through 1980/81, the
Ministry of Health claimed an average of only 6.8 percent of the Malawi government’s
recurrent budget and 1.8 percent of the development budget.60 Memos flew back and
forth within the Bank’s East Africa Department debating whether its reports should
attribute Malawi’s low level of government health spending to “neglect” or to “the
paucity of funds available” to fill the “bottomless pits” of need.61 Despite suggestions
from some Bank officials and other agencies that the government might spend more on
health, health as a share of government expenditure remained far below the Federationera peak.
d) Health in the political ideology of Banda’s rule, 1975-1977
Banda recognized the political significance of access to biomedicine. The numbers of
patients in hospitals and clinics continued to rise after independence, though at a slower
rate than during the Federation era. Between 1966 and 1974, outpatient attendances at
government facilities increased by 26 percent.62
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In his public addresses and in his administration’s propaganda, Banda stressed his
dedication to improving health care. The Times faithfully covered Banda’s annual
pilgrimages to Queen Elizabeth Hospital to visit the sick on Christmas Day. The first
stanza of Malawi’s national anthem, Mlungu dalitsani Malawi (“God bless Malawi”),
adopted in 1964, made the fight against disease one of the primary goals for the new
nation:
Mlungu dalitsani Malawi, (O God bless our land of Malawi)
Mumsunge m’mtendere. (Keep it a land of peace.)
Gonjetsani adani onse, (Put down each and every enemy,)
Njala, ntenda, nsanje, (Hunger, disease, envy,)
Lunzitsani mitima yathu (Join together all our hearts as one,)
Kuti tisaope (That we be free from fear.)
Mdalitse Mtsogoleri nafe (Bless our leader, each and every one,)
Ndi Mayi Malawi (And Mother Malawi.)
In speeches, Banda declared his commitment to improving access to medicine. During his
inaugural address as President [following a change in Malawi’s constitution] in 1966,
Banda said, “It is the endeavor of my Government to ensure that health services which it
provides meet the aspirations of the people of Malawi.” He pointed to his recruitment of
staff from Israel and other countries as evidence of his commitment. He also pointed to
the National School of Nursing, opened in 1965. He touted a 400-bed hospital to be built
in Zomba with the £1 million loan from West Germany.

Banda was not deterred by slow progress. In 1971, speaking once more before
Parliament, he acknowledged the modesty of his government’s achievements in the
health sector: “Of course…we have not achieved everything we want to achieve, but
everyone must admit that we have achieved far more than anyone ever hoped or expected
514

us to achieve.” New hospitals at Rumpi and Kasungu had been completed, though many
of the planned renovations to existing hospitals had not been carried out yet.63

By 1974 the tone was more confident. A Government-issued booklet that surveyed the
“expanding health services” since 1964 claimed: 3 new hospitals and 21 new dispensaries
had been built; visits at under-5 clinics (including government and mission facilities)
surpassed one million per year; government health assistants had improved access to safe
water in rural areas; smallpox and leprosy eradication programs had been launched; a
major new hospital in Lilongwe—with a new training school for medical auxiliaries—
was scheduled to be opened in 1975; and 20 Malawian doctors (trained abroad) practiced
in the country.64

Banda also touted his own status as a biomedical doctor, while simultaneous claiming
powers as an indigenous healer. At most every event, Banda carried a flywhisk, a gift
from Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta. Among the Kikuyu, the flywhisk was said to
confer defense against witchcraft. Many groups in Malawi, including the Yao, had
similar ritual objects.65 Banda had built a popular reputation for immense healing powers
during the first few months after his return from exile. A top-secret January 1959 report
by an analyst in the UK’s Special Branch explained, “Banda’s personal reputation
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amongst the illiterate masses has been enhanced by a belief, now becoming evident in the
urban areas of the southern province, that he has powers of faith healing, as even the most
sickly patients walk out of his surgery claiming to have been completely cured after five
minutes.”66 Even Banda was initially surprised by the power of his medical persona. A
few weeks after his release from Gwelo in April 1960, Banda expressed his surprise in a
letter to friends in London: “Poor patients! I do not know what to do about them…the
size of the crowd of patients is growing each day.”67

But after independence, the Life President’s most potent symbols of power were the
throngs of women who surrounded him. At the opening of Dedza District Hospital in
1975, Banda’s mbumba sang songs and danced during Banda’s speech. The songs, often
written by the women, were particularly important, as they were delivered in Chichewa.
Banda, on the other hand always delivered his speeches in English (even Banda’s closest
confidants admitted that after decades abroad he didn’t have much facility with Chichewa
or any other indigenous language). At the Dedza rally the mbumba’s first song was as
follows:
Ife ndife amayi (We are mothers)
Ochokera ku Dedza (The poor of Dedza)
Tangomvani mawu a Ngwazi (We are here to hear the words of our Hero)
Chitukuko m’Malawi (On the development of Malawi)68
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After Banda, speaking from the dais, thanked them for their “sense of gratitude,” the
women continued:
Taomboledwa a Malawi, (We are the redeemed of Malawi)
Taomboledwa mu ukapolo, (We are the redeemed from slavery)
Kubwera kwake kwa Ngwazi Kamuzu, (The coming of our Hero Kamuzu)
Nyimbo Zinamveka m’mwambam’mwamba, (The sounds of loud music could be
heard)
Oyitanidwa kudaona Kamuzu (When those who came to see Kamuzu)
Anasonkhana pa Chileka (Gathered at Chileka)69
“Chileka” is a reference to the airport outside Blantyre where Banda landed in Malawi in
1958 when he returned, to great fanfare, for the first time after decades living outside the
country. The women’s final song made clear that they were thanking Banda personally
for the new hospital. He was not a representative of the state, but rather its
personification:
Ife ndife amayi (“We are mothers”)
Tinyadira chipatala (“We are proud of the hospital”)
Tangoona a Ngwazi amangitsa chipatala. (“We see that our Hero has built a
hospital”)
The centrality of women to Banda’s political symbolism (also discussed in Chapter 9)
had been demonstrated early in his tenure. A prime example is an article from the Malawi
News, the mouthpiece of the Malawi Congress Party, which in January 1961 reported on
Banda’s speech to a crowd in Limbe with the headline: “Kamuzu Speaks to his Amazon
Army.” The article consistently referred to the women in the crowd as “his women.”70
This attribution of all women to Banda persisted well into his reign as Life President, and
motivated much of the imagery surrounding his appearances at hospitals and clinics. The
69
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presence of so many singing women was evidence of Banda’s greatest source of
wealth—his wealth in people.

IV. Counterintuitive, once more: health spending at the dawn of the neoliberal era
a) Limits of human capital and basic needs rhetoric at the World Bank
The brief opening for international aid for health services ended quite rapidly at the start
of the 1980s. Though McNamara had tried to champion new approaches to development
financing during his tenure at the Bank, he did not fundamentally change the institution’s
lending practices. In 1976, McNamara called for the Bank to focus not only on increasing
GDP growth, but to aim its attention and resources toward the universal provision of
“basic needs,” which to his mind included nutrition, health, clothing, and shelter.
McNamara insisted that there existed no tradeoff between equity and efficiency; the focus
on growth could continue alongside concern for basic needs. But his ambitions ran
aground against skeptical economists making everyday lending decisions and writing the
reports that shaped understandings of economic reality. Skeptics of health financing
maintained that no one could muster sufficient evidence to convince them that spending
on “basic needs” would yield as much growth as the earlier focus on physical capital such
as roads, telephone wiring and power plants. Critical observers (including the Bank’s
own staff) pilloried the “basic needs” approach as “a mistake,” a “superfluous new idea,”
a “slogan,” and a “populist” program that obscured the unavoidable trade-off between
consumption and investment.71

71

Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, The World Bank., 267.

518

By the early 1980s, profound global economic shifts made budget cuts for health appear,
to many in Ministries of Finance and international development agencies, a necessity.
Around the world rising oil prices increased the cost of imports, while poor harvests (due,
in part, to El Niño) depressed primary-product export revenue. At the same time, interest
rates on sovereign debt increased markedly. Following the elections of Margaret Thatcher
(1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), economic thought in the US and UK shifted away
from the Keynesian consensus. When McNamara departed from the Bank in 1981,
Reagan named as his replacement the former Bank of America CEO Alden Clausen.
Clausen and his Chief Economist, Anne Krueger, scrapped the rhetoric of basic needs.
The Bank’s 1981 World Development Report, authored by Elliot Berg, proposed on
stabilization of inflation through cuts in public expenditure, the liberalization of financial
markets, and the privatization of government services. Following Mexico’s default on its
sovereign debt in 1982, the Bank insisted on the prompt repayment of loans by other
nations. In this new environment of austerity, health spending was deemed contrary to the
central aim—the timely servicing of rising debt burdens.

b) Health spending in Malawi at the dawn of the neoliberal era, 1980-1983
But, once more, international development discourse and even economic crisis proved
insufficient to predict all of Malawi’s health policies during the dawn of neoliberalism.
Malawi’s health budgets did fall precipitously during this period. While the Ministry of
Health claimed 7.2 percent of total expenditure on the revenue account in 1980, it secured
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only 4.6 percent in 1982/1983.72 In absolute terms, this was a decline (in current
Malawian Kwacha) from 14.98 million to 12.64 million. The 1982/1983 figure marked
the smallest share of the revenue account that the Ministry of Health had claimed since
the Second World War (see Figure 0.2). Still, in the face of constant advice from Bank
staffers that Malawi should stop providing free food at hospitals and institute user fees,
public sector health facilities remained free at the point of care (with the notable
exception of obstetric services) and patients were fed at hospitals.73 Chakakala Chaziya,
Malawi’s Minister of Finance, wrote to McNamara on May 22, 1981 (during his final
week as World Bank President) to explain that due to the nation’s interest-rate-fueled
debt burden and falling export revenues, “low priority items” would be dropped from the
development budget. Yet there were, Chaziya continued, “key sectors” that would remain
priorities: agriculture, transport, education and health.74 The inclusion of investments in
human capital, as well as physical capital, on this list ran counter to contemporary trends
in development thinking. Banda sought to avoid a reenactment of the popular discontent
that had followed the ticky fees and budget cuts of 1964.
V.

Conclusion: politically important but sparse on the ground, health under

Banda’s reign
Through the first two decades of Banda’s iron rule medicine was not a central priority,
but nor was it entirely forgotten. In the colonial era, officials in London had used
medicine to try to tamp down labor unrest. During the Federation years, officials in
72
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Salisbury had increased medical spending to try to demonstrate the beneficence of
Federation rule. After independence, Banda used government medical services much as
he used his ubiquitous flywhisk—to ward off the bad omens threatening his own regime.

Yet in the midst of all Banda’s grand displays of concern, Malawians continued to suffer
for want of decent curative and preventive health services. Measles vaccination, for
instance, was fairly universal in children in the United States by the mid-1950s. But in
1979, measles remained the leading cause of inpatient pediatric deaths in Malawi’s
government hospitals.75 The other two leading causes of pediatric inpatient deaths,
pneumonia and malaria, were readily treatable conditions.76 And, for all his talk of
protecting women, Banda’s ban on birth control and poor funding for antenatal and
perinatal care helped Malawi secure one of the world’s highest maternal mortality rates.77
Banda’s rhetoric about health may have helped to secure his regime, but the lack of
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attention to health in his budgets helped Malawi maintain its position toward the bottom
of international health indices.

Nevertheless, many Malawians today remember Banda as a protector who successfully
brought a modicum of material security to most Malawians. In the three decades that
followed 1980, an era marked by AIDS, famine, and chronic want, government health
facilities again became a focal point of popular politics. The idealization of this less-thanideal past is the focus of the conclusion.
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Conclusion
I. Conflict as the Bridge Between High and Low Politics
During the summer of 2006, I was a congressional intern in Washington, D.C., working
in the office of a Democratic representative with a liberal voting record and an interest in
global health. His most senior legislative aide, “Susan,” was a woman in her early 50s.
She had the seen-it-all, done-it-all grizzled habitus shared by many long-time staffers on
Capitol Hill. Whenever I became too excited about a new piece of proposed legislation,
or a seeming breakthrough in budget negotiations, Susan would laugh a bit and warn me
not to get my hopes up.

One day, Susan explained the hierarchy of policy areas in congressional deliberations.
Health policy was, she explained, a “chick issue.” As health was part of her portfolio in
the congressman’s office, I thought at first this might be a declaration of feminist pride.
After all, the preparations for the next push for universal health insurance were one of the
few topics Democratic staffers would discuss without a hint of cynicism. Yet I could not
help but notice that Susan spoke of “chick issues” in a tone of bitterness. She went on to
explain that health and other “caring” issues (such as children’s policy and old-age
policy) were often delegated to female staffers because they were commonly viewed as
both more feminine and less important than economic policy and defense. Health was,
she explained, an afterthought in the halls of power, one that the male-dominated
legislative body felt comfortable relegating to a second tier.
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Susan was not alone in noticing this hierarchy. One need look no further than the field of
international relations, which draws a distinction between “high politics”—those issues,
namely defense, that are vital to the survival of the state, and “low politics”—issues that
are not so essential. But in this dissertation I have argued that this distinction between
high and low politics obscures a more complex history. Health policy has long been a
tool wielded by regimes seeking to maintain power. In Malawian history, the political
ideology of health was often gendered (see Chapters 7 and 8), but neither Banda nor the
(almost entirely male) British officials of the colonial era saw health as an issue that they
could simply ignore.

The unrest to which colonial and postcolonial officials felt compelled to respond with
health spending was not “health activism.” The labor militants of East and West Africa of
the 1930s and 1940s did not demand health spending, but rather higher wages and better
working conditions. Still, the UK Government responded with the Colonial Development
and Welfare Act of 1940, as it sought to answer concerns that the “colonial question” was
hurting its international standing. The Malawi Congress Party of the 1950s did not call
for hospitals and clinics, but rather for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. The one exception to this was the “ticky fee” in 1964 and the ensuing Cabinet
Crisis, in which access to care was an explicitly stated concern of agents of unrest. Yet,
for the most part, officials offered health care to restive publics demanding more
fundamental social changes.
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Africanists have long recognized the lack of a separation between what Aristotle termed
the oikos (the home) and the polis (the public sphere).1 Indeed, in Malawi there is no
clear distinction between these two spheres. Insofar as two spheres can be said to exist at
all, it must be recognized that the oikos shapes the polis. The logic of judgments about
local moral worlds informs those that citizens and subjects make about distant politicians
and institutions. They are not divided spheres with separate logics. In both, the ability to
subsist and the continuation of social solidarity are central concerns. The fluidity between
these two spheres—divided in Western self-understandings—is evident in the work of
“public healers,” as Steven Feierman has demonstrated.2 Dunduza Chisiza, the foremost
economic thinker in Malawi’s nationalist vanguard, recognized the influence of domestic
life on national politics when he argued that while “charity begins at home,” obligations
to the vulnerable extended beyond the family to “the clan, the tribe, the nation, and to
humanity as a whole.”3

The blurring of oikos and polis in European welfare states has long concerned social
theorists. Jürgen Habermas argues that a citizenry beholden to public benefits is no longer
well-placed to engage in “rational-critical” debate about the proper extent of state action.4
With the rise of the welfare state, particularly in postwar Europe, Habermas sees a state

1
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no longer opposed by a critical public sphere. Instead, he laments that the public sphere,
“once invested in the institutions of the bourgeois constitutional state,” has become “an
element in the political realm.” Once defined by negative rights guaranteeing certain
liberties to propertied bourgeois citizens, the public sphere has been transformed with the
rise of positive social rights. The state is now called upon to interfere constantly in realms
previously off limits.

In Malawian history, political leaders have indeed sought to use spending on social
services to maintain power and consolidate support. The white settlers who ran the
Federation Government from Salisbury touted health spending as a demonstration of
concern for Africans and proof of its mantra of “partnership.” President Hastings
Kamuzu Banda fostered the connection between oikos and polis whenever he spoke of
“his mbumba” or when he called himself “nkhoswe no. 1” at openings of new
government hospital wings. This practice endures. In 2012, President Joyce Banda (no
relation to Hastings Kamuzu Banda) had her likeness emblazoned on sacks of corn
purchased with USAID funds and distributed to drought victims.5 With such a
personalized, intimate discourse of political legitimacy, it is unsurprising that health
spending would be a central tool of leaders in times of imperiled legitimacy.

While Habermas might interpret these acts as nefarious attempts to foreclose critical
debate, many Africanists believe that postcolonial citizenries would benefit from more
robust state involvement in the lives of citizens. Achille Mbembe has argued that
5
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postcolonial African states have only rarely concerned themselves with the productive
capacities of their citizenries. By contrast, it was a continuation of colonial sovereignty,
which was “the exact opposite of the liberal model of debate and discussion.” Colonial
sovereignty did not fit Foucault’s description of biopolitics.6 Rather, like Foucault’s
classical sovereignty, it rested on violence, much of it “designed to ensure this authority’s
maintenance, spread and permanence” through numerous banal acts “falling well short of
what is properly called war.”7

When compared to such violence (seen in Malawi in the form of forced labor, hut
taxation, and coercive and ineffective public health campaigns), spending on voluntary
medical care seems more benign than Habermas’ dystopian portrayal. Anthropologist
Jean Comaroff echoes this point in her discussion of South African AIDS activists, who
have forged a “moral politics” that “insists on making death sacrificial once more.”8
These activists make productive use of the “salience of health in the reciprocal
engagement of rulers and subjects across the world.”9 There is, in this telling, life-saving
potential in the welfarist response to civil (and uncivil) disobedience.

The idea that social spending is a product of agitation is not entirely new. It has been
more than three decades since the economist Amartya Sen argued that famine is rarely

6
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the result of a decline in available food, but always occurs in the setting of an unequal
distribution of “entitlements.”10 The distribution of entitlements—the means by which
people acquire food, through cash wages or food distribution programs or any other
means—is an outcome, Sen argues, of political decisions. Scarcity is a political
construction used to justify a distribution of resources that leaves some with an
abundance of food while others starve and die. Sen places great faith in the ability of
democratic political discourse to prevent famines. He has gone so far as to argue “there
has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty democracy.”11

The importance of politics to social protection is evident in Malawian history as well. By
the 1960s, Chisiza would argue that ignoring popular expectations of social protection
“would be a dangerous political omission for the ruling parties.”12 Later politicians
heeded this counsel. In the years leading up to Malawi’s 2004 general election, President
Bakili Muluzi presided over an increase in public expenditure on health, which rose from
2.9 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.7 percent in 2004. Muluzi’s handpicked successor,
Bingu wa Mutharika, won the election and maintained this level of health spending as a
percentage of GDP even as Malawi entered a period of rapid economic growth.13

But during the period covered by this dissertation, Malawi’s 1961 election was its only
one with multiple parties and a large African franchise. What kinds of political action
10
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could shift the distribution of entitlements colonial Nyasaland, or Malawi under Banda’s
one-party rule? Neither British colonial officials nor Banda’s censors allowed for the
flourishing of critical discourse so valued by Sen. Colonialism and dictatorship
foreclosed to the populace certain options for registering discontent. Instead of strongly
worded newspaper editorials and orderly demonstrations, subject peoples had to resort to
other tactics. As the political scientist James Scott has argued, “Much of the politics that
has historically mattered has taken the form of unruly defiance.” Particularly in places
where a vocal civil society is outlawed (but even, as Scott argues, where it is allowed)
profound structural change usually only occurs after “massive, non-institutionalized
disruption in the form of riots, attacks, on property, unruly demonstrations, theft, arson,
and open defiance threatens established institutions.”14

Throughout the era covered in this dissertation, Malawi was not a place where votes
mattered.15 But even here, the demands of a marginalized African populace could not be
entirely ignored. Particularly after the antibiotic revolution, colonial and postcolonial
regimes could not miss the popularity of government health services. Even without
opinion polling or free elections, the long queues at outpatient departments made it
impossible to ignore the demand for government medical facilities. Rulers thought it wise
to oblige African publics with some measure of health spending, even if health spending
was not thought to contribute to economic growth. Cosmopolitan technical experts and
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repressive rulers did have to make some concessions to local demands if they were to
remain in power.

This line of inquiry reveals new insights about postcolonial global health. International
aid has been a crucial part of the recent response to AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, maternal
mortality and other major health problems in Africa. While the nature of this assistance
differs in many ways from colonial development funding, there are similarities. The
Colonial Development Act was, in part, a response to a political crisis of unemployment.
So, too, was the US President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 5-year,
$15 billion contribution to the international AIDS response. US President George W.
Bush announced this plan—which he called “a work of mercy” in his 2003 State of the
Union. In this same speech, the President issued an ultimatum to Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, threatening that if he did not “fully disarm” (of his alleged weapons of mass
destruction), “we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” In juxtaposing the threat of war
with AIDS relief, Bush seemed to try to soften his image.16 There were, of course, many
other motivations behind President Bush’s PEPFAR proposal—particularly the pleas of
powerful members of the evangelical Christian Right. I have written about these
motivations elsewhere.17 I mention the Iraq War connection only to show that the
confluence of crisis politics and health spending persists.
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More recently, health activists have used the power of what Martin Luther King Jr. called
“productive tension” to awaken politicians to the urgency of their demands. In 2000,
activists in the United States persisted in disrupting the campaign rallies of Vice
President Al Gore until the Clinton Administration stopped threatening Mandela’s
government in South Africa with trade embargoes for importing low-cost generic AIDS
drugs.18 Three years later, activist Zackie Achmat’s refusal to take antiretrovirals to treat
his own infection until low-income citizens were guaranteed access to the same drugs
helped compel the South African government to declare the right of universal access.19
During Bingu wa Mutharika’s presidency, protestors held marches and rallies to draw
attention to stock-outs of drugs and supplies in public hospitals.20

These actions are much more consciously directed toward the health sector than, say, the
Copperbelt strikes of the 1930s, or the anti-Federation protests of the 1950s. But this
recent activism, which makes claims upon what Adriana Petryna has called “biological
citizenship,” aims to recreate the same atmospheric of political tension that has often
impelled officials to direct public resources toward the needs of the masses.21 Indeed, the
share of government spending devoted to health reached its historical zenith after the
anti-stock-out protests, rising briefly to 21 percent in 2009.22 Health activism itself can
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then, in certain circumstances, open the purse-strings of government budgets just as
effectively as widespread social unrest.

II. Does health spending matter?
To advocates of a certain strain of social medicine, the kind of politically driven health
spending—largely on curative medicine—this dissertation has chronicled does little to
improve the public’s health. The architects of the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration promoted
the concept of “appropriate technology,” which sought to prioritize scientifically proven
and financially feasible interventions over expensive and sophisticated technological
interventions, which would, in the words of historian Marcos Cueto, draw away a
“substantial share of scarce funds and manpower.”23 The following year, Julia Walsh and
Kenneth Warren’s proposal for “selective primary health care” helped convince many of
the largest international health agencies to focus on small menu of simple health
interventions in order to achieve the maximum benefits for public health. Over the next
two decades, UNICEF, the World Bank, USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation
promoted and funded a set of interventions known by the acronym GOBI-FFF: Growth
monitoring, Oral rehydration therapy, Breastfeeding, Immunization, Family planning,
Female education, and Food supplementation.24

Proponents of “appropriate technology” and “selective primary health care” were
especially critical of the high shares of health budgets going toward urban hospitals. Such
23
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hospitals were, they said, costly distractions from the high-impact interventions in
nutrition, water and sanitation, maternal and child health care, immunization, and
essential drugs.25 Such hospitals rarely benefited the poor, and only served to bolster the
egos of out-of-touch politicians. As the economist Peter Ruderman had observed in a
1972 article, “To many presidents and prime ministers, a hospital is a more satisfactory
monument than an arch of triumph.”26 According to these critics, such monuments were
not an appropriate use of limited resources if the intent was to provide the greatest benefit
for the greatest number.

This strand of criticism also tended to criticize the focus in poor countries on curative
chemotherapeutic interventions. Steeped in 1970s debate about the “medicalization” of
U.S. and Western European societies, some cosmopolitan international health experts
viewed budgets as zero-sum contests between individual-level measures such as drugs
and surgeries and more upstream preventive interventions like clean water. Ivan Illich,
the most prominent proponent of the “medicalization” thesis, went so far as to argue that
medical provision was so harmful that “less access to the present health system would,
contrary to popular rhetoric, benefit the poor.”27 In a 1979 book, British political
economist Lesley Doyal used less strident language, but remained critical of the trend in
which postcolonial governments continued to spend on “individual curative” measures
instead of focusing on “fundamental social and environmental” transformations. She
explained, “While the application of western medical treatment under third world
25
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conditions may have extremely beneficial short-term consequences for the individual
patient, it cannot reduce the high incidence of disease, or raise the general level of
health.”28

Since the 1990s, similar critiques have often been couched in the language of costeffectiveness. Health economists, ethicists, and policymakers have argued against
spending “limited” international aid and domestic health resources in poor countries on
“high-tech” interventions such as antiretroviral AIDS treatment,29 multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis treatment,30 and cancer chemotherapy.31 These analyses tended to assume
costs were fixed, though as the steep fall in the prices of AIDS drugs would demonstrate
they are anything but.32 Many of these studies also made assumptions about efficacy of
preventive measures such as educational campaigns focused on behavior change that
lacked evidence. Still, cost-benefit analyses have been highly influential in shaping the
priorities of international agencies and national health ministries.33
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This line of argumentation contains many important truths. For instance, the lack of
access to health services in rural areas is a well-documented problem with deadly
consequences.34 Yet this perspective also elides other realities. First, pace Doyal,
individual-level medical care can “reduce the high incidence of disease” and “improve
the general level of health.” The most notable recent demonstration of this is a
randomized-controlled trial, published in 2011, which demonstrated that early initiation
of combined antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS not only improves the health of the
person taking the medicines, but also reduces the risk of transmitting the virus to
uninfected sexual partners by 96 percent.35 Thus, while the value of many preventive
interventions, such as behavior change campaigns, remains relatively unproven, treating
an individual patient is one of the most effective ways to prevent new infections and stem
the tide of the AIDS pandemic. The global scale-up in antiretroviral treatment helped
effect a 42 percent decline in global deaths from AIDS between 2004 and 2014. It also
contributed to the 35 percent decline in new infections between 2000 and 2015.36 There
exists, then, no bright line between individual-level treatment interventions and
population-level prevention measures.

There is also growing evidence that, at least since the antibiotic revolution of the midtwentieth century, individual-level medical care has been an important part of many
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population-level mortality declines. For instance, demographer Olukunle Adegbola
argued that the deployment of biomedicine in Nigeria helped increase life expectancy by
fourteen years between 1963 and 1980.37 In a presentation before the famous conference
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation on “Good Health at Low Cost” in 1985,
Stephen Joseph of UNICEF also presented a case for the population-level mortality
benefits of clinical services. He joked that in making this argument, he represented a
school of whose members “are usually in these circles referred to as ‘the bad guys.’”
Joseph contended that in each of the four case studies being considered at the conference
(Kerala, Costa Rica, China and Sri Lanka), a sizable portion of steep drops in mortality
could reasonably be linked to rising government expenditures on personal-encounter
medical care: “All the societies under consideration expended significant portions of their
government budgets for health, and much of that was and remains in the clinical or health
services sector.” Joseph did not argue against preventive services such as mass
vaccination campaigns, but contended instead that the two were complementary—
experience with clinical services “may well serve as a motivator and incentive for people
to utilize/accept preventive and public health services.”38 The key lesson in these case
37
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studies, Joseph maintained, was not the need to prioritize population-level prevention
over personal-encounter medical care. None of the governments had so shifted their
health budgets. Instead, these case studies revealed two much more salient factors: first,
the importance of the overall size of government health budgets, for both “medical”
services and “public health” interventions; and second, the need for equitable access to
such services in areas rich and poor, urban and rural.39

Scholars seeking to determine the causes of mortality decline face the challenge of
collinearity; investments in health infrastructure often occur alongside broader social and
economic changes. Yet there is now a sizable literature demonstrating that biomedicine
has made a discrete and measurable contribution to population-level mortality decline.40
A review of this literature by Harvard economist Michael Kremer in 2002 concluded that
the weight of evidence favored the view that “the role of pharmaceuticals and medical
technology in improving health in developing countries stands in contrast to the historical
experience of the developed countries…Modern medical technologies allow tremendous
improvements in health even at low income levels.”41 Medical care, then, is more than
just a neo-colonialist drain on limited resources.
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Furthermore, as this dissertation has demonstrated, after the Second World War what has
been called “personal-encounter” medical care—that is, care delivered by individual
medical professionals and paraprofessionals to individual patients—has increasingly been
in demand among the Malawian public. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nyasaland’s
Africans presented in rapidly growing numbers at government hospitals and health
centers. When, in 1964, the popular hero of the anti-Federation movement, Hastings
Kamuzu Banda, presided over the imposition of an outpatient user fee, he quickly
encountered armed resistance. This popular demand for medicine was not false
consciousness. As shown in Chapter 7, patients sought preventive and curative
interventions for those conditions with proven efficacy at relieving symptoms. Patients
with tuberculosis avoided palliative long-term hospitalization and surgical ablation of the
phrenic nerve for tuberculosis, but flocked for treatment once streptomycin and isoniazid
reached clinic shelves. Communities shunned ineffective smallpox vaccination
campaigns for decades, but accepted them willingly following the use of effective
vaccine and cold-chain storage. Care-seeking behavior in Malawi was highly specific and
empirical. Patients appeared when there was something on offer that worked.

III. Scarcity discourse
The most troubling consequence of pitting personal-encounter medical care against
population-level prevention is that it concedes the argument to those who argue that
health budgets in poor countries are fated to their current low levels. This concession
appears early in a 2008 commentary in the Journal of the American Medical Association
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authored by Colleen Denny and Ezekiel Emanuel, published just before Emanuel began
serving as a global health advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama. “International aid is
inherently limited,” the authors argued. “Consequently, it is extremely important to
consider how this finite aid is distributed.”42 The authors’ assumption that the size of the
budget for global health is inherently limited (to its current levels) automatically limits
the discussion to how existing resources should be divided amongst competing priorities.
Inevitably, this calculus leaves some to die: should money go to immunize children
against pertussis, or to treat adults with AIDS? But those who make this assumption
discard the many possibilities that arise from the question: where are more resources to
be found? Only if we accept the allocation of societal resources as given will we make
expanded AIDS treatment the enemy of higher immunization rates, as Denny and
Emanuel do in their commentary.

In one sense, this focus on apportioning limited resources in surprising, for it comes from
many of the same people who argue for the importance of upstream, environmental
factors. Yet when they discuss the political process, their temporal perspective is very
limited. They take health budgets as given, rather than considering how to influence
decisions about their size.

Rural Malawians, on the other hand do not accept this zero-sum formulation. Scarcity
may have a hold on the elite moral imaginary, but this thrall does not cross class lines. I
42
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learned this rather quickly during my time in Nyanza. There I frequently had my clothes
repaired by a paraplegic man who had survived polio. He used a hand-powered sewing
machine; his young nephew aided him by turning the wheel. About a kilometer away
lived a blind man who had lost his sight in the late 1970s to measles. Neither of these
men would likely link their debility to the man in their village who had regained his sight
following cataract surgery in Zomba’s Central Hospital. The cataract surgery was more
expensive than a polio or measles vaccine, but none of the men saw a necessary trade-off
between immunization and ophthalmologic surgery. They did not believe resources were
so scarce as to demand such a choice.

People in Nyanza knew the benefits of immunization, of better housing and more
adequate food. They desperately sought each of these goods for themselves and their
families. But none saw decreasing budgets for drugs and staff at hospitals as the
preferable way to increase spending on these other priorities. When asked where
additional funds for such programs might come from, many Malawians looked to
government officials who stole from government coffers, or wealthy Malawians in the
larger cities and towns, or foreign governments with historic ties to Malawi. Looking far
and wide, they could see that there was plenty of money available; it just wasn’t available
to them. In the words of Amartya Sen, they recognized the unequal “distribution of
entitlements.”

Understanding where health budgets actually come from demands that we see claims of
scarcity for what they usually are: an excuse. Even in Malawi, once an “imperial slum”
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and in the twenty-first century still one of the world’s poorest countries, scarcity is a
construction that obscures unequal wealth and exploitative extraction, and by so
obscuring aims to free the powerful from social obligations. During the First World War,
colonial police conducted night raids to kidnap villagers and force them into the carrier
service. At the same time, colonial officials claimed to lack the resources to provide
better care for the thousands of African carriers who toiled and died (Chapter 1). During
the 1920s, the claim of scarce resources was the preferred excuse of the UK Treasury as
officials demanded repayment for the TZR loan while refusing to improve African
hospitals (Chapters 2-3). During the 1940s, the Labour Party used claims of scarce
resources and the myth of comprehensive “traditional social security” to place
geographical bounds on its plans for social protection (Chapters 4-6). The Federation
government resorted to such claims as they spent far more per-capita on health services
for Europeans than they did for Africans (Chapter 8). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
Life President Banda and World Bank administrators constantly claimed Malawi’s dismal
health services were actually quite impressive “in light of funds available,” even while
Banda built personal palaces with state funds (Chapters 9-10).

The impoverishment of Nyasaland’s medical department by 1919 TZR loan guarantee
also has postcolonial parallels. Multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have consistently
favored large, capital-intensive projects over community health and education (see
Chapters 7 and 8). Muckraking exposés and confessional memoirs have presented loans
from the World Bank, USAID and other agencies to build dams, roads, and railways in
poor countries as ploys to profit European, American and (more recently) Chinese
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manufacturers and financiers, prop up puppet dictators, and entrap poor countries in
debt.43 The moral obligations invoked by advocates in the international debt relief
(“Jubilee”) movement of the 1990s and 2000s find echoes in the pleas of Colonial Office
officials to the Treasury to lessen the crushing burden of the TZR loan guarantee on
Nyasaland’s population. Neither accepts the geographical boundaries that underpin the
claims of scarcity.

While historians of colonial, postcolonial, or international health have tended (with
notable exceptions) to accept claims of scarcity at face value, other scholars have begun
to contest them. The clearest example of this is in studies of water and food allocation.
Inspired by Sen’s studies of famine, the Institute of Development Studies at the
University of Sussex convened a meeting in 2005 on “the limits of scarcity.” Their
collective statement, signed by economists and sociologists specializing in the politics of
food and other “scarce” resources, expresses many of the themes I have explored in a
dissertation on health budgets. It is worth quoting at some length here:
Scarcity is considered to be the ubiquitous feature of the modern condition and is
widely used as an explanation for social organization…Scarcity is made out to be
an all-pervasive fact of our lives…We, however, believe that scarcity is not a
natural condition. It is not something that is inherently in the nature of
things…Detailed sociological and political attention to what is actually happening
on the ground has almost always located the causes of pressing social problems
such as hunger or water shortage not in an absolute scarcity but in socially
generated scarcity arising from imbalances of power that deny people access to
food or water…Moreover, the ‘scare’ of scarcity has led to scarcity emerging as a
political strategy for powerful groups…It is also used to provide simplistic
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solutions rather than focusing on the social and political reasons that cause
inaccessibility and perpetrate exclusions.44
In order to understand that money for government health services is rarely so scarce as
officials claim, and to see when and how these claims of scarcity have been overcome (if
momentarily), scholars must look beyond the normal confines of global health discourse.
They must look to international labor history, the history of economic thought, and to the
idiosyncratic details of the political histories of particular countries. In doing so, it
becomes apparent that even in one of the world’s most impoverished nations, health
budgets have been determined not by the absolute amount of money available, but by the
extent of unrest.

This is not an automatic cause-and-effect relationship. The episodes of unrest that led to
increases in health spending in Malawi were not always—or even often—in Malawi
proper. And though governmental responses to unrest often involved the provision of
health care, the unrest itself was only seldom impelled by an explicit demand for health
care. In this dissertation, health spending came in response to varied and unrelated
movements, including strikes over pay and labor conditions (see the strikes of the 1930s
and 1940s in the Copperbelt and the West Indies), a movement to stop an inegalitarian
political system (see the anti-Federation protests of the 1950s), and rumors about foreign
creditors (see the vampire rumors about South Africa in the 1960s). Furthermore, as
James Scott has noted, sometimes unrest leads not to progressive social and political
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transformation, but to repression.45 Even unrest that accomplishes the aims of protestors
can lead to great suffering. The people of Masasa have not been displaced from their
homes, but Nicotine is dead and Innocent has only one leg (Chapters 3 and 4). It is
difficult to predict the dividends of disquiet.

And, of course, there are limits to health spending, particularly spending coming from the
domestic coffers of poor countries. Such nations cannot spend at will on anything and
everything. Governments do have competing priorities. A number of these—education,
agricultural supports, and social insurance—are essential for human flourishing. And
government spending requires revenue, which must be raised by collecting taxes, issuing
debt, or printing money. Each of these can have undesirable economic consequences,
such as inflation, particularly when taken to extremes. Yet low-income countries have
seldom found themselves imperiled by runaway government health spending. In a crosscountry analysis of 80 nations between 1973 and 1990, Song Han and Casey Mulligan
concluded that inflation was spurred by most often by wartime military expenditures
rather than by expansions in social spending.46

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, experts in development economics have
reached a consensus that poor countries generally underinvest in health, education, and
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social insurance.47 This consensus had affected Malawi’s health spending. In recent years
the International Monetary Fund has warned Malawi that it must pursue “tighter fiscal
and monetary policies geared toward placing inflation on a declining trend.” Malawi’s
refusal to follow this advice could leave it without the IMF’s seal of approval, a demerit
that often leads other international agencies to deny poor nations access to concessional
loans and grants. But even while it counsels cuts to farm input subsidies and certain parts
of the civil service, the IMF has insisted that Malawi’s finance ministry should
“safeguard social spending,” especially health, education, and cash transfers.48 So even
the foremost institutional guardian of fiscal austerity on the planet has decided that health
budgets need not be subjected to the same regimes of scarcity as other public spending.

IV. Lessons
In a series of lectures first published in 1961, British historian EH Carr objected to two
kinds of historical writing. The first is the kind of writing that maintains pretensions to
scientistic impartiality. These are chronicles of dates and events so thorough and without
analysis as to numb the mind. The second form of meaninglessness is the history of
47
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accidents, which rests all historical turning points on great or evil men or unforeseeable
calamities. While Carr believed that great historical shifts had multiple causes, he also
believed historians can speak of causation and not just pure contingency. Only from those
histories that explore relationships between actions and reactions can lessons be derived.
History does not repeat itself, nor prescribe immutable laws of causation. But, as Carr
suggested, it is not the historian’s aim merely to produce either naively “objective” or
meaningless narratives, but to glean lessons relevant to the present.49 In this spirit, I, too,
will suggest that this history has lessons for the present.

After rapid increases in international aid for health in southern Africa during the 2000s
and 2010s, funding has plateaued in recent years. International development assistance
flattened at a level far below of the target of 0.7 percent of GDP agreed to by the leaders
of wealthy nations at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005. Aid levels failed to rise even
as Western economies emerged from recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis.
Politicians in rich nations have justified the persistently low levels of aid by invoking
familiar claims of scarcity. At the same time, wealthy nations have done little to stem the
tide of illicit financial flows leaving poor nations. By some credible estimates, the
amount of money leaving Africa through illicit financial flows equals the amount
entering through aid.50 Meanwhile, Malawi’s recent governments have in recent years
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floated the idea of making the rural poor pay for user fees at government clinics. The
Ministry of Health has claimed that the government can no longer afford to treat patients
free at the point of care.51

These claims lack evidence and imagination; they are also tired. What Paul Farmer has
called “the house of No” was built long ago; officials in Britain’s Colonial Office and
Southern Rhodesia’s Federal Ministry of Health justified paltry health budgets with
similar claims, until forced by circumstances to shift course. Claims of scarcity are a
smokescreen, a simulacrum; they apply only in periods of political quiet. Health funding
is not an automatic function of economic growth. Government purses have been pried
open before, and they will be again. All it takes is a crisis of legitimacy. The health of the
poor has mattered most to those in power when their own political fortunes hang in the
balance.

If we acknowledge the role of unrest in determining health budgets, and the importance
of health budgets in determining health outcomes, what are we to do? Foment uprisings?
This seems a dangerous strategy, given the often-disastrous consequences of political
instability, particularly in central and southern Africa. Some Malawians have seen fit to
protest the dreadful state of government health services.52 Their protests could surely

out against licit, but still quite deleterious, avoidance of taxes by corporate actors in Malawi. The
most prominent recent example is the Australian mining company Paladin, which operates a
uranium mine in Malawi. See Martha Khonje, “Corporate Tax Deals Are Robbing Poor Countries
of Teachers and Nurses,” The Guardian, July 2, 2015.
51
Luke Messac, “Malawi’s Health Care Subject of Intense Worry for Country’s Poor,” Pulitzer
Center on Crisis Reporting, August 2, 2013.
52
“Missing Medicines in Malawi: Campaigning against ‘Stock-Outs’ of Essential Drugs.”

547

benefit from international support. But thus far, they have not secured sustained
improvements in the government health system. In fact, a popular rumor holds that when
78-year-old President Bingu wa Mutharika’s was rushed to Kamuzu Central Hospital
with a heart attack in April 2012, the hospital did not have any epinephrine to administer
to him.53 Though the government never confirmed the rumor, and it is not at all certain
that epinephrine would have saved the president’s life, this drug is a standard component
of cardiac resuscitation protocols around the world. Bingu’s purported death-by-stock-out
became a subject of derision among Malawians, no longer surprised by a health system
so poorly funded and managed it killed even the president.

For the citizens of the wealthy nations of the Global North, different lessons emerge from
the history recounted in the preceding chapters. There is an urgent need to challenge the
ubiquitous claims of scarcity. Even colonial-era doctors such as John Owen Shircore and
Henry De Boer realized that health budgets in Nyasaland need not be so low, and
presented plans to increase them. During the Federation Era, doctors like John Goodall
insisted that they did not have the tools they need to practice decent medicine in
Nyasaland’s African hospitals. At times their protests helped to garner greater resources,
as when the Colonial Development Fund approved the majority of the proposals in
Shircore’s 1930 report. Yet during the last two decades of the twentieth century, with the
World Bank and IMF insisting on cuts to social spending in debtor nations, practitioners
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and policymakers in international health became “socialized for scarcity.”54 So pervasive
was the habitus of defeatism in international health in 2004 that an executive at the
Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative told me he generally did not hire people with
NGO experience because they had grown “too used to taking no for an answer.”55

Through all of this, though, there remains a need to cultivate a “willingness to be
surprised,” to question totalizing narratives with inductive histories.56 Twenty-first
century global health does not share all the sins of colonial medicine.57 Nor were colonial
doctors and officials simply handmaidens of economic exploitation. Even this study of
colonial medicine, which is informed (though not dictated) by a materialist understanding
of history, there are still colonial administrators who exhibit deeply held moral
commitments and have made significant impacts on access to medicine and care. John
Owen Shircore, Shenton Thomas, and Lord Eustace Percy are such individuals. Working
within a discriminatory social and economic system, the efforts of these sons of privilege
helped to funnel resources down steep gradients of inequality to ensure some modicum of
medical care reached subject African populations.
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It may seem regressive to look to colonial doctors as role models, but in this case there is
something worth emulating. Global health practitioners and policymakers should be at
least as skeptical about claims of scarcity in our time as Shircore and De Boer were in
theirs. Just as De Boer suggested that tax revenues from mining might be used to benefit
Nyasaland, advocates of the present should insist on greater creativity in securing the
finances necessary to improve the health of poor people in poor countries.58 Such
creativity is evident in the creation, in 2006, of the UNITAID airline tax by a number of
European and Latin American nations. The revenues of this tax, which reached $2.4
billion between 2006 and 2014, have been used to finance AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria diagnosis and treatment activities around the globe.59 More recently advocates
have agitated for a financial transactions tax (on sales of bonds and shares) and a tax on
arms sales to fund health programs in poor nations.60

V. What it takes
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Malawi markets itself as the “warm heart of Africa,” trading on its international
reputation as a friendly, peaceful oasis in the midst of a region long mired in violence and
turmoil.61 As this dissertation has shown, this land is not so placid as its reputation
indicates. Early in the nineteenth century it received migrants from the south fleeing the
mfecane. By the mid-nineteenth century, its people were constantly subjected to slave
raids from armed traders seeking riches in the Indian Ocean trade. The colonial era
brought wars of conquest, two world wars, anti-witchcraft movements and Christian
millenarianism. Mass arrests and strikes attended the anti-Federation movement of the
1950s and early 1960s. After independence, the leadership of the new nation fell into a
bitter and bloody internecine battle. Popular demonstrations and labor actions heralded
the end of Banda’s long reign in the 1990s. Even today, as evidenced by the Masasa
incident in 2015, political violence remains a feature of life and death in Malawi.

Still, it is true that Malawi has presented few of the profound threats to foreign capital
that have led, in other places, to significant increases in social spending. Nyasaland
benefitted relatively little from the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, while
centers of labor agitation in the West Indies and West Africa received far more aid.
Malawi’s dearth of mineral resources and its geopolitical insignificance have afforded it
few opportunities to enter the realpolitik calculus of more powerful nations. The few
exceptions to this trend, such as the increase in health spending that followed the
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agitation of the Federation era, only prove the rule. There are dividends to disquiet, but
Malawian history has usually demonstrated, conversely, the perils of peace.

Just as Malawi’s health services have derived relatively paltry benefits from unrest, they
also have been unable to garner much funding from arguments about the economic
benefits of health spending. The interwar focus on nutrition petered out without any great
investments in either agriculture or medical services, while the human capital arguments
of the 1970s did not spur vast new health spending by international aid agencies or by
Banda’s government. Those holding the purse strings of colonial and postcolonial
treasuries have proven to be little moved by trends in economic thought.

The greatest recent boon to Malawi’s health sector came neither from unrest nor from
economic logics, but from a human rights movement for health at the dawn of the twentyfirst century. Activists, humanitarians, and politicians of vastly different ideologies from
the Global North and South propelled successful campaigns for debt relief and increased
international aid for global health. These campaigns made it possible for Malawi’s
government, and those in other poor countries, to expand access to AIDS treatment while
improving staffing in clinics and hospitals around the country.62

In 2004 an estimated 900,000 citizens had HIV.63 The next year, 98,000 Malawians
became newly infected.64 For every 10 new nurses graduating from Malawi’s training
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institutions, four existing nurses succumbed to AIDS.65 Only nine facilities in the public
sector offered antiretroviral therapy (ART); these treated a total of 3,000 patients.66 That
year, using funding from a successful application from the first round of the Global Fund
for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Malawi began providing free antiretroviral therapy
to adult patients.67 Within a few years, with funding from UNITAID, Malawi also began
to provide pediatric patients access to ART free of charge. By March 2011, 433 clinics in
Malawi treated over 264,000 patients with ART.68 A recurring survey in Karonga
District, in the north of Malawi, found that all-cause adult mortality decreased by 32
percent between 2002 and 2008.69

During this period, Malawi also received assistance to address its dire shortage of
healthcare workers. Low pay and desperate working conditions had long impelled many
of Malawi’s health workers to leave the public sector. The Global Fund and the UK
Department for International Development inaugurated 6-year, $272 million Emergency
Human Resources Programme (EHRP) in 2005. This program provided a 52 percent
salary increase for all health workers, expanded pre-service training, and recruited
expatriate volunteer doctors and nurses. The EHRP also included incentives to attract
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healthcare workers to underserved areas.70 Analyses found that the salary “top-ups”
helped stem the flow of healthcare workers out of the public sector, while expanded preservice training led to a more robust cadres of healthcare workers.71 The number of
health professionals trained annually increased from 400 in 2004 to over 1000 by 2008.72

Between 2002 and 2008, donor countries’ contributions to global AIDS programs
increased by a factor of six. For millions, these investments transformed HIV from a
death sentence to a manageable chronic disease. Yet in the wake of the financial crisis,
the annual increases in aid stopped.73 As of 2016, global health spending levels by
bilateral and multilateral donors remained largely unchanged.74 In a July 2011 interview
Dorothy Ngoma, Executive Director of Malawi’s National Organization of Nurses and
Midwives, expressed despair over the state of Malawi’s health sector:
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Don’t let anyone convince you that [past efforts] have relieved the emergency.
While we can see improvements in pockets, we are still in a crisis. Without
money on the table, we can’t make progress…Where are our partners?...Why are
babies still dying? In a nation with only one-quarter of the nurses necessary to
meet WHO-recommended minimums, why does tuition still cost $2000 per
student? Why are there so many people dying for want of basic needs? Why are
there so many hospitals without labs?75
While unrest and economic arguments may help put drugs on shelves and nurses in wards
of public hospitals, ultimately Sen is correct. Incredibly, scholars and policymakers still
need to be reminded of “the intrinsic importance we attach—and have reason to attach—
to living.” Campaigns built on moral claims have, in recent years, proved capable of
spurring rapid changes. Still, the provision of medical care and public health to Malawi’s
people remains woefully inadequate.

What is an acceptable standard of care for poor people in poor countries? How much
untimely and avoidable death is morally permissible? How much action is politically
possible? This dissertation has chronicled the (generally disappointing) answers that
actors of the past have given to these questions in their own time. Now, we must answer
them in our own.
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